The Future of Kyrgyzstan

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CAEI
Centro Argentino
de Estudios
Internacionales
The Future of
Kyrgyzstan:
Possibilities and
Challenges from the
Perspectives of
International Relations
by Márton Tompos
Working paper #46
CIS & Baltic States Program
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The Future of Kyrgyzstan: Possibilities and Callenges from the
Perspectives of International Relations
By Márton Tompos
Bachelor of Arts in History and Religious Studies from the Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest, Hungary. Researcher for the CIS & Baltic States Program since 2011. / CAEI
Introduction
Kyrgyzstan’s international affairs have two aspects: on one hand, bordering China, the
traditionally present Russia and the always interested USA are competing with each other for the
better partnership with the Kyrgyz government. On the other hand, neighboring Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are all showing different faces to Kyrgyzstan, challenging and helping
Bishkek at the same time. Despite the lack of considerable amount of natural resources in the
country, Kyrgyzstan, thanks to its location, is still a crucial target for all three superpowers.
The United States is already present in the country, operating the Manas airbase next to
Bishkek. For the supply of its troops in Afghanistan the future of the base is a cardinal question for
Washington, however the opportunity to monitor neighboring China and the troubled Fergana Valley
also increases the stake for the USA. To secure the stability of its own territories and provide space
for enormous future projects, such as the railway between Xinjiang and London, China uses its
economic power and the long common border to develop its position, causing hard times for local
companies, but also reducing the prices on the market which is highly welcomed by consumers.
Finally, there is the Russian interest which is based on history and tradition besides the struggle
against the US and its plan the encircle Moscow’s territories.
Kyrgyzstan’s relations to its three neighboring Central Asian countries are highly diversified.
On one hand there is Kazakhstan with its huge investments in the country, the immediate financial
aid they gave to Bishkek after the events of April 2010 and the extremely friendly tone, the two
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countries’ politicians talk with and about each other. On the other hand, there is Uzbekistan as – from
Kyrgyz perspective – the opposite of Kazakhstan; Tashkent and Bishkek continuously argue over the
gas prices, the clashes of last year were claimed as Kyrgyzstan’s inner state affairs by Uzbek
President Islam Karimov and the situation of the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan generates a
continuous tension between the two. Somewhere in the middle can be found the troubled Tajikistan;
smuggling and some terrorist cells’ movement between the borders overshadow the basically friendly
relations of the countries.
All in all, it seems that the the fastest way of development for Kyrgyzstan is to balance
between the three major powers, however slowly getting closer to Russia, while on a regional level,
try to work on a Central Asian Union, which would help solving the territory’s problems and balance
the Russian influence.
Geopolitics
China
Kyrgyzstan’s inner peace and stability is a crucial question for China, both from the economic
and security perspective. First of all, the volume of trade between the two countries radically
increased in the previous years: from 604 million $ in 2004 it reached 1.54 billion $ by 2006 and 2.97
billion $ by 20091. Although recent violent events2 in the Central-Asian country radically decreased
this amount, there is no evidence suggesting that this figure will not return or even exceed its
previous level. Also, the meeting between Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, Ismail Tiliwaldi,
1
Umed Erkinov, „Kyrgyzstan: Is China the Hidden Power in Bishkek?,” Eurasianet,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031809.shtml, March 17, 2009.
2
The successful demonstrations against President Bakiyev in April 21010 claimed the life of more than 80
people only in Bishkek and several more as the clashes spread around the whole country.
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vice chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress and a special envoy
of Chinese President Hu Jintao on 2nd of December, 20113 – the same day when Atambayev was
sworn in as President – clarifies that the importance of China has not changed with the regime in
Bishkek. However, the appearance of “Made in China” goods did not cause general satisfaction; as
the report of the French Institute of International Relations says; "The effect on the Kyrgyz economy
of this massive trade is both positive and negative. It creates jobs and people have access to cheap,
good quality projects. However, the local production finds itself unable to compete"4. Besides the
increased competition on the Kyrgyz market, the following Chinese immigration also leads to tension
as the country already suffers from an 11%5 high unemployment rate and an increasing number of –
mainly educated – Kyrgyz searching for work abroad6.
However, Kyrgyzstan’s importance is higher to China from geopolitical perspectives than by
its 5.5 million-people-market. The ambiguous plan of Beijing is the railway connection between
Xinjiang and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan – where 60 % of China’s Middle Eastern oil import goes
through – via Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan obviously requires the inner peace of
all of these countries7. There is also another grandiose plan from the far eastern superpower which
might need the cooperation of Bishkek; the railway between Xinjiang and Germany, and by 2025,
London. This may run through Kazakhstan, not Kyrgyzstan, but as it is still just a plan, Beijing
definitely wants to have as many options open as possible.
