Michael Walzer's Just War Theory: Some Issues of Responsibility
Author(s): Igor Primoratz
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 5, No. 2, Pardoning Past Wrongs (Jun., 2002),
pp. 221-243
Published by: Springer
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IGOR PRIMORATZ
MICHAEL WALZER'S JUSTWAR THEORY:
SOME ISSUES OF RESPONSIBILITY
ABSTRACT.
empts
In his widely
soldiers
conscripted
(the thesis
unjust
of
ex
statement
of just war theory, Michael
Walzer
all responsibility
for taking part in war, whether
just or
ma
of soldiers").
He endows
the overwhelming
equality
influential
from
the "moral
jority of civilians with almost absolute immunity from military attack on the ground that
they aren't
responsible
for the war
their country
is waging,
whether
just or unjust.
I argue
thatWalzer ismuch too lenient on both soldiers and civilians. Soldiers fighting for a just
cause
for an unjust one are not morally
fighting
propor
equal. A substantial
are responsible,
in a democracy
to a significant
for their coun
degree,
war. Moreover,
some of them
under certain
rare) circumstances,
(admittedly
and
soldiers
tion of civilians
try's unjust
are legitimate
on settling moral
attack. This has bearing
accounts
in
targets of military
the wake
of war and the issue of forgiving
the wrongs
done
in its course: possible
candi
are much more
numerous
dates for such forgiveness
than is usually
assumed.
KEY WORDS:
responsibility
civilian
immunity,
ethics
conscription,
of war,
just war
theory,
soldiers,
of, war
1. Introduction
trying to settle the complex and painful question of forgiving past
about the equally complex
wrongs, we must try to get as clear as possible
and unpleasant
of
Just
who is responsible
for the
problem
responsibility:
In what sense? To what degree?
that are to be forgiven?
wrongs
In this paper Iwish to discuss some of the issues of the latter sort. I pro
Before
pose to do so in the context of international military
cause these issues are raised in a particularly
serious
the course of such conflict and in its aftermath.
be
conflict, mostly
and poignant way in
moral theologians,
and legal schol
Together with many philosophers,
ars, I believe the best approach to the ethics of war is that of just war theory.
seems very attractive. Realism
None of the alternatives
is quite implausi
more
ble (and,
often than not, self-serving
too). The utilitarian
approach
to the ethics of war, just as to other areas of moral
is compro
concern,
mised
Pacifism
is a noble phi
by an array of unacceptable
implications.
one
but
that
in
the
face of utterly
proves dangerously
losophy,
otherworldly
or
unrestrained oppression
aggression. The most promising position on war,
then, is that some wars
Ethical
*
?
2002
Theory
Kluwer
are morally
and Moral
Academic
Practice
Publishers.
justified,
5: 221-243,
Printed
that awar
ismorally
2002.
in the Netherlands.
justified
222
IGOR PRIMORATZ
of the justice of war is provided by
of this paper.
for the purposes
of the theory in his Just and Unjust Wars
if it is just, and that the best account
just war theory. Or so I shall assume
Michael
Walzer's
statement
it has generated have been given the pride
(Walzer, 2000)
In
of war in the last two decades.
of place in discussions
of the morality
of both strong and weak points
the course of this debate, our understanding
and the debate
have been greatly
issues themselves
of just war theory and of the moral
are
further
invite
This paper
there
that
discussion.
advanced.
Still,
topics
a
on
one
to
at
I
wish
take
critical
look
the
such topic.
focuses
way Walzer's
raised by war.
theory copes with some issues of responsibility
It
of war under two headings.
Just war theory deals with the morality
a
are
to
to
decision
for
what
the
conditions
asks, first,
go
morally
justified
war
(jus ad helium) and, second, what may and may not be done in the
course of waging war (jus in bello). Under the first heading
the theory sets
a number of conditions;
themost important by far is that the cause for which
a state goes to war be just. In our time, this usually means
that the war
some
one
authors
of defense against aggression;
be
(Walzer is one)
the second heading,
add a narrowly defined right of intervention. Under
must
is that only legitimate
the paramount principle
targets (soldiers and a nar
be
class
of
circumscribed
attacked. The
deliberately
civilians) may
rowly
are
two
set
of
the
the
conditions
prongs
theory
mutually
independent:
by
whether your cause is just or not, you can fight for it in a 'clean' or 'dirty'
the justice
way. And
of your cause doesn't
absolve
you of the duty to fight
'clean'.
In the next
section
Iwill
look
into Walzer's
view
of the responsibility
In section 3 Iwill dis
in an unjust war.
for their participation
of civilians for the unjust war waged
of the responsibility
I
will
Walzer
is too lenient on both, and that
their
that
argue
country.
by
a
more
are
reasons
for
view.
there
demanding
good
adopting
of soldiers
cuss his account
2. Soldiers
and illegitimate
targets in war is,
legitimate
the claim is
More
soldiers
and
civilians.
accurately,
roughly,
that soldiers and a certain class of civilians may be deliberately
attacked,
to soldiers and those ci
while other civilians may not. The trait common
The
distinction
between
that between
are legitimate
is that they are "cur
targets of deadly violence
in
business
of
the
war"
(Walzer, 2000, p. 43). Other civilians
rently engaged
so engaged, and consequently
?that is, the overwhelming
majority?aren't
vilians who
mustn't
be attacked.
MICHAEL WALZER'S
223
JUSTWAR THEORY
to be conscripted
themselves
and thereby made dangerous
By allowing
to others, soldiers lose this immunity. In this respect there is no difference
between
soldiers fighting for a just cause and those fighting for an unjust
one. This
isWalzer's
thesis
of "the moral
diers who, as he puts it, "don't fight freely"
"license to kill", which
is "the first and most
equality of soldiers". All sol
are equal: they have an equal
important of their war rights"
(Walzer, 2000, p. 36). This license and the equality with regard to it are
based on the fact that they don't participate
in war of their own free will,
but have been conscripted
into it and accordingly
aren't responsible/or
it.
war.
are
To be sure, they
In other words,
for what they do in
responsible
they are exempt
those that make
Walzer
making
another
from the requirements
up jus in bello.1
but are bound
of jus ad helium,
by
explains and supports this thesis in several steps. He sets out by
one
the general claim that when
soldiers fight freely, choosing
as enemies,
their war is no crime; when
they don't fight freely,
their war
In the latter case we
isn't their crime.
war
for which
itself,
individual soldier
soldiers
aren't
inwar, for which
ambiguous: Walzer
responsible,
the individual
the
between
distinguish
and the actions of each
remains
responsible. But
the question
of responsi
this is clearly
is conflating
war
for
the
with
the question of an individual's
respon
bility
being fought
an
no
for
in
it.
While
individual
soldier
bear
may
sibility
participating
to
to
for
decision
his
that
doesn't
show
war,
go
responsibility
country's
that he isn't responsible
for taking part in it.
