Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization: An Economic Analysis
Michael Edward Mason Dean
Introduction
The field of economics has recently gone through a renaissance. What used to be a simple study
of supply and demand has evolved into a study of the full range of human behaviors. Since the 1960s,
economic theory has developed to explain everything from voter behavior to the incentives, actions, and
subsequent consequences of individuals locked in competition. Although its full potential as a social
science has yet to be unlocked, it has already proved useful in revealing secrets and explaining anomalies
in a vast array of fields.
The plays of Molière, one of France’s most famous playwrights, are replete with secrets and anomalies
for which economics may offer compelling, if not entirely definitive, explanations. Molière not only
created the most popular comedies of the day, but also revolutionized the comedic genre in seventeenthcentury France. One reason why Molière’s plays have consistently fascinated audiences and critics is
that his characters act in seemingly absurd or inexplicable ways, defying both the social conditioning
and economic incentives of early modern France’s sociopolitical order. Critics are often particularly
confounded by the seemingly improbable endings of Molière’s comedies, most of which depict the triumph
of young lovers over socially, politically, and economically superior adversaries through trickery. This is
not a revolutionary concept in its own, but Molière added his own unique twist on this classic formula in
many of his most famous plays: not only do the young lovers improve their lot, but the situation of the
antagonists is bettered as well by the end of the play. This trend can been seen in Le Médecin Volant (The
Flying Doctor), Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (The Middle Class Gentleman), Les Fourberies de Scapin (The
Impostures of Scapin), and Le Malade Imaginaire (The Imaginary Invalid). How is it that in these and other
plays, both the protagonists and antagonists improve their outcome by the end of the play?
I propose a methodology to explain why these endings are not just logical but essential to Molière’s
commentary on early modern French society. The method that I use is the economic tool of game theory.
Game theory proposes a different, powerful starting point from which to analyze the motivations,
incentives, perceptions, and choices of Molière’s characters. Analyzing the types of games played between
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
8
the protagonists and antagonists uncovers the playwright’s previously veiled criticisms of the French
social order and its inefficiencies of capitalization. Furthermore, it reveals Molière’s criticism of the
mutually hostile attitudes of each social order and his tacit contention that society would be vastly
improved by the institutionalization of non-zero-sum games.
Game Theory and Molière
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
In the opening of Act One of L’Avare (The Miser), the audience encounters Harpagon and his employee,
Valère, discussing whether it is prudent to marry Harpagon’s daughter Élise to Anselme, an affluent older
man, against her will. As always with Molière, there is a hidden context: Valère and Élise are in love, and
Valère has been trying to earn a favorable reputation with Harpagon in order to ask for Élise’s hand in
marriage. Harpagon, an old miser, is unaware of Valère’s intentions but is warming to his presence.
Here, Valère is supposed to decide Élise’s fate. He faces a number of equally unpalatable choices.
Valère could agree that Élise should marry Anselme, which would better secure Valère’s relationship with
Harpagon but only by giving up his beloved Élise to be married to someone else. Valère could also choose
to reject Harpagon’s proposal, which would destroy Harpagon’s and Valère’s relationship and thus further
impede Valère’s goal of marrying Élise. This is made explicit when Valère explains to Élise why he cannot
disagree with Harpagon:
I do it that I may not vex him (Harpagon), and the better to secure my ends. To resist
him boldly would simply spoil everything (…) Pretend to comply with his wishes; you
are much more likely to succeed in the end.1
How is it that Harpagon is supposed to make a decision? Both choices seem to guarantee the
separation of the two young lovers. In the end, Valère decides to agree temporarily with Harpagon.
Whether or not the audience agrees with Valère’s choice, they must wonder how Valère made it. Luckily,
there exists a methodology that can grant a measure of insight into how Molière’s characters make their
decisions. This method is called game theory.
APPLICATION OF ZERO-SUM GAMES TO MOLIÈRE’S WORK
Game theory helps the audience understand more fully Valère’s situation in L’Avare, providing insight
into how he made his impossible decision. The opening scenes of L’Avare offer examples of what game
theorists call a “zero-sum game,” meaning that only one of the individuals can improve his outcome. Here,
both Harpagon and Valère face choices. Valère can either agree or disagree with Harpagon. Harpagon in
turn can choose to accept or reject Valère’s advice. Valère is playing this game to ensure his future with
Élise, while Harpagon is playing to ensure his financial well-being, or rather to feed his voracious appetite
for money. The outcomes for this game can be summarized most easily in a grid format, as shown below:
Table 1
Choices
If Harpagon Agrees
If Harpagon Rejects
If Valère Agrees
If Valère Disagrees
V1, H1
V2, H2
(V3, H3)
V4, H4
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
9
Situation One: If Valère and Harpagon agree that Élise should marry the old man:
■■
V1: From the perspective of the young lovers, Valère obviously loses this game. He not only loses
his chance to be with Élise, but sees her in an unhappy marriage, with a large age difference
between groom and bride. However, Valère is able to keep his favorable relations with Harpagon,
which could allow him in the future to trick Harpagon into allowing him to marry Élise.
■■
H1: Harpagon is given a mandate to marry his daughter to an older man without having to pay a
dowry. Harpagon constantly obsesses over money, despite being financially stable. If he preserves
his own wealth by not paying a dowry, it will increase his well-being by putting his mind at ease, if
only until the next question of money arises.
Situation Two: If Valère recommends that Élise not marry Anselme and Harpagon accepts this judgment:
■■
V2: Valère saves Élise from an unfavorable union. However, he loses the time he spent to further his
relations with Harpagon and his relationship with Harpagon. He also ruins his chances of marrying
Élise.
■■
H2: Harpagon loses the money he would have gained through the marriage and his friend and
worker Valère. Both parties lose in this case.
Situation Three: If Valère agrees with Harpagon and Harpagon Disagrees:
■■
We can eliminate this possibility, since Harpagon certainly will not disagree with a favorable
judgment by Valère.
