Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23
Author(s): Sahar Huneidi
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Winter, 1998), pp. 23-41
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY
THE COLONIAL
PALESTINE,
OFFICE
REVERSIBLE?
AND
1921-23
SAHAR HUNEIDI
Thispaper focuses on theroleplayed by theMiddle East Department
of Britain's Colonial Officein shaping Palestine policy from early
1921 to September1923, when theMandate for Palestine tookeffect.
It shows the department'seffortsto neutralize thegrowingdomestic
theconchallengesto theJewishnational homepolicy and highlights
Arab
delethe
successive
of
treatment
the
department's
trastbetween
gations and theprivilegedaccess accorded to theZionists.It concludes
thatif therewere timesduring thisperiod thatthepolicy could have
been overturned,the effortsof the Middle East Department were
largelyresponsiblefor keepingit on course.
DESPITE THE LLOYD GEORGE GOVERNMENTS FIRM EMBRACEof the BalfourDecla-
ration as officialpolicy, the firstyears of Britishrule in Palestine were
The JaffariotsofMay 1921,aftera yearof
markedby a degree ofuncertainty.
calm,showed the extentto whichtheArabswere unreconciledto the "Jewish nationalhome" called forin the BalfourDeclaration.The Britisharmy,
of
whichhad remainedin Palestineas a securityforceaftertheestablishment
in July1920, was openly anti-Zionist.The British
the Civil Administration
favorableto theJewishnationalhome policy,had by theearly
press,initially
skepticalifnothostile,and a movementopposed
1920sbecome increasingly
to the BalfourDeclaration was gaining ground withinparliament.When,
againstthisbackground,a Conservativegovernmentcame to power at the
end of 1922,thereseemed a real possibilitythatthe pro-Zionistpolicycould
be reversed,and a spate of governmentinquiriesintothatpolicy continued
well into 1923. Yet in Septemberof thatyear,the Mandate forPalestinewhich specificallyenshrinedthe BalfourDeclaration-officiallycame into
force and became law when it was ratifiedby the League of Nations.
Whateveractive lobbyingforchange withinBritaintherehad been, effectivelywas over.
Thisarticleexaminesa largelyignoredaspect of thisearlyperiod:therole
playedby theMiddleEast DepartmentoftheColonial Officein keepingBritain's pro-Zionist policy on course. In so doing, it also may shed light on the
is currently
ofManchester,
fromtheUniversity
who holdsa Ph.D.in history
inKuwait.This
and Letters
Arts,
attheNationalCouncilforCulture,
ofpublications
director
articlehasbeen adaptedfroma muchlongerchapterin herbook,A BrokenTrust:Herbert
withI. B. Tauris.
Samuel,Zionismand thePalestinians(1920-25), forthcoming
SAHAR HUNEIDI,
JournalofPalestineStudiesXXVII, no. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 23-41.
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24
OF
JOURNAL
PALESTINE
STUDIES
interactionin the policy-makingrealm between politicaldecision makers,
permanentcivil servants,the parliament,and lobbyinggroups thatis not
withoutrelevancetoday.
THE MIDDLE
EAST DEPARTMENT
The MiddleEast Departmentwas createdin February1921 at theinitiative
of Sir WinstonChurchill,who had just become colonial secretary,to take
over responsibility
fortheArabic-speaking
areas thatcame underBritishrule
at the end of World War I. As such responsibility
had previouslybeen divided betweentheForeignOffice(Palestine,Egypt,theHijaz,and Aden) and
the India Office(Mesopotamiaand Arabia),a singledepartmentin the Colostandnial Officerepresenteda considerableadvance froman administrative
from
of
theaegis theForeignOfficeto
point.For Palestine,however,transfer
Whereastheforeignsecretary,
theColonial Officehad politicalramifications:
LordCurzon,was thesole memberofLloydGeorge's cabinetwithextremely
strongreservationsabout theJewishnationalhome policy and had fought
of the term,1Churchto apply themostrestrictive
strenuously
interpretation
ill was an unwaveringsupporterof Zionism.Despite Curzon's misgivings,
the BalfourDeclarationhad been endorsed at the San Remo conferenceof
April1920 and figuredin the August1920 Treatyof Sevresformallyentrustby the
ing to Britainthe Mandate forPalestine-which awaited ratification
incorporatedin the writof
League of Nations.The declarationwas further
the Mandate,successive draftsof whichwere still,at the timeof the department'screation,undergoingrevision.
Withregardto Palestine,the Middle East Department'staskwas to oversee and carryout Britain'spolicy there,actingas linkbetween the policyin Palestine.Headed by Sir
makersin London and the CivilAdministration
had been establishedinJuly1920 to
HerbertSamuel,theCivilAdministration
rulein place since Britain'sconquest of Palestinein 1918
replace themilitary
and was specificallyentrustedwith carryingout the BalfourDeclaration's
promise of a "Jewishnational home." In appointing Samuel-who had
helped the Zionists secure the BalfourDeclaration and had represented
them at the Paris Peace Conferencein January1919 alongside the Zionist
had
leader Chaim Weizmann2-Prime MinisterLloyd George "deliberately"
who "would tryto make
chosen as highcommissionera Zionistsympathizer
a success of the Zionistprogramme."3
in Palestine,where the threemost
In contrastto the civil administration
were
held
avowed
important
positions
by
Zionists,4theMiddleEast Departcareercivilservantsdrawnfromvariousgovmentwas staffedby traditional
ernmentoffices.To head the new department,ChurchillbroughtSirJohn
EvelynShuckburghfromthe India Office,where he had served fortwentyone years.HubertYoung, an Arabistand Middle East expertfromthe Foreign Office'sEasternDepartmentwho had servedwithT. E. Lawrence,was
officially
jointassistantsecretarybut in effectthe "second in command,"and
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
25
Lawrence himselfjoined the departmentas politicaladviser.Others came
fromthe Treasury,the War Office,the Mesopotamiansection of the India
Office,and the Foreign Office.5Of the senior staff,only Colonel Richard
Meinertzhagen,the militaryadviser,was a declared
Zionist,thoughhis passion was such thatthe Palin
It was Weizmannwho
Commission,set up to look into the causes of the
informedForeignOffice
1920 Easterriotsin Jerusalem,saw fitto devote long staffofBritain'sdecisionto
passages to himin itsfinalreportofJuly1920.Among
replacethe military
other things,the report called Meinertzhagenthe administrationin Palestine
"chiefsupportof the Zionists"and "Dr. Weizmann's witha civiladministration.
nominee"whose "definiteanti-Arabbias and a prejudice in favourof Zionism... revealhim as an agentwho, however capable
of doing good workin otherspheres,is singularlyout of place in the East."6
Meinertzhagenlaterbragged thatsoon afterjoining the departmenthe
succeeded in convertingHubertYoung and JohnShuckburghfromArabists
to Zionists,7a claimthatboth certainly
would have disputed.Nevertheless,it
is truethatin the summerof 1921,withinmonthsof the department'sestablishment,
Young drew up a memorandum,which Churchillcirculatedto the
cabinet,advocating,among otherpolicies favorableto the Zionists,the removal of all anti-Zionist
civilofficialsfromthePalestineadministration.8
And
whileYoung apparentlywas shakenduringhis visitto Palestinethatautumn
at theextentto whichthePalestinianshad lostall confidencein the "straightforwardness"of the Britishgovernment,9
back in London he continuedto
push stronglythe policy he had describedas so unpopular.
