Ragghianti 1
Ragghianti, Matthew
Govt 491/ Conflict and Cooperation
Prof Grigorian
December 11, 2007
Origins of World War I
World War I was the first war of its type ever to occur. Never before had so many nations of the world been involved in one conflict. And never before has there been a more diverse claim of origin. Since the closure of World War I, international relations theorists have been obsessed with determining what exactly caused the July Crisis and subsequently World War I, particularly regarding Germany. Some claim it was a preventive conflict as Germany and its allies were striking before others could attack them. Others claim that Germany did not actually want a war, that they were encircled and dragged into the conflict by alliances. And still others feel that
Germany actually provoked a war they always wanted. All of these arguments have valid empirical as well as theoretical backing. Commitment problems, chain-gaining, irrationality and more are adequate theoretical reasons for the advent of World War I.
Kier A. Lieber wrote an article entitled “The New History of World War I and What it
Means for International Relations Theory” that was published in the Fall 2007 edition of
International Security. After presenting his new reasoning for the July Crisis, Lieber writes
“international relations scholars now have good reasons to reexplore the ways which World War
I challenges or reinforces their understandings of the causes of conflict in international politics” 1
.
Again, this article was published in 2007, reinforcing the idea that not only are the origins of
World War I still highly debatable, but that the July Crisis is one of the most important empirical studies in international relations as it provides an excellent study of why conflict occurs. This discussion seeks to flesh out some of the arguments for why the July Crisis occurred and why it
1
Lieber, Kier A. “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”:
International Security . Fall 2007. p 191.

Ragghianti 2 sparked World War I, focusing mainly on German actions. The following four sections will break down some of the leading arguments on the subject including; one of the overarching principles of World War I, that Germany wanted a preventive war, that Germany was dragged into a war it did not want, and the Germany wanted war despite the costs. In the end, the goal is to determine which of these four major arguments is most convincing when attempting to determine why the July Crisis and World War I occurred.
An Overarching Principle for World War I
‘Cult of the Offensive’
Many international relations cite the „cult of the offensive‟ as one of the major causes of the July Crisis and World War I. The „cult of the offensive‟ is that idea that “militaries glorified the offensive and adopted offensive military doctrines, while civilian elites and publics assumed that the offensive had to advantage in warfare, and that offensive solutions to security problems were the most effective” 2
. Basically, the „cult of the offensive‟ theory states that in what was perceived to be an offense dominate system, the July Crisis was unavoidable and uncontrollable.
There are many factors that feed into this view. One was the belief by many countries, not just
Germany, that a war would be both quick and decisive. And, as before, there was a general feeling of offense dominance in Europe. It was not limited only to Germany. France was
“obsessed with the virtues of the offensive” and Britain declared that “the defense is never an acceptable role to the Briton” 3
. The point is that in the years leading up the 1914 the European continent were both obsessed with and convinced that offense was the best policy. There are some dangers that are associated with this view that many argue lead to the July Crisis. The
2
Van Evera, Stephen “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”. Military Strategy and the
Origins of the First World War: An International Security Reader. Princton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1991.
3
59.
Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 60.

Ragghianti 3 major dangers associated with the belief of offense dominance that will be covered in this discussing include;
1) States adopt more aggressive foreign policy, both to exploit new opportunities and to avert new dangers which appear when the offense is strong.
2) Windows of opportunity or vulnerability open wider, forcing faster diplomacy and raising the risk of preventive wars.
3) States adopt more competitive styles of democracy since the gains promised by such tactics can more easily justify the risk they entail
4
.
Many of these ideas speak individually to more specific arguments for the July Crisis
(which will be covered later), but this „cult of the offensive‟ is seen by many as the overarching principle in many aspects. It sets the scene for what the military and political culture of the time period was. When everyone thinks the offensive has the advantage countries act in particular manners to either take advantage of this fact or counteract it. But, as stated above, many leaders felt, at this point in history, that offense was the best defense. Therefore, any move can be seen as offensive, whether it is meant to be offensive or defensive.
Theoretical Underpinnings: Security Dilemma and Offense/Defense Balance
There are two major theories that are important to understand regarding the „cult of the offensive‟. First is the security dilemma. The security dilemma is the idea that “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others”
5
. The international system is anarchic, meaning that there is not an international government or any real means of punishment or way to reinforcement agreements. As a result, the anarchical international system
“permits wars to occur” 6
. The anarchy of international relations drives the security dilemma as there is no way to ensure that one countries security is not lessened by the actions of another.
This is what makes the „cult of the offense‟ so dangerous and why it is seen as one of the
4
Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 64-66.
5
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”. World Politics. January 1978. 169.
6
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, 167.