Situation Four: If Valère disagrees with Harpagon and Harpagon disagrees with Valère’s assessment:
■■
V4: Valère tries to prevent Élise from being married in an unfavorable union. As a consequence, he
loses his favorable position with Harpagon and thus his ability to marry Élise.
■■
H4: Harpagon disagrees with Valère, and most likely will still marry Élise to the old, rich man.
He will forsake Valère and will not let Élise marry him.
Having explored these possible outcomes, we can now better understand the actions that both
Valère and Harpagon will take. From Valère’s perspective, if he disagrees with Harpagon, he will lose
not only his good relations (and employment) with Harpagon, but he will also lose the ability to marry
Élise. Harpagon will forbid Élise from marrying anyone with whom he disagrees. If Valère agrees with
Harpagon, Valère will preserve his favorable relations with Harpagon and may or may not be able to find a
pretext for calling off the marriage between Élise and Anselme. It would not be accurate to say that Valère
is best served by agreeing with Harpagon. In any situation, he stands to lose Élise to Anselme, and thus
he cannot “win” in this game. To act in his best interest, he must choose to minimize his losses. Thus, it
would be reasonable to predict that Valère will agree with Harpagon.
The game from Harpagon’s perspective shows a completely different tale. Harpagon is through and
through a miser: he will not accept a loss without tremendous struggle. Thus, the outcomes for Harpagon’s
game only have positive outcomes. If Valère agrees with Harpagon, Harpagon stands to profit from Élise’s
union with Anselme. If Valère disagrees with Harpagon, Harpagon will still find a precedent under which
to marry Élise to Anselme and will most likely discontinue Valère’s employment. This, of course, would
not be the most favorable option— Harpagon would regret losing Valère’s support in these arguments,
but losing the sum of money brought by Élise and Anselme’s union would be an even greater loss.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
10
It is now possible to make a prediction: Valère will most likely agree with Harpagon, as marked in
the table below:
Table 2
Choices
If Valère Agrees
If Valère Disagrees
If Harpagon Agrees
V1, H1
V2, H2
If Harpagon Rejects
(V3, H3)
V4, H4
Considering Harpagon’s incentives, he will accept Valère’s decision if Valère agrees, but will reject
Valère’s decision if it clashes with Harpagon’s obsession. These are outcomes highlighted in the table below:
Table 3
Choices
If Valère Agrees
If Valère Disagrees
If Harpagon Agrees
V1, H1
V2, H2
If Harpagon Rejects
(V3, H3)
V4, H4
The box with two highlighted portions is the most likely choice, called the “Nash Equilibrium.”2
Consulting the text, we see that this is what indeed occurs: Valère agrees that Élise should be wed to
Anselme and Harpagon accepts Valère’s judgment. Valère even explains to Élise that his choice is in his
best interest: Valère makes this choice to secure his finances and curry favor with Harpagon, and to buy
him time until he can find a pretext for preventing Anselme from marrying Élise.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ZERO-SUM GAMES
In this example, Molière’s characters act in accordance with how the public in early modern France
was conditioned to act. People in early modern France tended to be risk-averse, perhaps even more so
than they are today. To understand why, one needs to understand the situation most French families faced
living in the French social order. There are documented cases where families struggled for generations
to move up a sub-order in the Third Estate (all French citizens who were socially beneath the King,
the clergy or First Estate, and the nobility and aristocracy, or Second Estate), thereby bringing a welldeserved increase in their quality of life.3 In a society where a person’s livelihood and lineage depended
on successful navigation of French politics by many generations over long periods of time, any rational
individual would refuse to engage in any behavior that jeopardized the family’s advancement. A member
of the Third Estate playing a competitive game with a socially, politically, or economically powerful
opponent had the most to lose and likely would lose; the authority of the person of a higher order would
supersede almost any entitlement held or action performed by a member of a lower order. Therefore,
members of the Third Estate would choose the option that would minimize their losses, as Valère did
with Harpagon. Strangely enough, tricksters like Scapin, Elmire, and other characters in Molière’s plays
do not follow this same logic. One would expect that Molière’s tricksters would either better themselves
at others’ expense or else everyone else would better themselves at the expense of the tricksters. However,
one often finds that all the major characters, even the antagonist, improve their outcomes. Why would
Molière structure a play to be a series of zero-sum games, only to have an ending where everyone benefits?
Is this not a logical contradiction in the structure of the story? To answer these questions, one must
understand the difference between zero-sum games and non-zero-sum games.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
11
ZERO- AND NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES
Game theory distinguishes among the types of games that individuals and societies play, and the
most important distinction is between zero-sum and non-zero-sum games.
Zero-sum games are games or situations in which players’ outcomes are inversely correlated. When
one player wins, the other player must lose. A perfect example of this type of game was the French social
order: only one party—usually the higher authority—won. These games are intensely competitive in
nature and involve opposing incentives. The very idea of a “zero-sum game” comes from a utilitarian
social perspective: because the fortune of one player cancels out the misfortune of the other, it can be
argued that society is neither bettered nor worsened by the outcome.
Non-zero-sum games, by contrast, are situations in which players’ outcomes are directly correlated.
Any one player’s improved outcome means that all players will have improved outcomes. Robert Wright
provides an example of a non-zero-sum game:
[Those of the Islamic faith] and “the West” are playing a non-zero-sum game; their
fortunes are positively correlated. If Muslims get less happy with their place in the world,
more resentful of their treatment by the West, support for radical Islam will grow, so
things will get worse for the West. If, on the other hand, more and more Muslims feel
respected by the West and feel they benefit from involvement with it, that will cut support
for radical Islam, and Westerners will be more secure from terrorism.4
Whereas zero-sum games encourage competition, non-zero-sum games encourage cooperation, and
thus have become a popular concept in modern politics.
