SCIENCE & SOCIETY TRUST
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: WHERE IS THE THREAT NOW?
A seminar sponsored by the Science and Society Trust following a public meeting at the
British Association’s Festival of Science at the University of Salford on Tuesday 9th
September.
10am-1pm, Wednesday 10th September 2003.
The Castlefield Hotel
Manchester, United Kingdom
Minutes recorded and prepared by Neil Davison (n.davison@bradford.ac.uk)
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Session 1: Historical and Political Context.
A. Mark Wheelis (The Bioweapon Threat: Lessons from History – abstract
attached)
My work is focussed on (a) the history of use of BW and (b) BW arms control. With
respect to the former emphasis on the use of epidemiological techniques to elucidate the
aetiology of outbreaks in order to distinguish natural outbreaks from biological warfare.
Currently involved with two major projects on the history of use of BW in collaboration
with Martin Furmanski:
The first concerns the German anti-animal programme during WWI.
programme is important for several reasons:
- it was the first state supported BW programme
- it was the first anti-agricultural programme
- It provides a model of the type of covert programme that is possible
This
We now have a good understanding of the programme with one major ‘hole’ – the
research and development aspects. What was the German academic community’s
involvement? Which scientists were involved? Unfortunately it appears that no relevant
documents remain.
We also do not know whether the programme was effective. Glanders was the principal
agent but we don’t know if there was significant animal mortality as a result of its use.
The German agents thought that they were successful but it is doubtful that they were.
The UK veterinary service kept immaculate records of horse purchase, penning etc and
horses were tested for glanders in many parts of shipment process from the US to the UK.
These documents may be of use in judging the effectiveness of the programme.
The second project concerns unproven allegations of biological warfare since 1945.
There are thousands but some distinctive ones are being selected for analysis. Those that
are politically or diplomatically important:
- Korean War
- Cuban allegations
- Yellow rain
- Sverdlovsk
- A few others…..
One of the main aims is to provide a new perspective on the Korean War and Cuban
allegations.
In terms of work in the area of BW arms control recent projects have concerned:
- the threat of bioterrorism to agriculture
- the implications of the ‘new biology’
The latter has parallels to Malcolm Dando’s work and Mark is collaborating with
Malcolm on what they see as the militarization of biology:
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new genetics & weapons
new techniques subject to abuse
erosion of civil liberties
Questions/comments
Q. (Vic Sidel) What is the usefulness of glanders as a BW agent?
A (Mark Wheelis)
- It is a devastating equine disease, also a human disease.
- It may be responsible for the Plague of Athens (Martin Furmanksi things this is
credible).
- We don’t know the extent to which it was successfully weaponised.
- Aerosolisation of glanders requires methods to ensure its viability.
- Ken Alibek has alleged that the Soviets used glanders as a BW (delivered by plane) in
the Afghan War.
Q. (Alastair Hay) How did the Germans deliver glanders?
A. (Mark Wheelis)
- At the beginning of the war they used vials with needles attached to prick the noses
horses. Alternatively they poured the cultures onto fodder.
- Glanders is transmitted through nasal mucous membranes
- Later they used sugar cubes containing the cultures
- Finally (on the Western front) they used wire brushes that would create abrasions to
brush the cultures directly onto the nose
- Incidentally most German BW was carried out in neutral countries but there were a
few agents on the Western front.
B. Trevor Findlay (The Biological Weapons Ban: Strengths, Weaknesses and
Rescue Attempts – abstract attached)
CBM’s
- Voluntary
- Seek to create greater transparency
- Not comprehensive
- Asked to report on only a few items
- Exhortations to make scientific research more open and to encourage exchange and
co-operation
Reporting Instrument
- UN Secretary General responsible for receiving reports
- Some states did not reply
- Some states submitted after the first year then nothing further
- Some are not comprehensive, including annual declarations.
- An example is the US incomplete declarations on biodefence despite urging other
states to report and annoyance at the lack of reporting.
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Strengthening CBM’s
- Make them compulsory
- But would that work?
- Add additional requirements
- Problem with reporting information is that it is not publicly available  no
transparency
- There is no analysis of this information – it is simply collated by the UN and sent out
to states parties
How might CBM’s be improved and how might awareness about them be improved?
Due to the fall of the Protocol this may be a good time to focus on CBM’s
Current expert meetings
- When the Protocol negotiations collapsed the US pressed for nothing further until the
2006 Revcon.
- Other states stood firm and agreed to annual experts meeting tacking one or two
subjects
- These are not negotiations but discussion for a
- The findings will be forwarded to meetings of states parties each year
- Programme for each session is 2 weeks of experts meeting followed by 1 week
diplomatic meeting
- Often little difference between the two – not many states send experts
The five subjects to be addressed at the expert meetings are as follows:
1. National legislation (2003)
2. Biosafety – national oversight (2003)
3. Enhancing international collaboration to investigate alleged use of BW (2004)
- could be the most controversial due to the ‘international’ element ( possible US
objections?)