3
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/02/content_14205259.htm, December 2, 2011.
Erkinov.
5
http://www.indexmundi.com/kyrgyzstan/unemployment_rate.html
6
“Emigration from Kyrgyzstan is surging,” Eurasianet,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav032106.shtml, March 20, 2006.
7
Roman Muzalevsky, “The Economic Underpinnings of China’s Regional Security Strategy in Afghanistan,”
The Jamestown Foundation,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5bswords%5d=8fd5893941d69d0be3f37857626
1ae3e&tx_ttnews%5bany_of_the_words%5d=afghanistan&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=36285&tx_ttnews%5
bbackPid%5d=7&cHash=436692a068, April 19, 2010.
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Last but not least, as Kyrgyzstan is neighboring the problematic Xingjiang Autonomous
Region where ethnic clashes occurred in previous years between Uyghur people and Han Chinese,
an instable state next door is the last thing what China needs. A possible hideout for extremist
Muslim groups, next to the rebelling Uyghur – also Sunni Muslim – territories could be a great threat
to China’s inner security. Furthermore, the presence of the U.S. army in Kyrgyzstan especially with
the cooperation of the Kyrgyz leadership to monitor Chinese activities in Xinjiang, are far from being
welcomed by Beijing. In the meantime “a sizeable Uighur community lives in Kyrgyzstan and almost
100,000 ethnic Kyrgyz live in Xinjiang. This facilitates the flow of information and the organization of
other activities”8, such as scouting activities by the American intelligence.
On the whole, China’s main advantage is its common border with Kyrgyzstan, which
simplifies trade and strengthens the relations of the two countries. Despite that it may cause some
dissatisfaction among the Kyrgyz traders, Chinese goods reduce prices and can become an
increasing part of the Kyrgyz state’s revenues. However, the United States and Russia also have
some serious interest in the Central Asian country, therefore their offers and requests also have to be
taken into consideration before choosing a future “best friend” for the Kyrgyz.
The United States
When referring to the USA, the first thing that needs to be mentioned is the Manas Air Base.
It was opened in December 2001 to support the coalition’s movements in the war in Afghanistan,
though as it has been described before, the Chinese actions also can be monitored from here. The
reason, why it is crucial for the United States to maintain Manas is the vulnerability of the other
8
K. Gajendra Singh, „Geoppolitical Battle in Kyrgyzstan over US military Lilypond in central Asia,” Media
with Conscience, http://mwcnews.net/focus/analysis/1810-geopolitical-battle-in-kyrgyzstan-over-us-militarylilypond-in-central-asia.html, April 12, 2010.
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supply routes. The way via Pakistan, more precisely, via the port of Karachi where the containers are
off-loaded onto trucks, is extremely dangerous and “Because of Pakistani sensitivities about
sovereignty, these trucks are 100 percent civilian-operated, with no military escorts.”9 The alternative
routes are the part of the NDN (Northern Distribution Network); the NDN North and the NDN South
both go via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while the KKT goes through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; in all
three instances by using the local U.S. military bases. All three NDN routes reach the Afghan border
at Termiz, Uzbekistan, however most of the supply and the troops from Manas are being transferred
to Afghanistan by air carriage.
A relevant problem is the issue of the Fergana Valley. Spreading across the territories of
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and presumably the home of Muslim fundamentalist, the U.S.,
as a part of the “war on terror”, is committed to monitor the local activities in the Valley. However
“many in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization10 region suspect that the NDN will be used by the
Pentagon to encourage spread attacks by groups like the ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’ or the
‘Islamic Jihad Union’ and the murky Hizb ut-Tahrir movement”11. Whether this is true or not, it is now
official that the US will pay an annual 200 million $12 for the usage of Manas. However no one knows
whether this will disappear as it did during the presidency of Bakiyev, who “placed his son and other
relatives in key posts where they raked in huge sums for the US airbase rights at Manas – reportedly
as much as $80 million a year”13 or now, with Atambayev, it will reach the people. Also it is
problematic whether the U.S. can maintain its military presence in the region and – as K. Gajendra
9
Bill Marmon, „New Supply ’Fron’ for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the ’Stans,” The
European Institute http://www.europeaninstitute.org/February-%E2%80%93-March-2010/new-supply-frontfor-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans.html, February – March, 2010
10
An intergovernmental mutual-security organization founded in Shanghai in 2001. The members are China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Observer states are India, Iran, Mongolia and
Pakistan.