Ragghianti 4 overarching reasons for World War I. There was rhetoric, as noted above, that many European countries had offensive ambitions and, as will be described in the following sections, many times this ambition centered on increasing security. And, based on the definition of the security dilemma, this would then threaten the security of other European nations.
Another important theory is the idea of offense/defense balance. Stated simply, “when we say that offense has the advantage is simply means that it is easier to destroy the other‟s army and take its territory than it is to defend ones own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take” 7
. As stated above, the
„cult of the offensive‟ mentality dictated that offense has the advantage. Therefore, it would be in the best interest of countries to act in an offensive manner. A problem occurs when it is difficult to distinguish between whether the weapons used are offense or defense oriented. Figure 1 displays the four situations that can occur and breaks down which ones are the most and less dangerous (4 being the most and 1 being the least):
Figure 1
Weapons Distinguishable
Offense Has Advantage
Defense Has Advantage
3
1
Weapons Not
Distinguishable
4
2
As displayed, the worst case scenario is when offense has the advantage and weapons are not distinguishable. This is essentially the situation that existed according to this idea of the „cult of the offensive‟. Whether or not offensive truly had the advantage or not, leaders of most
7
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 187.

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European countries were enamored with the fact that it was. In addition, Van Evera states in his article “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War” that despite the large and growing advantage which defenders gained against attackers as a result of the invention of rifled and repeating small arms, the machine gun, barbed wire, and the development of railroads, Europeans increasingly believed that attackers would hold the advantage on the battlefield [because they] embraced a set of political and military myths which obscured both the defender‟s advantages and the obstacles a aggressor would confront
8
In other words, European nations during the „cult of the offensive‟ existed in the “4” cell. They obviously felt offensive intentions were advantageous and were unaware, according to the above assertion that defensive weapons were actually at the advantage. As a result, offensive strategies meet defensive weapons, and thus the trench warfare that defined World War I. Therefore, the
July Crisis, from a security dilemma standpoint, took place in the most dangerous circumstances of offense/defense balance and whether weapons are distinguishable.
Belief One: Germany Wanted a Preventive War
Empirical Details: Fear of Russia
The preventive war argument for Germany in World War I is based around the idea that
“major war breaks out only when Germany military power is maximized relative to German adversaries”
9
. And this is exactly what proponents of the preventive war theory regarding the
July Crisis think occurred. In the early 1900s “Germany was peaking in relative power [… but]
Russia would overwhelm Germany once it completed its industrialization” 10
. German power was falling relative to Russian power. Germany sought to increase its territory and influence in
Europe, like most of Europe, but they realized that Russia would be at some point too strong for
Germany to overtake for two major reasons. One was the belief that “Russia would overwhelm
8
Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 59-60.
9
Copeland, Dale, The Origins of Major War. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2000. 57.
10
Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 61.

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Germany once it completed its industrialization” 11
. Among other things, one of the biggest issues with industrialization was the completion of a railroad. This paired with military build up would solve the Russian issue of slow mobilization, making it that “after 1917 Germany would no longer have the military superiority needed to win a total war” 12
. The other issue was the alliances Russia had with France and Britain. In the end, war would need to happen when
Germany wanted it if they hoped to win.
This logically makes sense, but does German action support this idea? Evidence of this is shown very clearly at the infamous War Council on December 8, 1912. Three key facts came out of this council. First was the idea that “preventive war for hegemony had to be fought, and soon” 13
. The second was that “Britain would oppose a German attack on France” as per the statement released by London
14
. In early December of 1892, Britain declared that its war policy hinged on the “conviction that the balance of power must be preserved [they] would not allow a situation in which it faced „a united continental bloc under the leadership of a single power‟” 15
.
This declaration meant that Britain would not remain neutral in any conflict involving Russia or
France. Third, and possible most significant to Germany‟s desire of World War I, was the idea that the people of Germany needed to be informed and needed to rally around the idea of a war with Russia. The people of Germany should “not be placed in a position of wondering only at the outbreak of a great European war, what the interest are that Germany must fight for in this war.
Instead [they] should be accustomed to the idea of such a war before hand” 16
. This is most certainly evidence that Germany was preparing for war two years prior to outbreak. They
11
ibid
12
ibid
13
ibid
14
Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 66.
15
Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 65.
16
ibid