SOCIAL COMMENTARY OF THE FRENCH SOCIAL ORDER
The French social order dictated in large part how people interacted, and worked ideally when
each social order cooperated with the others. Theoretically, the Salic Law Doctrines created incentives
that resulted in a “Protector-Servant” structure that stretched from the King to the poorest peasants and
farmers.5 As long as servants cooperated with their protectors and they both worked together, both would
gain economically and politically. Just as game theory predicts, great benefits to both parties would be
realized through cooperation, through the use of non-zero-sum games.6
Unfortunately, the theory does not match perfectly the reality of the French social order. Zero-sum
games seemed to prevail at every level of society. Each estate engaged in zero-sum games to gain a better
outcome at the expense of another estate. For example, the nobility had better access to gifts from the
King than those in the Third Estate. Instead of sharing these gifts with the Third Estate and perhaps
bettering everyone’s outcome through cooperation, the nobility petitioned the King to block the Third
Estate’s ability to join the aristocracy. This petition was answered in 1661: a member of the Third Estate
could become a member of the aristocracy only with the explicit approval of the King.7 This severely
limited the Third Estate’s ability to improve their social standing while maintaining the unbalanced
power distribution that privileged the aristocracy.
Struggles for power could even be seen within a social order. Those at the top of the Third Estate
(e.g., attorneys, doctors, and the King’s financiers) would enact barriers to entry by means of education.
For a member of a lower sub-order to reach a top sub-order, he or she would have to obtain a costly
education. This discouraged many from achieving their goal of social climbing and bettering their quality
of life. The doctors, attorneys, and other members of the top sub-orders became scarcer since fewer
people were able to obtain schooling. Thus, they were able to increase their wages and improve their
quality of life as a result of these barriers to entry. They improved their outcomes at the expense of the
lower orders by playing a zero-sum game.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
12
The French social order created an abundance of zero-sum games in a system that would have
been better served by non-zero-sum games. This harmful dynamic is depicted in Molière’s plays, which
present an abundance of zero-sum games to characters who would be best served by playing non-zerosum games. In these plays, the initial conflicts are only exacerbated by the playing of zero-sum games.
The conflicts are only resolved when each side decides to cooperate with the other and play non-zero-sum
games. In fact, not only are the conflicts resolved, but all character’s outcomes are improved: characters
of lower social orders are able to climb the social ladder without repercussions. Monsieur Jourdain, of Le
Bourgeois gentilhomme, is finally able to be considered a member of the aristocracy after Cléante convinces
him and other members of the aristocracy that Jourdain’s daughter is marrying a very powerful Turkish
Prince. Members of higher social orders also improve their outcomes by obtaining a larger sum of money
from the young lovers’ weddings (as in Le Médecin Volant), or accruing other kinds of benefits from the
young lovers’ weddings (as Cléonte does by agreeing to become Argan’s doctor in Le Malade imaginaire).
By structuring his plays as a series of zero-sum games resolved by a single non-zero-sum game, Molière
seems to suggest that the French social order was not functioning properly. It was inefficient because it
promoted too many zero-sum games between the orders. As a result, it fostered unhappiness for those at
the bottom, which resulted in incentives that only promoted more severe zero-sum games. This limited not
only the prospects for most of the French population, but also the amount of wealth the state could earn.
Starting in the mid 1600s the state turned to more desperate measures—selling offices and borrowing money
from neighboring countries—an indication that France’s economy was not nearly as efficient as it needed
to be.8 Instead of selling offices, a better system would have provided incentives for playing non-zero-sum
games. Molière, by showing how ridiculous these zero-sum games are, may have been encouraging people
to discard their “all-or-nothing” mindsets and to adopt an ideology where everyone worked together, not
just for their personal welfare but for the benefit and preservation of the state.
Capitalization and Molière
CAPITALIZATION AND THE FRENCH SOCIAL ORDER
Playing non-zero-sum games would have been a step in the right direction for seventeenth-century
French society, marginally improving every person’s outcomes and creating a more unified state. However,
there were larger problems that even cooperation could not solve. The largest problem facing early
modern France was the structure of the social order itself, which often failed to capitalize on the talents
and abilities of its citizens. Early modern France had a dreadfully low “capitalization” rate.
BRIEFLY DEFINING “CAPITALIZATION”
Best known for his research on Intelligence Quotients (IQs), James Flynn has also studied the degree
to which societies take advantage of the talents and abilities of their workers (also referred to as “human
capital”).9 For example, say there are 100 people who are perfectly suited to become scientists. They have
not only the required skill sets but also a remarkable talent in these areas. If a society allows only 75 of
these 100 people to become scientists, forcing the other 25 people to find work in another profession
where their talents or skills are not put to optimal use, the society’s capitalization rate is 75%. Ideally,
societies would allow every worker to choose a profession for which he or she has the requisite skills and
talent. Assuming that working in one’s preferred (or “specialized”) sector leads to a happier and more
productive worker, a capitalization rate of 100% would maximize the levels of happiness and expertise
among workers and of economic production in the society.
While unfortunately it is not possible to calculate an overall capitalization rate for an entire society,
it would not be unreasonable to assume that early modern France had a low rate of capitalization. Many
factors contributed to this low rate, but none contributed more than the structure of the French social order.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
13
PRINCIPLES OF THE FRENCH SOCIAL ORDER
A basic understanding of the structure of the French social order and of social mobility within
it reveals the limits on talent and abilities that it imposed. On the surface, there were three “Estates”
underneath the status of the King. The clergy was the most powerful order—the “First Estate”—while
the nobility and the aristocracy occupied the “Second Estate.” Everyone else, including the bourgeoisie,
was contained in the “Third Estate,” which, despite its considerable financial and political power, was the
least socially dominant order. Each order was then subdivided into sub-orders.