Walzer brings up the case of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who fought
for a morally
indefensible
cause, but fought well, not only from the mili
tary, but from the moral point of view
kill enemy soldiers caught behind his
an order
he received
to
lines rather than taking them pris
he is appreciated
and indeed praised for fighting
and foe alike. Itwould be odd to praise him for that, unless
to blame him for the war itself. Otherwise
he is simply a crimi
oner, he ignored
'clean', by friend
one refused
too. When
it.Now
nal, and all the killing he does ismurder, whether he kills enemy soldiers
in the field, or POWs, or enemy civilians. But we don't think of him in
sense only against the background
of the view
these terms. This makes
that soldiers must
adhere
to the rules of jus
the requirements
of jus ad helium.
there is no inconsistency
However,
in bello,
in blaming
but aren't bound
Rommel
by
for x, while
praising him for y: blaming him for taking part inWorld War II,while
*For an earlier
1980. My
of Walzer's
critique
discussion
in this section
account
is indebted
of the responsibility
to Coady's
fine
of soldiers,
paper.
see Coady,
224
IGOR PRIMORATZ
in accordance with the rules of war. There are
him for fighting
are
and there
and there are different degrees of wrongdo
wrongs,
praising
wrongs
ing too.
In Shakespeare's
Henry V(TV, i), a soldier says: "... We know enough
our obedi
If his cause be wrong,
know we are the king's subjects.
ence to the king wipes
the crime of it out of us." Walzer quotes these words
that both international
law and
with approval; they reflect the exemption
if we
common
grant
morality
them responsible
holding
Not
to soldiers
obedience
that [the soldier's]
with
for offenses
regard
against jus
can never
be criminal;
to jus
ad helium,
while
in bello:
for when
he violates
the rules
are his own; the
The atrocities
that he commits
orders are no defense.
superior
war
law and in ordinary moral
in international
is not. It is conceived,
both
judgment,
as the king's
not of individual
matter
of state policy,
business?a
volition,
except when
of war,
the individual is the king. (Walzer, 2000, p. 39)
Walzer
be right about international
law, but I am not at all sure about
well
of
be right to suspect Walzer
Indeed, Coady may
morality.
own
them
additional weight by declaring
his
opinions undeserved
may
common
"giving
stock of moral wisdom"
part of the common
(Coady, 1980, p. 279). More
in
of the state prevalent
over, this view is at odds with the understanding
in political philoso
modern Western
societies (albeit not quite as dominant
to this understanding,
today, unlike the times of Henry V,
phy). According
is a citizen, rather than a subject. The individual is conceived
The state is but a de
to the state, both conceptually
and morally.
and expensive
be sure, a very large, complex,
device, but a mere
?
the in
for protecting,
and perhaps also promoting,
nevertheless
the individual
as prior
vice?to
device
if the exemption
applies to jus ad helium,
Finally,
an
to
in
If
isn't respon
individual
it
hello
too?
jus
just why
apply
him to do so, why
sible for taking part in a war when the state commands
does he remain responsible
for what he does when carrying out the state's
terests
of its citizens.
doesn't
commands
in the course
Walzer
proceeds
conscript must decide
the fore six points.
of fighting?
to take a closer
look at the circumstances
and act. Careful
reading
of his discussion
in which
a
brings
to
(1) The individual isn't asked if he wants to join, but is simply drafted; his
by the state. And he must
to be drafted and to fight.
life is "nationalized"
should he refuse
(2) Army service isn't merely
imposed
isn't all there is to it. There
volved
reckon with
punishment
on the individual;
the coercion
"moral
is also the individual's
in
in
MICHAEL WALZER'S
vestment"
225
JUSTWAR THEORY
in the state. I take this tomean
the individual's
belief
in the
authority and binding force of law in general and the conscrip
tion law in particular.
the individual's
love of and loyalty
(3) There is also the pull of patriotism,
to his country.
moral
(4) It is difficult for the individual to know with certainty the justice of his
country's cause. But if he isn't sure that the cause is twjust, he ought to
fight in spite of his doubts. If a citizen's doubts about the justice of the
war his country is waging were reason enough to absolve him of the
duty to fight, the state would be in grave peril.
(5) It takes courage to doubt the state's
to doubt them in public.
particular
(6) We must take into account the youth
bly young" when drafted
to make a moral decision
This
reasons
for going
to war,
and in
of conscripts. They are so "terri
that "they can hardly be said
and sent to war
at all" (Walzer,
2000,
p. 40).
is amixed
bag. Most points, if valid, support the claim that a soldier
for an unjust cause should be excused,
rather than blamed. For
fighting
they refer either
or to other ways
to coercion,
in which
the individual's
to
is
said
diminished.
the bottom
be
However,
responsibility
significantly
of
line
the difficulty of knowing with certainty that one's
point (4)?about
cause is just ? is that if one has doubts, but isn't sure that his
country's
country's war
fight for one's
one ought to fight for it. But then, if one ought to
in
country
spite of doubts about its cause, then it is right to
in
of
such
doubts.
And if so, there is no need for excuses. There
fight
spite
fore, point (4), if valid, would make all the other points redundant. This
ismerely
suggests that on amore charitable
interpretation, Walzer
saying
is unjust,
that if the individual
puts the doubts aside and fights for his country, he
for doing so.2
Let me comment on each of Walzer's
six points. Iwish to argue, first,
that if they were valid, they would prove too much: they would excuse the
individual soldier not only with regard tojus ad helium, but with regard to
shouldn't
be blamed
the rules of war
that make
that not one of them
up jus
is valid.
in bello
as well.
Second,
Iwant
to argue
an individual's
between
in an unjust war and
justifying
participation
it is compounded
to kill" as something
talk about the "license
all
by Walzer's
have.
In fact, on his view only soldiers who fight for a just cause can have such
a license. The correct wording
with regard to those fighting
for an unjust cause would
be
"the excuse
for killing".
2The confusion
excusing
soldiers
226
IGOR PRIMORATZ
were enough to excuse the individual for
(1) If the fear of punishment
the call-up and taking part in an unjust war, a soldier who of
answering
fended against the rules of war in the field when ordered to do so would
the same excuse.
have
to carry
for refusing
the punishment
If anything,
will more often than not be more severe than
out orders on the battlefield
one meted
But
out to a citizen who
refuses
the fact that an individual
to be drafted.
is ordered, rather than merely
invited, to
of doing
him from the responsibility
so. We
to
for
him
do
be morally
right
forces, can't release
to find out whether
itwould
the armed
join
his best
to do all manner
are constantly
of things by other individuals,
enjoined
are
we
groups, and institutions?and
always bound to do some moral think
and check whether we really ought, or indeed may, do
ing for ourselves
In this respect, the state has no special status that exempts
their bidding.
independent moral evaluation.
as well as groups and institutions who
other individuals,
Moreover,
back up their demands with penalties
would
tell us what to do, sometimes
it calls us to arms. But then,
So does the state, when
for noncompliance.
like to
the right thing to do and what comes naturally, or what one would
its commands
from
do, or what would be in one's interest
is a gap between what we are morally
to do, aren't the same. Indeed, there
required to do and what we would
do but for this requirement;
doing the right thing ordinarily has its price.
to pay varies with the importance
of the
should be willing
more
the
the
the
moral
the
higher
price
requirement,
important
requirement:
The price we
is right. Some moral
enjoin us to pay in order to do what
one is supposed
to
are
that
of
such
paramount
importance
imperatives
not
even
murder!"
is
at
shall
commit
life.