As forShuckburgh,he was no Zionistbut fromthe beginningwas driven
by the convictionthatBritainwas dutybound to uphold the Balfourpolicy,
insistingthatthispolicy would not lead to a Jewishstate.10These were undoubtedlysincerebeliefs,but thereis also no questionthathe was manipulatedbyWeizmann,who was ubiquitousin theearlyyearsto thepointthatit
was he who informedForeignOfficepersonnel,in a telegramsentfromthe
San Remo conference,of Britain'sdecisionto replace themilitary
administration in Palestine with a civil administration.1"
By his own testimony,
when the latterwas in England,12
Shuckburghsaw Weizmann "constantly"
and Weizmann'sbiographerspeaks of Shuckburgh's"unusualdeference"to
him.13Weizmannhad only to threatento resignfromthe ZionistOrganization,thusleavingthemovementin thehands of the "extremist
elements,"for
Shuckburghto bend over backwardto give him his way.14
REPORTS FROM THE FIELD
Whetherout of convictionor as a matterof turf,the Middle East Departmentfromthe outsetseemed intenton downplayingreportsfromthe field,
mostlyfromthe Britishmilitary,concerningArab anger and discontent.
Thus,when preparationswere underwayforthe Cairo Conferencecalled by
Churchillin March1921,Palestinewas on the agenda alongside Mesopota-
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26
OF
JOURNAL
PALESTINE
STUDIES
mia and Transjordan,
buttheMiddleEastDepartmentinsistedthatnothingin
Palestinerequiredany attention.15
Yet, the departmenthad been privyto
numerouswarningsabout the imminentdangerof disorder,includinga December 1920 reportto the War Officeby the directorof military
operations
statingthat riotswere likelyto break out in Jerusalem,Jaffa,Haifa, and
Nablus.16
The Jaffariots,the intensity
of which shocked the civilauthorities,
broke
out scarcelytwo monthslater.Asked by Young to commenton the situation
in Palestine,General Congreve,commanderof the Britishforcesin Egypt
and Palestine,wrotein June 1921 thatthe riotswere neitherorganizednor
premeditatedand that"unlessArabaspirationsare attendedto ... and Zionistaspirations... greatlycurbed,"itwould notbe surprising
ifsomethingyet
more seriousdeveloped. AfternotingthatSirHerbertSamuel had "seen and
heard onlywhat he wanted to see and hear" and indeed resentedwarnings
of the growingArab discontent,he concluded:
Whatwe have got to face is the factthatas long as we persist in our Zionistpolicy we have got to maintainall our
presentforcesin Palestineto enforcea policyhatefulto the
greatmajority... 17
The Middle East Departmentreceived at the same timea similarletterfrom
AirVice MarshalSalmond,18and in Julyanotherintelligencereportwarned
thattheprestigeofthegovernment
was decliningrapidlyand thattheimmediate renewal of disturbancesmightbe triggeredat any momentby "any
action"of the government.19
The Middle East Departmentappeared to view such reportsas an intrusion into its domain.MeinertzhagendismissedGeneral Congreve,the most
seniorBritishmilitary
commanderin the Near East,as a "partisanprovocateur."20Even T. E. Lawrence,the department'spoliticaladviser,conjectured
"a personal bias behind [Congreve's]opinions."21
Commentingon yet anothermilitaryintelligencereportnotingthatthe
in Palestinewas "unpopular,"22
civiladministration
the department'sGerard
Clauson wrotein a minutedated 24 Augustthatit was "mostobjectionable
that'poison gas' of thisnatureshould be produced in Palestineand reach
otherCabinetMinisterswithoutthisofficeor the PalestineGovernmentseeNot surprisingly,
the reportwas labelled "inaccurate"and
ing it first."23
quicklypassed intooblivion.A monthlater,Meinertzhagenaccused Military
Intelligenceof "in effect'spying'upon the Government,"adding thatthe
"sooner this departmentbecomes a branch of the civil administration,
the
better."24
HubertYoung had alreadycounseled thattheBritishmilitary
force
in Palestinebe separatedfromthe Britisharmyin Egypt.25
Tension over the militarycame to a head when Samuel forwardedto
Churchilla copy of a circulardated 29 October 1921 fromthegeneralofficer
of theEgyptianExpeditionary
Force to the generalofcommanding-in-chief
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
27
ficercommandingtroops in Palestine.The circularnoted, interalia, that
while the armyofficially
was supposed to be apolitical,
In the case of Palestine these sympathies[of the British
troops]are ratherobviouslywiththeArabs,who have hitherto appeared to the disinterestedobserverto have been
the victimsof an unjustpolicy,forcedupon them by the
BritishGovernment.
Althoughthe circularalso noted thatwhateverthe justiceor injusticeof
the policy, the government'sintentionshad been honest,26the tone was
found extremelyoffensive.Meinertzhagenwanted to make an issue of it
with the War Office.Weizmann,who had obtained a copy and sent it to
commentedthatit was the worstof all the "wicked"
Lloyd George,bitterly
that
had
been
done
to theZionistsin thelastsix months.Interestingly,
things
the War Officewiththismatter,
Shuckburghcounseled againstconfronting
because "the latterwould be sure to ask us what were the particular
passages to which we objected and what were the precise groundsof our
objections.I do not thinkthatit would be veryeasy to answer."27
In anyevent,thesewere thefinaldays of Britishmilitary
oppositionto the
to asChurchillinvitedtheAirMinistry
pro-Zionistpolicy.Shortlythereafter,
of
a
forthe defense Palestine, step thatpreventedany
sume responsibility
AirVice
between the military
and the CivilAdministration.28
futurefriction
MarshalSalmond alreadyhad been reportedby HubertYoung to be "very
anxious thathis officersshould not interfere
undulyin politicalmatters."29
THE FIRST ARAB DELEGATION
In the wake of the Jaffariotsin May and encouraged by an important
speech by Samuel on 3 June 1921 assertingthatthe BalfourDeclarationdid
not mean thatPalestinewould be taken away fromPalestine'sArabs and
an Arabdelegationproceeded to London in thehope of
"givento strangers,"
bringingabout a change of policy.
Even before the delegation arrived,Shuckburghhad spelled out, in a
memorandumdatedAugust1921,theline thatwas to be takenwhen dealing
withit.The Arabs"mustaccept as the basis of all discussion"thatitwas the
"fixedintention"of the Britishgovernmentto fulfilits pledges in the matter
of a nationalhome fortheJews.30
of the establishment
Given thisbasis, it is not surprisingthatthe talks did not make strong
headway. In an exhaustive draft statementdated 7 November 1921,
Shuckburghassertedthatsince theArabsfailedto realize thatabandonment
of the BalfourDeclarationwas "out of the question,"any discussion with
themin London was "a mere waste of time."It had been explained to the
Arab delegation"overand over again" thatthe presentpolicy was a "chose
jugee." He noted thatthe governmentwas "deeply pledged to the Zionists
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28
OF
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STUDIES
and have always made it clear to the Arabsthatthereis no prospectof our
waveringon thispoint."31Experiencehad shown thatthe Arab delegation
was "a hopeless body to deal with":first,hardlyany of them could speak
second, they
English,and everything
had to be translatedby an interpreter;
were "veryslow of understanding,
and probablyrathersuspicious of one
another."Aftermuchinconclusivetalk,"theygo back to theirHotel and wait
tillone of theirEnglishadviserscomes and tellsthemwhat to say."He concluded that
the time has come to leave off arguing and announce
what we propose to do. Being
plainlyand authoritatively
Orientals,theywill understandan order;and if once they
realise that we mean business, may be expected to
acquiesce.32
Shuckburgh'smemorandumof 7 November 1921 provides an illuminating contrastbetween the Middle East Department'sdealingswiththe Zionists and the Arabs.Afterdismissingas "groundless"Arab fearsof "Jewish
politicalascendancy,"Shuckburghpraised the recent Zionist Congress at
Carlsbad forits "wise and statesmanlike"language. He did allude to "less
responsible"utterancesmade by some Zionists,but added, in termsstrikinglyreminiscent
oftheapproach thatwould hold sway some threequarters
of a centurylater:
Provocativelanguage is bad, but provocativeaction is far
worse. And it is here thatI have a plain word to say to the
Arab leaders. As you all know, therehas recentlybeen a
further
outbreakof violence in Palestine,aftera lapse of six
monthssince theJaffadisturbances.These outbreaksmust
stop; and I musthold the Arab leaders responsibleforseeing thattheystop.33
Shuckburghwas, however,willingto placate the Arabs on trivialissues.