Ragghianti 7 realized the potential strength of Russia as well as the role Britain would play in the conflict. As a result, war had to occur before Russia was at its full strength and in a way that might keep
Britain from blaming Germany, keeping them out of a war with Russia.
And thus, the answer to Germany‟s preventive war was the Austrian- Serbian conflict.
Stephen Van Evera states that “Germany and Austria pursued bellicose policies in 1914 partly to shut the looming “windows” of vulnerability which they envisioned lying ahead and partly to exploit the brief window of opportunity which they thought the summer crisis opened” 17
. Russia supported Serbia in this conflict and Germany supported Austria. So, if Austria threatened Serbia and then Russia responded with a threat, Germany could legitimately declare war on Russia.
Through this conflict, Russia could come off as the aggressor, which would mean more support from home and Germany could blame Russia for the war and appease Britain. But, as before,
Germany had to be ready for war. As a result, “when there was little possibility of Russian intervention, Berlin allowed Austria to act forcefully; but whenever it seemed that Russia might be oblige, for the sake of reputation, to oppose Austrian action, Berlin withheld support and advised Vienna to maintain its „waiting attitude‟. By July 1914, this policy would be reversed” 18
.
By this point the time was right for Germany to succeed in their preventive war. In the words of then German chancellor Theobald Von Bethmann-Holweg “Lord yes, in a certain sense it was a preventive war” [motivated by] the constant threat of attack, the greater likelihood of its inevitable future, and by the military claim; today war is still possible without defeat, but not in two years” 19
.
Theoretical Underpinnings: Preventive War, Commitment Problems, and Hard-Line Policy
17
Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 80.
18
Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 75.
19
Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 81.

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First and foremost, it is necessary to formulate what preventive war is. Preventive war is war whose goal is to prevent an attack the might occur in the future by a nation who is rising in power relative to your own power. The goal is to attack another state before they attack you.
There are certain qualifiers that must be in place before a state will rationally engage in preventive war. For one, the state must believe that the opposing state is a legitimate threat to their security. And, as the „cult of the offensive‟ diagramed above displays, all the nations of
Europe felt that any other nation was a credible threat. In addition, the nation must think that they are capable of defeating the other nation with a strike that will limit their ability to strike back. The idea is to strike at the right time to maximize benefit and minimize risk.
The argument for preventive war can be seen most clearly as a commitment problem.
Commitment problems are defined as when “states may be unable to settle on an efficient bargained outcome when for structural reasons they cannot trust each other to uphold the deal” 20
.
Here we related back to the idea of the „cult of the offensive‟. The structural reason that states in the early 1900s could not trust each other is because of the belief that the offense has the advantage over defense, that states will first look to act aggressively. Therefore, even if Russia had extended some sort of bargain to Germany to prevent war, it would not have been possible.
One reason for this is of course the idea of an anarchical international system as there is “no hegemonic power exists to threaten states with „jail‟ if they use force” 21
. In this situation, states become worried about the intentions of other states and thus the security dilemma.
Dale Copeland presents a model in his book The Origins of Major War that outlines this situation and how it can result in preventive war. Copeland states that the major goal is to “pick the option that maximizes the state‟s security that is the option which, all things considered,
20
Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanation for War”, International Organizations, Summer 1995. p 401.
21
ibid