4. Surveillance of infectious diseases (2004)
5. Codes of conduct
- the UK FCO have taken the lead on this and are open to ideas.
After this experts meeting process the results will be forwarded to the 2006 Revcon – it
will be up to the Revcon to decide what to do with any ideas that emerge.
It is worth building up momentum at these meetings – they could turn out to have more
impact than originally planned. It depends on how much states ‘push’.
VERTIC – carried out a global survey of states parties national legislation. They
used a questionnaire (in English/French/Spanish/Arabic) modelled on one produced by
the OPCW.
The information on 75 countries is available on the VERTIC web site
(http://www.vertic.org/). An interim report was presented to the experts meeting in
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August and a final report is being prepared for the November meeting. VERTIC hope
states parties will come to them with clarifications & additional information.
The findings of the survey:
- Some do not cover the whole range of prohibitions (i.e. not use Article 1 of the BWC)
- Many have weak penal conditions (e.g. £2,000 fine)
- In the UK for example the penalty is life imprisonment
- Some have provisions to penalise individuals but not companies
- Others do not cover extra-territorial areas
- Some are poorly drafted (spelling!)
- Mostly, those who have legislation have done a good job
- St. Kitts and Nevis – their legislation could be used as a model for those states who
are having trouble putting their legislation together
What to do?
- States have a legal obligation
- UN Department of Disarmament Affairs had a database of national legislation
(official)
- Embarrassing / shaming states into acting?
- One of VERTIC’s ideas is to have a clearing house
- Carried out by a willing state party? Or an NGO? (ICGEB have indicated
willingness – Mark Wheelis).
- Careful of those who fear institutionalisation (US?)
Next step….
- To find out whether the legislation is being implemented/used
- Problem – legislation overlap with other areas (e.g. pathogen protection).
- Suggest states check to see if there are any contradictions or loopholes.
Another VERTIC project – fact-finding in alleged BW use
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Based on CW.
Looking at existing mechanism in BWC to call for meeting (used once by Cuba –
1997) and how it operates.
Early 90’s – UN mechanism to investigate alleged use of mycotoxins in Indochina
and Afghanistan. This model is still ‘on the books’
- How ready is this mechanism? (which applies to CBW – attached to the Geneva
Protocol)
- Preparations in terms of experts
- Preparations in terms of equipment etc.
Also the Security Council mechanism for investigations relating to the Iran/Iraq War
What is the usefulness of these two mechanisms?
Questions/comments
Comment (Mark Wheelis) US national legislation goes beyond the convention (includes
anti-materiel for example)
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Comment (Trevor Findlay) Re: UN investigation mechanisms, the General Assembly
mechanism is easier to dispatch than the Security Council mechanism.
C. Ian Kenyon (Threats to the international regime set up to control biological
weapons – abstract attached)
CBM’s
- difficult area
- originally tried to get analysis and translation but an (unlikely) alliance of the US and
Cuba killed it.
- What would happen if they became compulsory?
- Look at the CWC – Like getting ‘blood from a stone’. However, principal
countries got their returns in quickly apart from the US (3 years)
Australia Group
– by invitation – this can cause problems with states saying that AG is blocking
peaceful use of biology.
Success of BWC regime
- 150 parties, 16 signatories, 17 non-signatories
Problems with BWC
- belief that it is not useful
- belief that it is easily evaded
However there are a lot of states that we don’t have to worry about – not having a
verification mechanism does not mean that the BWC is a waste of time.
Concern about terrorism
- BWC not designed to cover terrorism
- But can be useful
NLW’s
- Dangerous for the BWC and more so for the CWC
- Modifying regimes is a risky business – a two-tier system could create problems for
monitoring what states are doing.
Current activities at Mountbatten Centre
- Attempting some ‘crystal ball gazing’ to see what would happen to the BWC
regime given certain outcomes. How would it react to:
- Secret BW development
- Overt BW development
- A state denouncing the treaty and starting a BW programme
- Confirmed use of BW by a state in warfare
- Terrorist use of BW
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D. Jez Littlewood (Discussion of the future of the BWC)
-
We have got to move forward from the protocol issue. – there is no going back
Focus now should be on the expert groups
Efforts nationally, regionally and amongst allies
New elements – different activities in different areas
Where are the gaps?
Who is going to oversee/co-ordinate?
What needs to be done?
-
For now work on the BWC will be seen as national efforts – the difficult questions
are:
- what needs to be done?
- who is doing it?
-
What are the danger zones for focus at the international level?
