Torts and Damages
Taylor vs Manila Electric Co
16 Phil 18
Torts and Damages – Element – Quasi Delicts
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30
blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries
to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for
damages due to the company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the
power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the company’s
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion
of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts
that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well----grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which
he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a
stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents
of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
"The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand reparation therefor from another."
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Torts and Damages
Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf
7 Phil 359
Torts and Damages – Kinds of Fault
Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the
company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of
the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were
no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were
also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks
but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the
track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and
causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only
before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the
rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the
tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who
swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross
nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred
from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the
Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two
persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an independent
obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
NOTE: Today the three kinds of negligence are (derived from Roman Law):
1. Culpa Criminal
2. Culpa Contractual
3. Culpa Aquiliana
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Torts and Damages
Francisco vs Onrubia
46 Phil 327
Torts and Damages – When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises
In November 1922, Onrubia was driving his car in Calle Ascarraga, Manila and he overrun the 9 year old son of Francisco
which led to his son’s death. Francisco sued Onrubia for homicide through reckless imprudence. The lower court
acquitted Onrubia as it ruled that Onrubia did not drive the automobile he was operating at an exaggerated or
unreasonable speed, was not responsible for any imprudence, fault, carelessness or negligence whatsoever, and did not
violate any regulation in connection with said death.
Now Francisco filed a separate civil suit for damages against Onrubia for P4.5k. Onrubia assailed the civil suit arguing
that Francisco did not reserve the right to file a separate civil case against him. Francisco grounded the civil suit on
Article 1902 which states that “Any person who by an act or omission causes damages to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Onrubia is civilly liable.
HELD: No. In order to establish the civil liability in a criminal case, it is necessary that the same spring from, or be a
consequence of, the criminal liability, and, therefore, if a defendant is acquitted of a crime, a judgment, sentencing him
to pay a determinate indemnity by reason of the same crime is not possible. A person not criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor cannot be civilly liable. The full and complete acquittal of Onrubia necessarily implies his innocence of,
and freedom from responsibility for, the crime of which he was accused.
Though there is another provision of the Civil Code (Article 1093) which states that “Those arising from wrongful or
negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter Second of Title Sixteen of
this book.”, and said chapter contains Article 1902, it is necessary that the negligence or fault in question be not
punished by law. This is not the case in the case at bar; the negligence complained of in this case is punishable by law,
however, said negligence does not exist on the part of Onrubia.
Tenchavez vs Escaño
15 Phil 355
Torts and Damages – When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises- Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaño’s
parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s
parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration
because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2
years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an
American citizen and also married an American.
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In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their
daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a
P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they
never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment
before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that
Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded.
HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a
divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and
attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.
On the part of Escaño’s parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must
have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation,
or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and
has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in
the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
73 Phil 607
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia.
Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla
was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi
(employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of
their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit
should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is
well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also
proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic
infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his
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right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued
for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver's negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).
Elcano vs Hill
77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his
dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his
son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that
his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor child", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "Emancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the
decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
BLTB vs CA
64 SCRA 427
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
In February 1963, Ilagan was driving a bus owned by Batangas Laguna Tayaban Bus Company along Manila South Super
Highway. He sped pass a big cargo truck thereby taking the opposite lane and he hit the car driven by a certain de los
Reyes which resulted to the latter’s death and the latter’s niece’s death and causing serious injuries to the other car
passengers. Ilagan was sued for homicide through reckless imprudence and while the case was pending in the CA the
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victims sued Ilagan and BLTB for damages via an independent civil action based on Article 2180. BLTB assailed the suit as
it invoked the opinion penned by Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje which states that under Article 33 of the Civil Code
it excludes criminal negligence as one of those which an independent civil action can be filed, hence homicide through
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party
reserved his right to institute a separate civil action; and based on this, BLTB wanted the dismissal of the civil suits
pending the criminal suit in the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil suit can be filed independently of the criminal negligence case pending before the CA.