"You
one's
the
of
price
comply
one
what
will
be
But
that
is
most
the
obvious
exactly
example.
perhaps
even if the penalty
in the course of an unjust war. Therefore,
committing
may
morality
for refusing to be drafted for such a war is death, one must refuse. (On this
in a murder
law is at one with common morality:
case, a
point, criminal
is no defense. The law will admit it nei
threat to the life of the defendant
nor as the excuse of duress.) Actually,
of necessity,
ther as the justification
less severe. That
the penalty for refusing to be drafted is normally much
makes
it even
less plausible
unjust war.
(2) If the belief
an excuse
for taking part
in one's
country's
authority of law were enough to excuse the
also excuse him for
individual for taking part in an unjust war, it would
course
war
of
in
the
rules
of
the
offenses
it, when com
fighting
against
officer's
orders in the field have
under orders. The commanding
mitted
the same
enlist
in the moral
legal and moral backing
issued by the draft board.
in the law of the state as the order
to
MICHAEL WALZER'S
However,
either case.
the belief
in the moral
JUSTWAR THEORY
227
of law isn't a good excuse in
conscript believes he has amoral
authority
Itmay be true that the average
of his country, and therefore also
duty to obey the laws and authorities
believes he ought to join the armed forces when called up. This belief may
we do have a moral duty to obey the law and au
be mistaken. Whether
is the central question of modern political philosophy,
discussed
under the heading of 'political obligation',
and it is very much an open
one. I needn't
take up this question here; for Walzer's
is best
argument
thorities
as focusing
on the fact of belief, rather than on its truth. The
that he ought to obey, and this "moral investment"
in
believes
his country is said to excuse his participation
in its unjust war.
This won't
the theory behind the claim that one is
do. For whatever
construed
individual
bound to obey the law and authorities
of one's country, the claim
morally
to
to aprima facie
taken
refer
itself is, for obvious
reasons, always
duty,
an
one.
war
at issue is unjust, that is a moral
If the
rather than
absolute
one.
against taking part in it; and it is surely an overriding
the law and authorities
in such a case is killing and
command
in an unjust cause.
of human beings and all manner of destruction
maiming
to
If
the love of and loyalty
his country excused
the individual for
(3)
also excuse him for doing what
it
taking part in an unjust war, it would
consideration
For what
takes to win,
in his or the commanding
the armed
ism that gets one to join
reached the front line.
officer's
forces
view. The pull of patriot
cease once one has
needn't
But again, this excuse won't do in either case. The conscript may well
is an open issue inmoral
be a patriot. But like political obligation, patriotism
and political philosophy,
rather than an uncontroversial
starting point for
or excuses. Some philosophers
dispensing
justifications
reject all patriot
as
ism
incompatible with impartiality required by justice and with univer
are the philosophers
sal human
who
solidarity. At the other extreme
as the basis
patriotism
and
universalism
impartialism
present
of all true morality, while decrying moral
as unrealistic
at best and disingenuous
at
worst.
I have discussed
the moral
standing
of patriotism
elsewhere
(Primoratz,
2002); here Iwill merely say that I find both extreme positions implausi
ble.
I concur with
those philosophers
who argue that morality
allows for
concern
one's
for
love
of
and
for
country
patriotism':
special
that is constrained by basic, universal moral considerations.
The difference
'moderate
extreme and morally
indefensible
type of patriotism and itsmod
erate and morally
is
acceptable
variety
captured by two sayings. One is
short and very popular: "My country, right or wrong!" The other is a bit
If right, to
longer and not quite as popular: "My country, right or wrong!
between
228
IGOR PRIMORATZ
amoderate
to be set right!" Obviously,
patriot
to wage an unjust war as an occasion
decision
be kept right, and ifwrong,
will consider his country's
for doing his best to set itright, rather than following its call and joining it
in doing wrong.
(4) If it is difficult
to know with
certainty
whether
a war
one's
country
decides to fight is just, it is often no less difficult to know with certainty
an action on battlefield
one is ordered to perform ismorally
right.
as an excuse
in cases of the former type, it
If this difficulty
is accepted
should in consistency
be accepted as an excuse in cases of the latter type
whether
too.
this shouldn't be accepted as a sweeping excuse in either type
Actually,
too much of the difficulty
of case. Walzer makes much
of knowing with
cause
or
At
one's
whether
is
the most gen
certainty
country's
just
unjust.
can
is
eral level, it
be said that, surely, at least sometimes
such knowledge
In our time, the omnipresent
media have made
the problem
is going on and why much more tractable than itwas
available.
of
out what
finding
as inWorld War
recently
couldn't make
II. It can be said with
confidence
up their minds about the rights and wrongs
or Kosova,
or Chechenia,
or southern Lebanon,
in Bosnia,
that they could
ingenuous:
chose not to.3
have
found
as
that those who
of the conflicts
were
out all they needed
being dis
to know, but
even if we grant ? as we
is a separate point that can be made
?
our knowledge
Walzer's
about the
shouldn't
concerning
misgivings
cause.
an
our
matter:
War
is
serious
of
wag
country's
morality
extremely
means
in
it
and
and
wholesale
de
maiming
engaging
ing
killing
people
There
struction. Moreover,
than just ones. The
don't
know much
history shows that unjust wars are much more frequent
same conclusion
can be reached even by those who
one side is
about history. For there are wars in which
fighting for a just and the other for an unjust cause; there are wars
both sides are fighting for an unjust cause; but there are no wars
inwhich
in which
are just. In view of this, if the justice of one's country's
war is a moot point, shouldn't
rather than in
the presumption
be against,
favor of taking part in it?
both sides'
causes
claim that if an individual's
Finally, one can also question Walzer's
cause
are allowed as a good rea
doubts about the justice of his country's
cause may
to be
the justice
the judgment
about
need
of one's
country's
as a
What
and perhaps
revised
in view of subsequent
developments.
begins
war of defense
and expansion,
and the other way
later turn into one of conquest
may
a country may
but then fight
around. Then
go to war for a just cause,
'dirty' to
again,
such an extent
that its overall war effort
is seriously
compromised.