In terms of controlling BW there needs to be a fundamental rethink. A focus on
individuals:
- Lawyers
- Scientists
- Government officials
E. Session 1 – Discussion
Comment (Ian Kenyon) Intelligence and whistleblowing are two elements that need to be
built up in relations to BW arms control
Comment (Mark Wheelis) Agree, whistleblowing is a central issue that needs attention –
there are legal and ethical issues here
Comment (Malcolm Dando) Is there a role for civil society / NGO’s in the oversight of
fragmented efforts?
Comment (Jez Littlewood) Yes, certainly a role for NGO’s.
- There was a call for national legislation to be submitted to the UN but hardly any
states did so. Another call for this at the experts meeting and spurred on by VERTIC
could lead to the submission or more legislation
- States in the ‘middle’ found that a collection of national legislation would be useful
too see how they might improve their legislation and to see where the gaps are.
Q (Alastair Hay) Is there model national legislation for a set of different countries to
make use of?
Comment (Trevor Findlay) Many states do not want to be using other states legislation.
Differences in legal systems between states can also be a problem. Models are difficult
for individual states to adapt but examples from various states can be useful.
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Comment (Victor Sidel) Given the offensive/defensive connection with regard to BW,
should restricting ambiguous activities be added to the list of regime successes?
Comment (Ian Kenyon) We can’t assume that those with big biotech industries will be
good – we need to keep an eye on them
Regarding legislation – there have been efforts to produce model legislation. The OPCW
produced a model for states with a chemical industry.
Models can be useful in some instances (for example for use by small island states.)
Comment (David Wield) It appears that many more actors from civil society could be
getting involved in the effort to control BW. Investigative journalists, activists,
individuals, etc.
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Session 2: What Can Scientists Do?
A. Vic Sidel (The Role of Scientists and Health Workers in the Face of Biological
Weapons – abstract attached)
Origins of work on the BW issue from the generalist/activist point of view come from
three main areas:Medical ethics
- ethical codes
- beginning to raise issues in the hope that medical students will think about it
- also explanation of codes before students sign up
NGO’s / Civil Society
- International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and affiliates (e.g Medact
in the UK)
- begun with Nuclear and moving on to biological
Human experimentation
- testing of BW simulants
- impact of experimentation in hospitals
Much published work in the field – intended for activism.
Susan Wright’s book ‘Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New
Perspectives’ (Rowman-Littlefield, 2002) is highly recommended.
B. Alastair Hay (Biological Weapons and the Threat to Civil Liberties – abstract
attached)
Has been working with Ian Kenyon, Julian Perry-Robinson, and Mathew Meselson and
others to bring up to date WHO responses to bioterrorism.
- This work is now completed – the report is on the web:
- Public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance, 2nd
edition (Draft, May 2003)
http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/index.html
- Hard copy will be produced soon.
- The first part of the report covers public health preparedness and response to BW and
legislation. There are also detailed annexes on various technical issues.
- Other annexes may be developed if required – process is ongoing.
Also been involved in a Royal Society Working Group focussing on the need for
biological detection methods for civilian biodefence and decontamination measures.
- £35 million budget
- Most of what is currently available is geared towards the military
- The working group has been meeting for a year (some confidential sessions)
- Extensive briefings from Porton Down and other governments
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Details on the Royal Society web site
(http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/policy/DD_Issuesinnews.htm)
Report due in the new year identifying research needs for next generation detection
and decontamination systems
Decontamination is a major issue – particularly buildings
Codes of ethics
- Project with Malcolm Dando some years ago that didn’t get much of a response
- Perhaps an area where the Science and Society Trust might consider doing
something
- The Royal Society are holding a public meeting in the new year on codes of ethics
- There needs to be a wider discussion of the issue - not just at the top echelons of
science
- The overall value of a code of ethics is not clear
- What should it cover?
- Tied into societies?
- Penalties?
- Whistleblowing?
Questions/comments
Comment (Malcolm Dando) In the past he majority of scientists have had no awareness
of the domestic/international regimes related to BW and the political problems
- But this is changing because of the work on potentially dangerous scientific research
- See NAS report - Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting
the "Dual Use" Dilemma (2003) http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089778/html/
- All bioscientists will feel the impact of this – it will capture their attention
Comment (Alastair Hay) As a minimum scientists should be taught the laws in these
areas of biology and chemistry. They should also have courses on ethics during training.
Comment (Mark Wheelis) FAS – have developed a web-based course on these issues – it
is being piloted now
Comment (Vic Sidel) Re: codes of ethics for scientists
- Distinguishing development work from weaponization work
- Sidel & Levy wrote a chapter for a US Army medical corps book arguing that it is
immoral for physicians to even be part of military
- The US Army wanted to start a discussion on ethics
- This type of activity is part of the education process.