HELD: Yes. The opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje is not controlling because it is not doctrinal – this is
because the majority of the court did not agree with it. Also, the Corpus case was different because the damages
claimed there were based on the same criminal negligence. But in the case at bar, the damages sought to be recovered
were based on quasi-delict or Article 2176 & 2180 of the Civil Code which is an independent civil action.
Virata vs Ochoa
81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages – Double Recovery of Civil Liability
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latter’s death. The heirs of
Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata’s lawyer
reserved their right to file a separate civil action but he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the
criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it
was ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the
jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was
already acquitted and that the Virata’s were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with
Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised
Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Cuison vs Norton & Harrison Co
55 Phil 18
Torts and Damages – Liability of Employers
Ora was the owner of a truck which transports lumbers owned by Norton & Harrison Co. Ora employed two minors as
his helpers in securing the lumbers from the lumberyard. In August 1928, while the truck filled with with lumber was at a
stop, the lumbers slid from the truck thereby pinning the 7 year old son of Cuison which caused the boy’s death. Cuison
sued Norton and the 2 minors for damages amounting to P30,000.00 for the death of his son.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Norton is liable as an employer.
HELD: Yes. Although the lower court did not determine the nature of relationship between Ora and Norton it can be
deduced from the testimonies given that Ora, as owner of the truck is a contractor of Norton. But at the same time, he is
also an employee of Norton because he also acts as a foreman of the company. This being established, Norton is liable
as an employer because of Ora’s negligence in directing his men in terms of securing the lumbers. The pertinent
provisions apply:
Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the
damage so done. Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the [old Civil] Code provides: Owners or directors of any
establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or an occasion of the performance of their duties. The
liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Norton failed to prove that they exercised diligence in the selection of their employees. Note further that the basis of
civil liability of an employer is not respondeat superior but the relationship of paterfamilias (or pater familias – can be
spelled both ways). The theory of pater familias bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence i.e.
selection of employees, and not that of his servant.
Yamada vs Manila Railroad & Bachrach Garage
33 Phil 11
Torts and Damages – Liability of Employers
In January 1913, Yamada et al hired a taxi owned and operated by Bachrach Garage so that they may travel to Cavite
Viejo. The trip was safe going to said place but when they were going back from said place the taxi was hit by a train
owned by Manila Railroad. Yamada et al sued the driver, Bachrach, and Manila Railroad. They claimed that the driver
was negligent as he did not slow down while he was approaching the railroad tracks. The driver said there was no way
for him to see the train coming because of the tall growing bushes and trees. Bachrach said that it is not liable as an
employer because prior to hiring the driver, the driver has been of good record for 5 years and had had no traffic
infractions prior to the collision; and that the negligence of the driver is also imputable to Yamada et al they being the
ones in control of the vehicle; that Yamada et al should have controlled the driver and instructed him to slow down.
Manila Railroad said that it is not liable as well because its engineers provided proper warning signals on their approach
and that there were no tall trees or bushes at the time of the accident.
Yamada’s counsel presented the president of Bachrach who alleged that all their drivers habitually drove their taxis over
railroad crossings without slowing down or investigating whether a train is coming – such practice being allowed and
tolerated by Bachrach.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable.
HELD: It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent driver should have slowed down approaching a
railroad crossing regardless if he could see a train or not there are tall bushes.
Manila Railroad and its employees are not negligent as showed by the evidence which were uncontroverted hence no
liability can be had against them.
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Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an employer. Although they did establish that they have done their
diligence in properly selecting their driver and in providing said driver with a good car, they have failed to provide proper
supervision and control over their employee. Bachrach Garage did not perform its full duty when it furnished a safe and
proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one of the essential requirements of
the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper rules
and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules
and regulations and instructions are necessary.