When two membersof the delegationapproached him about a questionregardingthe Greek Orthodox Patriarchatein Jerusalem,he minutedthatit
would be worthwhileto convey the Arab suggestionprivatelyto the civil
secretaryin Palestine,since "If we can conciliate these people on minor
points,so much the better."34
matter.
The department'streatmentof the Zionistswas quite a different
On occasion,
True, there were complaintsabout Zionist "pushfulness."35
at the
therewas a flap about "leaks."36There was also frequentirritation
tendencyof "extremeelementsin the Zionistmovement"openly to declare
theirintentionto have a Jewishstate.In the above-cited7 November 1921
memorandum,Shuckburghcomplainedthatno sooner had theBritishgiven
theArabs"reassuringpromises"thansomebody "getsup at the ZionistCon-
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
29
gress and talksabout the privilegedpositionof theJews in a JewishState,"
thereby"neutralizing"the "effectof our language" and giving the Arabs
cause to believe "thatour measured statementsare
Therewere complaints
mere emptylanguage ...."37
Yet therewas a constantflow of information
from about Zionist 'pushfulness"
the Middle East Departmentto the Zionists.38At the
and leaks,yet therewas a
constantflow of
same time that Shuckburghwas dealing so sternly
information
fromthe
withtheArabdelegation,he was keepingWeizmann
"privately
informed"of thedealingsand "solicitedhis MiddleEast Departmentto
views" on how the Colonial Officeshould respondto
theZionists.
Arab demands.39And. durinLg
autumn1921. when a
sent
reviewof immigration
policywas called for,Shuckburghconfidentially
Weizmann a Colonial Officememorandumsummarizingthe findingsof a
Departmentin Palesreporton immigration
by the head of the Immigration
tinewho had refusedto show it to the Zionists.The ZionistCommissionin
Jerusalemsucceeded in obtaininga copy anywayand promptlysentitto its
officesin London,40but Weizmannwas on the inside,and actuallyappears
in theColonial Office'sreview
to have takenpart,at Shuckburgh'sinvitation,
Inof immigration
policy fromthe inceptionof the CivilAdministration.41
deed, Weizmannwas giventhe draftmemorandumto "comment"on before
itwas sent to Samuel.42
A clue as to how Shuckburghcould reconcilehis behaviorwithhis apparand detachment"43can be
ently sincere claim to "complete impartiality
foundin thatsame 7 Novembermemorandum.Britishpolicyin Palestine,he
wrote,was directedto promotethe interests"not of any particularsection"
but of the Palestiniansas a whole, "Palestinians"being understoodto mean
"notonlythe existingpopulationof Palestine,but also those futurecitizens
of the countryto whom the BalfourDeclarationhas promised a National
Home."44
discussionswiththe
The Arab delegation,duringthe monthsof fruitless
Colonial Office,did succeed in developingextensivecontactswithmembers
oftheBritishestablishment.
The MiddleEastDepartmentdid whatitcould to
inhibitsuch interaction,
sending numerouslettersto highlyplaced British
statesmenwhom the Arabswere tryingto contact.Letterssentat the end of
forforeign
undersecretary
October 1921 to LordRobertCecil,parliamentary
and theDuke ofAtholl,forexample,statedthatnegotiationswiththe
affairs,
and thatmeanwhile,"theDelegation
Arab delegationwere at a "standstill"
has been canvassingvarious persons of influencein the hope of receiving
theirhelp or support"and Churchilldid not advise that they should be
granted"any interviewsas theyask for."45A letterto Lord Southborough
carriedthe same message.46
Aroundthe same time,followinga Times storyon 16 November 1921
about a luncheongivenby theArabdelegationat whichLordSydenhamhad
said that"theJews had no more rightto Palestinethanthe descendantsof
theancientRomanshad to thiscountry,"47
Meinertzhagendispatcheda min-
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30
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ute to Shuckburghrecordingthe names of the luncheon guests,all highrankingBritishofficersand administrators,
and thencommented:
It is idle to suppose thattheywere notaware ofthepolitical
significanceof the luncheon party,where theirpresence
constitutedan act of sympathywith the Arab delegation,
and does in factconstitutean act of obstructionto the Governmentpolicy.48
in a memorandumto thecolonial secretary
Shuckburgh,
while remarking
thattherewas "nothingcriminal"in acceptingan invitationto lunch,added
thatthe presence of high-ranking
officers"atwhat was, in effect,a meeting
and cannotfail
to protestagainstthepolicyofH.M.G.is certainly
unfortunate
to produce an undesirableimpression."49
OPPOSITION
AT HOME
Domestic oppositionto Britain'spolicyin Palestinefocused on two main
themes:its tax implicationsand the promises made by Britain(as represented by SirHenryMcMahon) to the Arabs (as representedby SharifHussein of Mecca) in the famed 1915 correspondence.These promises were
argued to be in directcontradictionto the Balfourpledge made two years
later.
It was the potentialtax burdenthatwas the earlierfocus of public scrutiny,being takenup by the press withinmonthsof theJuly1920 establishin Palestine. On 5 February 1921, for
ment of the Civil Administration
example,theDaily Express wrotethatthe termsof the Mandatemade clear
the extentof the financialburden at a timewhen the Britishpeople were
tradeand widespread
already"crushedby taxation,oppressed by restricted
and thattherewas no reason whyBritainshould squander
unemployment,"
resourcesin the "aridwastes of the Middle East."50Despite the March1921
conferenceconvened by Churchillin Cairo aimed at reducingimperialexpenditurein the Middle East,51the press continued on this theme. The
Times,which initiallyhad supportedthe BalfourDeclaration,by 1922 was
raisingthe question of whetherBritaincould affordit.52
Withdomesticopposition to the government'sinvolvementin Palestine
increasing,ChurchilltelegraphedSamuel on 25 February1922 requestinga
cut in the expenditureon the new Palestinegendarmerieand noting:
In bothHouses ofParliamentthereis growingmovementof
hostility,
againstZionistpolicy in Palestine,which will be
stimulatedby recentNorthcliffe
articles.53I do not attach
undue importanceto thismovement,but it is increasingly
to meettheargumentthatitis unfairto ask theBritdifficult
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
31
ish taxpayer,already overwhelmedwith taxation,to bear
the cost of imposingon Palestinean unpopularpolicy.54
In an effort
to quell oppositionto the pro-Zionistpolicyboth in Palestine
and at home and in preparationforthevote on theMandateby theLeague of
NationsscheduledforJuly,Colonial SecretaryChurchillissued theWhitePaper of 3 June1922,writtenby Samuel in collaborationwithShuckburgh.The
paper,even while statingthattheJewswere in Palestine"as of rightand not
on sufferance,"
placed limitson the definitionof theJewishnationalhome
and statedthatthe Britishgovernmentdid not contemplatethe "disappearance or subordination"of the Arab population.Neitherthe Arabs nor their
supportersin Englandwere mollified,and less thanthreeweeks later,on 21
June,a motionwas introducedin theHouse of Lordsrejectinga Mandatefor
Palestinethatincorporatedthe BalfourDeclaration.Lord Islingtonargued
that a Mandate based on the Balfour Declaration directlyviolated the
pledges made by the Britishin 1915 to SharifHussein as well as those made
by General EdmundAllenbyin his Declarationto the Palestinianpeople in
withtheTurksended.55Notingthatthegreatmajority
1918,afterthefighting
oftheinhabitants
opposed theBalfourDeclaration,he urgedthatacceptance
by the League of Nationsbe postponed untilmodificationscomplyingwith
those pledges were made.56The motioncarriedby a vote of 60 to 25, causing Young to minuteon 23 June:
Yesterday'sdebate in the House of Lords will have encouraged the Arab delegationto persistin theirobstinate
attitude,and unless the Lords' resolutionis signallyoverruled by the House of Commons and the Council of the
League of Nations,we mustbe preparedfortroublewhen
the Delegation gets back to Palestine.57
In the event,the Lords'resolutionwas "signallyoverruled."Althoughoppositionin the House of Commons had been mounting,and a numberof
passionatespeeches againstthe pro-Zionistpolicywere made duringitsdebate on 4 July,Churchillmanaged to carrythe day by convincingthe members of parliamentthathe had cut the cost of maintainingPalestinefrom?8
millionin 1920 to an estimated?2 millionin 1922.58WithCommonsvoting
in favorof the policy,the way was open forthe League of Nationsformally
to approve Britain'sMandateforPalestineon 24 July.