3To be
reconsidered
sure,
MICHAEL WALZER'S
229
JUSTWAR THEORY
son for his decision
not to fight for it, the state will be in great peril. One
can say that, on the contrary, the state will be in a great
an
peril if itwages
war
as
and loses,
itwell may. The price itwill then have to pay may
unjust
isn't there a great moral peril in the
prove very high indeed. Moreover,
to fight an unjust war?
state's decision
this point I should add a word of caution. What
I find unconvincing
move
isWalzer's
from the difficulties
of knowing with certainty that the
war one's country iswaging
excuse for soldiers who
is just to a sweeping
At
to deny that such
in it. I don't mean
participate
cases: that there are
valid excuse
inparticular
culpable belief in the justice of one's country's
many parts of the world
today this excuse is no
may prove a
of false, but in
cause. My point is that in
longer the rule, but rather
difficulties
instances
an exception.
the decision
of one's government
(5) If the lack of courage to question
to go to war were enough to excuse the individual
for taking part in an
war
same
then, by the
token, he should be excused for carrying out
unjust
an order to commit amorally wrong act in the field. For
one's
questioning
superior's
in the heat of battle will
orders
normally
take at least as much
courage.
toWalzer's
But my response
point (1) takes care of his point about
re
courage too: in order to do the morally
right thing, we are sometimes
a
measure
to
muster
a
of
and
sane,
mature,
courage. Suppose
quired
healthy
person tells us that he fights in an unjust war because he doesn't dare ques
we think that a poor excuse
tion the state's reasons for the war. Wouldn't
for killing and maiming
people and taking part in large-scale
a moral justification
without
for doing so?
destruction
If their age makes
them too young
(6)What of the youth of conscripts?
tomake moral decisions
about joining the armed forces, it also makes
them
too young to make moral decisions
in combat. For normally
they aren't
much older when sent to fight than they were when drafted.
But again, this isn't a valid excuse at all. If soldiers are minors, of course,
for their participation
in war; that is pre
they can't be held responsible
minors
be
mustn't
to enlist
drafted, and shouldn't be allowed
cisely why
If they aren't minors,
their youth doesn't exempt them from mak
own
their
moral
decisions
and being held responsible
for them and the
ing
actions that follow. Making
one's own decisions
and living with their con
either.
sequences
If what
scripted soldiers
ceed. An individual
of fighting
itmeans
to be a minor
no longer.
case for absolving
saying is correct, Walzer's
of moral responsibility
for taking part inwar doesn't
is just what
I have been
not only for what
is responsible
in a war, but also for his very participation
he does
con
suc
in the course
in it. Soldiers
fight
230
IGOR PRIMORATZ
for a just one are not morally
ing for an unjust cause and those fighting
equal. The former, unlike the latter, have no "license to kill" at all. Nor do
excuse for the killing
they have a sweeping
they do.4
3. Civilians
tenet of just war theory under the heading of jus in bello gives
civilians
attack. Walzer makes no at
immunity from deliberate military
is not
tempt to argue for this, and rightly so; for "the theoretical problem
to describe how immunity
is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune
The central
our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human re
(Walzer, 2000, p. 145 n.).5
lationships"
a legitimate
To be sure, one can forfeit this right and become
target of
attack. But one can forfeit it only through one's own action. In time of war,
to start with;
a soldier, by holding high
sees three ways of doing so: by becoming
office and taking part in decision-making
political
concerning war, or by
in an arms or ammunition
factory. In all these cases one is "cur
working
Walzer
in the business
rently engaged
4The practical
not
suggesting
import
that after
of
these
a war
one either fights,
of war":
conclusions
is over,
isn't
all soldiers
as radical
who
fought
or decides
as might
be
for the unjust
that
I am
thought.
cause should
be tried, and that all those who killed should be tried for murder. That would be a fur
for two reasons:
and indeed
unfeasible
ther, and extremely
step,
(a) the immense,
out just who did exactly what
in the course of war;
unsurmountable
difficulties
of finding
I am saying
What
refers to the moral
of jurisdiction.
(b) the obvious
judgment
problems
for having
about those who fought for an unjust cause and have no excuse
done so. Those
who
late
have
are murderers,
although
morally
speaking,
(To be sure, not all murders
legal judgment.
some of Walzer's
in some cases
points might
as might
Nor
is this claim quite as outlandish
killed
that into
this context,
cumstances.)
of some of the unpleasant
instance,
veterans
in the aftermath
ofthat war.
for
Another
possible
be thought at first blush. Think,
were
to Vietnam
saying
some Americans
things
would
misunderstanding
to trans
itmay not be possible
are equally morally
In
wrong.
as mitigating
be admitted
cir
be
to take what
I am
as undermin
saying
ing the claim (advanced byWalzer andmany others) thatjus ad bellum andjus in bello
are basically
mutually
independent.
soldiers
Although
fighting
for an unjust
cause
aren't
morally equal to soldiers fighting for a just one, that doesn't preclude our judging both in
terms
of jus
in bello
too. Our moral
of a soldier
judgment
fighting
'clean'
for an unjust
cause (say, of Erwin Rommel) will be less harsh than our judgment of a soldier who fights
cause and fights
for an unjust
'dirty'
discussion
of Walzer's
5For another
the problem
guerrilla
from
warfare,
a different
see Koontz
angle
(1997).
at that.
views
and
on
focusing
the immunity
the issues
on
of civilians,
of sieges,
approaching
and
blockades,
MICHAEL WALZER'S
others ought
to fight,
or provides
JUSTWAR THEORY
those who
fight with
the means
231
of fight
ing.
The
as "making a contribu
last phrase shouldn't be construed widely,
tion to the war effort". Many activities besides arms and ammunition
pro
duction are indispensable
for the war effort. An army needs not only to be
armed,
to be fed. Still, workers
in a food factory, even if all its
for
goes to the front, may not be attacked. For they are providing
as human beings, rather than as soldiers. Workers
in an arms fac
but also
produce
soldiers
it possible
tory, on the other hand, supply soldiers as soldiers:
they make
to
for them
fight.
as
The case of high political
officials might be thought controversial,
as
have
been
who
attacked.
classified
civilians
mustn't
be
they
traditionally
to go to war and inmajor po
in the decision
surely those implicated
litical decisions
related to pursuing it are as responsible
for it as those who
a
war
when
is fought, they too can be said
fight in the field. Accordingly,
Yet
to be "currently engaged
in the business of war"; thus they too are a legiti
of
violence.
The pre-Nuremberg
of sover
target
deadly
conceptions
are
no
and
'acts
of
state'
considered
eignty
longer
good grounds for their
mate
exemption.
On the other hand, Walzer
endows the overwhelming
of civil
majority
ians with a very strong immunity against deliberate military
attack. He
of this immunity for sieges and blockades,
guer
explores the implications
rilla war, terrorism, and the bombing
of German
and Japanese cities in
World War II. His position on the status of the overwhelming
of
majority
... ci
civilians comes down to this: "with reference to the actual fighting
vilians on both sides are innocent, equally innocent, and never legitimate
military
targets" (Walzer, 2000, p. 296). Of course, the civilian population
of the country that has fought (and lost) an unjust war may be subjected to
to pay reparations,
and economic
Itmay be made
and
political
penalties.
in some cases
reconstruction.
a whole.
even occupied
and forced to undergo a process of political
are punishment
These measures
visited on the country as
the most
that can be said is
regard to individual citizens,
sees no grounds
that there is room, and perhaps call, for shame; but Walzer
war
for holding civilians
for
the
and
the
responsible
unjust
killing, maim
to
extent
and
destruction
it
has
wreaked
the
that
would
make
them
ing
legitimate
economic
When
With
to target the
targets of deadly violence. Nor is it permissible
an unjust war.
infrastructure of a country waging
a country iswaging
an unjust war, its citizens may well be bound
to try to do something
about it, and may be blameworthy
if they don't.