11
Cornelius Graubner, “Implications of the Northern Distribution Network in Central Asia,” Central Asia –
Caucasus Institute, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5169, January 9, 2009.
12
http://www.tazar.kg/news.php?i=5230, July 14, 2007.
13
F. William Engdahl, “Kyrgyzstan as a Geopolitical Pivot in Great Power Rivalries,” Centre for Research of
Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19327, May 25, 2010.
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Singh, retired ambassador of India in Turkey, Azerbaijan and several other countries sees it –
continue the “Western intrusion into eastern and even central Eurasian lands.”
As the interest of Washington is mainly coming from its political and military ambitions, it is
questionable if the United States can be the best choice as the main partner of the country. Even if
the money after Manas reaches the people and a short-term pivot position can be beneficial, a war –
irrespective of whether it is in Afghanistan or anywhere else – is always temporary, while the
presence of China and Russia is constant. Nevertheless, the people also want another friend;
according to a Gallup survey from July 2008, 63% of the respondents said, that a close relationship
with Russia, even if it might hurt relationships with the USA is more important14.
Russia
Russia’s interest in Kyrgyzstan comes from several factors. First of all, since the Great Game
of the nineteenth century, when Britain and the Tsar’s empire fought their political war for the control
over the territory, the whole region was under Russian influence. From Bishkek’s point of view, this
war was won by the Russians as they captured the city in 1862 and by the early 1880’s the whole
territory of today’s Kyrgyzstan belonged to Tsar; hence they were under Russian control for around
110 years. Besides this, 9 % of the country’s population is Russian 15, which means approximately
half million people. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Moscow’s main interest comes from two
other sources; drug traffic and inner security.
As Semyon Bagdasarov, deputy of the Russian State Duma described in an interview in
August, 2010;
14
15
http://gmj.gallup.com/content/150011/kyrgyzstan-security-freedom-later.aspx
http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php?rog3=KG
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“In October 2009, the United Nations stated, in a very professional and comprehensive report,
absolutely clearly that at the time US troops went to Afghanistan, no drugs were cultivated in
the Taliban-controlled areas. An absolute record in this respect, 8,200 tons [of opium], was set
in 2007 after the US troops had arrived in Afghanistan.…in that report Mr. [Luiz Carlos da]
Costa, the deputy special representative of the United Nations’ Secretary General who is also
the head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said that drugs were not the biggest problem.
Can you imagine it, given the fact that 30,000 or 40,000 Russians were annually dying of drug
abuse.”16
In other words, the Taliban, that forbade commerce of drugs on their territories, had to find a fast and
highly profitable source with the arrival of the NATO troops. As one of the main routes of narcotics to
Europe leads through Russia, the presence of the coalition’s forces in Afghanistan – at least from this
point of view – causes some discontent in Moscow, even if the country gains profit from letting the
Americans and their allies use their infrastructure to transport their supply. This results in the
question, whether Russia should put some pressure on the Kyrgyz leadership to close down the
Manas base and try to work on the end of the Afghan war or use the money coming from NATO, to
fight more efficiently against drug trafficking – and usage as well – among the Russian borders. Even
though, since 2003 Russia has its own airbase at Kant next Bishkek, the issue of inner security
enforces the former; as F. William Egdahl, journalist and contributor of the Centre for Research on
Globalization put it, “the Medvedev-Putin regime is creatively using every level -- from energy pipeline
deals with the state-owned Gazprom, to military trade -- to rollback the threatening NATO
encirclement that reached its peak in 2004-2005 with Washington’s ‘Color Revolutions’ in Georgia,
Ukraine and finally Kyrgyzstan”17. At the moment the solution is somewhere in the middle as the
joining of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO is now off the table; the Russians use the upcoming end of
the Manas’ contract to put some conditions in the new one; they want the Americans to practice
better control over drug trafficking.
16
http://rt.com/usa/news/us-central-asia-chaos/
F. William Engdahl, “Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Roza Revolution’: Russia and the Future of Kyrgyzstan,” Centre for
Research of Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19335, June 4, 2010.
17
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Getting back to the traditional influence of Moscow over the territory, three organizations
need to be mentioned. First of all, Kyrgyzstan is already a member of the SCO and the CSTO18.