A NEw GOVERNMENT
maintained
Shuckburghand theMiddleEast Departmenthad consistently
thatBritain'scommitment
to the BalfourDeclarationwas a closed issue, a
"chosejuge'e." In fact,skepticismwithinthe governmenthad accompanied
the policyfromthe outset:As earlyas March 1920,when Palestinewas still
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32
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underForeignOfficecontrol,a minuteby HubertYoung demonstratedthat
the possibilityof "abandoning"the government'spro-Zionistpolicy was a
recurring
themein officialcircles.59Nor did the League of Nation'sratification of the Mandate close the debate: As Porathpoints out, if Britainhad
decided to change itspolicy on the BalfourDeclarationand made changes
in thewritof theMandate,itis "highlydoubtful"thattheLeague would have
opposed it.60Indeed, seldom had Britain'spolicyin Palestineseemed less of
a chosejuge'e thanduringthe firsthalfof 1923,when the entiregovernment
seemed occupied withdelvinginto itsveryfoundations.
The triggerto thisdeep probingwas the October 1922 fallof the governmentof Lloyd George,who had been deeply committedto the pro-Zionist
of a new governmentfollowingtheoverwhelming
policy,and theformation
electoralvictoryin November of the Conservatives,where an anti-Zionist
currentwas strong.In a debate in theHouse ofLordson 27 March1923,Lord
Islingtonremarkedthat"Zionistpolicyin Palestinecontributeditsshare,and
It assisted
no small share,I think,to the downfallof the late administration.
correspondinglyin the accession to power of the presentadministration."
Notingthatthereare "manygentlementoday occupying quite prominent
positions in His Majesty'sGovernmentwho were last year and the year
beforeamong the most active and vehementassailantsof Zionistpolicy in
Palestine,"he concluded thatthis"would constitutea stronggroundforearly
61 Indeed, such a considerationwas
considerationof the whole policy.
alreadyunderway,and somethingof theclimatethatfollowedthe formation
of the new governmentis conveyed in a lengthysecretmemorandumentitled "Policy in Palestine" submittedto the cabinet on 17 February1923,
which declared:
If there is to be a change of policy, the sooner it is announced the better.The presentstateof suspense is fairto
nobody. It is not fairto allow theJews to go on collecting
moneyfortheirprojectsin Palestineifthereis any question
of non-fulfillment
of thepledge on whichtheseprojectsare
based. It is not fairto theArabs,ifwe mean to maintainour
policy,to allow themto continuean agitationwhich may
develop into action forwhich theywill sufferin the long
run.
62
Throughoutthis period, the Middle East Department,and particularly
directeda steadystreamofmemorandaat thenew colonial secShuckburgh,
theDuke of Devonshire,who unlikehis predecessorChurchilllacked
retary,
firmconvictionson thesubjectofPalestine.Two messages in particularwere
drivenhome repeatedly:thatif Britainfailedto honor its pledge "We certainlyshould standconvictedof an act of perfidyfromwhichitis hardlytoo
much to say thatour good name would neverrecover,"63and thatthe "real
alternative"facingthe governmentwas between "complete evacuation or
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
33
continuingto honor the Zionist pledge."64The influenceof such memoranda on Devonshirewas considerable.65
Not long afterthe new governmenttook office,Shuckburgh,anticipating
new inquiries,took it upon himselfto look into the originsof the Balfour
Declaration.The inquirywas remarkableespeciallyforthe dearthof official
documents on the subject that it uncovered. Althoughhe combed the
records,he foundnothingthatshed lighton the earlierhistoryof thenegotiations leading up to the BalfourDeclaration.66Balfourhimself,pressed by
Shuckburgh,pleaded a bad memoryand regrettedthe death of Sir Mark
Sykes,who "had the whole thingat his fingerends."67The "mostcomprehensiveexplanation"oftheoriginoftheBalfourDeclarationthattheForeign
Officewas able to provide was contained in a small "unofficial"
note affirming
that"littleis knownofhow thepolicyrepresentedby theDeclaration
was firstgivenform.... Negotiationsseem to have been mainlyoral and by
means of privatenotes and memorandaof which only the scantiestrecords
are available,even ifmoreexists."68Shuckburghthenturnedforhelp to Wilof stateforthe colonies, who wrotehis
liam Ormsby-Gore,undersecretary
own recollectionoftheevents,whichhe had witnessed,in a one-page memorandum,thelastparagraphofwhichnotesthatitwas he who, togetherwith
Colonel L. S. Amery,had actuallydraftedthe BalfourDeclarationin itsfinal
form.69Given the lack of documentation,Shuckburghwas able to develop
his own interpretation
(certainlyinfluencedby Ormsby-Gore)in his memorandum"Historyof the Negotiationsleading up to the BalfourDeclaration,"
whichemphasizedthe diremilitary
straitsin whichBritainfounditselfat the
timethe declarationwas draftedand itsdebt to the Zionistsfortheirhelp in
thistimeof need.70Colonial SecretaryDevonshirehad the 10 January1923
to thecabinetalong
memorandumprintedas a cabinetpaper and distributed
note declaringthatthetimehad come when theattention
witha handwritten
of thecabinet"shouldbe directedto thisaspect of thePalestinequestion."71
A morefar-reaching
and explicitinquirywas demanded ofthe cabinetby
Devonshire in his covering note accompanyingthe Middle East Department'slong 17 Februaryreporton policyin Palestine.By thattime,thelongover the McMahon pledges had reached new levels
simmeringcontroversy
of public debate, a factreflectedin the secretary'snote to the cabinet.Thus,
afterurgingthat"a definitestatement"on Britain'spolicy be made with"as
littledelay as possible,"he suggestedthatthe cabinetfocus on threequestions:(1) whetheror notpledges to theArabsconflictwiththeBalfourdeclaration;(2) ifnot,whetherthe new governmentshould continuethe policy
set down by the old governmentin the 1922 WhitePaper; and (3) if not,
what alternative
policy should be adopted.72
THE MCMAHON PLEDGES
Itwas thearrivalin London on 24 December 1922 of a second Arabdelegation,actingupon advice fromEnglishsupportersheartenedby thechange
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34
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE
STUDIES
in government,thatbroughtthe issue of Britain'swartimepledges to the
Arabsback to centerstage.Immediatelyupon arrival,thedelegatesset out to
meetrepresentatives
oftheMorningPost,theDaily Mail, and the Timesand
distributed
copies of the Hussein-McMahoncorrespondence.