Ragghianti 9 leads to the highest expected probability of survival over the foreseeable future”
22
. When considering what action is best to take under this model, states must consider the following causal factors:
Independent Variables
1) Initial differential of relative military power
2) Depth of decline
3) Inevitability of decline
Parameters
1) Extent to which hard-line policies can overcome decline
2) Extent to which hard-line policies will increase the probability of war through inadvertent means
3) The probability of the other attacking later should it be allowed to rise
23
And based on these factors, the declining state has the following policy choices, with 1 being the hard-line choice and 5 being the soft line approach:
1) initiate war
2) crisis initiation
3) deterrence/containment
4) do nothing
5) Reassurance
24
.
Using this model and the ideas of commitment problems, the choice of preventive
War by Germany makes sense. As before, due to the offense having the perceived advantage and the lack of punishment for action, there is sufficient reason not to trust the commitment of other actors, hence a commitment problem. It forces states to “think about what may happen in the future” 25 . And in the future, preventive action by German fits into each parameter of Copeland‟s model. There is an initial power gap and Russian potential is much greater than that of Germany, so German decline is inevitable. And because of the „cult‟, there is most certainly a great chance of attack in the future. So, hard line policy would possibly overcome the decline by striking and
22
Copeland, Dale, “Foreign Policy Choices and the Probability of Major War”. The Origins of Major War. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London, 2000. 39.
23
Copeland, “Foreign Policy Choices and the Probability of Major War”, 39.
24
ibid
25
Fearon, “Rationalist Explanation for War”, 405.

Ragghianti 10 defeating Russia before they are too strong. And that is what happened, as Germany chose the most hard-line of the possible responses, choosing to initiate a preventive war with Russia.
The reason why this hard line policy of preventive war makes sense is because of the chances of winning. There is no incentive to bargain when a commitment problem exists because you cannot trust the actions of the other party. Because of the rising power of Russia, they, as before, have no incentive to keep to any bargain made with Germany. It goes back to the idea of what will happen in the future. Russia “will not be able to commit itself not to exploit the greater bargaining leverage it will have [in the future]” 26
. In the offense dominate world that Europe existed in 1914, Russia would most certainly renege on their agreement once they were in fact more powerful than Germany. So, Germany had no incentive to try and bargain and their best chance at victory is to attack while Russia is rising in power. It is pure commitment problem and the result was World War I.
Belief Two: Germany was dragged into War
Empirical Details: War Plans and Alliances
Another argument for the July Crisis is that the nations were dragged into a war that none of them wanted. This argument claims that war was a result of military schedules. That “leaders
[…] attempted to back away but the pull of military schedules dragged them forward” 27
. The best way to understand this argument is to simply look at a brief description of the war plans of the
Germany, France, Britain, and Russia and then to look at how they dragged Europe into war
Germany
The German war plan centered on the famous „Schlieffen Plan”. The „Schlieffen Plan‟ called for a two front war with France and Russia in which Germany would attack France first.
26
ibid
27
Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”, 155.

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This plan was developed for two main reasons. The first is that in the event of any conflict, a two front war was inevitable. This was because “Germany was obliged to support Austria in any conflict with Russia […] under the terms of the alliance between France and Russia, both parties were obliged to move against Germany if either became involved in a defense war with
Germany” 28
. France and Russia had been in a military alliance since 1892, so therefore an attack on one would be an attack on both. An attack against France would come first because of the mobilization capabilities of the two countries. France, as well as Germany, was expected to be able to mobilize in two weeks while Russia would need six weeks
29
. The plan called for troops to march through neutral Belgium and attack France on their right wing so as to envelop the
French. This would involve 7/8 of the troops, including reserves, to attack France on the western front while 1/8 of German troops protected the eastern front. Once France is defeated, the
German army would march on Russia while they were still in the mobilization phase.
France
France‟s war plans were derived from a heightened sense of nationalism and past military defeats. Following defeats in Sudan and other places, France entered the 1900s with a stigma of defensive strategies. But, like most countries in Europe in the early 1900s, France began to subscribe to a new military doctrine of the offensive. As a result of this new military perspective,
French leaders developed New Field Regulations in 1913, which was a document with eight amendments trumpeting the new French way of war, which stated things such as “the French army, returning to its traditions, henceforth admits no law but the offensive”
30
. In addition, the support that they had from Russia and Britain allowed them to pursue a more offensive strategy.
Since the German war plan called for a strong right wing that would engulf France, leaders of the
28
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1962. 18.
29
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 19.
30
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 33.