While economic factors contributed to the prestige of each order, the social ranking of each was
absolute. In France, even the lowliest and poorest priest (the First Estate) had more social power than the
most powerful Prince of Blood (the highest sub-order of the Second Estate). Mousnier emphasized this
by stating that “The humblest priest therefore should precede the most elevated of the ordinary nobility
[…] The humblest gentleman should precede the wealthiest and most honourable member of the third
estate.”10 This absolute ranking was not arbitrary. The French social order was constructed carefully to
reflect the moral, political and economic values of early modern France.11 If a certain group of people
is placed in a high order, then this group of people is considered to be relatively more important to
the function of the state than other groups. The French social order essentially meted out rewards and
punishments based on birth (or family lineage), social or economic capital, and occupation.
The King, for example, was the most important person in the operation of the state. The King
in theory was in an order above all other estates, reflecting a system that valued service to the King
(according to the Protector-Servant system) and the preservation of the state above all else. The First
Estate was composed of the clergy, which indicates that religious values were also highly valued. The
Second Estate was composed of the King’s relatives, or the nobility (the higher of the two sub-orders) and
the aristocracy (the lower sub-order), the main groups who financed and supported the King and thus
helped fulfill the important goal of preserving the state and its wealth. Finally, the Third Estate consisted
of everyone else in early modern France.
The Third Estate was divided into five main sub-orders. The first and most powerful sub-order
contained those in service industries requiring extra education, including attorneys, doctors, and the
financiers of the King. The second sub-order consisted of the bourgeoisie, or those whose labor “depended
on…cleverness of mind.”12 Practitioners and merchants would fit into this category. The lowest three
sub-orders depended “more on bodily labor than on the trade of goods or cleverness of mind.”13 These
workers consisted of farmers and peasants (the third sub-order), artisans or craftsmen (the fourth suborder) and finally artists, casual workers, servants, and laborers (the fifth and lowest sub-order). As social
orders reveal the hierarchy of values of a society, the structure of the Third Estate reveals that education
is also valued, although perhaps less so than the preservation of the state and of the King’s wealth.
Education did not often result in a worker transitioning from the Third Estate to the Second Estate.
In fact, there were very few ways by which people could advance from one order to another. One way
to climb the social ladder quickly was to become a member of the clergy, but this was a difficult process.
Years of Jesuit education were required, and though the education was free, it was incredibly competitive.14
After receiving sufficiently high marks in elementary school, many years of higher education were
required. These schools were not free, thereby eliminating many people’s ability to attend.15 The people
who could attend would have an ability to advance, assuming they were able to survive in the highly
competitive schooling system. After completing these studies, one could apply to become a member of
the clergy. Very few were able to complete such a difficult process, but those who succeeded could wield a
great social power (despite humble economic remuneration). Other than becoming a priest, it was nearly
impossible to truly transcend social order. Even if a member of the Third Estate became affluent enough
to equal the riches of the aristocracy or nobility, it would be improbable that he would be accepted as a
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
14
member of the Second Estate. It would be impossible to become a member of the nobility, unless a person
were to marry a blood relative of the King, and it would be difficult to assimilate into the aristocracy. Each
social order had its own customs, dress, and culture, and after June 22, 1664, the culture and lineage of
the aristocracy were protected by the King.16 The King would have to authorize a movement between the
Third and Second Estates and would have to be shown “authentic evidence of nobility dating to before
1560.”17 At this point, transcending entire orders became all but impossible.
It was not just movement between orders that was difficult, but even moving to a higher sub-order
was an incredibly arduous process. Social power in the sub-orders of the Third Estate derived from a
combination of economic resources and connections available to a member of a particular sub-order.
Therefore, people strove to earn as much money as possible and tried to network with the most powerful
people they could. Through wealth and networking, they would theoretically be able to obtain better jobs
and a better quality of life. In practice, there were many more factors that slowed social climbing than
factors that aided it. Eventually, it would be possible to transcend sub-orders, but this took generations
to accomplish. As Roland Mousnier points out, social climbing does not depend on what can be acquired
for oneself in a lifetime; rather, “everything depends on what a man can acquire for his children.”18 The
process of accruing enough funds to advance took as many as nine generations in some documented
examples. It was not a matter of working hard for a couple years; it was a concentrated effort in each
family over generations to advance, for example, from a casual worker to an artisan or craftsman.
The process of earning money and networking was further complicated by gender dynamics and
lack of education. Women were mostly limited to raising families and working inside the home; their
domain was very limited. Thus the burden of advancing was put almost entirely on the men of the
family. The only factor that could aid in social promotion was education. An elementary education alone
theoretically could help to improve quality of life; however, there were further disincentives to obtaining
an elementary education. The free schools provided by the Jesuits required eight hours of study per day
for six to seven days of the week.19 This prohibited working outside of school. Families living in cities
had very high expenses: food, drink, and shelter were much more expensive in urban areas than in more
rural areas. To become financially viable while living in cities, many would have pushed their children to
work or take on an apprenticeship. The required and free elementary schools would not allow children
to earn necessary income for their families to live comfortably in the city. Even if a family could afford
the opportunity cost of elementary education, the positions in higher social orders (everything from
financiers to doctors) required higher education. For those who could afford it, an advanced education
might help them to rise to the highest sub-orders of the Third Estate. Those who were too poor to attend
these private universities or to hire personal tutors had little choice but to remain in their sub-order.
Essentially, due to a lack of opportunities to climb the social ladder, workers would not be able to
advance in their own generations. The best one could hope for would be to make enough money during one’s
lifetime to fund a child’s education or apprenticeship, allowing him or her to advance to a higher sub-order.
A modern perspective would hold that France operated as a regressive political system, oppressing
the poor and maintaining the power of the rich. However, those in power in early modern France would
praise the French social order for its effectiveness: it was designed to keep individuals within their orders
so that the nobility, the aristocracy, the clergy, and the King’s socio-economic and political power were not
threatened.20 The value placed on French fealty descended from feudalism; the discontentment caused
by the Third Estate’s inability to progress socially would render social struggles between orders not just
common, but inevitable.