Secondly, according to Atambayev – at this time he was the First Deputy Prime Minister of the interim
government – Kyrgyzstan wants to join the Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan; "We
have a common past with Kazakhstan and Russia and obviously our future will be with them in a
common economic space and a common customs space". Talking about the common past, the will of
politicians and people seem to meet each other at this point; in a 2010 Gallup survey 65 % of Kyrgyz
respondents wanted “a strong authoritarian system, which places order above freedom”; “a system
that has a lot of similarity to the Soviet one, but more democratic and market-based” or “the Soviet
system which was in place in your country prior to Perestroika”19.
All in all, Moscow’s interest – besides its traditional influence and their own people there – is
mainly the result of the American’s activities in the region. The continuing effort to get a closer
relation with the Central Asian country – Russia was the first to recognize the interim government
after the coup in April 2010 – suggests that Russia has long-term intentions, while the U.S., as it has
been analyzed previously, not necessarily capable of maintain its own presence in the region.
In sum Kyrgyzstan seems to be in a good position to use the rivaling parties against each
other, however balancing between two superpowers has never been an easy task, not to mention
that in this case there are three of them. Therefore perhaps the most efficient solution is to use the
money of the U.S. and the investments of China to stabilize and develop the country, while step-bystep getting closer to Russia. This would somehow reflect the will of the people and by maintaining
the relations with the former two, the influence of Moscow could also be hold on a healthy level.
18
An intergovernmental military alliance which was signed on 15 May 1992. The members are Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
19
http://gmj.gallup.com/content/150011/kyrgyzstan-security-freedom-later.aspx
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The Neighbors
Kazakhstan
From economic perspective Kazakhstan’s influence in Kyrgyzstan is unquestionable. In 2007
the two countries’ Prime Ministers established a common investment found with a total of 120 million
$. Kazakhstan’s part was 100 million $, which demonstrates how seriously Astana considers the
investment in its developing neighbor. Also “Kazakhstan’s major cities are becoming more attractive
for Kyrgyz migrant workers, including businessmen and highly skilled workers.… At the same time,
more and more residents of southern Kazakhstan are traveling to Kyrgyzstan for tourism and various
services today, as prices are much lower in Kyrgyz cities.”20 Furthermore, the expressed importance
of the vast northern neighbor did not change with the system in Bishkek; in an interview in January,
2011, the interim government’s President, Roza Otunbayeva praised her Kazakh colleague,
Nursultan Nazarbayev and his country for supplying building materials of 10 million $ 21 in order to
reconstruct Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions. Also, in February 2011, on a meeting in Astana, Prime
Minister Atambayev and President Nazarbayev agreed on further expansion of the bilateral economic
partnership. The fact, that “There are more than 400 companies in banking, energy, gas
transportation, manufacturing, and the production of building materials operating in Kyrgyzstan with
the Kazakh investments in them, along with 250 companies with the Kyrgyz participation operating in
Kazakhstan”22 shows that both countries are willing to strengthen their cooperation.
20
Erica Marat, “Kazakh-Kyrgyz Economic Relations Receive New Boost”, The Jamestown Foundation,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32864, July 12, 2010.
21
http://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2346321, January 31, 2011.
“A bi-weekly online publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan”,
February 08, 2011.
22
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Uzbekistan
Regarding the Uzbeks and the problems between the two countries, two historical elements
need to be clarified. First of all, the Kyrgyz were ruled by the Uzbek Kokand Khanate from 1710 until
1876, and lost four wars against them between 1845 and 1873 23. Secondly, Kyrgyz are traditionally
shepherding nomads, while Uzbeks are sedentary farmers and due to the differences of the two ways
of life, the Uzbeks were always wealthier. Relating to these or not, it is certain that the main cause of
the tension between the two countries is the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan, with a total population of
close to 800.000 people. The most well-known issues were the clashes in the city and region of Osh
in 1990 and 2010. The former caused the death of 120 Uzbeks, 50 Kyrgyz and one Russian 24, while
in last year’s event officially 893 people lost their lives25, however unofficial figures talk about more
than 2000 killed26.
Additionally, the differences between the two countries’ system also lessens the chances of
cooperation. As Erica Manat – analyst and reporter at Voice of America's Russian Service –
described it; “Boosting ties with Uzbekistan could potentially affect the democratic climate in
Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek risks cooperating with an authoritarian political regime that seeks to persecute
its own political dissidents on neighboring territories….Kyrgyzstan has become a hub for numerous
Uzbek political asylum-seekers, refugees, and members of banned religious groups, mainly from
eastern Uzbek cities.27”
23
http://www.centralasia-biz.com/cabiz/eng/kyrgyz_eng/tourist_kg_eng/tourism_hystory_kg_eng.htm
Valery Tishkov, "Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!': An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic
Conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 2. pp. 134–5.