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French military saw the opportunity to exploit a weak German center and left wing. The French would therefore attack the center, effectively cutting the German army in half.
Britain
Great Britain‟s war plans hinged on their desire for stability, as described in the previous preventive war discussion. The general belief leading up to 1914 was that France would need
British assistance if it wanted to oust Germany. This relationship was solidified in July of 1911 with the Dubail-Wilson agreement which “attached the British army, in the event that a war came and Britain entered it, to the French, placing it where it would prolong the French line and guard the French flank against envelopment”
31
. The extent of British involvement would be to join the French, mobilize at the same time as France, and send six divisions to France. The thought was that if put to the extreme left of the French line, these divisions could help to stop the Germans
32
. An issue though for the British was neutral Belgium, as they did not wish to upset the balance of power. In the end, it was determined that the French could not cross into
Belgium first for “if they did, England could never be on their side; if the Germans did, they would bring England in against them” 33
.
Russia
The Russian army was “one [the] chessboard of military planning […] represented the largest piece […] it was envisaged as a gigantic mass, initially lethargic, but once thoroughly roused into motion, rolling forward with inexorably with, no matter how many losses, endless waves of manpower to fill the places of the fallen” 34
. Russia was the stream roller that all feared and all wanted on their side. In 1911, Russia agreed to launch an offense with the French because
31
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 51.
32
ibid
33
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 54.
34
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 56-57.

Ragghianti 13 of their perceived threat of Germany. With Russia involved, it would guarantee a two front war, which was consequently what the Germans wanted. The plan was that if “Germany launched her main forces against France, Russia would launch her main strength against Austria”
35
. Since
Germany was tied to Austria they would be forced to relocate troops to the eastern front sooner than they wanted to, giving France a chance on the western front.
The Spark
As one can see, the ground work was set far before the July Crisis for an all out European war. Germany was tied to Austria Hungary, Britain was tied to France, and Russia was tied to
France. All that needed to happen was the spark. This spark occurred when the Archduke of
Austria Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist on June 28, 1914. Then, on July 5,
1914 Germany informed Austria that they could rely on “Germany‟s „faithful support‟ if whatever punitive action she took against Serbia brought her into conflict with Russia”
36
. And that was all it took. It had happened too soon and in the wrong way. Austria Hungary delivered the ultimatum to Serbia, which Serbia rejected, which leads to a declaration of war by Austria
Hungary. In response to the war declaration, Russia mobilized her troops against Austria, causing Germany to issue an ultimatum to Russia, threatening war on all fronts and eliminating the war plans outlined by Schlieffen. Mass mobilization began. And because of the rigid structure of the German war plan, this mobilization included movement towards the French
(partly in response to Frances denial to stay neutral in a German-Russo War) despite their desire to keep Britain out of the war for the time being. In the words of German General Moltke, “to have signed as the first order after mobilization one that would have annulled all the careful preparations would have taken […] as evidence of „hesitancy and irresolution […] I will not sign
35
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 65.
36
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 71.

Ragghianti 14 it” 37
. And thus, Germany did not want the war they were given, yet were force into it because of the rigid structure of war plans and the pull of alliances.
Theoretical Underpinnings: Chain Ganging, Moral Hazard, and Rigidity
When there is multipolarity, meaning that there are multiple powers in the international system, two different alliance types can affect the stability of the balance of power, chain ganging and buck passing. The situation described above is most certainly an example of chain ganging. Chain ganging occurs when states form alliances with other states in an effort to balance. But, since it is a multipolar system, each member of the alliance is essentially equal in power. This “approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance” 38
. Therefore, the security of one relies highly on the security of others. As a result, “no state can restrain a reckless ally by threatening to sit out a conflict, since the demise of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security” 39
.
This exact situation occurred in the July Crisis. All the nations of Europe were linked to each other because of the chain gang logic. In the words of Kenneth Waltz;
It Austria Hungary marched, Germany had to follow; the dissolution of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the middle of Europe. If France marched, Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a defeat for
Russia. And so it was all around the vicious cycle. Because the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its force to the aims and fears of its partners
40
.
These points follow very much in line with the war plans described above. When Austria
Hungary and Serbia went to war with each other, the chain gang effect lead to a chain reaction, leading to war. The question to ask though is why these alliances occurred. And to answer this
37
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 81.
38
Christensen, Thomas J & Jack Snyder, “Chain Ganging and Passed Buck: Predicting Alliance Patterns in
Multipolarity” International Organizations Spring 1990, 140.
39
ibid
40
Christensen, “Chain Ganging and Passed Buck: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity”, 141.