Comment (Chandre Gould) Physicians for Human Rights have done work on this area
looking at the dual loyalty issues for doctors. See:
http://www.phrusa.org/healthrights/dl.html
C. Catherine Rhodes (Encouraging public support for biological weapons control –
abstract attached)
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Looking at the international regulation of biotechnology as a whole
Encouraging support by connecting areas
Genomics Gateway (http://www.genomicsgateway.net)
Also may cover European legislation
Issues
- the coverage is not good
- contradictions in different pieces of legislation
Web site aiming to reach out to the public to encourage support. Connecting with various
groups e.g. GM groups, patent law groups…)
Questions/comments
Comment (Stuart Parkinson) Scientists for Global Responsibility have a project – ethical
careers briefings for students/graduates. There are tricky issues relating to S&T careers.
Would be good to have something on BW.
D. Brian Rappert
(codes of ethics)
ESRC grant with Malcolm Dando for work on Codes of Ethics. Have been speaking to
scientists involved in cutting edge genomics and neuroscience to get their impressions
with regard to the relationship between their work and BW. Responses: - “There’s such a thing as contentious research?”
- “Are controls needed?”
Asked what they thought about their own responsibilities and about the relevance of their
work to BW. There is an amazing lack of awareness:
- “No relevance to BW”
- Limited recognition of the issues
Research councils still have very limited engagement with these issues. Carried out a
telephone-based questionnaire to see what they are doing about these issues: - In the UK there is much interest in biosafety and biosecurity
- But only preliminary engagement with the issues of future BW possibilities
However, there is a growing interest in codes of conduct/ethics
Brian Rappert and Malcolm Dando – plan to put together workshops for practising
scientists
In history codes have often been used to deflect responsibility rather than encouraging
individuals to become responsible
Codes should not be thought of as regulatory vehicles. The focus of these workshops is
to get people engaged in the issues rather than relying on a code to affect their behaviour
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As we debate codes we will also need to debate the nature of scientific research.
- to what extent is it open?
- To what extent is secrecy a part of research practises?
If you look at some ambiguous areas – e.g. Non-lethal weapons (NLW) research in the
US
- These researchers see themselves as morally progressive. They don’t see themselves
as weaponeers
How can we enact codes into the daily practises of researchers?
E. Session 2 – Discussion
Comment (Jonathan Rosenhead) Codes of Conduct – an areas where the Science and
Society Trust (SST) could get involved – a further meeting
Comment (Alastair Hay) Important to think what we wants a code to prevent and what
we want it to encourage/discourage
- e.g. Issue of ‘leakage’ from military scientists. If SST did organise a meeting it
would be important to invite people from the defence community
Comment (Brian Rappert) Regarding the Royal Society:
- uncertainty about what the code should be?
- BW issues being wrapped up in more general issues
- People became interested because of issues in fields other than BW
- Perhaps it would be interesting to widen the debate beyond BW – responsibility of
scientists in the production of weaponry as a whole (e.g. nuclear issue)
Comment (Mark Wheelis) Note the blur of BW and CW
- the thrust of modern biology is based on ligand-receptor interactions
- Ligands - these agents are chemicals not covered by the CWC. But covered by the
BWC
- There is not much covered by the CWC that is not covered by the BWC
Industrial scientists & conduct
- Federation of American Scientists (FAS) held meetings with PhRMA and are also
trying to talk to the Bioindustry Organisation (BIO)
- PhRMA has no interest in the issue of NLWs or pharmaceuticals used as weapons they say it is benign
- The military is mining this pharmaceutical information – co-operation with industry
on looking at rejected pharmaceutical compounds (e.g. bad side effects etc) to see if
they might have a military use
- Pharmaceutical industry could be a big ally in terms of perception and liability.
Comment (Malcolm Dando) There is a potential opportunity in the UK
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because of the work elements in the UK government on the BWC there is the
opportunity to be more radical on the issue of codes of conduct
SST might want to take up this issue, perhaps at next year’s British Association (BA)
meeting in Exeter. The theme next year is the responsibility of scientists.
Comment (Alastair Hay) Brian’s idea of including all weapons is a good idea – widening
the reach
Comment (Mark Wheelis) Do not think that engagement of scientists involved in legal
weapons development would receive much support
- think it would be better to focus on the illegal use of scientific skills for weapons
development
- conflicts are ethical not legal for conventional weapons.
- Need to tie code of conduct to international law and humanitarian law
- This would possibly encompass nuclear weapons
Comment (Alastair Hay, Malcolm Dando) Tied to ICRC perhaps.
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Session 3: New Weapons, New Challenges.