The cruxof thecontroversy
over the correspondencewas whetheror not
Palestine had been included in the areas Britainhad promised the Arabs
would become independentafterthe war. McMahon's letterto SharifHussein had explicitlyexcluded "portionsof Syria,lyingto the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." The Arabsand theirsupportersarguedthat
Palestinelies well south of these areas, which accordingto themhad been
excluded because of Frenchintereststhere.
The Middle East Department,ever since its establishment,
had wrestled
withthisissue, as seen in a flowof minutesand memorandaon the subject
as of 1921.73 Unsuccessfulin itsefforts
to demonstratepersuasivelythatPalestine was not covered by the promise,the departUnsuccessfulin its efforts mentconcentratedon tryingto keep the issue from
to demonstratethat
public scrutiny.
Thus,fivedays aftera 6 January1922
Palestine was not covered
minuteby S. M. Campbell,assistantprincipalof the
by theMcMahonpledge,
Colonial Office,statedcategorically(citinga Foreign
thedepartment
Officememorandum)that"geographicallyPalestine
is included in the area withinwhich Britainwas to
concentratedon tryingto
keep the issuefrompublic
acknowledge Arab independence,"74 Shuckburgh
had minuted that though "the view taken in this
scrutiny.
Officehas been thatPalestinewas so excluded, but
thereis sufficient
doubt in the matterto make it desirable not to drag the
controversy
out into the daylight."75
Shuckburghresponded similarlywhen SirHerbertSamuel,havingheard
thatShuckburghhad soughtand obtainedan explanationof thematterfrom
SirHenryMcMahonhimself,76
pressed the Middle East Departmentin a letterof 6 August1922 to publishthe explanationso thatthe Arabswould accept once and forall the faitaccompli thatPalestinewas excluded fromthe
pledge. Samuel's request,comingtwo monthsaftertheWhitePaper had addressed the McMahon pledges at some length,shows how inadequate the
latter'sexplanationhad been. In his belated replyto Samuel dated 7 Novemwho in themeantimehad receivedcriticalcomments
ber 1922,Shuckburgh,
on McMahon'sexplanation,77statedthathe was "ratheragainstmakingany
further
public announcementson thistroublesomequestion,"and that"indeed itseems to me thatour best policyis to letsleepingdogs lie as much as
possible."78
The publicationin the Britishpress in early 1923 of partsof the correspondence, provided by the second Arab delegation,revivedpreciselythe
kindof public scrutinytheMiddle East Departmenthad triedso assiduously
to avoid. In January,J. M. N. Jeffries,
the Daily Mail correspondent,published a series of articlescalling foran evacuation fromPalestine and the
abolitionof the BalfourDeclaration.79Soon after,Lord Sydenhamproposed
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WAs BALFOUR POLiCY REVERsIBLE?
35
a parliamentary
questionin theHouse ofLordsaskingthegovernmentto lay
on the table the entirecorrespondenceon which the previousgovernment
had based its contentionthatPalestinewas geographicallyexcluded from
the pledges, promptinga flurry
of memorandain the Middle East Department. R. C. Lindsay, undersecretaryof the Foreign Office, replied to
Shuckburgh'surgentquery on the subject on 19 February1923 that "we
should not be likelyto strengthen
our case by publishingthe McMahonletmiters."80On 21 February,SydneyMoody,a seniorColonial Officeofficial,
the
correspondence
"remain
nuted that the reasons for not publishing
good,",81while Young minutedon the same day that"thebest counterblast
to argumentsbased on the McMahon correspondencewould be the signatureand publicationof a TreatywithKingHussein in which he accepts our
positionin Palestine."82
The debate in the House of Lords took place on 1 March 1923. Lord
Sydenhamrequestedpublicationof thecorrespondenceon thegroundsthat
thepublichas therightto know "exactlyhow our nationalobligationsstand"
withregardto theArabs.In an exceptionallycogentsummationof thetopic,
he rehearsedin detail-and withlong verbatimquotes fromthe versionof
the correspondencethathad been made available-the entirehistoryof the
was his
interesting
McMahon pledges and those thatfollowed.Particularly
meticulousand scathingdeconstructionof the theory"invented"in the
White Paper to explain Palestine's alleged exclusion from McMahon's
pledge.83
Colonial SecretaryDevonshire,who was presentat the debate, was too
shrewdto addressdirectlytheargumentsraisedbutconfinedhimselfto reafin broad termshis acceptance of theWhitePaper's explanation.Folfirming
lowingthe advice of the Middle East Department,he deftlyavoided making
available ("much as I regretit") any of the correspondenceon the grounds
to the
thatpassages not relatingto the controversycould be "detrimental
public interest."When asked whetheronly those passages relatingto the
customagainst
correspondencecould be published,he cited parliamentary
partialpublications.84As to Lord Sydenham'srequest thatDevonshire at
of the numerouspassages cited in the
least commenton the authenticity
course of the debate, Lord Devonshirequite simplyignoredit.
Anotheraspect of the examinationof statepolicy on Palestineinvolved
themilitary
dimension.InJanuary1923,the GeneralStaffof theBritishArmy
declaredthatPalestinewas of no strategicvalue in defendingtheSuez Canal.
Doubtlessin the aim of counteringthisview, Shuckburghrequestedthe department'smilitary
adviser,Meinertzhagen,to writea reporton Palestine's
gave
strategicimportance.Meinertzhagen'sreport,which not surprisingly
detailedargumentsas to why its importancewould increase as timewent
on,85was producedin May 1923. Shuckburghsuggestedthatitbe submitted
to the Committeeof ImperialDefense,which should be invitedto fixa day
forthe discussionof the whole question and to determineto what extent,
of everykind,"Palestinewas of
"quiteapartfrompledges and commitments
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36
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE
STUDIES
strategicvalue to the BritishEmpire.It was decided thatthe subjectshould
be discussed withSir HerbertSamuel when he arrivedin London.86In the
event,the Committeeon ImperialDefense concluded thatPalestinewas not
as importantstrategically
as once thought.
THE CABINET COMMITTEE
ON PALESTINE
The futureof Britain'sinvolvementin Palestinewas, finally,
decided by a
high-poweredcabinet committeeappointed on 27 June 1923 by the new
primeminister,
StanleyBaldwin.Chairedby Colonial SecretaryDevonshire,
the committeeincluded,among others,Lord Curzon of the ForeignOffice;
the secretariesof stateforwar,India,and air;the firstlord of the Admiralty;
the presidentof the Board of Trade; and the secretaryof the treasury.87
The
committeewas chargedwithadvisingthegovernmentto enable itto make a
"promptand finaldecision" on Palestine.