Ragghianti 15 question lies again in the idea of the „cult of the offense‟, that offense had the perceived advantage in the years leading up to the July Crisis. The belief of this era was the wars would be quick and decisive. This directly leads to chain ganging as “the expectation of rapid, easy conquest leads state to conclude that allies essential to maintaining the balance of power will be decisively defeated unless they are given immediate and effective assistance” 41
. In other words, when states think they are vulnerable because everyone has relatively equal power in the multipolar system, they seek friends. They seek other states that can come to their aid when their security is threatened. They are essentially looking for an answer to the security dilemma.
France, for instance, looked to Britain as a back up if they were invaded by Germany. The thought is that if one state threatens the security of two states, the two states will win out. The problem is that every state did this, keeping the playing field relatively even. And the result was
World War I.
Another factor that can be examined here in an abstract sense is the idea of moral hazard.
Moral Hazard is the theory that “threats of third party interventions to protect minorities against state-sponsored violence provides minorities with perverse incentives to behave recklessly”
42
.
Obviously World War I does not deal with ethnic violence within states or third parties promising to protect them. But, taken at its bare bones, there is a connection between moral hazard and alliances. One could argue that the culture of the time, the „cult of the offensive‟ and the chain gaining it entailed, leads to an idea similar to moral hazard. Take France for example.
France speaks of a foreign policy of the offensive despite historical precedent to be defensive minded. The argument can be made that possibly part of France‟s new ideas of foreign policy could be tied to the fact that their security depends on the security of others they are in alliance
41
Christensen, “Chain Ganging and Passed Buck: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity”, 144-145
42
Grigorian, Arman, “Third Party Intervention and Escalation in Kosovo: Does Moral Hazard Explain It?”,
Ethnopolitics, June 2005, 196.

Ragghianti 16 with and vice versa. France knew that Britain had their backs, that Britain valued the balance of power above most things in their foreign policy decisions. They also were in alliance with
Russia. This fact could have precipitated the new stance by France to avenge their past defeats.
In the end, it is possible to argue that the security dilemma and chain ganging can in times of offensive advantage can lead to a moral hazard situation in terms of policy and even action because you know for sure who has your back. To take this idea a step further, the fact that the alliances lead to war rather than constant balancing relates to moral hazard. The fact that all nations knew they had support because of the security dilemma and the perceived offensive advantage, moral hazard can be employed to explain how alliances lead to World War I.
Another issue to look at in this explanation is the rigid war plans. Why could Germany not change their plans when it meant pulling Britain into the conflict? This again is the fault of the „cult of the offensive‟. Because of the perceived offensive advantage, there were narrow options for states to pursue. States developed “only options which they believed prudent to exercise, while omitting plans which they believed would be dangerous to implement” 43
.
Another problem was the massive amount of troops that were involved with war mobilization. In the words of General Moltke when asked if troops could be sent to the East, “Your Majesty, it cannot be done. The deployment of millions cannot be improvised. If Your Majesty insists on leading the whole army to the East it will not be an army ready for battle but a disorganized mob of armed men with no arrangement for supply” 44
. Stopping or altering mobilization would have put Germany at a distinct disadvantage and would allow the slow mobilizing Russia to catch up to them. In other words, the nations of Europe reserved themselves to World War one straight
43
Van Evera, ““The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, 86.
44
Tuchman, The Guns of August, 92,99.

