S PECIAL S UPPLEMENT
S PRING 2000
PREVENTIVE
Strategies
A BULLETIN OF LABOR,
Decision and Analysis
EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS
L AW
FOR
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.:
Supreme Court Lowers the Bar on Proving Workplace Discrimination
In a June 12 decision with broad implications for workplace litigation, the
United States Supreme Court has clarified the requirements for individuals attempting
to prove on-the-job discrimination. In doing so, the Court has lowered the bar for
plaintiffs in getting their federal discrimination claims before a jury in certain jurisdictions. It is expected this decision will assume its place with other major Supreme
Court cases in defining the rights and obligations created by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
The case, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., involved allegations of
age discrimination (see lead story in Spring 2000 Preventive Strategies). However, in
agreeing to review the case, the Supreme Court considered the general conflict among
the federal courts over the kind and amount of evidence necessary to prove intentional discrimination. It was this conflict which was the basis for the Court’s grant of
review.
“The implications for employers from the Reeves decision are likely to reach the
range of discrimination complaints under federal law, including age, race, sex, religion,
national origin, pregnancy, and disability,” according to Gregory I. Rasin, who heads
the employment litigation practice for Jackson Lewis. “As lawyers, we must rethink
our strategies for defending discrimination lawsuits; as employers, we must redouble
our efforts to have legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons underlying all adverse
employment actions.”
At issue in the Reeves case was the legal procedure for parties presenting their
cases to federal courts in employee lawsuits under the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Courts in every circuit have required plaintiffs first to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. Once done, the defendants then must articulate legitimate business reasons for their adverse employment actions. Here is where the circuits differ: some
stated that once the defendants’ reasons were shown to be a pretext, the case went to
the jury to decide whether, in fact, the employer discriminated. Others, including the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which decided the Reeves case, said that
E MPLOYERS
before the case went to the jury, plaintiffs were required to prove the defendants’ reasons were a pretext plus that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse action.
Mr. Reeves, a 57-year old supervisor with 40 years of service, was terminated
from his job at a plumbing supplies manufacturer for “numerous timekeeping errors
and misrepresentations” concerning the attendance and tardiness of employees in his
department. He subsequently sued his former employer alleging the real reason for
his termination was age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. At trial, Reeves presented evidence from which a jury ultimately
determined the employer had discriminated and awarded Reeves nearly $100,000 in
damages and front pay.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the jury’s award, finding Reeves’ evidence insufficient to prove unlawful discrimination. It ruled that, although Reeves
had cast sufficient doubt on the employer’s stated reasons for the termination, he had
not actually shown the termination was motivated by age bias. In short, he had not
proved pretext plus.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. The High Court held that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case and produces evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the action is false, a
jury may conclude the employer acted unlawfully. “In appropriate circumstances the
trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer
is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose....once the employer’s justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason
for its decision,” the Court wrote.
A showing that the employer’s stated reason is false will not always be enough
to find the employer liable, the Court noted. “...’it is not enough ... to dis believe the
employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.’” For instance, if the litigation conclusively revealed another, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, or if the plaintiff’s evidence was weak in the face of other
proof that no discrimination had occurred, there would be no liability.
From a litigation defense standpoint, motions for summary judgment are likely
to be harder to win given the Court’s ruling on the kind and amount of evidence
needed to show proof of an employer’s discriminatory actions. If more cases ultimately go to a jury where the employer’s chances of prevailing are diminished and the
stakes are higher, there is likely to be a corresponding rise, not only in the already
explosive number of employee lawsuits and fair employment practice agency complaints, but in the pressure to settle cases out of court — and in the cost of doing so.
Jackson Lewis attorneys are available to more fully discuss the implications of
this case. For more information, please consult the Jackson Lewis attorney with
whom you regularly work, or contact Margaret Bryant, Esq., at (914) 328-0404;
bryantm@jacksonlewis.com. Please visit our web site, at www.jacksonlewis.com.