The guiding principle in assigning blame in these matters
is that "the greater
the possibility
of free action in the communal
sphere, the greater the de
232
IGOR PRIMORATZ
gr?e of guilt for evils done in the name of everyone"
(Walzer, 2000, p. 298).
on democratic
allow their
This leads to focusing
states, which normally
a
citizens a significant
action.
In
where
all
of
scope
perfect democracy,
informed about state policies
and fully and effectively
citizens are well
in political
for an unjust war would fall
life, the responsibility
participate
on those who voted for it, while
those who voted against couldn't be held
at all could be blamed for their indif
vote
who
Those
didn't
responsible.
for the war.
be held responsible
a query: what is the practical
of the responsi
significance
on
sort of
those who voted for it?What
for the unjust war that falls
ference,
This
bility
but couldn't
invites
do they deserve? Walzer
doesn't reconsider or qualify his earlier
on
claim
that
civilians
both
sides are innocent, and equally so,
sweeping
are
never
a
which means
attack. This
target of military
they
legitimate
response
in a perfect democracy,
that civilians who,
suggests
freely and advisedly
vote for an unjust war, retain their immunity from such attack. But this is
How can one freely and advisedly
be a party to the
surely implausible.
decision
the war
an unjust war without
for
thereby becoming
responsible
and the killing, maiming,
and destruction
itwreaks? But for the
to wage
none
would
take place.
that this can't be very important, as nobody
lives in a
are
concern
test
The
real
of
the
its
theory
perfect democracy.
implications
Here Walzer
ing actually existing and unavoidably
imperfect democracies.
similar to the line he takes on the responsibility
of con
adopts a position
decision,
Itmay
scripts:
excuses
ofthat
be replied
are presented
as so many
war.
of
the
The
is dis
support
government
unjust
It comes to power through elections,
but its aims and
the imperfections
for the citizen's
tant and arrogant.
aren't very
policies
of actual democracies
at election
in particular
time. Political
transparent,
is intermittent and its effects are limited. The flow of infor
participation
mation
is partly controlled
and distorted
no
as
"it
is
this,
easy to impose
longer
In view of all
by the government.
as
it
is
in a perfect
responsibility
as if they
One doesn't want to regard those distant officials
democracy.
were kings, but for certain sorts of state action, secretly prepared or sud
denly launched, they bear a kind of regal responsibility"
(Walzer, 2000, p.
301). (Echoes of Henry V?)
starts an unjust war, its citizens are
such an imperfect democracy
did during the war inVietnam.
likely to go along, as Americans
They will
sure
cause
that
can't
be
their
is
whether
say
country's
they
just, but that
When
best, and that in any case nothing they might
affect the course of events. The pull of patriotism
be taken into account too. The conclusion
is that these citizens may
their leaders probably
do would
significantly
must
be blamed?but
know
only for bad faith as citizens,
not for the war.
"One might
MICHAEL WALZER'S
233
JUSTWAR THEORY
say of them what one says of soldiers in combat, that they are not to blame
for the war, since it is not their war" (Walzer, 2000, p. 302). And if so, then
attack remains intact.
their immunity against deliberate military
isn't the only philosopher whose
majority of civilians of any significant
Now Walzer
the over
theory absolves
for the war
responsibility
immu
them with almost absolute
and endows
is fighting,
a
In
he
rather
this
is
attack.
from
repre
respect
prominent
nity
military
view. This view has recently been criticized
sentative of the mainstream
whelming
their country
by Michael
Green
takes to task philosophers
(1992). Green
such asWalzer,
Thomas Nagel (1971/72) or Robert Holmes (1989) for operating with a
and its citizens that no longer reflects
of the state, itsmilitary,
conception
the realities of politics and war.6
to that conception,
which was prevalent before the French
According
is
the
the
monarch
Revolution,
sovereign. He or she is solely responsible
about war and peace. The army ismade up of professional,
laid down by
and is a mere tool for carrying out the policy
soldiers,
paid
at large has no say. It also remains basically
The population
the monarch.
in the waging
of war (except to the extent that it has to pay
uninvolved
for decisions
taxes and the like). It is therefore only natural that soldiers should respect
of civilians by taking care not to endanger their lives
this noninvolvement
in the course of fighting.
and property
and democ
this changed with the triumph of popular sovereignty
a
to
In
the
French
Revolution.
racy since
belongs
democracy,
sovereignty
the agent of the people. The
is merely
the government
the people, while
and thus, in the last analy
out
of
the
the
carries
army
government
policies
All
sis, of the people.
citizens'
army',
and professional,
It is no longer mercenary
in arms'. And war is no longer
'a people
but rather
a conflict
'a
be
but a strug
their subjects are innocent bystanders,
to the
is required to contribute
themselves.
Everyone
gle among nations
war effort. And when everyone or almost everyone does, the immunity of
tween
rulers
civilians
in which
no longer makes
sense.
much
are basically
led and indeed
civilians
claim that most
also points out that Walzer's
for the war,
can't
be
held
and
their
government,
responsible
accordingly
by
manipulated
that
in the same book
with his insistence
isn't consistent
2000,
pp. 51?58)
(see Walzer,
of its citizens,
and that territorial
of a state is based on the consent
the moral
standing
6Green
are rooted
and sovereignty
integrity
I should
add that it is also out of
citizens
in the rights of individual
tune with Walzer's
discussion
of
to life and
the moral
liberty.
basis of
conscription in his essays The Obligation to Die for the State, and Political Alienation
and Military
Service
(see Walzer,
1970,
chs. 4-5).
234
IGOR PRIMORATZ
to
that lead Walzer
impressed by the flaws of democracy
war.
his
of
for
On
the
its citizens of responsibility
absolve
understanding
for what the
the people remains responsible
theory of popular sovereignty,
and the military do even in a tyrannical regime. It has not only
government
Green
isn't
a right, but a duty to oppose and overthrow a tyrannical government. When
to the government
and its poli
it fails to do so, it thereby gives legitimacy
for them.
cies, and thus becomes
responsible
arrives at a conclusion
Thus Green
extreme. WTiile
for Walzer
opposed
the entire civilian
to that of Walzer,
but equally
except for high
population,
in arms and
those advising them, and those working
industry, is innocent and immune from attack, for Green "the
can ... be culpable,
for a war's
that is, responsible
initiation
officials,
government
ammunition
entire nation
seem that the entire
(Green, 1992, p. 56). But if so, itwould
a legitimate
of
attack, and that civilian
target
military
sense
or
no
in any
is
scope.
longer recognized
and conduct"
nation
becomes
immunity
Not many
Nor is Green. But he can
will be happy with this conclusion.
see no way of reconciling
and democracy
the ideas of popular sovereignty
between
soldiers and
of the distinctions
with the traditional understanding
the guilty and the innocent. He seeks to reinstate the traditional
it as but a
civilians
of deliberately
by construing
attacking
prohibition
of
and
thus
also
convenient,
familiar,
limiting killing and
promising way
in war. The prohibition
of deliberately
destruction
attacking civilians has
civilians,
it is
the centerpiece
of the jus in bello part of just war theory, where
as a demand of justice grounded
in the innocence
of civilians.
presented
a
to
that
has
is
but
rule-utilitarian
convention
In Green's
it
view,
nothing
been
amoral rule whose
of guilt and innocence:
justification
questions
force is
and whose
is in the good consequences
of its adoption,
binding
on
its adoption by both sides to the conflict.7
conditional
from deliberate military
of civilians
the sort of protection
However,
do with
stems
ismuch too weak. Itsweakness
attack provided by rule-utilitarianism
from the view of moral rules as devoid of any intrinsic moral significance
of their general adop
and owing all their force to the good consequences
tion. This view implies that, in cases when sticking to the rule won't have
the rule is no longer binding and the
the most beneficent
consequences,
struc
to
In
to
the
ethics of war, this well-known
do
is
break
it.
right thing
tural flaw of rule-utilitarianism
is compounded
by the requirement of reci
procity.