Ragghianti 17 from the drawing board. Because once the ball started to roll, they insisted that there was no stopping it.
Belief Three: Germany Provoked War; The New History
The Claim
The two arguments for the origins of World War I and the July Crisis presented thus far are two of the major arguments. But, as stated in the introduction by Kier Lieber, there is always good reason to reexplore why World War I began, which is exactly what he does in his article
“The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”.
Lieber presents an idea that is quite different from the two examined thus far and argues that
Germany provoked war. Germany in this view “went to war in 1914 with eyes wide open […] they provoked a war to achieve their goals of dominating the European continent, and did so aware that the coming conflict would almost certainly be long and bloody” 45
. Lieber presents three main arguments for his claim. One is that the „Schlieffen Plan‟ was not a war plan but rather a ploy to increase the German army. Second, that Germany did not believe the war would be short. And third, that crisis dynamics were not to blame for World War I.
Lieber points out that everything people know about the „Schlieffen Plan‟ has come from one source, a book written by Ritter entitled “The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth”. Lieber argues that Schieffen was aware of the fact that Germany could not win in a single front war, let alone a two front war, with the current size of the German army and that his plan for war was simply a ploy to enlarge the army. To prove his point, Lieber points out four inconsistencies with the „Schlieffen Plan‟. The first is that “Schlieffen apparently never conducted a military exercise testing a German attack into France”
46
. In other words, the plans never resembled German
45
Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”, 156.
46
Lieber , “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”, 170.

Ragghianti 18 intentions to start a war with France. Two, he claims that the plan went against German precedent as it planned too far into the future. The gap between the number of troops the
Germans had and the number called for was huge. German war plans were “”traditionally firmly rooted in the present” 47
. They would never have developed a true plan involving so many troops that were not available. But, it does point out the inadequacy of the current army very clearly.
Third was the fact that the plan called for the Eastern front to be almost completely unprotected from Russia assault, an idea that he considers insane. And again, evidence that a larger army was needed. Finally, Lieber argues that the handling of the war plans is not consistent with a military document of suppose equal importance. The documents were in the possession of Schlieffen‟s daughters until 1931.
Lieber‟s second main point challenges one of the ideas of the „cult of the offensive‟. He states that the history of World War I does not support the notion that Germany felt the war would be quick. General Moltke is cited as stating the war would “likely deliver only limited victories and military stalemate”, which is exactly what it did 48
. Lieber argues that many others in the German military felt this way as well, but still moved forward in the hope of maximizing the chances of German success in the long war. In the end, Lieber argues that Germany believed
“a continental war was inevitable, necessary for preserving and extending Germany‟s power in and beyond Europe, and fought better now than later- all despite the […] vision of an apocalyptic battle
49
. The Germans sought to increase their power, despite the costs that it was sure to entail.
The final and most compelling argument made by Lieber is that Germany was not dragged into war, but rather acted on the war they wanted. For one, he argues that Germany never really believed that Britain would be neutral because of their love for the balance of power.
47
ibid
48
Lieber , “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”, 180.
49
Lieber , “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory”, 183.

Ragghianti 19
Second, he states that the goal of the July Crisis was to place blame on Russia and France.
Support of this idea is seen when Lieber claims that the telegram to Russia with the ultimatum regarding mobilization did not include the fact that mobilization would lead to war. Thirdly, he states that the German government did not resist the over zealous military generals and allowed war to take the precedent over diplomacy. And despite all of this, Germany still went to war,
„with eyes wide open‟.
What it means: Irrationalist Explanation for War
Kier Lieber‟s account of the July Crisis challenges what many believed to be the causes of the First World War. It alludes to the fact that Germany did not act in a preventive manner, but rather an all offensive manner because they felt they could dominate. It also states that they knew war would be long, yet still moved forward. There is no talk of encirclement or of chain gang logic. Lieber asserts that Germany went to war and provoked World War I for the simple reason that they wanted it.
The claim of this article calls into question the rationality of German action, particularly when considering the fact that they acted despite the knowledge that it would be long and bloody. In the article “Rationalist Explanation for War”, James Fearon begins by providing the reader with two alternate reasons for war besides his rationalist explanation. One is “that people
(and state leaders in particular) are sometime or always irrational” 50 . The other is “leaders who order war enjoy the benefits but do not pay the costs, which are suffered by soldiers and citizens” 51
. Lieber seems to be arguing for the irrationalist explanation for war. Lieber claims that Germany went to war despite what it was sure to do to their citizens. This taken with the fact of rallying support as conveyed in the aforementioned infamous War Council could add some
50
Fearon, “Rationalist Explanation for War”, 379.
51
ibid