The committeedeliberatedforone month.Duringthattime,opponentsof
thepolicyin theHouse of Lordscontinuedto agitate.Even in theCommons,
a groupof 110 Conservativemembersof parliament,"feelingthatthe matter
is one offirst
class Imperialimportancewithfar-reaching
futureresults,"sent
now
a petitionto the "MiddleEast CabinetCommittee
sitting"
urgingthatthe
"definitePLEDGES" given to the PalestineArabs be fulfilledand thatthe
"whole population of Palestine,with its 93 percentArabs,should be consulted, and a form of governmentagreed upon in harmonywith their
"to impose on an unwillingpeople ...
wishes."Accordingto thepetitioners,
theDominatingInfluenceof anotherrace is a violationofnaturalrights"condemned in the covenantof the League of Nations.88
Itwas duringthatsame period thatthethirdArabdelegation,encouraged
by the appointmentof the committee,arrivedin London. Even beforethey
made an officialrequest to be heard by the committee,Ormsby-Gore,an
ardentZionist,wroteto thecolonial secretaryon 19Julythat"I deplore most
emphaticallythe idea thatthe CabinetCommitteeshould see those people
or make any concessions."89Shuckburghalso weighed against receiving
them,notingthatthe delegationwas "in no sense an officialbody and to
allow themto appear beforea cabinetcommitteewould be givingthemtoo
much importance,"especially as theyrepresented"theextremistsection of
the PalestineArabs,who constitutea majorityperhaps,but certainlynot the
whole of the Arab population."90However, Shuckburghwarned in another
minutethatsince theMiddleEast Departmentwas "constantly
representedin
the press" as being "whollyunder Zionist influence"and "accused of all
kindsof Machiavelliandesignsto preventany but the Zionistview on Palestinianquestionsreachingthe Secretaryof Stateor the cabinet,"care mustbe
taken in refusingto allow the Arabs to see the committee.91
When Musa
Kazim al-Husseini,presidentof the delegation,wrote fromthe Hotel Cecil
on 24 July1923 to thechairmanof the CabinetCommitteethatthepeople of
Palestineregardedthe formationof the committee"as a step,on the partof
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WAS BALFOUR POLICY REVERSIBLE?
37
theBritishGovernment,
towardsa fairand equitablesolutionofthePalestine
problem,"92Shuckburghinformedthe delegation"thatthe committeewere
not hearingoral evidence and accordinglycould not receive them."93
In the end, Sir HerbertSamuel, who had arrivedfromPalestine in late
Juneespeciallyfortheproceedings,was thesole outsidewitness.He argued
thatindecisionwas inadvisableand thatfromthestandpointof international
securityin Palestine,a finaldecision had to be taken.In his two meetings
withthe CabinetCommitteeon 5 and 9 July,he arguedthatArabopposition
to Zionismwas based to a large extenton a misunderstanding
of its goals
and thatresponsibleZionistleaders did not intendto confiscateArab lands
or flood the countrywithJewishimmigrants.
Accordingto Wasserstein,Samuel's "reasonableness"seemed to have won over the doubters on the
committee.94
Meanwhile,thefulldetailsof the CabinetCommittee'sdeliberationswere
being leaked by Meinertzhagento LeonardStein,thesecretaryof the Zionist
Organization,who in turnurgedWeizmann,who was in Europe at thetime,
to returnimmediately.95
As soon as Weizmannarrivedin London,on 24 July
1923,he consultedSamuel.The followingday, he went to see Shuckburgh,
who reportedin a secret minuteto the colonial secretarythatthe Zionist
leader had been "in a greatstateof agitation"by what he believed was the
CabinetCommittee'sintentionto propose "freshconcessions to the Arabs,"
which in his opinion would "further
whittledown the BalfourDeclaration
and the privilegesofJews in Palestine."He told Shuckburghthat"ifthisapitwould have the effectof breakingup the Zionist
prehensionwas fulfilled,
Organizationand killing,Zionistactivityin Palestine."96On 26 July1923,
Weizmannsenta lengthyletterto the colonial secretaryconcerning"certain
aspects of the situationin Palestine,"whichhe ended by saying:"A freshreadjustment,and a re-adjustment
involvingthe abandonmentof vitalprinciblow whichmightwell prove fatal"97
to Zionism.
ples, would be a shattering
The CabinetCommittee'sfinalreport,entitled"The Futureof Palestine,"
was submittedon 27 July1923. It is difficult
to guess what impactthe interventionsofWeizmann,conveyedby Devonshire,mayhave had on thecommitteein buttressing
the argumentspresentedby Samuel.At all events,the
to blame those who argue
committee,even while notingthat"itis difficult
... thatthe entireMandateis builton the fallacyof attempting
to reconcile
the irreconcilable"(i.e., securing the establishmentof a Jewish national
concluded
home while safeguardingthe rightsof the country'sinhabitants),
along the lines of countless Middle East Departmentmemoranda: that
whetherthe policyhad been "wise or unwise,it is well-nighimpossiblefor
any Governmentto extricateitselfwithouta substantialsacrificeof consistencyand selfrespect,ifnot honour."98
Four days later,thecommittee'srecommendationswere approved by the
cabinet,effectively
ending,ifnot oppositionto the policy,at least the prosof
it.
pects changing When theMandatecame intoforcea few monthslater,
in September1923, the matterwas "settled,"and the BalfourDeclaration,
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38
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE
STUDIES
which had been a politicaldocument-in facta letterof intent-acquireda
legal status.99
Itwillneverbe knownwhethertheBalfourpolicycould in facthave been
reversedthatsummerof 1923.The Zionistsapparentlybelieved thisto be the
case. If they are correct,they owe a debt of thanks to the Middle East
Department.
NOTES
1. Churchill
(as war secretary)
and
Curzonhad been engagedsincemid-1920
in a struggle
forcontrolof Britain's
Middle Eastpolicy.Churchill
wanteda Middle
Eastdepartment
withintheColonialOffice,whileCurzonfavoredeithera separatedepartment
withitsown secretary
of
stateor,failingthat,ForeignOfficeresponsibility
forMiddleEastpolicy.Curzon latercalledtheBalfourDeclarationa
"striking
contradiction
of our publiclydeclaredprinciples."
David Gilmour,Curzon (London:JohnMurray,
1994),pp.
522-25.On Curzon'santi-Zionist
views,
see also Doreen Ingrams,
PalestinePapers 1917-1922. Seeds of Conflict
(London:JohnMurray,
1989).
2. BernardWasserstein,
TheBritishin
Palestine.TheMandatoryGovernment
and theArab-Jewish
Conflict,
1917-1929
(London:Basil Blackwell,1991),pp.
75-76.
3. Elie Kedourie,"SirHerbertSamuel
and theGovernment
Middle
of Palestine,"
EasternStudies5, no. 1 (January
1969),p.
44.
4. In additionto Samuelas highcommissioner,
NormanBentwichwas attorneygeneraland WyndhamDeedes (a
GentileZionist)was chiefsecretary.
5. Fortheformation
of thedepartment,see HubertYoung,TheIndependentArab (London:JohnMurray,
1933),
pp. 323,325;Jeremy
Wilson,Lawrenceof
Arabia (London:Heinemann,1989),pp.
632-34,643-45.See also JohnMcTague,
"British
Policyin Palestine"(Ph.D. diss.,
New YorkUniversity,
1974),p. 235.
6. "Enquiry
intoRiotinginJerusalem
in April1920"(PalinReport),submitted
PortSaid,August1920,PublicRecordOffice [PRO]ForeignOffice[FO] 371/5121
E 9373,pp. 44-46.
7. McTague,"British
Policyin Palestine,"p. 298.
A Peace to End All
8. David Fromkin,
Peace. CreatingtheModernMiddleEast,
1914-1922 (London:PenguinBooks,
1989),p. 524.
9. Ingrams,
PalestinePapers,pp.
151-52.
10. Shuckburgh
was apparently
not
privyto theviewsof his superiors.