French fealty was something that every member of society understood implicitly. This is precisely
why Molière used it as the basis of the conflicts in his plays: everyone could understand the many levels
of complexity because these plays partially paralleled reality. This is why the antagonists are all of higher
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
15
political and social status than the protagonists, the young lovers. This struggle not only represented the
battle between love and societal politics, but represented the clashes and irreverence between the lower
orders and the higher orders. Even in plays where there are no clear antagonists, Molière still lampoons
all classes. In La Jalousie du Barbouillé (The Jealousy of Barbouillé), Molière criticizes the upper classes (in
this case a doctor) for their separation from reality. There is a massive argument among all characters in
this play in scene 6, and the doctor is accidentally tripped while lecturing the other characters. The stage
directions insist:
In the midst of all this, LE BARBOUILLÉ ties the DOCTOR by the legs with a rope,
throws him down on his back, and drags him away; the DOCTOR goes on talking all
the time, and counts all his arguments on his fingers, as if he were not on the ground.21
Meanwhile, Molière portrays the characters from a lower social order as incapable of resolving their
own problems: the tension is unresolved at the end of the play because the characters refuse to play nonzero-sum games with each other.
GORGIBUS. Well! Come, come, try to agree together, and ask her to forgive you.
BARBOUILLÉ. I ask her to forgive me! I had rather the devil flew off with her. I am in
such a terrible rage, I hardly know what to do.
GORGIBUS. Come, daughter, kiss your husband, and be friends.22
This is the closest to resolution that these characters come. Molière uses the upper and lower orders’
inability to cooperate and play zero-sum games as the basis of his argument that the French social order is
ineffective because it does not allow people to advance. However, he also uses it as the basis of his social
commentary that the French social order does not allow people to capitalize on their talents and abilities.
HOW TO CALCULATE RATES OF CAPITALIZATION, BASELINE MEASUREMENTS
The concept of social capitalization is relatively new. In fact, it is so new that there are no standards
defining an acceptable rate or the cutoff point for an unacceptably low rate of capitalization. A severe lack
of empirical data from early modern France with which one could actually compute levels of capitalization
compounds this problem, making it even more difficult to make judgments about the efficiency of the
French social order. Instead of proposing a universal cutoff percentage, which does not take into account
the contexts of each situation, it would be more helpful to use a comparative system. In theory, a society
with a greater amount of choice in professions would allow for greater capitalization.23 Workers would be
able to choose their occupations based on their talents, existing skills, and experience. This would lead
to the most efficient allocation of resources and would result in an optimal level of social capitalization.
An example of a society closest to this description would be the modern United States. By comparing an
idealized system with that of the French social order, it would be possible to make inferences as to the
levels of capitalization that could be achieved in the French social order.
The principle of choice is at the foundation of many modern Western technocratic societies, and the
epitome of this societal infrastructure is the modern United States. The public education system allows
people to be sufficiently prepared for any career that one might pursue. This infrastructure allows workers
not only to choose the industry that best fits them, but also, by offering them the option of returning
to school at any time, to grow with the industry. While industry-wide measures of capitalization have
not been calculated, there is reason to believe that the number is relatively high. At present, the United
States has the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP, a measure for the production of goods and services)
of any country in the world. At 13.81 trillion dollars, the United States accounts for a full 25% of the
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
16
value of all goods and services available worldwide.24 This is an astoundingly high number, but there are
other countries that have large GDPs as well. For example, the second-ranked economy in the world
is the People’s Republic of China, with a Gross Domestic Product of 7.06 trillion dollars.25 However, to
accurately compute capitalization rates, it is necessary to consider the populations for each country. The
United States produces $13.81 trillion with 301 million people; the People’s Republic of China produces
$7.06 trillion with 1,318 million people.26 Based on this measure of capitalization, the U.S. obviously
has a higher rate of capitalization than China; the U.S. can produce almost twice as many products and
services with almost five times fewer workers!27
Despite the U.S.’s (and most Western societies’) generally high capitalization rates, there are certain
industries that provide valuable lessons as to what decreases rates of capitalization. Some shocking
examples, exposed in Malcolm Gladwell’s newest book Outliers, were in the sports-entertainment industry
and education. Two economists, Kelly Bedard and Elizabeth Dhuey, found that the way students were
selected for advanced programs in elementary and middle schools effectively lowered the rate of social
capitalization in education. As they explained in Outliers:
We do ability grouping early on in childhood. We have advanced reading groups and
advanced math groups… [but] the teachers are confusing maturity with ability. And
they put the older kids in the advanced stream, where they learn better skills; and the
next year, because they are in the higher groups, they do even better; and the next year,
the same things happens [sic], and they do even better again. The only country we don’t
see this going on is Denmark. They have a national policy where they have no ability
grouping until the age of ten.28
By analyzing test scores on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, the authors
found that “among fourth graders, the oldest children scored somewhere between four and twelve
percentile points better than the younger children [in the same fourth grade class]…That’s the difference
between qualifying for a gifted program and not.”29 In this case, within the educational system of East
Memphis, the infrastructure of the school favored some students while discriminating against equally
qualified and talented students, thereby lowering the capitalization rate. When this type of infrastructure
was studied at the college level, it was found that younger students were underrepresented by 11.4%,
meaning the infrastructure led to a total rate of capitalization of 88.6% for young students (as opposed
to 100% for older students).