In the words
7For an earlier
argument
of another
along
somewhat
tation of civilian immunity, seeMavrodes
proponent
different
(1974/75).
of rule-utilitarianism,
lines
for a conventionalist
"for
interpre
MICHAEL WALZER'S
235
JUSTWAR THEORY
what one's opponent does, what
'eve
obligations,
convention-dependent
are
facts of great moral
Such facts help
ryone is doing,' etc.,
importance.
to determine within what convention,
if any, one is operating, and thus they
1974/75, p. 128).
help one discover what his moral duties are" (Mavrodes,
of the
attacking civilian population
ought to refrain from deliberately
a
state
if
such
is
in
formal
convention
attacks
enemy
place and
prohibiting
We
we should uni
too is abiding by it. Lacking
such a convention,
we
reason
to believe
civilians
if
have
refrain
from
laterally
targeting
good
that we will thereby induce the other side to follow suit, so that a conven
the enemy
tion of the protection
of civilians will eventually
emerge and be formally
are
an
we
free to launch
all-out attack on civilians; their
adopted. Otherwise
innocence
Surely
cratic view
of the war
counts for nothing.
do. However,
neither what Green presents
of civilians
in war nor Walzer's
of the complicity
this won't
as the demo
account
of
an attractive
at war provides
in imperfect democracy
too hard on civilians;
The former is undiscerning
alternative.
and much
the latter is undiscerning
too, and much too soft on them. The correct po
their role and status
sition, then, must be somewhere
need some distinctions.
Nondemocratic
stick
to the view
and democratic
that preceded
in between.
In order
to spell
it out, we
states. With regard to the former we may
one that sees war
the French Revolution:
as a fight between professional
soldiers carrying out the will of the rulers,
and civilians as uninvolved,
innocent bystanders. Green's
argument from
to
of civilians
in any state, whatever
the
popular sovereignty
complicity
form of government,
If the people
is far-fetched.
is the sovereign,
then it
an undemocratic
govern
certainly has the right to oppose and overthrow
ment. But the claim that it also has a duty to do so, and that the failure to
do so makes everyone
for the actions and policies of the gov
responsible
is another matter. For almost any duty, there is a certain thresh
ernment,
old price one can reasonably be required to pay for the sake of complying
carries a higher price, the duty no longer binds.
it;when compliance
In a state ruled by an undemocratic,
but well-entrenched
and ruthless gov
to
use
in suppressing
the
ernment, ready
large-scale violence
opposition,
with
people can't have a duty to oppose and overthrow the government,
although
it has a right to do so and will be admired for any attempt at exercising
an unjust war, its civilian
this right. Therefore, when
such a state wages
can't
held
be
for it, and may not be deliberately
population
responsible
attacked.
in a democracy,
however
Things are different
imperfect. There it is in
deed the people who decides, while both the government
and the mili
mere
are
executors
of
the
will.
unlike
the case of
But,
tary
people's
236
IGOR PRIMORATZ
nondemocratic
account
some
states and their civilian
here we must
population,
take into
further distinctions.
The responsibility
of a citi
can only be
the state is waging
based on what the citizen herself does or fails to do about it. If she actively
?
if she votes for the ruling party,
and the war
supports the government
to
the war, expresses her
the
that
is
government
gives allegiance
pursuing
?
war
on
then she is fully re
occasions
for
the
effort
support
appropriate
a
war.
for
the
She
is
therefore
target of deliberate
legitimate
sponsible
Active
support/passive
support/opposition.
zen of a democratic
state for the unjust war
military
debates
that she takes no part
the government
and the decisions
attack. The
within
fact
or in the
in the fighting
it takes concerning
the
fighting makes no difference. For both the government
are but the executors of her will and the will of others
to this class of citizens,
apply with
sovereignty
the harsh
implications
and the armed forces
like her. With
of democracy
regard
and popular
full force.
resist this conclusion
because
would
Quite a few philosophers
they
an
narrow
at
too
most
the
with
of
least
of
time,
operate,
understanding
one is innocent as long as one performs
innocence. On this understanding,
no act of war oneself, nor provides
those who do with the necessary means.
innocence
be thought to follow from self-defense
of
may
conception
as the fundamental
the right to self-defense
of
jus ad bellum:
principle
This
those, who are attacking us, in order to
the self-defense
view of innocence
fend off their aggression. Accordingly,
content
turns
and
it into a technical
of
its
usual
moral
the
word
empties
the innocent
term whose meaning
its
is fully determined
etymology:
by
entitles
us to attack
those, and only
are innocentes,
those who aren't harming us here and now. As the late
"
'innocent' here is not a term referring to per
G.E.M. Anscombe
put it,
"
at all. It means
rather 'not harming'
sonal responsibility
(Anscombe,
we
seems
to
in
when
take into
This
view
1981, p. 67).
plausibility
gain
account
includes defense
that the right of self-defense
are
innocent in the usual
i.e. aggressors who
aggressors',
they aren't responsible
But the self-defense
for their aggressive
of innocence
view
'innocent
against
sense of the word:
actions.
can't be all there
is to it. Con
two cases. In both A wants B killed but, for whatever
sider the following
or
reason, can't
prefers not to do it himself, and can entrust C with the task.
In the first case, A hypnotizes
in the second case he hires him to
C, while
do the job. Now B can fend off the attack either by killing C or by killing
and her life is no longer in
is canceled
If she kills A, C's assignment
there
is no difference
between
of
view,
point
danger. From the self-defense
A.
the two options,
to me
It seems
so B may
as well
that, morally
toss a coin. But
speaking,
surely
in the hypnosis
this can't be right.
case B definitely
MICHAEL WALZER'S
237
JUSTWAR THEORY
ought to defend herself by killing A, rather thanC, while in thehired killer
case there is at least some, albeit less compelling
reason for doing the same.