A. Ian Davis (BASIC projects – abstract attached)
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
- Independent research advocacy and analysis
- Transatlantic security/arms control questions
- Offices in London and Washington DC
Main concerns
Re-engage the US in multilateral legislation
- opportunity may open up after the 2004 elections
Threat assessments
- ‘over-egged’
- Bioterrorism
Independent scrutiny of intelligence assessments especially given policy of pre-emption
Currently an unbalanced approach (in the US) e.g. Bioshield and biodefence
- fuelling paranoia
- moving the debate in the wrong direction
BASIC
- facilitate transatlantic information exchange
- Monitor developments as a civil society organisation (involved with BWPP)
Project on public information material
- Not much grassroots activity
- Produced leaflet & other information on the web (http://www.basicint.org)
- Media focus – bad reporting has fed problems
- Just got grant for 10 further public information leaflets on BW
Study on controlling pathogens (transatlantic)
Study on EU (see attached abstract)
- collaboration with Canadian Government
- published next month (October)
Questions/comments
Q (Tracy Sartin) Might there be a drift in multilateral co-operation from now to future
US administrations?
Comment (Ian Davis) There is a deeper trend for US isolation. On the BWC perhaps a
change of key figures could make a difference (e.g. Bolton etc). UK pressure could have
a lot of impact
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Comment (Mark Wheelis) A change of administration is a pre-requisite for a change of
approach but it is not sufficient on its own.
- US administration is very fragmented (CDC, DOD, NIH etc)
- Only enthusiasm for BWC amongst a small number of people in the State Department
- Need inter-agency co-operation
- Pressure from the UK would be useful
B. Caitríona McLeish (Dual Use Controls and Genomic Research – abstract attached)
Project on Dual Use Controls and Genomic Research
- co-operative project with the Complex Product Innovation Department at University
of Sussex.
- Practical help to policy makers on impact of dual use controls on legitimate scientific
research
- the literature shows:
- a changing relationship between science and society/policymakers
- increased justification for control is leading to a closer relationship.
- In the dual use area there is an underdeveloped relationship
- Questionnaire/interview study in the UK of private and public genomic research will
compare the intended application of controls on research with there actual effects
- Identifying costs and benefits
- Identifying variance between public and private sector
- Are dual use controls working?
- Are they inhibiting scientific research?
- Feed back to the policymaking process
2nd project – longer term
- What does dual use mean? How have definitions evolved?
Initial findings:
- Definition has expanded from lists of products
- Widening of ‘dual-use’ definition into potential applications
C. Tobias Feakin (Biological Non-Lethal Weapons: What threat do they pose? –
abstract attached)
Development of biological NLWs got underway in the US national research laboratories
in the early 1980’s. Seen as weapons that could slow the advance of Soviet tanks an
increase the kill ratio.
Anti-materiel weapons
- attack chemical bonds
- initial development looking at degradation of rubber and plastics
- Also fuel degradation, TNT degradation
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Anti-plant weapons
- against specific crops e.g. opium poppies, cannabis, cocoa
Legal challenge
- Loophole for the development of bio-NLWs in the BWC
- These NLWs could weaken conventions
- David Fidler – radical change perspective – they could undermine the entire legal
system in relation to humanitarian law.
Environmental issues
- clean-up
- persistence
Ethics
- Where do you draw the line?
- Will these anti-materiel and anti-plant weapons lead to the development of antipersonnel biological NLWs
Comments/questions
Comment (Malcolm Dando)
- Important not to separate biological and chemical NLWs.
- Dual use issues are often raised in relation to the context of use of biological NLWs
- e.g. argument that anti-plant fungal agents are justified for use against drug crops
on law enforcement grounds
- e.g. Organisms that degrade explosives are needed for clean up of explosive
residue on arms ranges.
- Also other forms of bioremediation
D. Simon Whitby (Anti-agricultural BW)
Agricultural issues have not been given as much attention as anti-personnel
- in BWC negotiations
- in new context of BW arms control
Biocontrol & plant inoculants
- farmers use these for peaceful purposes
- they are produced in production facilities
- Open literature available on how to produce large quantities of these agents with
limited resources
- These production facilities should be included in CBMs (see South African S&T
background paper)
Where do we inject agricultural issues back into the discussion? – civil society/NGO’s
will have to do the work.
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Codes of conduct
- Recent meeting of American Phytopathological Society (APS)
- They are engaging in this issue and may be a potential ally in developing a code
of conduct
- Need to get over the problem that in general these scientists are not interested in
arms control issues
E. Chandre Gould (South Africa’s Biological Warfare Programme: Lessons for
Disarmament – abstract attached)
Disarmament debates are ‘north-centric’
- this relates to universality
- African countries think that the agenda is being set to exclude their interests
- They are worried about restrictions on the peaceful uses of biology
- Need to start engaging African countries
- Funders say that this issue is not a priority given health and poverty issues.
BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP)
- Strengthen the norm against BW
- Bring in NGO’s all around the world in engaging their own scientific communities
and governments
National legislation
- Need to harmonise legislation (in some countries it is complex and/or overlapping)
South Africa has comprehensive legislation (9 pieces)
- Non-Proliferation act includes information from the BWC and CWC
- Last year a SA scientist tried to seell information to the CIA
- This is creating a market under the guise of counter-proliferation
- Police officers are enforcing the legislation but they have limited access to the
information and means they need to do this job.
- Failure of intelligence
- Whilst we need strong legislation we need to think about the practicalities of using
the legislation.
Questions/comments
Comment (Jez Littlewood) Re: Geneva experts group meeting
- Went with a pessimistic view but the technical discussion that occurred left
participants feeling that there might be something useful about the experts meeting
process – it may take on a life of its own. “We might have something here”.
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ABSTRACTS
Note: Abstracts of presentations given by speakers at the British Association Festival of
Science on Tues. 9 Sept. and additional abstracts submitted by participants in support of
the seminar on Wed. 10 Sept. (included below in order of presentation/discussion at the
seminar)
Session 1: Historical and Political Context.
Mark Wheelis
Senior Lecturer
Section of Microbiology
University of California, Davis
Title:
The Bioweapon Threat: Lessons from History
Abstract:
The use of biological weapons was outlawed in 1928, and their possession in 1975. They were
the first, and still only one of two, weapons of mass destruction to be completely banned.
However, in the absence of robust verification measures this ban has always been fragile, has
been violated several times in major ways, and the weapons are probably more of a threat now
than ever before. Some technologically advanced nations are intrigued by the potential of
bioweapons in the post-genomic era, and some developing nations are attracted to the potential
they have for deterring aggression by technically more advanced nations. Without vigorous
multilateral action, the world may slip into a new and dangerous biological arms race.
Compounding the danger is the potential utility of such weapons for terrorism, and the increasing
interest of some terrorist groups in them. This presentation will briefly review the history of
bioweapons and biowarfare in the 20th century as background to understanding the current
situation and its dangers.
Trevor Findlay
Executive Director
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)
Title:
The Biological Weapons Ban: Strengths, Weaknesses and Rescue Attempts.
Abstract:
The paper will cover the origins of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and
briefly describe its structure, mode of operation and greatest lacuna, the lack of a verification
system for determining compliance. Discussion will follow of the various attempts to either
ameliorate the situation (including the institutionalisation of confidence-building measures) or to
establish a comprehensive, dedicated verfication regime (via the negotiation of a protocol to the
treaty). There will be considerable analysis of the reasons for the failure to date of such efforts
and an explanation of the current attempts to at least keep some sort of official discussions on the
verification, compliance and implementation challenges to the BWC alive.
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Ian R Kenyon
Mountbatten Centre, University of Southampton
Threats to the international regime set up to control Biological Weapons
In what does the regime consist?
Humanitarian Laws of War
1925 Geneva Protocol
1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Decisions adopted by various BWC Review Conferences
Sundry Resolutions of UNGA and UNSC
[Australia Group]
How successful is the regime so far?
Use in war
One confirmed instance - Japan in China 1938-45
Development programmes pre-1972
UK, US (both reduced to defence only prior to 1970) USSR, ?
Developments post 1972
Active BW research and military preparation by non parties to BWC
Confirmed: Iraq;(acceded following 1991 war)
South Africa (apartheid regime, acceded later)
Suspected: Syria; DPRK
Active BW research and military preparation by BWC State Party (in secret)
USSR (acknowledged by Russia after USSR breakup)
Suspected: Iran, Libya
Response of international community within BWC
Membership of regime
146 Parties; 17 Signatories (yet to ratify but committed to objectives)
Attempts to strengthen BWC
Decisions adopted by various BWC Review Conferences
Ban on use; CBMs
‘Verex’ Group of verification experts 1992/3
Ad Hoc Group to consider a Protocol to the BWC 1994-2001
Expert Group process starts 2003
reports 2006 (next Review Conference)
Continuing threats
View that BWC is too easily evaded.
Concern over activities of non-parties
View that regime does not reduce terrorist threat
Current attempts to bolster the regime outside BWC
Tightened export controls [Australia Group]
National Legislation
[UK Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001]
National contingency planning
[UK - HPA]
International vigilance
WHO
International criminalization proposal
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Session 2: What Can Scientists Do?
Victor Sidel
Distinguished University Professor of Social Medicine
Montefiore Medical Center
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Title:
The Role of Scientists and Health Workers in the Face of Biological Weapons.