Perhaps the greatest modern example of inefficient capitalization can be found in a study Malcolm
Gladwell cited in a speech given to the Pop Tech! conference in 2008. Gladwell related the story of an
educator who awards scholarships for gifted middle grade students in Los Angeles. One fact he found was
that gifted students often couldn’t attend their middle and high schools:
The problem with this particular [poor high school] I work with is that the high school
that the kids go to requires them to cross gang lines. And as a result, basically none of the
boys can go to high school. So then [the] cap[italization] rate in that community, in Los
Angeles, one of the richest societies in the world, is 0.30
These examples illustrate that poor infrastructure, especially combined with poverty, can dramatically
lower the capitalization rate in a society. This can happen in any society, even in the United States, a society
with a strong focus on choice, opportunity, and both social and private programs to combat poverty.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
17
PRINCIPLES OF CAPITALIZATION APPLIED TO EARLY MODERN FRANCE
When looking at the problems of infrastructure and capitalization in early modern France, it is
apparent that the rigid system of social hierarchies would have had a devastating effect on the level of
social capitalization in nearly every facet of the economy. The first factor to consider is the role of women
in society. Women may have been educated as children, but they were not accepted in work places
outside of the home. A few women of the artisan class were able to work alongside their husbands at
skilled trades, but these outliers are few and far between. No matter what talents women had, they were
generally not allowed to exploit them outside the home, and therefore their rate of capitalization in early
modern France was certainly very low.
The capitalization rates of men would have been higher, but not necessarily by much. There were
many constraints on a man’s choice of occupation. Families often were in the same line of work for
generations, and men often continued in the family business when first entering the work force, in part
because doing so involved the fewest barriers and the least amount of additional training. In addition, the
worker could network among established customers and suppliers and could enjoy the reputation already
established by the family. Taking up a different trade meant slowing the family’s economic progress (new
investment would be needed to launch a new business) and often losing their pre-existing networks.31
Even if familial pressures were not significant factors, a worker would still be constrained by his
social order. It took generations to advance from one sub-order to another; any possibility outside of the
order was not an option. Even without this constraint, the available job options were limited by one’s
education or lack thereof. Both the intense competition for and the high cost of higher education served
to discourage applicants who wished to advance to the highest sub-orders of the Third Estate. Most did
not have the money or the ability to complete such an expensive and rigorous set of studies. Given these
three constraints, the capitalization rate in France must have been very poor.
MOLIÈRE’S EXPERIENCE WITH PRINCIPLES OF CAPITALIZATION
Molière perhaps knew better than anyone the pressures and lack of social capitalization faced by
new workers entering the work force. Molière’s father was a marchand tapissier (upholstery merchant)
who, through years of hard work and networking, was eventually granted a royal office. In 1631, he was
named the tapissier ordinaire du roi, meaning he ensured that the King’s bedroom was fully furnished and
hired carpenters to repair furniture when the furnishings were damaged.32 This was a position that, if
Molière had cooperated and continued to work for years for the King, might have allowed a transition
into the aristocracy (the lower sub-order of the Second Estate).
When Molière finished his primary education at the Collège de Clermont, he was offered his father’s
position as the tapissier ordinaire du roi. However, Molière refused social promotion in order to become an
actor instead. It was apparent that Molière’s father was desperate to change his son’s mind: “Jean Poquelin
[Molière’s father], desperate to persuade [Molière] to give up the foolish notion of becoming an actor,
sent him to a former teacher who—the father believed—still had some authority over the boy.”33 In a
rather shocking act of defiance, Molière transferred the title of tapissier ordinaire du roi back to his father
for the sum of 630 livres and used the money to form the Illustre Théâtre.34
Becoming an actor in early modern France was socially undesirable for many reasons, not only
decreasing one’s social status to the lowest levels of the Third Estate, but foreclosing the possibility of
advancement for one’s offspring. According to the common wisdom of the time, by choosing to become
an actor, Molière was rejecting all of the work that his family had done over many generations while also
limiting the potential social status of future generations of the Poquelin family. However, Molière was
not operating under the assumptions of the traditional French social order. Molière could have chosen
to work as a tapissier ordinaire du roi, a position for which he had no real ability or talent. Instead, he
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
18
chose to work as a playwright and actor—something for which it is now obvious that Molière had a great
amount of talent.
Initially Molière did quickly fall down the social order to the lower Third Estate. However, in
choosing to follow his dreams and pursue a position for which he was actually qualified, he developed his
talent for writing, trickery, and cooperation. Using these skills, Molière was able to advance to the Second
Estate in less than 20 years; in fact, by doing something for which he had talent, Molière advanced to the
Second Estate faster than if he had originally retained the office of tappissier ordinaire du roi. It was a most
unusual path, but Molière realized that his talent and skill, combined with his ability to accommodate the
higher orders, would allow him to make powerful connections, earn significant amounts of money, and
ascend to power very quickly in early modern France.
The concept of rising in the social hierarchy was so integral to Molière’s paradigm that it was carefully
integrated into every play he wrote. Most notably, this technique is used by the character that most closely
parallels Molière: the “actor.” Every character that can be described as an “actor” is of very high intelligence
but has been relegated to a low sub-order in the Third Estate. Elmire from Tartuffe, Cléonte from Le Bourgeois
Gentilhomme, and Cléante from Le Malade Imaginaire all portray the simplest form of the actor: they simply
conceal their true identity to gain the upper hand against the antagonists. While also fitting the characteristics
of the “actor,” Sganarelle from Le Médecin Volant and Scapin from Les Fourberies de Scapin are more extreme
than Elmire, Cléante, and Cléonte in their actions, and thus represent the most extreme version of the actor:
the trickster. Tricksters and actors both construct elaborate deceptions and plots in which they convince the
tricked person, against his will, into cooperating with them. Often, these characters imitate the gestures,
customs, and actions of a higher social order. In nearly every case, the imitation is so skillfully performed
and effective that the trickster is believed to be of a higher social order than he or she actually is. Finally, each
actor or trickster is employed in a position in which he or she is not able to use his or her intelligence, skills,
or talents, just as Molière would not have been able to use his intelligence or skills as a tappissier ordinaire du
roi. Molière seemed to identify closely with each of the actor and trickster characters in his plays, not only
constructing their personalities from his own but also casting himself to play their roles.