If so, personal
does
and
the
innocence
of civilians
matter,
responsibility
in war
solely in terms of self-defense.8
on the self
Some of what Walzer has to say on the subject is predicated
an argu
defense view of the innocence
of civilians. But he also deploys
ment similar to his case for the "moral equality of soldiers" I discussed
in
shouldn't
be construed
2. He points out the imperfections
of democracy,
and argues that
they excuse those civilians who support their country's unjust war. They
can be blamed for being poor citizens; but even poor citizens remain in
section
respect to war.
case for
to my response
to this is parallel
toWalzer's
My response
an
war.
Even
in
the soldier fighting
in
circumstances
excusing
unjust
tomoral judgment about the justice of the war, a citizen ought
unfavorable
nocent with
to do her best to find out for herself. She may not renounce her moral right,
and indeed duty, of independent moral thinking by assuming
that the gov
ernment knows best. If she isn't satisfied that the government
is right and
cause
the
support it. In view of the nature and conse
just, she shouldn't
quences of war, the presumption must be against war, rather than in favor
to do. The pull of patriotism
of whatever
the government
isn't a
proposes
excuse
either.
Patriotism
is
it
is
when
mod
good
morally
only
acceptable
erate, i.e. of the sort that calls for loyalty to one's country only if one has
that its cause is just. "The government
says it is" is
good reason to believe
a poor reason for believing
that.
What of those civilians who neither support their country's unjust war
nor oppose it in any way: who choose to get on with their lives as if noth
ing very untoward was taking place, who refrain from voting in elections
from voicing
any opinion on the subject in
is
untoward
since their state is
something very
happening,
an unjust war, their government
is in charge and their armed forces
and referenda,
public? Since
perhaps
even
waging
are doing
the killing, maiming,
and destruction,
it seems to me that they
don't really have the option of sitting on the fence; their refusal to be in
to passive
volved
is tantamount
and the mili
support of the government
and are both entitled and
tary. They live in a democracy
in
the
be sure, one also has a
To
part
political process.
a
interest in politics. But this is
right for normal times,
a
matter
of
economic
mostly
accommodating
competing
ests. When
one's
country
goes
to war,
supposed
right not
to take
to take
when
is
politics
or cultural inter
the times are no longer normal.
8Formore on this, see Fullinwider (1975/76) andAlexander (1975/76).
The
238
IGOR PRIMORATZ
the justice of war and, if she finds it
bound to consider
as a citizen to oppose
can
at
least whatever
she
it. The imper
unjust, to do
are constraints
on what she can accomplish,
not
fections of democracy
citizen
ismorally
excuses
for doing nothing.9
the unjust
she really can't hope to accomplish
anything:
cause has enthusiastic
the
of
the popu
of
support
overwhelming
majority
she and a few like-minded
others do will have any
lation, and nothing
the
In
that
she
still
has
effect.
case,
duty to protest; that admit
palpable
Sometimes
the course
of events, but will give notice that the kill
aren't
and destruction
being done in her name too. As Thomas
ing, maiming
there is room and
E. Hill Jr. argues in his analysis of symbolic
protest,
are very se
indeed call for this type of protest "when the acts or policies
tedly won't
affect
of groups to which we be
they are acts or policies
unjust, when
a token of consent"
make
silence
and
when
the
circumstances
(Hill,
long,
riously
1979/80, p. 95).
in symbolic
honor this duty and oppose the war, or engage
more
no
of
is
when
effective
feasible, obvi
other,
type
protest
opposition
war
no
and
for
their
mustn't
be
bear
country's unjust
ously
responsibility
attacked. For there is nothing they have done or failed to do which would
Those who
make
them forfeit
deserving
the other
their immunity
or maimed,
to be killed
side's
attack,
against deliberate military
or to have their property destroyed,
by
armed forces.
don't are passive
supporters of the government
are
for it. Their responsibility
too,
they,
responsible
Those who
Therefore
and
and the war.
isn't of the
same
too
It would
be much
type and degree as that of active supporters.
or
killed
maimed.
But
it
be
harsh to say that they, too, may
legitimately
seems to me it isn't too harsh to say that their property may be targeted.
the inconveniences
and hardships brought about
they richly deserve
on
attacks
their
infrastructure.10
country's
by
Adults/minors.
All I have said so far refers to adults. Not much needs to
a significant
be said about minors.
part of any civilian
They constitute
And
9What if she has done her best to find out, but still can't decide whether he country's
cause
other
is just? Obviously,
she doesn't
hand,
she
seem
shouldn't
to have
the government
support
a duty to oppose
them. Hers
and
the war.
is a case
On
the
of bona fide
noninvolvement.
Such
racies,
cases
can't
they are
be ruled
likely
out. But
to be quite
it seems
to me
that, at least
in contemporary
democ
atypical.
10Thisdoesn't apply to the uninvolved bonafide (see note 9 above). They shouldn't be
accused
military
of passive
attack.
support
of
the unjust
war,
and
retain
the
immunity
from
deliberate
MICHAEL WALZER'S
239
JUSTWAR THEORY
not
population. And they are innocent of the war their country is waging,
in virtue of any act or omission,
but in virtue of being minors.
From the
is almost absolute. Deliber
standpoint of just war theory, their immunity
them, or harming them in any way, can virtually
ately killing or maiming
never be justified.
Yet for all I have said, the bottom line seems to remain the same:y?s
in
bello prohibits deliberate
attacks on civilian
However
the
targets.
unjust
cause and however democratic
we aren't
the enemy government,
enemy's
to send our aircraft
enemy cities and towns, nor our
to attack enemy ships and ports; we mustn't
have our artillery
warships
shell enemy towns and villages, nor our snipers shoot enemy civilians. Nor
are we allowed
to let our military
of the enemy
destroy the infrastructure
allowed
state. For we
active
to bomb
sure that it is only those enemy civilians who give
to their government
and military,
and thus share the respon
can't make
support
sibility for the war, who get hit. From where we are, we can't separate them
or aren't responsible
from other civilians who aren't as responsible,
at all,
and accordingly may not be deliberately
killed or maimed.
But if so, itmay be objected, what is the point of this discussion
of the
status of civilians?
and others for the sweeping
im
Why criticize Walzer
a
to
I
if
civilians
end
with
all
conclusion
that
for
up
is,
they give
munity
from
theirs?
practical purposes,
indistinguishable
First, there ismore tomoral think
My response to this is two-pronged.
ing than its practical purposes. Even if the two views lead to the same line
of action, the moral reasoning behind it is significantly
different; and our
and
human
of
conduct
should
understanding
judgment
surely take into
on
account the moral reasons guiding
and
indeed
focus
them. I concur
it,
with Walzer
that we mustn't
attack civilian
"all
targets, but not because
on both sides are innocent, equally innocent, and never legitimate
do that for purely practical,
technical, rather
targets". We mustn't
military
than moral reasons: because our bombs,
and
bullets
can't seek out
shells,
those civilians who are responsible
for the war and therefore constitute
civilians
legitimate military
and don't. Those
targets, while
civilians who
staying
clear of those civilians
who
aren't
the democratic
govern
that rules out de
support
actively
and the war have no immunity, no moral standing
liberate attacks on them. They merely hide behind the backs of those who
are innocent, or at least much
less guilty; they merely
benefit from the
ment
technical
of separating the sheep from the goats.
practical,
impossibility
Second, the bottom line isn't quite the same. In those (admittedly
rare)
cases when
to deliberately
it is possible
attack those, and only those civil
ians who are actively
their democratic
in its pur
government
supporting
suit of an unjust war,
and when
such attack
is the thing
to do from
the
240
IGOR PRIMORATZ
in good
military
point of view, I don't see how they can claim immunity
is targeting war-mongering
rallies
that comes to mind
faith. An example
on
successive
in Serbia during that country's
Croatia, Bosnia,
onslaughts
is provided by the second intifada.
and Kosova. Another
topical example
armed struggle against Israeli occupation
is
If one thinks the Palestinians'
one
justified, as one well might,
raeli settlers as justified, provided
and don't target minors.
should
also consider
their attacks
sense
such attacks make
inmilitary
on Is
terms
an unjust war that
Furthermore, when a democratic
country is fighting
of the popu
majority
enjoys active or passive support of the overwhelming
to
in
be
effective
is
when
its
infrastructure
and
lation,
going
targeting
incon
terms, that too will be morally
justified. For the resulting
military
most
and hardships will be borne, for the
veniences
part, by those who
of
Western
allies against
The
deserve
them.
1999
military
campaign
fully
Serbia
is a case
in point.
4. Concluding
foundations
The philosophical
have a wide appeal. Many will
of the state
gitimacy
rooted in theirs. Many
tegrity and sovereignty
is based
will
Remarks
of Walzer's
of just war theory
to the view that the le
statement
readily subscribe
on the consent of its citizens,
and its rights
concur that the state's rights to territorial in
as grounded
in the rights of
should
citizens to life and liberty, and that this understanding
individual
of just war theory, how
elaboration
also inform the ethics of war. Walzer's
must
be understood
with
ever, remains true to this understanding
on
to
it
alien
others.
reaching conclusions
regard
to some
issues, while
on the responsibility
of soldiers for taking part in an unjust
war and on the responsibility
of citizens for giving
their support to such
war are clear examples
the point of de
of the latter. Here, as elsewhere,
as
a
rational
is
the
individual
mature,
free,
parture
being whose
rights
His
views
consent is the condition of legiti
the rights of the state, and whose
state
of this
instead
of
But
of
macy
drawing out the implications
policies.
to
drasti
the
Walzer
the
soldier
and
for
both
civilian,
proceeds
approach
the freedom and rationality of both, and to divest both of
cally diminish
actions and omis
for some of their highly
the responsibility
significant
ground
sions
concerning
soldiers", which
war. He
of "the moral
equality of
an
cause
an equal
on
for
fighting
unjust
for a just one. He reaches
those fighting
advances
the soldiers
puts
footing, morally
speaking, with
same
the
conclusion
with regard
the thesis
to civilians:
those
supporting
their gov
MICHAEL WALZER'S
241
JUSTWAR THEORY
in their pursuit of an unjust war, and those who
and military
a
cause is just, are both equally
and
government
support
military whose
to
and
therefore
immune
deliberate military
attack.
innocent,
equally
s account
But the flaws of inconsistency
aren't the main flaws ofWalzer'
ernment
in this pa
of responsibility
of both soldiers and civilians.
Ifmy argument
is
conclusions
be
Walzer's
should
We
correct,
per
rejected.
ought to take
the
and
of
human
freedom, rationality,
seriously
responsibility
beings, as
well
will
as the implications
of democracy,
however
see that soldiers fighting for an unjust cause
If we do, we
imperfect.
are not morally
equal to
an
unjust war
supporting
for a just one. Nor are civilians
to
civilians
support
morally
equal
supporting a just one. And if civilians
an
and
be deliberately
ing
large, mustn't
unjust war, by
targeted, that has
nothing to do with their rights, their status, their immunity. That ismerely
a consequence
of the fact that bullets, shells, and bombs, by and large, can't
soldiers
fighting
seek them out while
staying
the same population.
These conclusions
have
ing past wrongs,
view, the wrongs
the aftermath
as it arises
clear of other,
truly innocent
civilians
within
important implications for the problem of forgiv
to the dominant
in the wake of war. According
to be acknowledged,
attended to, and perhaps forgiven
are of two types: those committed
by the leaders
of war
in
of
the country that waged an unjust war, and those perpetrated by soldiers on
the battlefield.
The former are responsible
for having planned,
initiated,
and managed
the war. The latter are responsible
for whatever
offenses
they
attacks on civil
against the rules of war: deliberate
etc.
of
The
of
ians, killing
POWs,
civilians, on the
overwhelming
majority
other hand, may have to suffer the consequences
of economic
and politi
cal penalties
but are thought to bear
imposed on their country as a whole,
no individual
for the war their country waged.
The same
responsibility
?
?
to
those
soldiers
the
who
applies
normally
overwhelming
majority
an
or
not
for
but
'clean'.
There
be
may
may
fought
unjust cause,
fought
good reasons for forgiving the leaders and those soldiers who fought 'dirty',
may
have
committed
soldiers who fought 'clean' nor civilians need be considered
in this regard. Their slate is thought to be clean.
Ifwhat I have been saying is right, the problem of forgiving
the wrongs
an
war
more
of
is considerably
and the class of those who
unjust
complex,
much
may be in need of forgiveness
larger. A soldier who fought for an
but neither
for his part in the killing, maim
unjust cause is individually
responsible
course
and
destruction
in
the
of war, even though he had
ing
perpetrated
been conscripted
and even though all he did was in accordance with the
rules of war. He
treme gravity. And
for having participated
in a wrong
of ex
is responsible
if that wrong
is to be forgiven, he too is very much
in
242
IGOR PRIMORATZ
in a de
of civilians
of forgiveness.
The same is true of the majority
war
was
on
those
who
of
all
citizens
The
behalf
mocracy.
supported
waged
it was the expression
of their political
it, whether
actively or passively;
for the war and the
will. Each of them, too, is individually
responsible
need
and destruction wreaked
upon the other side. If that is to
killing, maiming,
to be forgiven.
need
will
those civilians,
be forgiven,
too,
when
those soldiers and civil
Of course, that becomes
only
possible
their responsibility
for the
and acknowledge
ians, too, come to understand
to atone for it in some appro
and willingness
on
other
basis, on any less exacting
any
priate way. Forgiveness
can
and
will
fall
of
what
short
true,
conditions,
truly healing,
forgiveness
and should be.
war,
their remorse
and show
obtained
Acknowledgments
earlier, much shorter version of this paper was read at the annual Soci
on August
etas Ethica conference,
held at Askov, Denmark,
23?27, 2000.
van
to
and Tony
den Beld for
Iwish
thank Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez
An
on an early draft of the paper; two anonymous
review
helpful comments
ers for this journal, for helpful comments
on a later draft; Ville P?iv?nsalo,
and all who took part in the discus
who read a reply to the paper atAskov,
sion.
My special thanks go toNick Fotion, who
and most
and provided numerous,
detailed,
read several
successive
helpful
drafts
on each.
comments
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3rd