Abstract:
Warfare exacts a devastating toll on combatants and noncombatants, ranging from death and
disability caused by traumatic injury to acute and chronic disease caused by exposure, starvation,
and displacement. Scientific and medical personnel have been important in the prevention and
treatment of casualties but have also contributed to making the wounds. Attempts at the
purposeful imposition of disease through the development of biological weapons (BW)began in
earnest before and during World War II when Japanese personnel conducted extensive BW
experiments on prisoners of war in
China, and Japan and other countries developed and tested a variety of agents believed suitable
for use as BW. The unilateral declaration by the United States that it would not use BW and the
negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 did not halt "defensive research" on
BW, some of it ambiguous. Allegations continue of development and stockpiling of BW in
several countries. This paper will explore the legal and ethical objections to such work by
biological scientists and medical personnel and the new problems posed by the use and threat of
use of BW in what has been termed
"bioterrorism."
Alastair Hay
Professor of Environmental Toxicology
School of Medicine
University of Leeds
Title:
Biological Weapons and the Threat to Civil Liberties.
Abstract:
First indications of a biological weapons attack by terrorists are likely to be reports of ill health
which,when analysed, are unusual in their geographical location and possibly, though not
necessarily, in the symptoms reported. Terrorists may announce their intention to release
biological agents but may create greater panic if they make the announcement after the release.
Possible terms of imprisonment will not deter the highly committed but may dissuade the more
foolhardy. For populations affected by the disease outbreak many issues will arise including
forced quarantining; evacuation ( or incarceration ) in their homes; separation of families ;
access to vaccination and other treatment options; availability of information and communication
difficulities; and decisions about safety. These, and other issues affecting our normal liberties
before and after an attack will be discussed.
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Catherine Rhodes
Research Student
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
My research, funded by Carnegie as part of the Project to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, aims to encourage public support for the Convention by showing how it is
connected to other international standards, treaties and guidelines in attempting to regulate the
biotechnology revolution. My PhD thesis will demonstrate the fragmented nature of existing
international regulation of biotechnology and will discuss the implications of this i.e. gaps,
contradictions, and overlaps in regulatory coverage resulting in ineffective regulation. Aiming to
raise public awareness of the current state of international regulation of biotechnology a website
(http://www.genomics-gateway.net) has been set up which presents summary information on the
key international regulations and regulatory bodies along with contextual information such as a
news page and historical overview of biotechnology.
Session 3: New Weapons, New Challenges.
Ian Davis
Director
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
The Role of Regional Control Measures in Strengthening the International Prohibition of
Biological Weapons: The Role of the European Union
Introduction
This is an extract from the Executive Summary of a draft BASIC Research Report to be published
in October 2003.
The current US Administration appears to neither have confidence in the 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) nor will it participate in discussions to strengthen its
provisions until the next review conference in 2006, at the earliest. Although the Bush
Administration has made a number of useful alternative proposals, these fail to adequately
address many of the main areas of concern in relation to BW proliferation and bio-terrorism.
With the current impasse in developing a global approach, one alternative is to develop regional
approaches. BASIC is exploring the potential for a European BW Control Regime, centered on
the EU, as a precursor to a strengthened BTWC regime. Such a European regime might be
developed in two stages: starting with EU Member States and the EU Associate Countries,
followed by the rest of Europe, including the Russian Federation. The SIPRI BW Inspection
Project of the late 1960s provides a useful precedent.
Four Strands for Enhancing EU Engagement on BW Controls
Strand 1: Strengthening BTWC Compliance and Verification
There are three key areas in which the EU could develop proposals to strengthen BTWC
compliance and verification: investigation mechanisms; confidence building mechanisms; and
increased transparency.
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Strand 2: Combating and Preventing BW Proliferation
There are three main mechanisms for combating and preventing BW proliferation: export
controls; ‘cooperative threat reduction’ programmes; and controlling access to pathogens.
Strand 3: Deterring BW Use
The EU could push for an international commitment to counter and punish both states and
individuals for BW use, or failing that, adopt a common position on the issue. In addition, the EU
could take the first step towards international criminalization of individual BW use.
Strand 4: Strengthening Civil Emergency Planning
Co-ordination of bio defence, at the local, national and regional levels could be improved,
building on several existing EU initiatives and further harmonisation with the EU Associate
Countries and other OSCE states.
The EU is already adopting a strong leadership role in this issue. However, the Member States
and EU institutions will need to develop a stronger culture of co-operation between the full range
of experts and interested parties, across the wide number of affected disciplines, including law
enforcement, intelligence, science, education, industry and international diplomacy.
Moreover, much more debate is needed as to the scope and direction of any future EU BW
control regime. At present, for example, there seems little enthusiasm among EU officials for
developing investigative or reporting mechanisms among member states as means of promoting
confidence in compliance with the BTWC. However, regional control, reporting and response
measures in the European context could serve as a positive role model for other regions. This is a
debate that is still in its infancy and needs to be broadened to include parliamentarians and other
interest groups.
With the adoption of its ‘concrete measures’, the EU has already gone beyond the ad hoc
mechanism stage in dealing with the BW threat. However, it is important that this high level of
coordination on paper is translated into high-level cooperation in practice. The best way for the
EU to approach the challenge would be a multilevel approach: gradually increasing and
strengthening EU legislation and co-operation, rather than immediately moving towards a legally
binding inspections regime, although this is not ruled out in the medium to long term.
Potential benefits of an EU BW regime include: facilitating best practice among member states;
creating a staging post for a global regime; developing expertise which could be used by the UN
Secretary General (and others) to investigate allegations of non-compliance; engagement with
Russia in working to control its huge and ageing BW infrastructure; and enhancement in the
standing of the EU both in eyes of its citizens and ‘abroad’. For these benefits to be realised, an
EU regime will need to demonstrate that: there is significant utility in policing low-risk states;
fears over national security violations and industrial espionage are misplaced; and European
cohesion and national approaches to BW controls will be advanced.
Further discussion among policy-makers and opinion shapers within the EU, United States and
the wider Europe will be necessary, to further develop some of these ideas. BASIC is committed
to facilitating such discussion in 2003/4.
Caitríona McLeish and Paul Nightingale
SPRU
University of Sussex
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Dual Use Controls and Genomic Research
Recent international events are increasing public awareness of risks of biological warfare (BW).
The failure, in 2001, of international negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention means greater attention is now being placed on the array of national measures
protecting against BW activity. Most of theses national measures focus on restricting access to
‘dual use’ biological technologies. These policy measures aim to balance suppression of the
potentially negative characteristics with promotion of the positive characteristics.
This research seeks to explore whether these dual use controls are negatively impacting the
direction and practice of legitimate scientific activity, and then if negative features are found to
address policy improvements. The research project will launch a pilot study in the UK on the
impact of these controls are having on practitioners of genetic and molecular biology research. A
questionnaire will be sent to a sample population of private and public research organisations in
these two areas and will be followed by 25 in-depth interviews.
The research methodology involves mapping out the intended implementation of the various
policies, then comparing that with the actual results of the implementation to identify areas of
substantial difference. The variation in the results between different types of institutions will then
be analysed.
Tobias Feakin
PhD Researcher
University of Bradford
Biological Non-Lethal Weapons: What threat do they pose?
The development of the most recent so called “non-lethal” biological weapons can be traced
back to the early to mid 1980s. At this time, within the USA, NLWs were beginning to be
examined intensely by the national research laboratories. They were viewed as potentially
valuable weapons which could be used to break the ‘tempo’ of Soviet tanks if and when they
attacked during a conventional war in Central Europe. Since this period research has
continued into non-lethal biological agents within the US for various purposes.

What weapons are being developed?
There are two main biological agents that are of immediate concern:
(i). Plant killing micro-organisms – Research focuses on identifying micro-organisms which
can kill drug-producing crops.
(ii). Anti-materiel organisms – Organisms which attack chemical bonds within a material to
degrade them to an unusable state.

What challenges do these weapons pose?
(i). The Legal Challenge – After the breakdown in talks for the BW Protocol there was a
feeling that the insistence by some countries for loopholes similar to those that exist in the
CWC was key to the Protocol not being agreed. This problem surrounding the ‘grey’ area of
non-lethal biological weapons could undermine the whole process.
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(ii). Environmental Effects – What are the potential long-term environmental effects of using
these weapons?
(iii). Breaking Ethical Boundaries – Where do you draw the line?
Chandre Gould
Researcher
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
Title:
South Africa’s Biological Warfare Programme: Lessons for Disarmament.
Abstract:
South Africa’s small scale biological warfare programme, established in the mid-1980s (despite
South Africa being a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention) was established to provide
members of the military and police with covert assassination weapons for use against those
perceived to present a threat to the stability of the minority government. This paper discusses the
reasons for the establishment of the programme and the direction it took; the implications of
international isolation and the effect of the Biological Weapons Convention on the programmes’
development; considers the motivations of the scientists who worked in the military front
company responsible for biological weapons research and production; examines the closure of the
programme; and raises questions about whether current national legislation is an effective tool to
deal with proliferation dangers.
Malcolm Dando
Professor of International Security
Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
Title:
New Biological Weapons: The Impact of Biotechnology.
Abstract:
There is increasing concern over possible use of biological weapons of mass destruction. This
current concern will be set in the historical context of the offensive biological weapons
programmes of the last one hundred years. It will be argued that the present threat is limited, but
that it will certainly grow. All previous scientific and technological revolutions have been applied
in major ways to warfare and so this is likely to happen to the ongoing revolution in the life
sciences. The potential outcomes of such applications are reviewed in some key areas. It will be
argued that these malign applications will lead to major threats to human rights and that all
possible means should be used to prevent this happening.
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