Ata
smallgathering
on 22 July1922in Lord
Balfour'shomeat therequestof
Weizmannand attendedby Churchill
and
LloydGeorge,amongothers,Balfourand
LloydGeorgestatedthat"bytheDeclarationtheyalwaysmeantan eventualJewish state."Atthesame meeting,
Lloyd
that"we" mustnot
GeorgetoldChurchill
allow representative
in Palesgovernment
tine.JehudaReinhartz,
Chaim Weizmann:
TheMakingofa Statesman(New York:
OxfordUniversity
Press,1993),pp.
356-57.
11. See Minuteby HubertYoung,27
April1920,PRO FO 371/5139.Indicative
ofWeizmann'saccess to policymakers
is
a memohe wroteto ForeignSecretary
Curzonadvisingaboutthe"danger"of
Arabpersonnelin theadministration
in
Palestineand counsellingon theadvisaBritish
bilityof "infiltrating"
Jewsintothe
In thesame despatch,
administration.
WeizmannrevealedthattheZionistOrganizationhad alreadypreparedlistsof
availablecandidatesand thattheselists
had been submitted
to theForeignOffice.
2 March1920,PRO FO 371/5113E 1184.
12. Shuckburgh
to Secretary
of State,
24 July1924,PRO Colonial Office[CO]
733/86.
Chaim Weizmann,p.
13. Reinhartz,
377.
14. See, forexample,Shuckburgh
to
of State,Secret,25 July1923,
Secretary
PRO CO 733/54.
15. McTague,"British
Policyin Palestine,"p. 239.
16. Ibid.,224.
fromGeneralCongreveand
17. Letters
AirVice MarshalSalmond,through
A. M.
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39
WAS BALFOUR PoLICY REVERSIBLE?
Trenchard,
"Situation
in Palestine,"
28
June1921,PRO CO 733/17.
18. Ibid.
19. WarOfficeto ColonialOffice,
in
Confidential
Reporton thesituation
Palestine,
July1921,PRO CO 733/13.
20. Minuteby Meinertzhagen,
29 June
1921,PRO CO 733/17.
21. Minuteby T. E. Lawrence,
June
1921,PRO CO 733/17.
22. WarOfficeto Churchill,
15 August
1921PRO CO 733/13.
23. Minuteby Meinertzhagen,
8 September1921,PRO CO 733/13.
24. Ibid.
25. McTague,"British
Policyin Palestine,"p. 299,quotingPRO CO 733/14.
26. Samuelto Churchill,
10 November
1921,PRO CO 733/7.
27. Shuckburgh
to SirJ.MastertonSmith,1 December1921,PRO CO 733/7.
28. Wasserstein,The British in Pales-
tine,p. 107.
29. Minuteby Young,29 June1921,
PRO CO 733/17.
PalestinePa30. Quoted in Ingrams,
pers,p. 139.
31. Memoby Shuckburgh,
7 November 1921,PRO CO 733/15.
32. Ibid.
of a Statement
to be
33. "Summary
made by Secretary
of State,"drafted
by
in November1921,PRO CO
Shuckburgh
733/15.
34. Shuckburgh
to Clauson,28 November1921,PRO CO 733/15.
35. Forexample,see Minuteby
1 February1924,PRO CO
Shuckburgh,
to LordArnold,10
733/84;Shuckburgh
May1924,PRO CO 733/84;Shuckburgh
to Secretary
of State,24 July1924,PRO
CO 733/86.
36. InJune1922,forexample,
Weizmannwas discoveredto have gained
and dispatches
access to secrettelegrams
comingin and out ofthedepartment.
Suspicionfellupon Meinertzhagen,
thoughhe latterwrotein his diarythathe
suspecteda juniormemberof thedepartment,a Jew,ofbeingthesourceof the
leak.MarkCocker,Richard
Meinertzhagen: Soldier, Scientistand Spy
(London:Seckerand Warburg,
1989),pp.
151-52.
37. Memoby Shuckburgh,
7 November 1921,PRO CO 733/15.
main38. Meinertzhagen's
biographer
tainsthat"theflowofinformation
be-
tweenthemilitary
adviserand his close
friend,
Weizmann,was fargreater"
than
Meinertzhagen
was preparedto admit.
Cocker, Richard Meinertzhagen, pp.
151-52.
39. Reinhartz,Chaim Weizmann, p.
359. Reinhartz
notesthatthe"relationship
nuroftrustthatWeizmannhad carefully
turedwithShuckburgh
paid off."
40. Ibid.,45-47.
41. MosheMossek,PalestineImmigration Policy Under Sir Herbert Samuel
(London:FrankCass, 1978),pp. 44, 48.
42. Weizmannto Shuckburgh,
7 December1921,PRO CO 733/16.
to Secretary
of State,
43. Shuckburgh
24 July1924,PRO CO 733/86.
44. "Summary
of a Statement
to Be
Made by theSecretary
of State,"drafted
by Shuckburgh,
7 November1921,PRO
CO 733/15.
45. CO to theDuke ofAtholl,27 October1921,PRO CO 733/17.
46. EricMillsto theRt.Hon. Lord
Southborough,
29 October1921,PRO CO
733/17.
47. "Futureof Palestine:ArabPlea for
FairPlay,"Times,16 November1921,reproducedin PRO CO 733/15.
48. Meinertzhagen
to Shuckburgh,
17
November1921,PRO CO 733/15.
49. Ibid.
50. "In theWilderness,"
Daily Express,
5 February1921.
51. Young,IndependentArab,p. 325.
52. Fromkin,A Peace to End All
Peace, p. 525.
Britain's
53. LordNorthcliffe,
greatest
who owned the
newspaperproprietor,
Times and the Daily Mail, wrote a series
of highlycriticalarticlesduringhisvisitto
Palestinein early1922.
to Samuel,Telegram,Pri54. Churchill
vateand Personal,25 February1922,PRO
CO 733/18.
55. On 9 November1918,theBritish
and Frenchgovernments
issueda joint
declaration,
approvedby U.S. President
WoodrowWilson,assuringthepeople of
Syria,Palestine,and MesopotamiathatAllied policyaimedat "thesetting
up of nationalgovernments
and administrations
thatshallderivetheirauthority
fromthe
freeexerciseof theinitiative
and choice
of theindigenouspopulations."
(The declarationwas reproducedin PRO FO 371/
5036).
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40
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE
of State,Tele56. Greento Secretary
of State,Recordsofthe
gram,Department
Department
ofStateRelatingto Internal
Affairs
ofTurkey,1910-1929,Microcopy
353,Roll80, NationalArchives.
57. Minuteby Young,23 June1922,
CO 733/22.
58. Fromkin,A Peace to End All
Peace, pp. 525-26.
in Syriaand Pal59. "PoliticalSituation
estine,"15 April1920,PRO FO 371/5034
E 3182.
60. YehoshuaPorath,TheEmergence
of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (London: Frank Cass,
1974),p. 168.
61. Parliamentary Debates (Lords),
to 3 May,1923),pp.
vol. 53 (13 February
639-69.
Secret,17
62. "Policyin Palestine,"
February1923,PRO CO 733/58,Cabinet
Paper [CP] 106 (23).
of State
to Secretary
63. Shuckburgh
fortheColonies,8 January
1923,PRO CO
used
thearguments
733/54.Interestingly,
by thoseopposed to theBalfourpolicy
were almostexactmirror
imagesof
Lord
pro-Zionist
arguments.