As we watch one of Molière’s tricksters carefully construct a deception, it quickly becomes apparent
that the trickster is talented and cunning. Why is this trickster not working in a position better suited to
his skills? With every trickster, there is a fundamental disconnect between his occupation and his talent.
Sganarelle, the trickster from Le Médecin Volant, works as a hired hand for Valère. In the second scene of
the play, Sganarelle states what he is capable of doing as a hired hand:
Valère. Ah! my poor Sganarelle, how glad I am to see you! I want your help in a most
important business, but as I do not know what you can do …
Sganarelle. What I can do, sir? Only make use of me in your more important business,
in things of consequence: for instance, send me to see what time it is by the clock; send
me to the market to ask the price of butter; send me to water a horse; it is then that you
will be able to judge of my talents.35
At no point does Sganarelle even realize that he has the ability to imitate the more learned doctor of
the land. When Valère suggests the trick, Sganarelle scoffs at him:
I, a doctor, sir! I am ready to do all you please, but as for being a doctor, I say no; I am
your servant, I will be nothing of the kind. I ask you how I should set about it; goodness
me, sir, you are only laughing at me.36
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
19
One may suppose that Sganarelle was born into the fifth sub-order of the Third Estate (manual
labor), and thus never had an opportunity to explore his talents. His job is menial at best, limited to
checking for the price of butter or telling his master the time. However, he not only manages to “perfectly”
impersonate a doctor (even an attorney could not tell the difference), but also, at the end of the trick, uses
his low sub-order to his advantage to avoid punishment.
Scapin is another classic example of a low-order trickster with an extraordinary intelligence and savoirfaire. Scapin essentially has the lowest sub-order possible in French society: he is a known trickster and was
exiled from society. However, not only is he charismatic and clever enough to trick everyone, but eventually,
by the end of the play, he has taken a seat at the head of the table. Not even attempting to hide the fact, he
proclaims, “And you, take me to the head of the table; it is there I will await death.”37 This proclamation of
superiority only emphasizes Scapin’s usefulness; although he is far from benevolent, he is a cunning ruler.
How is it that these talented tricksters are still in such low social sub-orders? Would it not make more
sense for them to make some greater contribution to society? There is evidence that Molière considered
this very question and proposed an answer. In the last scene of Le malade imaginaire, after multiple tricks
involving every character, the young lover Cléante is given permission to marry Angélique. However,
Argan imposes one condition: Cléante must study to become a doctor.
Argan. Well, let him become a doctor, and I will consent to the marriage. (To Cléante)
Yes, turn doctor, Sir, and I will give you my daughter.
Cléante. Very willingly, Sir, if it is all that is required to become your son-in-law. I will
turn doctor; apothecary also, if you like. It is not such a difficult thing after all, and I
would do much more to obtain from you the fair Angélique.38
There is never a question about Cléante’s intellectual ability to become a doctor, nor about his
competence practicing as a doctor. Argan and the rest of the characters see that Cléante is fit to be a doctor
and allow him to contribute his skill, intelligence, and talent in a way that was previously impossible.
However, Molière then adds another layer to the play: Argan’s brother suggests that Argan study to be a
doctor as well, so that he may treat himself. Argan then questions his own ability to be a doctor:
Argan. I imagine, brother, that you are laughing at me. Can I study at my age?
Ber. Study! What need is there? You are clever enough for that; there are a great many
who are not a bit more clever than you are.39
While Cléante’s trickery was recognized as a skill set that could be used in a socially productive way,
Molière lampoons the requirements needed to attend higher educational systems by suggesting that Argan
would make an equally productive doctor, despite having little of the skill and intelligence that Cléante has.
Molière is suggesting two things quite explicitly in this last scene. First, because of the social order,
those who are able to do well in a given profession are often not recognized for their talents or permitted
to practice them. Second, those who are permitted by the social order to obtain the training for and to
practice in a given profession may not be the best people for the job. Their skill set may not qualify them
for the job they have. It is only social custom and the networking that custom facilitates that allow these
people to receive training. Molière himself was a lucky outlier; he was able to receive recognition for his
abilities as a playwright and comedic actor, despite his relatively low social order when he first moved to
Paris in the early 1660’s.40 Molière must have realized at some point that many talented and skilled people
were not as lucky as he.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
20
Conclusion: Molière’s Resolution, or Lack Thereof
There is still one problem left to answer: if one assumes that Molière did advocate greater capitalization
through meritocracy, is there anything in his writings that points towards an unequivocal solution to
be implemented to increase capitalization or the play of non-zero sum games? Unfortunately, a single
solution wouldn’t be possible. There is always an inherent conflict between what Molière says and the
conclusions of his plays. He stated in his dedication to Louis XIV in Tartuffe that his role was to present
a moralizing tale to correct vice. In Tartuffe, he supposedly wrote to discourage hypocrisy, and thus he
attempted to demonstrate that hypocrites would be punished by the King. In Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme,
he supposedly attempted to demonstrate the absurdity and futility of social climbing. On the surface,
he would have preserved the status quo. But the actions of the characters and resolution of these plays
indicated something entirely different: society can be corrupt, discriminatory, and in order to have a
properly functioning and productive society, the corruption needed to be corrected.
As always with Molière, it is nearly impossible to obtain a definitive view of his true opinions. As a
trickster, he dealt exclusively in subtleties, nuances, and ambiguities; if he took a direct stand against a
social or economic issue, he might alienate the network that he struggled to create over the years. What
can be shown is that the concepts of capitalization and meritocracy were integral to the way that Molière
lived in seventeenth century France. Even though economic theory had not yet been developed, it helps
illuminate the concepts by which Molière lived and that were directly responsible for his meteoric rise
in status and power: a combination of the exploitation of his talent and the play of non-zero-sum games.
Moreover, the actions and outcomes of his own unusual story seem to mirror those of the characters
with which Molière most identified, the tricksters. It is true that Molière’s social commentaries are by
their very nature subtly developed and his morals seemingly ambivalent, but these ambiguities served
the purpose of preserving his status and network. Looking deeper, the connections between his life and
writings suggest a less ambivalent answer: Molière in fact was advocating the widespread play of nonzero-sum games and exploiting the available talent inherent in all people.
Molière did not have to take the role of a social engineer to be significant or to effect societal change.
He just had to fulfill his role as a trickster. Tricksters are found in the mythologies and folklores of nearly
every culture. They are pervasive precisely because the role of the trickster is one of the most important
in all societies. The trickster takes the absurdity of the society and uses absurdity to society’s advantage,
critiquing its morals and economic values. This criticism exposes the corruption and discriminatory
practices of society—particularly the upper classes—and the tricksters give strength and hope to the
oppressed until society can correct itself. All tricksters are special in their contexts, but what makes
Molière stand out is that his plays are applicable in so many contexts. Molière was prophetic in regard
not only to early modern France but to modern society as well. Much has changed since Molière’s death
in 1673. The field of economics was created, social climbing is now regarded positively in most Western
societies, and people are playing more non-zero-sum games now than ever before. Despite these changes,
an economic analysis of Molière’s commentary reveals more areas upon which to improve. Modern society
is not perfect: there are still many situations where modern society squanders the talents of its citizens,
and though people are playing more non-zero-sum games, most business interactions are approached
primarily as zero-sum games. Perfection may never be reached, but at least one can take solace that
further studies of Molière’s social commentary will continue to expose societal defects, gently guiding
society towards better, more efficient resolutions, one at a time.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Molière, Game Theory and Capitalization:
An Economic Analysis
21
Acknowledgments
Writing this thesis was a collaborative experience involving the efforts and responses of many
people. I would particularly like to thank Professor Noah Guynn, who introduced me to my passion of
medieval French literature, and contributed so many brilliant ideas, references, and questions during
the writing of this thesis. I would also like to thank Professor Julia Simon for her guidance, support,
and stunning insights into the political and cultural structures of early modern France. I would like to
extend many thanks to Professor Robert Feenstra for introducing me to game theory and for grounding
me with the economic principles needed to analyze seventeenth century France. I would like to thank
Mark Hoyer, who worked with me tirelessly to edit and perfect this thesis for publication. While all
those mentioned have contributed to an improved final manuscript, none is, of course, responsible for
remaining weaknesses. As with any academic work, there will likely be errors, omissions, and oversimplifications, for which I alone take full responsibility. It is my hope that the remaining material will be
sufficient to stimulate new insights into early modern French drama, literature and economics.
And finally, I would like to express my unending gratitude to my parents, best friend and academic
colleagues at the University of California, Davis, whose support, advice and good will kept me going
through the writing of this thesis. Without you all, none of this would have been possible. Thank you all.
Notes
1.Molière, L’Avare, I.v.49-50, 53-4. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of Molière’s works will refer to the edition located
at www.toutmolière.net and to Charles H. Wall’s translation accessible at www.gutenburg.org.
2.Named after John F. Nash, who developed this economic game theory methodology in 1950. See: Martin J. Osborne, An
Introduction to Game Theory. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2004. Pages 2-3
3.Roland Mousnier, Social Hier John F. Nash, who developed this economic game theory methodology in 1950. See: Martin
J. Osborne, An Introduction to Gaerarchies: 1450 to the Present (London: Croom-Helm, 1969), p. 79.
4.Robert Wright, “One World, Under God,” The Atlantic, April 2009, 53.
5.Roland Mousnier, État et Société en France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Les Cours de la Sorbonne (Paris: La Sorbonne, 1969),
p.16
6.Mousnier, Etat et Société, p. 3.
7.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 73.
8.Scott, Molière, p. 13.
9.Malcolm Gladwell, “Capitalization and Outliers.” Pop!Tech 2008, Lexus, Yahoo.com, Owls Head, October 28, 2008.
10.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 70-71.
11.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 11.
12.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, pp. 68-69.
13.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 69.
14.Scott, Molière, p. 17.
15.Scott, Molière, p. 30.
16.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 73.
17.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 73.
18.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 84.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009
Michael Edward Mason Dean
22
19.Scott, Molière, p. 17.
20.Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, pp. 78-79.
21.Molière, La Jalousie, 6.76-80.
22.Molière, La Jalousie, 12.12-15.
23.See Gladwell, “Capitalization.”
24.The World Bank, “Key Development Data & Statistics.” http://go.worldbank.org/1SF48T40L0 (accessed April 25, 2009).
25.The World Bank, “Data Profile: China.” ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=1&REPORT_
ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N (accessed April 25, 2009).
26.See The World Bank, “Key Development.”
27.While some of the difference in GDP per capita may be due to better technology in the US economy, we also have a surplus
of workers who are skilled in the technology used to produce goods and services. The technology would not have any effect
without a sufficiently high rate of capitalization of workers to take advantage of the technology.
28.Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success (New York: Little, Brown, 2008), pp. 28-9.
29. Gladwell, Outliers, pp.28.
30.See Gladwell, “Capitalization.”
31.Scott, Molière, p. 18.
32.Scott, Molière, p. 12.
33.Scott, Molière, p. 18.
34.Scott, Molière, p. 32.
35.Molière, Le médecin volant, 2.1-8.
36.Molière, Le médecin volant, 2.10-13.
37.Molière, Les Fourberies de Scapin, 3.13.38-9.
38.Molière, Le malade imaginaire, 3.14.27-31.
39.Molière, Le malade imaginaire, 3.14-36-9.
40.Scott, Molière, p. 89.
Explorations: An Undergraduate Research Journal

2009