Ragghianti 20 support to this idea. The Germans knew the conflict would be long and knew it would be bloody, so they needed the support of the people, yet told them it would be quick. Was this because they would suffer the cost and the government would receive the benefits?
One of Lieber‟s main points of this article was to call into question some of the theories of international relations such as the security dilemma and offense/defense balance. He claims that they relied solely on World War I to make the case for some of their theories while ignoring the somewhat obvious. Germany wanted war. It seems though that Lieber does not put enough emphasis on what he is arguing is the core reason for German action. He provides some reasons why they wanted war, that they wanted to dominate Europe and wanted war despite the costs.
They were even willing to go as far as make 'fake' war plans to ensure their army would be large enough. Yet Lieber never seems to mention how irrational this argument seems. Not irrational in the sense of it not making sense, but irrational in the sense of their motivation for war. The idea of dominating Europe is somewhat absurd. It is hard to argue with the fact the Europe in the early 1900s was a multipolar system. There was no hegemon in the system. And other states in
Europe did ascribe to offensive strategies, such as France as described in their war plans.
Germany knew this, yet still provoked. This seems like an irrational explanation for war. Leiber, unlike many international relations theorist, supports the view that Germany did not act rationally according to prevention and alliance logic. Rather they simply wanted war, irrationally so.
Conclusion: Which is best?
As before, World War I was the first war of its kind ever to occur. And as a result, it is a conflict which can test some of the major theories of international relations and the logic of conflict and cooperation. The „cult of the offensive‟ and offense/defense balance are a key cog in

Ragghianti 21 the equation, leading to the ideas that the war might have been preventive, might have being unavoidable, or might even have been provoked by Germany. The question though is which idea is best. Which idea truly explains what drove German action and brought about the infamous
World War I? Or is it some sort of combination of the three? Kier Lieber though proves that trying to determine which model is best is an exercise in futility. New information is always becoming available and always leads to new ideas, which includes up to today, as Lieber published his article in 2007. And that fact alone means that there will never be a time when anyone can definitively say what drove German action in the July Crisis.
This does not mean though that this exercise is also one of futility. There are some key components of German decision making which seem to be particularly important. Above all is the idea of chain ganging. There is no disputing that there were alliances in place that most certainly influenced the July Crisis. These are bound agreements that predetermine who will be involved in a conflict. But, the commitment problem comes into play here as well. What if states go back on their alliance? This is a credible criticism, but unlikely to occur. Because of the atmosphere and the threat to security that the early 1900s posed, if you subscribe to that notion, states would have little incentive to renege on an alliance because it would leave them incredible vulnerable to attack. This argument also supports the idea that the commitment problem is key to the July Crisis, but more in a sense of commitments within alliances rather than between Russia and Germany. It is hard to argue the aggressive intentions of Germany, meaning that peace with
Russia or any other country seems unlikely. All nations in fact had aggressive intentions. So, rather than a commitment problem, it would seem that there was a commitment assurance within alliances.

Ragghianti 22
The above paragraph would seem to state that in the end, the most convincing explanation for World War I is the idea that Germany was pulled into war because of the power of alliances. And there does seem to be merit to this argument. But, in the end, the easiest model to explain German decision making is the irrational one presented by Kier Lieber because it really involves only Germany. It is the idea of Occam‟s razor, that “the simplest approach, for if a simple explanation is adequate, is preferable”
52
. They wanted war, so they provoked it. This seems most convincing because it involves no other actors or situations, just the irrationality of
Germany fueled by their desire for power in the offense dominate world of 1914.
52
Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflcits: An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson, Longman,
New York, 2007. 37.

Ragghianti 23
Works Cited
Christensen, Thomas J & Jack Snyder, “Chain Ganging and Passed Buck: Predicting Alliance
Patterns in Multipolarity” International Organizations Spring 1990.
Copeland, Dale, The Origins of Major War. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2000.
Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanation for War”, International Organizations, Summer 1995.
Grigorian, Arman, “Third Party Intervention and Escalation in Kosovo: Does Moral Hazard
Explain It?”, Ethnopolitics, June 2005.
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”. World Politics
. January 1978.
Lieber, Kier A. “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations
Theory”:
International Security . Fall 2007. .
Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflcits: An Introduction to Theory and History,
Pearson, Longman, New York, 2007
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1962.
Van Evera, Stephen “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”. Military
Strategy and the Origins of the First World War: An International Security Reader.
Princton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1991.