Bachrach’s contention that Yamada et al were also negligent because they failed to properly instruct the driver is
untenable. Those on a cab do not become responsible for the negligence of the driver if they exercise no control over
him further than to indicate the route they wish to travel or the places to which they wish to go. Note that in order to
impute negligence to a passenger, at least one of these two things must exist:
1. That the driver is actually the passenger’s agent in all respect
2. The passengers have cooperated in producing the injury complained of.
Ortaliz vs Echarri
101 Phil 947
Torts and Damages – Employer Liable for Damages Caused by Employee Although not Engaged in Business or Industry
In December 1953, Segundino Estanda was driving the Studebaker Sedan car owned by Echarri when he hit the son of
Ortaliz thereby causing injuries to the child. Estanda was sued and he pleaded guilty. Ortaliz subsequently sued Echarri
as the employer of Estanda for damages for the hospital expenses as well as for moral damages because of the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings he suffered due to the incident. Echarri refused to pay alleging among
others that he is not engaged in any business or industry in conjunction with which he has at any time used the said car,
much less on the occasion of the alleged accident, nor was he had at any time put out the said car for hire; that, under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential, in order for an employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies
committed by his employee, that the former be engaged in some kind of industry, and that the employee had
committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry.
ISSUE: Whether or not Echarri can be held liable.
HELD: Yes. The applicable civil code provisions are:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Marquez vs Castillo
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68 Phil 568
Torts and Damages – Employer Not Liable When Injury Did Not Occur in the Course of Duty or Service
On April 30, 1937, Mariano Capulong, a chauffeur, without the knowledge of his employer, Bernardo Castillo, drove his
boss’s car. Capulong ran over Fernanda Marquez thereby killing her. The heirs of Marquez sued Capulong and the latter
was convicted. As he was insolvent, the heirs of Marquez sued Castillo for damages caused by his employee’s
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Castillo is liable for damages for the negligence of his chauffeur.
HELD: No. it was established that Castillo exercised due diligence in employing Capulong; that he had no knowledge of
the fact that Capulong drove the car without his permission; that Castillo is not engaged in any kind of business or
industry on or about April 30, 1937, the date of the accident; that Castillo was not riding in the car at the time of the
accident.
It is clearly shown that the accident did not occur in the course of the performance of the duties or service for which
Capulong had been hired. Castillo did not hire him to do as he pleased, using Castillo’s car as if it were his own. His
duties and service were confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him, and the accident did not take
place under said circumstances. The subsidiary civil liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article 103 of
said Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant, subordinate or employee commits a punishable
criminal act while in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him
incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability, this is not so in the case at bar.
Bahia vs Litonjua and Leynes
30 Phil 624
Torts and Damages – Due Diligence as a Defense
On May 14, 1911, Leynes rented a car from International Garage owned and operated by Ramirez. As per the
arrangement, Ramirez would also provide for the driver and a machinist. Leynes was to use the car to transport people
from a certain fiesta for profit. The car was actually brand new and was only used a few hours. On May 16, 2011, while
driven on the road, the automobile, by reason of a defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the driver
in turning a corner in the streets, and, as a consequence, ran across the street and into the wall of a house against which
the daughter of Bahia was leaning at the time. The front of the machine struck the child in the center of the body and
crushed her to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leynes is liable in the case at bar.
HELD: No. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a
servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the
automobile was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the
negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes
liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when that liability shall cease. It says:
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.
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From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He
obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The car had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear
from the evidence that Leynes had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering
gear.
While it does not appear that Leynes formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them
proper instructions, designed for the protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that the death of
the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the car as to
which Leynes has shown himself free from responsibility.
Ong vs Metropolitan Water District
104 Phil 397
Torts and Damages - Due Diligence as a Defense
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by
Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six
lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time
on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with
oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him
returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the lifeguard in attendant
(Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be
revived multiple times but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its employees. During trial, the elder
brother of Ong and one other testified that Abaño was reading a magazine and was chatting with a security guard when
the incident happened and that he was called a third time before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even
assuming that there was no negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for
having the last opportunity to save the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.
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HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all of them were duly
certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a complete and
proper defense in this case. Further, the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the
statements they have given to the investigators when they said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when
he was called about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application here. It was not established as to how Dominador was able to go
to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body was retrieved from the
bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to the big pool if he did
not see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to
have contributed to the injury.
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