25
http://rt.com/news/kyrgyzstan-riots-death-toll/, June 12, 2010.
26
http://www.polit.ru/news/2010/06/12/1000/, June 12, 2010.
27
Erica Marat, “Kyrgyz-Uzbek Security Relations: Similar Problems, Different Policies,” The Jamestown
Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31929, August 1,
2006.
24
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Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Uzbek gas is another element of the tension between the two
post-Soviet countries. In 2005 Tashkent’s unilateral closure of the tap, forcing Kyrgyzstan to buy from
Kazakhstan on a higher price level, while in this year a 14 % increase in the price showed to Bishkek
that the neighbors are not afraid to use their natural resources as a tool.
Tajikistan
The third Central Asian country bordering Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan has its own problems. Drug
trafficking from Afghanistan and Islamist militants means a constant threat to the country’s stability
and in 2009, the International Crisis Group stated that the country is close to become a failed state28.
However, Tajikistan seems to work on these issues as they reported to gain full control over their
problematic eastern regions29, also in the name of cooperation they handed over two suspected
terrorists to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
For Bishkek, both problems are relevant; drug trafficking results in pressure from Russia,
while infiltration of extremists groups can challenge the country’s inner security. As it has been
described by The Jamestown Foundation’s analysts, Roger Kangas and Brianne Todd “until the
ethnic violence that occurred in southern Kyrgyzstan in June, Tajikistan’s relationship with Kyrgyzstan
was relatively positive.…However, as the killings in Osh and Jalalabad were taking place in midJune, Kyrgyz officials and media offered oblique comments that the actual culprits were gangs of
“provocateurs” coming across the border from Tajikistan”30. The similarities of the two countries are
28
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/centralasia/tajikistan/162_tajikistan___on_the_road_to_failure.ashx, February 12, 2009.
29
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11565443, October 18, 2010.
30
Roger Kangas, Brianne Todd, “Arrests Mark Opportunity for Improved Relations Between Tajikistan and
its Neighbors,” The Jamestown Foundation,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36711, August 5, 2010.
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obvious; they both host NATO forces31, they are “both dependent upon Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
for their hydrocarbon energy, while also providing water to the same countries32”, they both face
problems of internal stability and they both try to develop the economic relations of the two
countries33.
On the whole, all three countries have a different approach towards Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan,
at the moment playing the role of the helping bigger brother, Uzbekistan, aggressively using their gas
supply and is concerned about the mistreat of its people and troubled Tajikistan having issues
between its own borders which need to be solved, before it could seriously step out to the
international stage. One of the possible solutions could be a Central Asian Union, which was
proposed by President Nazabayev in 200734. It would contain all five Central Asian countries and
besides it could counter-balance the power of CSTO and SCO it could also help to find solutions to
ethnic and security problems in the region. Despite the considerable difference between the origin
and the lifestyles of the peoples, in a well-organized Union the benefits would exceed the
disadvantages.
Conclusion
To sum up, Kyrgyzstan faces tough competition for its support. China is using its economic
power to gain influence, the USA is already present with the Manas base and wants to keep it this
way, while Russia is working on the opposite, to get the Americans out of the country and the region.
This competition is a heavy burden, but in good hands, it can be beneficial for the country. The best
31
The Franch Air Force has a base in Tajikistan since 2002.
Kangas, Brianne.
33
http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/tajikistan/viewstory.aspx?id=10052, August 26, 2011.
34
http://www.towardsunity.org/cau.phtml
32
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option – and the most supported by the public, as well – would be Russia, however the progress
towards Moscow needs to be slow and without seriously damaging the interests of the other two. On
regional level, Kazakhstan seems to be a serious investor, while with Tajikistan, after it solves its own
internal issues, the high number of similarities can help the future cooperation. Uzbekistan’s high
importance is unquestionable, first of all due to its gas supply, however the various historical
differences and events, also the issue of the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan, makes collaboration
difficult. A Central Asian Union could help on both balancing the increased influence of Russia and
solving the regional problems, however it is still a very long-term project. But the region and
Kyrgyzstan have time and as it is not so likely that the major powers’ interest drop soon, they have
various opportunities as well. It is only up on them, to determine how they will use it.
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