Shuckburgh's
in thedebatein theHouse of
Sydenham,
Lordson 1 March1923,declaredthatthe
us verygreatservArabshad "rendered
ices duringthewar at a verycriticaltime,
and theycertainly
believedthatthe
was a
pledgeto whichI have referred
realpledgethatwe shouldhonour."
that"ourpledgehas been disCharging
tinctly
broken,"he urgedthegovernment
for
to restoreits"tarnished
reputation
He notedthatbeforetheargood faith."
regardedas
mistice"we wereuniversally
a straight-dealing
people whose word
was theirbond,"butthatbecause ofthe
Balfourpolicy"ourprestigein theNear
Eastand farbeyondithas undergonea
very dark eclipse." Parliamentary De-
to 3
bates (Lords),vol. 53 (13 February
May1923),pp. 226-34.
to Secretary
of State
64. Shuckburgh
fortheColonies,8 January
1923,PRO CO
733/54.
65. Porath,forexample,creditsthe
withDevonshire'sdecisionto
department
continuethepolicyof itspredecessor.
Porath,Emergence, p. 168.
to Ormsby-Gore,
10
66. Shuckburgh
January
1923,PRO CO 733/58.
STUDIES
Leadof theNegotiations
67. "History
ingup to theBalfourDeclaration,10January1923,PRO CO 733/58,CP 60 (23).
68. The fulltextof thenotewas includedin SecretCabinetPaperCP 60
(23), "Palestineand theBalfourDeclara1923,PRO CO 733/58.
tion,"January
69. Ormsby-Gore's
memorandum,
dated24 December1922,was printedas
partof theSecretCabinetPaperCP 60
(23) in PRO CO 733/58.Thisversion,
The
however,omitsthefinalparagraph.
handwritten
facsimileof Ormsby-Gore's
minuteis in PRO CO 733/35.
70. In fact,subsequentminutesand
memorandasuggestthattheexpected
In a minuteto
help did notmaterialize.
wrote
of state,Shuckburgh
thesecretary
on 8 January
1923:"We made our promise to theJewsat a timeof gravenational
we
because we thought
emergency,
mightobtainsome assistancefrom
them...."(PRO CO 733/54).On 17 Februby the
ary1923,a secretmemorandum
of stateassertedthat"These
secretary
benefitsmayor maynothave been worth
securing,and mayor maynothave been
actuallysecured;buttheobjectionsto goingback on a promisemade undersuch
conditionsare obvious.TheJewswould
naturally
regarditas an act of basenessif,
havingappealed to themin our hourof
peril,we were to throwthemoverwhen
thedangerwas past.(SecretmemoCP
106(23)in PRO CO 733/58.)
71. SecretCabinetPaperCP 60 (23),
"Palestineand theBalfourDeclaration,"
1923,PRO CO 733/58.
January
72. Secretmemo,17 February1923,
PRO CO 733/58,CP 106 (23).
to
73. See, forexample,Forbes-Adam
20 October1921,
Private,
Shuckburgh,
to Hogarth,
PRO CO 733/38;Shuckburgh
Private,12 October1921,PRO CO 733/38;
17 October1921,
Hogarthto Shuckburgh,
PRO CO 733/38.
74. Minuteby S. M. Campbell,6 January1922,PRO CO 733/8.
11January
75. Minuteby Shuckburgh,
1922,PRO CO 733/8.
76. On 11 March1922,Shuckburgh
minutedthatMcMahonhad come to see
himthepreviousday and readto himhis
in whichhe
explanationof his intention,
had said thathe meant"toexcludethe
whole of Palestinefromthearea in respectofwhichthepledgeofArabindependencewas given"and thathe was
This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:15:03 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
41
WAS BALFOUR PoLIcY REVERSIBLE?
"quiteclear"on thatpoint.(Minuteby
11 March1922,PRO CO
Shuckburgh,
733/38.McMahon'sletterto Shuckburgh
is dated
is in thesame file,and,curiously,
12 March1922.)
77. Minuteby EricMills,theacting
principalin thecolonialoffice,18 August
1922,PRO CO 733/59.
7
to Samuel,Private,
78. Shuckburgh
November1922,PRO CO 733/39.
79. Daily Mail, 9, 10 and 11January
1923.
19
80. R. C. Lindsayto Shuckburgh,
February1923,PRO CO 733/55.
81. Minuteby S. Moody,21 February
1923,PRO CO 733/57.
82. Minuteby HubertYoung,22 February1923,PRO CO 733/57.This,in fact,
was thecourseadopted,and negotiations
offriendship
treaty
fortheAnglo-Hijaz
withSharifHussein,whichlasted
1923and into1924,snagged
throughout
on thisissue.WhenHusseinbalkedat Arto
ticle2, in whichhe was asked in effect
policyin Palestine,the
recognizeBritain's
shortof its
decidedthatanything
British
would be seen as a defeatof
formulation
theBalfourpolicyand thatwithoutthis
had no
treaty
articletheAnglo-Hijaz
was neverconcluded,
value.The treaty
abandonedHusseinto his
and theBritish
fatewhenIbn Saud attackedTa'if,the
summercapitalof Hijaz,in August1924.
See Sahar Huneidi, A Broken Trust.Her-
bertSamuel,Zionismand thePalestiniwithI. B.
ans (1920-25), forthcoming
Tauris.
83. Forthecompletedebate,see ParDebates (Lords),vol. 53 (13
liamentary
to 3 May1923),pp. 226-34.
February
84. Ibid.
by Meinertzhagen,
85. Memorandum
in Palestine,"14
Importance
"Strategical
May1923,PRO CO 733/54.
Imon Strategical
86. Memorandum
portancein Palestineby Meinertzhagen,
14 May1923,PRO CO 733/54;
of Stateand
to Secretary
Shuckburgh
17 May1923,PRO CO
Ormsby-Gore,
733/53.
on Palestine,
87. CabinetCommittee
SecretReport,"TheFutureof Palestine,"
27 July1923,PRO CO 733/58.
88. Petitionby Membersof theHouse
of Commons,26 July1923,PRO CO 733/
54.
of State,
to Secretary
89. Ormsby-Gore
19July1923,PRO CO 733/54.
to Masterton-Smith,
90. Shuckburgh
of State,
and theSecretary
Ormsby-Gore,
24 July,1923,PRO CO 733/54.
27 July
91. Minuteby Shuckburgh,
1923,PRO CO 733/58.
27 July
92. Minuteby Shuckburgh,
1923,PRO CO 733/58.
93. Ibid.Accordingto Porath,thereal
reasonthedelegationwas notreceived
was thatSamuelobjectedto itbeing
heard.Porath,Emergence,p. 174.
HerbertSa94. BernardWasserstein,
muel:A PoliticalLife(Oxford:Clarendon
calls
Press,1992),pp. 262-64.Wasserstein
thecabinetdecision"nottheleastof services renderedby Samuelto Zionism."
95. Cocker,RichardMeinertzhagen,
pp. 152-55.
of State,
to Secretary
96. Shuckburgh
SecretMinute,25 July1923,PRO CO 733/
54.
97. ChaimWeizmann,TheLettersand
Papers ofChaim Weizmann,vol.XI,January 1922-July1923, ed. BernardWasIsraelUniversities
serstein(Jerusalem:
Press,1977),p. 350.
on Palestine,
98. CabinetCommittee
27 July1923,
"TheFutureof Palestine,"
SecretCabinetPaperCP 351 (23) in PRO
CO 733/58.
99. DennisEdwardKnox,"TheDevelPolicyin Palestine,
opmentof British
1917-1925:SirGilbertClaytonand the
New EasternQuestion"(Ph.D. diss.,UniofMichigan,1971),p. 359.
versity
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions