The United States and Cuba
1898 - 1959
By
Ann-Marie Holmes
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
October 22, 2009
2
We certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in
scope and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies.
Committee
______________________________
First Reader (name/date)
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3
Abstract
This paper examines the political and economic relationship between the United States and Cuba
from 1898 to 1959. In examining this relationship, I intend to illustrate how such a simple
relationship based on trade agreements evolved into the complicated relationship that exists
today. The time period 1898 to 1959 covers from the start of Cuban independence after the
Spanish American War to the rise of Fidel Castro. Data have been collected from Foreign
Relations of the United States documents, archives, and existing published research. This paper
shows that the arguments that the United States actions were imperialistic or altruistic are false.
Instead the intentions behind the United States actions were just as complicated as the
relationship they affected. By understanding this past relationship, we can better understand the
present relationship.
4
Table of Contents
Introduction
7
Before the Spanish American War
10
The Spanish American War
14
1900-1920
19
1920-1940
34
1940-1960
52
Conclusion
83
Appendix A
Cuban Presidents from 1899 - 1959
86
Works Cited
88
5
Dedication Page
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Allan and Victoria Holmes, for putting up with me and for
motivating me. Thank you to my friends and family for their unending support and well wishes
through the course of my research and writing.
6
Acknowledgements
I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. Asselin and Dr. Hart for their guidance, critiques, and
exceptional advice in the course of my research and writing.
And to Dr. Pavkovic, without whom any of this would be possible, thank you.
7
Introduction
"This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility
for the future good government of Cuba. We have accepted a trust
the fulfillment of which calls for the sternest integrity of purpose
and the exercise of the highest wisdom. The new Cuba yet to arise
from the ashes of the past must needs [sic] be bound to us by ties
of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be
assured. Whether those ties shall be organic or conventional, the
destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably
linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to
determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we
must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect
entity, not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of
failure."1
Cuba lies 90 miles off the coast of Florida. This proximity to the United States lent to the
viewpoint among many American decision makers, referred to as the law of political gravitation,
that annexation of Cuba would be a logical extension of the United States' borders and
fulfillment of manifest destiny.2 Cuba's proximity to the United States also meant that its
harbors were of strategic importance, Cuba’s harbors could be used by enemies to threaten war
on the United States conversely the United States could use those harbors as a first line of
defense against enemies. Thomas Jefferson considered the Western hemisphere, especially
Cuba and Florida, to be a jumping off point for a new “empire for liberty.”3
Cuba also factored into the economic system of the United States and equally the United
States greatly impacted Cuban economics. Beginning with illicit trade in the 1700s, the United
States quickly became not only the primary market for exports from Cuba but also the primary
1
William McKinley, State of the Union address, 1899, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters,The American
Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database).
Available from World Wide Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540.
2
“The Right of the United States to Interfere in Cuba”. The Albany Law Journal: A Weekly Record. Volume LVII,
From January to July, 1898, 278-281. Albany NY: Albany Law Journal Co. 1898., 278
3
Greg Grandin. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States and the Rise of New Imperialism. New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006, 2
8
source of imports into Cuba.4 The United States began to expand that trade with Cuba, including
sugar, tobacco, and tourism. As time went on, due to politics and commerce between the United
States and Cuba, the United States began to have more of a vested interest in Cuba and thoughts
of annexing Cuba became more prevalent among United States policy makers. While annexation
was a vision shared by many Cubans, who felt that it would bring stability and wealth to Cuba, it
was not without its opponents. Cuban Independentistas held the dream of an independent Cuba,
fully sovereign and in control of its own destiny.
Cuba gained its independence after the Spanish American War and the relationship
between the United States and Cuba continued to grow and strengthen. The United States
became fully vested in both Cuban politics and Cuban economics. This investment in Cuba
meant the United States assisted Cuba financially, militarily, and to some extent, politically.
Cuba sided with the United States in both World Wars and the United States provided weapons
and training to Cuba to build their military to aid in the fight against Communism. With the
triumph of the revolution led by Fidel Castro and the seizure of Cuba by Communist powers
came the end of the friendly relationship between Cuban and United States. Shortly thereafter,
Cuba sided with the Soviet Union in the Cold War and before long, the United States embargoed
Cuba.
By understanding this past relationship and its effect on Cuba's evolution, we can better
understand the current relationship. This paper does not attempt to answer questions regarding
the current relationship, but instead will relate the history of the relationship between the United
States and Cuba, a simple relationship that started out on terms of trade agreements, but soon
became more complicated and politically and economically driven. These complications:
4
Louis A. Pérez. Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press,
1990, 1
9
economic, political, and military not only formed the foundation of that relationship, but
eventually led to the downfall of it.
10
Before the Spanish American War
The relationship between the United States and Cuba began based on basic supply and
demand. During the Spanish occupation, traders in Cuba and the American colonies established
illicit trading contracts to obtain commodities needed in the colonies as well as for colonists to
avoid paying colonial taxes on the imports to Great Britain. Over time, trade between Cuba and
the United States waxed and waned based on the whims of the Spanish government, the ability
of Spain to stop smugglers, and the recognition of local Spanish officials in Cuba of the need for
trade with the colonies.5
By the late 1700s, sugar had replaced tobacco as Cuba’s main crop and by the mid 1800s
Cuba produced 25 percent of the world’s sugar.6 The United States was a natural market for
Cuban sugar; the American public was a heavy consumer of sugar but the United States did not
have a sugar industry to meet that demand. In 1884, the international sugar market collapsed and
the resulting loss of revenue drove many Cuban sugar mills into bankruptcy. Sensing an
opportunity, investors from the United States poured capital back into Cuba purchasing the sugar
mills and garnering a stake in the Cuban industry. This influx of revenue brought about an
industrial revolution in Cuba’s sugar industry resulting from modernization of the mills and
improvements in refining techniques.7
When the American colonies rebelled against Great Britain, in an effort to thwart the
British government, Spain quickly made plans with the revolutionaries to establish overt trade
relations with Cuba. However, in January 1784, Spain, in an effort to exert more control over
Cuba, once again closed Cuba down to outside trade. Over the next decade, the Spanish
government continued to open and close Cuba to outside trade depending on who Spain was
5
Perez, 3.
Henry Teller. The Sugar Industry and Reciprocity with Cuba, March 18, 1903.
7
Phillip Brenner et al. A Contemporary Cuba Reader. Lanham : Rowman and Littlefield. 2008, 325
6
11
allied with at the time. In 1798, when trade between the United States and Cuba surpassed the
amount of trade between Spain and Cuba, Spain once again closed Cuban ports. A year later,
when Spain went to war with England again, Cuban ports were once again opened to United
States merchants.
Cuba's ability to conduct trade with the United States continued to be dependent on
Spain's political climate and not on the needs of Cuba. The United States was as important to
Cuban imports as it was for Cuban exports, especially in regards to sugar, and by 1818, with
Cuba still under Spanish rule, trade agreements between Cuba companies and their United States
counterparts began to replace the trade agreements traditionally held with Spain.8
With the acquisitions of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and Florida in 1819 the borders
of the United States expanded down south to the Gulf of Mexico and thoughts of annexing of
Cuba moved to the forefront. In 1808, President Thomas Jefferson asked his Cabinet what the
United States should do about Cuba. His Cabinet felt the best course would be for Cuba to
remain under Spanish control. United States’ and Cuban interests were strongly connected, but
the United States should not support Cuban independence, as that would open up Cuba to
possible rule by other European nations.9
In 1820, Thomas Jefferson told Secretary of War John Calhoun that the United States
"ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba" and in 1823, in a letter to Mr. Nelson, the
Minister of Madrid, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, stated that Cuba offered multiple
opportunities, both commercial and political, to the United States and therefore annexation
should be considered.10 Adams was concerned that France was going seize Cuba from Spain in
8
Perez, 13
Samuel Bemis. The Latin American Policy of the United States. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. 1943, 27
10
Carmen Diana Deere. “Here Come the Yankees: The Rise and Decline of United States Colonies in Cuba, 18981930”. The Hispanic American Historical Review 78.4 (November 1998): 729-765., 732
9
12
answer to unpaid Spanish debts. He was also suspicious that Great Britain was planning to join
Spain in an alliance against France. Suspicious of these countries, he voiced these concerns to
President James Monroe. Monroe turned to Thomas Jefferson for advice; Jefferson felt that
Cuba, while important to the United States strategically and economically, could not be obtained
except through war. As such, Jefferson felt the next best thing would be a free and independent
Cuba.11 It was based on these concerns and thoughts that Monroe announced the Monroe
Doctrine on December 2, 1823. It stated that American continents were free and independent,
were not to be considered subjects for future European colonization, and any attempt by a
European power to extend their territory into the Americas would be considered a threat to
American "peace and safety" and dealt with accordingly.12
In the following decades, it became the forefront of American policies to attempt to
annex Cuba based on fears of a weak Spain losing control of Cuba to another European power.
Annexation was seen as a mission of liberation; annexation was not just an act of manifest
destiny for the United States but also one of self-determination for Cubans.13 In 1854, through
the Ostend Manifesto, it was recommended the United States make every attempt to purchase
Cuba or, if necessary, seize Cuba by force. However, under the anti-slavery climate of the times,
it was decided not to acquire Cuba, which was considered by the abolitionists to be another slave
territory.14 During the Civil War the desire to annex Cuba waned. The change of interest was
not only because of the war, but also because of Cuba’s status as a slave territory and the
11
Monroe, James, and Thomas Jefferson. The Monroe Doctrine: Also, Jefferson's Letter to Monroe. United States:
Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the U.S., 1920. Questia. 16 Dec. 2008
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10384261.
12
Monroe Doctrine. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/jd/16321.htm
13
Hill, Charles E. Leading American Treaties. New York: Macmillan, 1922. Questia. 16 Dec. 2008
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=9410086>, 317
14
Harry F. Guggenheim. The United States and Cuba; a Study In International Relations. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1934, 20.
13
American policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries. This policy lasted until
1895 when a new separatist war broke out in Cuba.
14
The Spanish American War
The United States was concerned with the thought of another conflict in Cuba and the
effect of such conflict on American interests there. For thirteen of the previous twenty nine
years, Cuba had been the scene of violent conflict. The ten year war of Cuban independence that
began in 1868 ended not because one side was defeated but because the combatants were
exhausted and agreed to a truce. Then in 1895 another conflict erupted between Cuba
nationalists and Spain. This conflict, larger than any previous conflict in Cuba, continued to gain
momentum and the United States doubted Spain could prevail. The capital that the United States
had poured into Cuba was in ruins. Commerce in Cuba was at such a low level the United States
doubted that even if Cuba was able to negotiate peace with Spain peace, the Cuban government
would not be able to restore the economy. Taking these facts into consideration, Washington felt
it needed to consider America’s duty to its neighbors. The United States considered the Cubans’
suffering and the decimation of commerce and felt that it was no longer reasonable to follow a
policy of inaction. Lawmakers in the United States had to consider if they thought Spain would
be able to put an end to the war and make peace with Cuba.15
The United States government felt the situation in Cuba could not be ignored. They were
concerned not only with American commercial interests in Cuba, but also the effect of the
conflict on Americans residing in Cuba. Based on the plan the Spanish government had chosen
to stop the conflict, the violence and severity of their efforts, the United States did not believe the
Spanish could restore peace or stability. The United States government could not stand by
watching American interests in Cuba suffer while Spain made no progress. The United States
felt such policy, being of no benefit to Spain, would ultimately hurt the United States. Therefore,
15
Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, July 16, 1897. FRUS 1898, 560.
15
Minister to Spain Woodford was to bring the United States concerns before the Government of
Spain and ask that the United States be allowed to help bring about peace in Cuba.16
Spain felt the best course of action for the United States was to leave Spain to conduct
military operations, to stick to the neutrality policy, and to stop Cubans living in the United
States from sending supplies and weapons to the insurrectionists. The Spanish government
wanted the United States government to side with Spain to crush the hopes of the insurrectionists
and trusted the United States would assist Spain in its endeavors by not supporting the Cubans.17
The McKinley administration agreed to let Spain attempt to bring about peace, but cautioned the
Spanish on their harsh methods. The outcome in Cuba had to be one of lasting peace; the United
States government felt no less was due Cuba and no less was possible for Spain. United States
lawmakers felt that whatever humane measures the Spanish government used in Cuba to attain
that peace would be admirable. Peace in Cuba was necessary to the welfare of the American
people and peace would also bring prosperity to the island.18
However, the situation in Cuba did not improve. The United States government felt that
the war was more one of inaction rather than action. The economic situation worsened and
Spain’s harsh treatment of the Cubans continued.19 In March 1898, the United States once again
attempted to purchase Cuba, but the Spanish government felt that that offer encouraged the
Cubans to fight harder. The United States government felt peace in Cuba could only come about
through American intervention. Woodford maintained the United States must occupy and
ultimately own Cuba. He felt if the United States recognized Cuban independence that the
United States government would be turning Cuba over to the Cuban population against the
16
Ibid, 561
Telegram from Woodford to Sherman, October 27, 1897. FRUS 1898, 587.
18
Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, November 20, 1897. FRUS 1898, 611.
19
Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, March 1, 1898. FRUS 1898, 669.
17
16
judgment of the upper Cuban classes. If the United States advised the insurgents to lay down
their arms and accept Spain’s offer of autonomy, then the United States would be doing a
disservice to those Cubans who had fought so hard for independence. Either of those options, he
believed, would foster conditions that would ultimately lead to more conflict in Cuba. If the
United States were to choose to go to war, then ownership of Cuba needed to be the final
outcome.20 Woodford felt Spain could not bring about peace in Cuba and that the insurgents
could not defeat Spain. He thought the only power that could bring about such peace was the
United States. He did not think the United States should recognize Cuban independence, stating
that if the United States government formally recognized the Cuban provisional government then
the United States would require approval from the Cuban government to intervene.21
In March 1898, President William McKinley delivered a three-part request to Spain,
demanding an armistice; permission to deliver United States relief supplies to the Cubans; and
participation of McKinley to mediate the end of the dispute. The Spanish government allowed
the United States to ship relief supplies, but refused to cease hostilities in Cuba.22 Woodford felt
there needed to be an armistice in Cuba in order for negotiations to succeed. He felt that as long
as there was still fighting, neither the Cubans nor the Spanish would see reason.23
On April 11, 1898, McKinley sent a resolution to Congress asking for a declaration of
war on Spain. Within this resolution, he referenced the damages done to the commercial
productivity in Cuba and the monetary losses suffered by American interests and stated that the
conflict in Cuba was a menace to the United States and peace.24 What stands out about
McKinley's war message was the omission of any mention of Cuban independence or
20
Message from Woodford to the President of the United States, March 17, 1898. FRUS 1898, 688.
Message from Woodford to the President of the United States, March 18, 1898. FRUS 1898, 689.
22
Telegram from Woodford to Day, March 31, 1898. FRUS, 1898, 727.
23
Telegram from Woodford to Day, April 2, 1898. FRUS, 1898, 731.
24
McKinley War Message, April 11, 898. FRUS, 1898. 751.
21
17
recognition of the Cuban provisional government. Those omissions were not lost on Cubans.
Prominent Cubans within the United States responded to McKinley's comments by stating they
opposed any intervention which would not result in Cuban independence. The provisional
Cuban government added that any intervention by the United States based on McKinley's
statements would be viewed as "nothing less than a declaration of war by the United States
against the Cuban revolutionists."25
These concerns were shared by some Congressmen within the United States, including
Senator Henry Teller of Colorado. The United States politicians also wanted assurances that the
United States would not annex Cuba after hostilities with Spain ended. As a result, the
resolution for war with Spain stated that the people of Cuba had a right to be free and
independent, that Spain must relinquish control of Cuba and withdraw its military, and the
President of the United States could use American armed forces to carry out those resolutions
and the Teller Amendment which stated that the United States disclaimed any intent to exercise
sovereignty or control over Cuba and that when the war was over, would leave the governing
Cuba to the Cuban people. 26
On April 25, 1898, a bill was issued by Congress declaring war against Spain.27 On May
1, 1898, Admiral Dewey attacked and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.28 In October
1898, Spain agreed to meet United States representatives in Paris to finalize the terms for ending
the conflict.29 The disposition of Cuba was provided for in Articles I and XVI of the Treaty of
Paris. Under Article I, Spain relinquished all claims of sovereignty and title to Cuba and after
25
Perez, 94.
Teller Amendment http://www.etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/teller.htm
27
Adams. “War Between the United States and Spain”. House of Representatives, Report No. 1173. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1898.
28
George F. Kennan. American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 12.
29
Guggenheim, 51.
26
18
Spain’s evacuation, the island would be occupied by the United States. The United States would
be responsible for any obligations that may result under international law based on its occupation
of Cuba. Article XVI stated any obligations assumed under the treaty by the United States with
respect to Cuba would be limited only to the time the United States occupied Cuba. Once the
occupation ended, the United States would then advise any government established on the island
to assume the same obligation.30
30
Treaty of Paris, http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html.
19
1900 – 1920
The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs (sic) be
bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring
welfare is to be assured. Whether those ties shall be organic or
conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner
irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to
determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we must
see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity, not a hasty
experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure.
William McKinley
State of the Union address, 1899
The United States formally took possession of Cuba on January 1, 1899. A military
government headed by Governor General Leonard Wood was established and by February the
evacuation of Spanish troops from Cuba was complete. The military government set out to bring
order to chaos. Wood began by disarming the Cuban rebels as well as those who had been loyal
to Spain, providing aid to the Cuban people, improving Cuba's infrastructure, and setting up a
Cuban government. In September 1900, the military government called for a convention to
adopt a constitution outlining the relationship between the United States and Cuba and providing
for the election of a Cuban government to assume control of the island.31
Before elections took place the United States vetted candidates to restrict, in the words of
Secretary of War Elihu Root, the “mass of ignorant and incompetent” and promote “a
conservative and thoughtful control of Cuba by Cubans.” 32 Wood worked not only to promote
the appropriate, conservative candidates, but also to hinder the opposition. Despite Wood’s and
Root’s efforts, members of the Cuban independence party, the Independintistas, prevailed,
defeating the majority of American backed candidates in the June elections. In the following
31
Dana G. Munro. The United States and the Caribbean Area. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934. Questia. 9
Dec. 2007 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6444051>, 8
32
Perez, 102
20
December assembly elections, the same scenario played out and the Independintistas prevailed in
the balloting. Wood informed Senator Oliver Platt in a letter after the elections that the people
he considered more suitable for the protection of American interests and a stable Cuban
government were not well represented. Conventional American wisdom was that Cubans were
incapable of effective self governance. The Cuban people had not elected the candidates the
United States found acceptable, and as a result the United States considered their judgment
flawed. The Teller Amendment provided for a free and independent Cuba, but the United States
government felt that based on Cuba’s apparent lack of competent elected officials, the United
States couldn’t in good conscience withdraw without ensuring some means of stability for
Cuba.33
While the United States officially recognized the outcome of the elections, Root felt that
United States’ interests required the United States to insist on certain constitutional limitations
which would result in the United States being able to intervene to protect American interests
after independence. Wood agreed believing Cuba and the United States needed to establish a
Cuban government of and by the people of Cuba and a free government, because that was
promised by the United States. But he was also concerned about what he felt were “adventurers”
who were currently in the Convention and in many of the municipalities.34
The end result of this thinking was the Platt Amendment which was passed into United
States law as part of the Army Appropriations Act in February 1901. The Platt Amendment
allowed the United States to maintain control over Cuba without actual annexation. Article I,
limited the Cuban government from entering into any treaty or contract with a foreign power that
33
Ibid, 104
Jack McCallum. Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism. New York: NYU
Press, 2006, 154.
34
21
would allow that foreign power any control over Cuba, politically or militarily. Article II barred
the Cuban government from contracting any public debt, paying interest on any debt, and
ensured that the government of Cuba maintained adequate funds for government expenses as
well as revenues of the island. Article III stipulated the United States reserved the right to
intervene in Cuba for the purposes of maintaining Cuban independence as well as ensuring that
the Cuban government was capable of protecting human life and property. Article VIII required
these tenets to be incorporated into the new Cuban constitution. Lastly, the Amendment ceded
Guantanamo Bay to the United States for use as a naval base in perpetuity.35
News of the Platt Amendment sparked almost immediate protests in Cuba. Many Cubans
felt that agreement to these demands would divest Cuba of any real independence. Delegates of
the Cuban Constitutional Convention felt the Platt Amendment dealt only with what the United
States felt the Cuban people should want in future relations. They thought the stipulations were
not acceptable since they modified Cuba’s independence and sovereignty. The delegates
believed their duty was to the Cuban people and to the establishment of Cuba as a nation
independent of all others, including the United States. If they were to bind themselves to the
United States by allowing the United States to retain the right to intervene, to support or displace
Cuban governments as they chose, to concede to them the right to acquire lands for naval
stations, and to dictate who Cuba can form treaties with, then in fact, while Cuba would appear
to be free to the rest of the world, they would never truly be so with the United States.36
The Cuban Constitutional Convention conceded knowing their only choices were limited
sovereignty or no sovereignty at all and Cuban patriots were forced to accept the Platt
Amendment giving the United States the right to interfere in Cuban affairs in order to avoid
35
36
Platt amendment. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.html
Bemis, 126
22
losing the Republic they had worked so to hard to acquire.37 In June 1901 the provisions of the
Platt Amendment were included in the Cuban constitution, verbatim.38 The United State military
occupation of the Republic of Cuba officially ended on May 20, 1902, though the United States
maintained control of Guantanamo Bay thereafter.
The first governor of Cuba, Leonard Wood, was a proponent of the Americanization and
annexation of Cuba. He felt that a free Cuba would ultimately, at the request of the Cuban
people, seek annexation and as such, strove to promote it.39 An acceptable candidate for
president, based on his feelings, was Tomas Estrada Palma. He served as president of the
Republic during the 10 Years War of 1868 to 1878. At the time of his nomination, Estrada
Palma was living in New York. A supporter of the Platt Amendment, he favored the status quo
under the rule of the United States and his policy was one of cooperation. He also felt that
Cubans were incapable of truly governing themselves in such a way as to protect American
interests and that an association with the United States was necessary to ensure Cuba’s political
liberty. Estrada Palma was elected in December 1901, however, it was April 1902 before he
even stepped foot in Cuba and May before he arrived in Havana.40
On May 20, 1902 Leonard Wood handed over the control of Cuba to Palma.41 But after
the Spanish American War, Cuba suffered a lack of trade money. General James Wilson
commented on the need for a treaty of alliance and commerce between the United States and
Cuba. This treat would bring relief to an embattled Cuba. He felt a treaty that would allow for
the free entrance of certain goods from Cuba into the United States, help establish close relations
37
Fulgencio Batista. Cuba Betrayed. New York: Vantage Press, 1962, 188
Munro, 14
39
Bemis, 138
40
Offner, John L. The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Questia. 11 Dec. 2007
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=99426981, 4
41
Telegram from General Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, to the Adjutant General of the Army, May 20, 1902.
FRUS 1902, 320.
38
23
between the two countries, restore confidence to Cuba, and create an influx of capital into Cuba
ideally bringing about a period of prosperity.42 President Roosevelt began negotiations for a
Treaty of Reciprocity and even appealed to the American people in August 1902 saying, "Cuba
must always be peculiarly relative to us in international politics. She must in international affairs
be to a degree a part of our political system. In return she must have peculiar relations with us
economically. She must be in a sense part of our economic system. We expect her to accept a
political attitude toward us which we think is wisest for both her and us. In return we must be
prepared to put her in economic position as regards our tariff system which will give her some
measure of the prosperity we enjoy."43
Under the terms of the Treaty of Reciprocity articles listed as being free of duty in either
country at the time of ratification would continue to be free, even though subsequent tariffs
should make them dutiable from other countries. The United States made a twenty percent
concession of dutiable articles when they were "the product of the soil or industry of the
Republic of Cuba" and Cuba made a similar concession to the United States. The treaty was
submitted to the Senate in December 1902 and passed in March of 1903.44
However, in the House of Representatives, the treaty was not without its detractors.
Some, such as Representative John Williams of Mississippi, from the Committee on Ways and
Means, felt that it was wrong for the Congress of 1903 to bind all other upcoming congresses to
the duty of sugars from foreign countries, including Cuba. They also had concerns about
assigning a fixed duty rate to sugar; they felt that this fixing of duty rates would take away the
ability of American sugar producers and dealers to effectively do business. They requested a
rewording and instead of a reduced duty that all countries pay a set fee per pound of sugar. Even
42
Bemis, 118
Theodore Roosevelt. Message from the President of the United States, November 10, 1903
44
Theodore Roosevelt. Message from the President of the United States, November 10, 1903
43
24
if the bill passed without their requested amendments, the representatives still thought that the
good the treaty would do the United States and Cuba outweighed their concerns about wording.
They felt that the Treaty would relieve the unnecessary burdens on both Cubans and Americans
and that as friends to the new Republic of Cuba and that the Treaty would bring Cuba prosperity
and increase the volume of trade between the two countries.45
Other detractors to the treaty did not feel so benevolently towards Cuba. Representative
Cooper of Texas, also on the Ways and Means Committee, was more strident in his objections.
He felt the United States was under no obligation to grant special consideration to Cuba. He did
not feel that Cuba needed to be dependent, politically or economically, on the United States, nor
was the United States bound to guarantee Cuba’s success as an independent republic. He also
had concerns about the constitutionality of the bill. He felt the presentation of this bill before
Congress represented subterfuge since its real effect was to ratify treaties already in place and
that is was unconstitutional to “tie the hands” of the House of Representatives in matters of law
effecting revenue.46
Despite these opposing views, in November 1903, Roosevelt convened a special session
of Congress and stated the passing of this treaty was demanded by our honor. On December 17,
1903 it passed in the House and went into effect on December 27, 1903. The treaty gave Cuba
more advantages in the American trade than any other country.47
Palma’s administration was punctuated by small rebellions and in 1905 real cracks began
to show: the Cuban Congress refused to approve the budget and an attempt was made on Estrada
Palma’s life while he was campaigning for re-election. In August 1906, just months after
45
Williams, John S. “Views of the Minority (to accompany House Resolution 1921). Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1903
46
Cooper. “Views (to accompany House Resolution 1921) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903.
47
Roosevelt, Theodore. “Message of the President of the United States Communicated to the Two Houses of
Congress”. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903.
25
Estrada Palma was re-elected against strong opposition and amidst claims of electoral fraud, the
“Guerrita de Agosto” broke out. The insurrectionists called for minority representation in
Congress and equal representation in the Cabinet.48 Palma publicly declared he was in favor of
crushing the rebellion by force, but would be open to outside intervention. The main concern of
the United States was the effect of the conflict on the sugar and tobacco crops.49 Despite
Palma’s public statement regarding crushing the insurrection, his call for people to volunteer for
the militia was met with a lackluster response. Trying to forestall the destruction of the sugar
mills, Estrada Palma asked the United States to intervene in Cuba.50 He told the United States he
was unable to quell the rebellion and requested that the United States dispatch two ships, one to
Havana and one to Cienfuegos.51 Roosevelt was hesitant to intervene. He dispatched the two
ships, but stressed to Cuban Consul General Steinhart how reluctant the United States was to get
involved. He wanted the Cuban government to exhaust every option available to the Cuban
government to put down the insurrection. The United States felt that Palma’s inability to
suppress the insurrection suggested that the Government of Cuba was weak and did not have the
support of the Cuban people.52
Palma again requested intervention by the United States stating he could not stop the
rebellion. He made the decision to resign and turn the Government of Cuba over to whoever the
United States designated as their representative.53 Roosevelt sent a commission headed up by
48
Telegram from Chargé Sleeper to the Secretary of State, September 1, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 464.
Telegram from Chargé Sleeper to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 467.
50
Jose M. Hernandez. Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868-1933. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1993, 128
51
Telegram from Consul General Steinhart to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I,
473.
52
Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to Consul General Steinhart, September 10, 1906. FRUS 1906,
Volume I, 474.
53
Telegram from Consul General Steinhart to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I,
477.
49
26
William Howard Taft to attempt to work out a peaceful solution.54 On September 29, 1906
Palma and his cabinet resigned and, with Taft as Provincial Governor, the United States assumed
control of Cuba until such time as a Cuban president could be elected.55 This instability
confirmed American expectations of an incompetent Cuban government and politically unstable
Cuba.56
On September 29, 1906 Taft issued a proclamation to the people of Cuba. He stated that
since Palma resigned and the Cuban congress did nothing to stop him or to elect a successor
thereby leaving Cuba without a government in the midst of an insurrection, the United States had
no choice but to step in and establish a provincial government. He also assured the people of
Cuba that the provincial government would only be in place for as long as it took to restore peace
and order and then hold elections and that even though the provincial government was
established under the authority of the United States, it would still be a Cuban government
conforming to the Cuban constitution.57 On October 10, Taft granted a general amnesty to the
people of Cuba, including the insurrectionists, bringing a sense of peace to Cuba and on the 19th
of October, he handed over governorship of Cuba to Charles Magoon.58
In 1908, Jose Miguel Gomez, a Cuban general in the Spanish American War, was elected
president of Cuba. He assumed control of the Government of Cuba in January 1909.59 In 1910,
word filtered back to the United States of a political disturbance in Cuba and of rumors that the
United States was going to intervene. Secretary of State Knox responded to these rumors stating
54
Telegram from the President to the Cuban Minister, September 14, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 478.
Epitome of events attendant upon establishment of the provincial government in Cuba, FRUS 1906, Volume I,
490.
56
Antoni Kapcia. Cuba : Island of Dreams /. Oxford, England: Berg, 2000. Questia. 9 Dec. 2007
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102360238>., 63
57
Proclamation, Governor Taft, September 29, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 491.
58
Epitome of events attendant upon establishment of the provincial government in Cuba, FRUS 1906, Volume I,
490.
59
Telegram from the President to President-elect Gomez, November 16, 1908. FRUS 1908, 251.
55
27
the United States was not interested in taking part in or even expressing concern for the internal
politics of Cuba and that the United States would not be in favor of any violent activities that
would force American intervention in Cuba.60
In 1911, the United States and Cuba revisited the 1903 Treaty of Reciprocity. While
President Taft understood the importance of the commercial relationship between the United
States and Cuba and the treaty’s importance in giving Cuba better terms for its products than
Cuba was receiving in the European markets and in the promotion of stability in Cuba, he had to
take into consideration the complaints of American commercial interests. American
businessmen felt the advantages given to Cuba in American markets were much greater than the
advantages given to the United States in the Cuban markets. He did not see the point in asking
Congress to renew the treaty for five years and then attempting to modify it after the fact. He felt
the treaty should be modified with a decrease in duties to American goods.61
At the end of 1911, a new conflict arose in Cuba. Veterans and officers who had fought
for Cuban independence against Spain were calling for “guerilleros”, Cubans who had fought for
Spain, that were serving in any sort of government capacity to be removed from office. When
the Cuban government responded that the guerillos were protected by provisions of the civil
service law, the veterans and officers began to “agitate” the Cuban people.62 President Gomez
called for a panel to be appointed including one member from the Liberal Party, once from the
Conservative Party, two veterans, and a Chairman to be appointed by Gomez. The panel would
then meet and discuss on a case by case basis the removal of guerilleros from office. The
veterans refused.63
60
Telegram from the Secretary of State to Minister Jackson, June 21, 1910. FRUS 1910, 416
Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Chargé d’Affaires, November 2, 1911. FRUS 1912, 98.
62
Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, November 11, 1911. FRUS 1912, 236.
63
Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1911. FRUS 1912, 239.
61
28
Consequently, the Cuban Congress passed a resolution accusing officers of the Cuban
Army of sedition and called for the President of Cuba to take action against them.64 In response,
Gomez issued a decree forbidding officers serving in the Cuban Army from participating in
politics; he also forbade them from attending Veteran’s Association meetings. Beaupré, the
American Minister, was concerned by the deteriorating situation in Cuba and felt that if the
United States showed support for Gomez, it would quell the veterans.65 Woodrow Wilson’s
administration issued a statement that the United States government was concerned with the
situation in Cuba and that the laws created to keep Cuba as a republic needed to be enforced.
They looked to Gomez to prevent the situation from escalating which would force intervention
by the United States.66 The veterans acquiesced and entered into an agreement with Gomez for
the creation of a board. Based on this agreement the Government of Cuba would publicly
recognize those who had fought for Cuban independence and there would be no need for
intervention by the United States.67
In 1913, Mario Garcia Menocal was elected president. A graduate of Cornell University
in New York, he was very supportive of big business. He ran for re-election in 1916 amidst
charges of fraud and military intimidation. A rebellion ensued. In January 1917, in a telegram to
the United States Secretary of State, Minister Gonzalez stated Menocal would do everything in
his power to secure the majority of the vote including use of force, killing of opposition
managers at the polls, and, eventually, declaring himself the winner. Gonzalez felt siding with
Menocal would be seriously detrimental to Cuba.68 Gonzalez was directed to meet with Menocal
64
Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1912. FRUS 1912, 240.
Telegram from the American Minister to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1912. FRUS 1912, 240
66
Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Minister, January 16, 1912. FRUS 1912, 241.
67
Telegram from the American Minister to the Secretary of State, January 20, 1912. FRUS 1912, 242.
68
Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, January 22, 1917, FRUS 1917, 350.
65
29
and attempt to settle this in accordance with the law and bring about peace in Cuba. The United
States also dispatched a military attaché to Cuba to observe the electoral process.69
Menocal sought the support of the United States over his opponents, former President
Gomez and Alfredo Zayas, who was a former secretary of the Cuban Constitutional Convention
of 1901 and an opponent of the Platt Amendment. He stated that with support from the United
States he would be able to quell the revolution and re-establish order.70 On February 16, 1917,
the United States dispatched naval warships to Cuba.71 On February 18, 1917, Washington
stated publicly that 1) the government of the United States supported and sustained the
constitutional government of Cuba: 2) the armed revolt against the constitutional government of
Cuba was considered to be a lawless and unconstitutional act and would not be countenanced; 3)
the leaders of the revolt would be held responsible for injury to foreign national and for
destruction of foreign property; 4) the government of the United States would give careful
consideration to its future attitude towards those persons connected with or concerned in the
present disturbances of the peace in the Republic of Cuba.72
In spite of this statement, Cuban revolutionary leaders felt intervention by the United
States was best. Gomez responded to the United States stating the revolutionaries were not
interested in overthrowing the government, only that they wished for Menocal to respect the
constitution and allow for elections free from fraud and abuse.73 The United States issued
another statement, this one to Menocal, that in order to end this rebellion, he needed to make
clear to the Cuban people that he supported constitutional methods for the settlement of election
69
Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, February 12, 1917, FRUS 1917, 354.
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cuban Minister, February 14, 1917, FRUS 1917, 360.
71
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cuban Minister, February 14, 1917, FRUS 1917, 361.
72
Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, February 18, 1917 FRUS 1917, 363.
73
The President of the Directory and General Commanding the Constitutional Army to Minster Gonzalez, February
18, 1917, FRUS 1917, 371.
70
30
disputes, that if the insurgents would lay down their arms he would give amnesty, and elections
will be called in the affected areas.74 Menocal granted amnesty to the enlisted men and granted
amnesty to all civilians involved except revolutionary leaders and people who committed
criminal acts in the course of the revolution. He also agreed to partial elections being held.75
Despite this, the rebellion continued. In late March 1917, rebel leaders met with
American navel officers and stated that only supervision by the United States would ensure a fair
election. They would force an intervention by any means necessary, including a “wholesale
campaign of destruction” and threatening the lives of Americans, if necessary.76 On May 7,
1917 Cuban Congress declared Menocal President-Elect.77
As tensions continued to build in Cuba, in an effort to show allegiance to the United
States, the Cuban government declared war on Germany in May, 1917. On May 15, 1917, the
United States issued a statement to the Cuban people. The statement read that as Cuba entered
into this war side by side with the United States, this meant that all internal fighting needed to be
set aside to focus on the larger, international conflict. Since the United States relied heavily on
Cuban sugar production, any effort to interfere in that production would be considered a hostile
act and all those in rebellion with Cuba were ordered to restore their allegiance or the United
States would regard them as enemies and deal with them accordingly.78
On May 20, 1917, Cuban Minister Carlos Manuel de Cespedes sent word to the United
States government that President Menocal and Vice President Nunez were sworn in and would
74
Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, March 1, 1917 FRUS 1917, 372.
Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, March 4, 1917, FRUS 1917, 376.
76
Telegram from Commander Hewitt to the Secretary of the Navy, March 20, 1917, FRUS 1917, 388.
77
Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, May 7, 1917, FRUS 1917, 401.
78
Department of State, May 15, 1917, FRUS 1917, 407.
75
31
serve terms until 1921.79 In June 1917, Zayas resigned as leader of his party and with Gomez in
prison awaiting trial for his actions during the conflict, the revolution was over.80
Despite Cuba’s willingness to side with the United States in World War I, there were still
battles being fought over the sugar market. In 1917, the price of raw sugar climbed to 6.75 cents
in the New York Market, the highest it had been in the United States since the Civil War. As a
result, in August 1917, the United States Congress passed the Lever Act which gave the
government power to control the production and manufacturing of foodstuffs. It also created the
Food Administration under Herbert Hoover. A dedicated humanitarian, Hoover had been
overseeing distribution of food to war victims in Germany. One of Hoover’s first actions was to
find a way to control the sugar market; as the war continued, Cuba became one of the sole
sources of sugar to all Allied countries and prices in the New York sugar market soared. Hoover
wanted control of the sugar supply to fall under a central body, so the United States would not
compete with Allied countries for sugar supplies and by placing control of pricing in the hands of
the United States government would virtually eliminate Cuba’s bargaining power. Hoover
created the Sugar Plan. Under this plan, he proposed the United States and Britain form a single
buying agency in New York. This agency would be made up of men appointed by Great Britain
and the United States and would then set the price for raw sugar as well as apportion out the
Cuban sugar crop among the other purchasing nations.81 Hoover presented this plan to the
British government and they agreed. The International Sugar Committee was created. On the
Committee were two British and three Americans. Hoover appointed Earl Babst, the head of the
American Sugar Refining Company, to head the Committee. One of the first acts of the Sugar
79
Telegram Cuban Minister (Cespedes) to Secretary of State, May 20, 1917, FRUS 1917, 410.
Telegram Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, June 18, 19197, FRUS 1917, 411.
81
Smith, Robert F. The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960. New York: Bookman
Associates, 1960, 20
80
32
Committee was to lower the price of sugar to 4.6 cents per pound plus the cost of freighting to
New York. The Cuban sugar producers protested saying that pricing sugar that low would
negatively affect Cubans. The price of foods imported from the United States into Cuba was
beyond the affordability of most Cubans. Within three months of protesting the Committee’s
decisions, there was no flour, no bread, and almost no coal in Cuba. Economic pressure was
used to gain Cuban cooperation. Import licenses from the Food Administration were needed in
order for Cuba to buy wheat or coal from the United States government. Once the Cuban sugar
producers conceded to the price set by the Committee, the import licenses were granted.82 The
United States had used “dollar diplomacy” in Cuba since the early 1900s, often supplemented
with military force.83
From 1919 through 1933, American businesses came to dominate in Cuba. Investments
by American companies increased 536% between 1913 and 1928. In 1913, the 39 American
owned sugar mills represented 23% of the sugar mills in Cuba. Cubans owned 67 and Spaniards
owned 41, but while the majority of sugar mills were Cuban-owned, they produced smaller
amounts of sugar than the American owned sugar mills. This disparity was most likely because
the American owned sugar mills were newer and therefore more productive based on technology
and location.84
With the Spanish American War over, the United States and Cuba turned their attention
to defining their future relationship. The Platt Amendment mandated Cuba to act in accordance
with United States wishes, while the Treaty of Reciprocity afforded Cuba a better position when
trading with the United States. The first Cuban presidencies were not without issues; Palma
82
Smith, 21
Bemis, 140
84
Ayala, César J. "Social and Economic Aspects of Sugar Production in Cuba, 1880-1930." Latin American
Research Review 30.1 (1995): 95-124. Questia. 9 Dec. 2007 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=95812648>,
107.
83
33
resigned forcing the United States to intervene and set up temporary governorship. With
Menocal, the United States chose not to intervene, but Cubans called for the United States to
assist them under the Platt Amendment. During these first 20 years, American businesses found
profits to be made in Cuba and quickly began to dominate, especially in the sugar markets.
34
1920-1940
In 1921, Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso was elected president. Knowing that Cuba needed
economic assistance, Zayas requested a loan of $50 million from the United States. Under
Article II of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Cuba was prohibited from assuming or contracting any
public debt. The United States took this into consideration and decided to loan Cuba the money
with certain stipulations. These stipulations included that the 1922-1923 budget for Cuba be
approved by a set date, that Cuba limit its expenditures, and that the Cuban military be reorganized.85 The United States felt Cuba’s economic problems were a result of the failure of the
Cuban Congress and the Cuban President to enact a budget. Unless the Cuban Congress acted
on the above mentioned stipulations, the United States would have no choice but to intervene.86
While the Cuban Congress was convening to work on meeting the stipulations set forth
by the United States, the Cuban Senate passed an Amnesty law making it difficult to punish
those arrested for corruption, which had contributed greatly to Cuba’s economic woes. The
United States told Zayas that if he did not veto this law, the United States would not agree to
lend Cuba the money.87 Zayas agreed and on October 18, 1922, Cuba met the required
stipulations set forth by the United States and the loan was approved.
Tensions regarding sugar resurfaced when Cuban sugar producers learned that American
companies were reselling Cuban sugar for profit on the international market. After World War I,
the increased world demand for sugar created an economic boom in Cuba. As a result of the
85
Report on Special Commission in Cuba (Crowder) to Secretary of State, April 9, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922,
1021.
86
Letter from Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs Department of State (Munro) to the Secretary of
State, April 10, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922, 1022.
87
Letter from Acting Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs Department of State (White) to the Secretary
of State, October 10, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922, 1043.
35
boom, American creditors began loaning money to Cuban sugar producers at a greatly increased
rate. The Emergency Tariff Act passed by the United States in 1921 raised the duty of raw sugar
imported from Cuba from 1.0048 cents per pound to 1.6 cents per pound. In 1922, the FordneyMcCumber Act raised it again to 1.7648 cents per pound.88 In the mid-1920s the bottom of the
boom fell out. Demand for sugar decreased as consumption decreased and sugar prices dropped
drastically and the resulting economic distress brought turmoil, both economic and political, to
the island.89
In 1923, over a veto by Zayas, the Cuban Congress passed a lottery measure which the
United States objected to based on the possibility for corruption. In a conversation with the
Cuban Chargé, Dr. Arturo Padro, the Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, stressed the
United States’ displeasure and told Chargé Padro that if Cuba insisted on continuing down this
road the United States would caution the Cuban government and advise them on a correct path.
If Cuba ignored that advice then the United States would not be responsible for the financial
downturn that would follow.90
In 1925, Gerardo Machado was elected president. Machado was a Cuban businessman
whose administration was one of “business nationalism”.91 When Machado ran for president, he
ran on the “Platform of Regeneration”, a platform of political and economic reform with a
promise to “win Cuba an independent place in the world”. Although he gained a reputation for
being against the Platt amendment, his campaign promises were in keeping with the Platt
Amendment, to not incur any foreign debt and to serve only one term as president. Machado had
ties to American businessmen as well as Cuban businesses and the United States government
88
Bemis, 182
Leland Hamilton Jenks. Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), 277.
90
Conversation between the Secretary and State and Cuban Chargé Padro, FRUS, Volume 1, 1923, 840.
91
Smith, 113
89
36
believed Cuba to be in good hands. Upon election, he told American officials that he intended to
increase Cuban commercial relations with the United States. He wanted to modernize Cuba and
began making plans for a Cuban exposition to advertise Cuba as a tourist destination and viable
commercial market. Machado garnered American praise by arresting pro-Communist factions, a
new emergent threat, and promising to protect American businesses and capital in Cuba at all
costs.92
Cuban nationalism was rising and Machado was able to manipulate the anti-American
attitude by defending Cuban sovereignty and taxing American business interests while still
promising the United States to protect its interests. Considered by many to merely be a lackey
for the United States, he quickly became the symbol of “dollar democracy” as a sense of
prosperity and stability settled over Cuba. He assured the United States that he felt Cuba’s
welfare was tied to America and capital flowed into Cuba. However, while that capital
temporarily covered some of the cracks in the Cuban economy, it was clear by 1928 that Cuba’s
sugar economy was failing.93
Machado did feel that the Platt Amendment was an embarrassment and that Cuba
deserved to be free and independent. Knowing that abrogation of the Platt Amendment would
increase his popularity, Machado told the Cuban people that for all intents and purposes the Platt
Amendment no longer existed. In 1929, a bill was submitted to the Cuban Senate which stated
that any Cuban seeking intervention or interference by a foreign power would face
imprisonment. Secretary of State Stimson felt that this provision was included with the sole
purpose of making it more difficult for the United States to exercise the rights of intervention as
allowed under the Platt Amendment. Stimson directed Ambassador in Cuba Judah to remind
92
93
Smith, 113.
Bemis, 143
37
Machado that the Platt Amendment was not what gave the United States the right to interfere in
Cuba; they merely recognized those rights in writing.94 Judah met with Machado regarding
Stimson’s concerns. Machado assured Judah that the bill would not pass and no bill would ever
pass that would negatively impact the relationship between Cuba and the United States.95
Originally, when Machado ran, he stated he would only serve one term, but almost
immediately he began making plans to extend his tenure. However, many Cuban nationalists no
longer felt Machado could be trusted and Machado’s announcement to seek re-election was met
with strong opposition. Through bribery and threats, he secured party nominations from the
Liberal, Conservative, and Popular parties. The Cuban Congress, mainly Machado supporters,
passed amendments extending the presidential term to 6 years and extending Machado’s and
Congress’ terms without an election. This amendment violated procedural requirements and the
opposition called Machado’s reelection illegal.96
General Crowder, former governor of Cuba, felt the Sate Department should support
Machado’s reelection due to his relationship with the United States. After Machado’s reelection
reports began to filter back to Washington concerning corruption and repression. After verifying
those reports as being true, the State Department was fully informed of the opposition to
Machado. The United States continued to support Machado in spite of these claims, but the
claims were also forwarded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Committee passed
a resolution calling for an investigation and suggested the United States intervene. American
businessmen protested the resolution and stressed to the Committee the importance of the good
relationship between Machado’s administration and American businesses. The resolution died
94
Letter from Secretary of State (Stimson) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Judah), April 23, 1929, FRUS Volume II,
1929, 896.
95
Letter from the Ambassador in Cuba (Judah) to Secretary of State (Stimson), May 2, 1929, FRUS Volume II,
1929, 896.
96
Perez, 181
38
with the Committee.97 Washington believed that as long as the Cuban military remained loyal to
him, Machado represented the best hope for order and stability and if Machado could be tided
over until the Depression was over, Cuba would return to normal. A stable Cuba meant security
and prosperity for American interests in Cuba. The United States stuck to this policy of “dollar
diplomacy” even after the revolution began to erupt in 1929. Ambassador to Cuba Harry
Guggenheim attempted to persuade Machado to work out a settlement with the leaders of the
conservative opposition, but he refused and instead became even more oppressive.98
Guggenheim continued to press Machado to make concessions to the conservative
opposition in an attempt to forestall a full scale revolution. Machado ignored this advice and
Guggenheim became convinced that Machado needed to be replaced. The opposition group
requested intervention by the United States. The United States refused and this negative policy
was interpreted as support for Machado.
In October 1929, the crash of Wall Street in the United States also brought about an
economic crisis in Cuba and the battle over sugar tariffs erupted again. Lobby groups with
strong financial backing entered into the fray on Cuba’s behalf. Banks which had taken over
Cuban sugar properties after the bottom fell out of the sugar market in the mid-1920s also sided
with Cuban interests. The United States set about creating acts to protect American interests, but
these actions just further battered Cuba. A duty of 3 cents per pound was proposed, but after
much lobbying the pro-Cuban lobby groups were able to get the duty reduced to 2 cents and the
Hawley Smoot Tariff Act went into effect. This raise in duty, even lobbied to a lower amount, in
turn caused the Cuban share of the American sugar market to drop from 49 percent to 25 percent
in just three years. This caused sugar production in Cuba to drop by 60 percent; Cuban exports
97
98
Smith, 116
Bemis, 147
39
dropped by 80 percent, and sent Cuba’s economy into a tail spin.99 American business interests
in Cuba were convinced the only way to stabilize Cuba’s sugar economy was through controlled
competition.
By the end of 1930, the situation in Cuba was deteriorating for Machado, both due to the
economic depression and his opponents gaining strength. Businesses, including banks,
continued to fail. Unemployment skyrocketed while wages plummeted. The Acts the United
States had passed to protect itself, such as the Hawley Smoot Tariff Act, further damaged Cuba’s
failing economy. American banks, in an attempt to bolster Cuba’s failing economy, loaned Cuba
millions of dollars. Machado also began taking out loans from American banks to cover his
personal debts. The banks urged Machado to reduce the budget and seek a compromise with his
opposition. As things continued to worsen, United States officials urged the State Department to
issue a memo saying the United States no longer supported Machado. The State Department
refused, but American businessmen felt that if they could just tide Machado over until the
Depression was over and then things would return to normal.100
As Cuba’s situation worsened, opposition to Machado increased greatly with social
conflict, hunger strikes, and armed struggles. But as American banks continued to lend Machado
money, the United States government maintained its stance of nonintervention. Many Cubans
felt this nonintervention equaled backing by the United States. So while the United States
publicly announced Cuba needed to be recognized as a sovereign nation, behind the scenes it was
widely recognized that getting involved in Cuban affairs would weaken Machado’s regime and
undermine his authority.101
99
Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: US – Latin American Relations since 1889. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, Inc, 2000. 76
100
Smith, 134.
101
Perez, 182
40
The Secretary of State stated the policy of the United States remained unchanged. The
United States would not intervene in Cuba merely because Cuba was running the Cuban
government differently from how the United States thought it should be run.102 Cubans who
sought change from within were met time and time again with violent repression. They called
upon the United States for assistance. Citing the Platt Amendment, Cubans felt the United States
was “duty bound to see that Cuba does not continue in the hands of a dictator.” They felt that
under the Platt Amendment, the United States was obligated to see to it that a government was
maintained that was capable of protecting life, property, and individual liberty.”103
So many Cubans called for mediation by the United States that Machado’s Congress proposed
the passage of a penal code ordering life in prison or long term imprisonment for anyone who
sought international intervention in Cuban affairs. As the State Department continued its policy
of noninterference, many Cubans began to blame the United States for what they considered to
be acts of terrorism by Machado.104
When Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in 1933, the United States and the rest of
the world remained in Depression. The unrest in Cuba brought about by the depression was
considered by the United States to be of utmost importance. The United States sent Ambassador
Sumner Welles to Cuba to mediate between Machado and the opposition. The United States felt
that the order and stability Machado provided during his first term and had garnered him United
States support for re-election was absent from his second term.105 President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt had just announced his Latin American Good Neighbor Policy and he needed to
102
Memorandum of Conference by the Secretary of State with the press on October 3, 1930, FRUS 1930, Volume
II, 662.
103
Perez, 185
104
Bemis, 148
105
Juan M. Del Aguila. Cuba, Dilemmas of a Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, 21
41
resolve this Cuban crisis without military intervention.106 Welles was to offer the friendly
mediation of the United States between Machado and the leaders of the conservative opposition
and to negotiate a trade agreement to bolster the Cuban economy. He was told to consider the
relationship between the United States and Cuba to be between two “sovereign, independent, and
equal powers” and that no action would be taken which would lead to the United States
intervening in Cuba.107
Welles met with Machado. He told Machado that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was
loathe to interfere in Cuba. However, the United States government was concerned with the
political agitation in Cuba and with the acts of oppression committed by the Machado
administration. He stressed to Machado the hope that Machado work towards conciliation by
ending illegal killings, censorship, and martial law. He also spoke of economic relief for Cuba
from the United States in terms of a trade agreement if mediation could be reached.108
Welles also met with Cosme de la Torriente, an opposition leader. Torriente told Welles
the opposition was opposed to revolution and intervention by the United States, but remained
open to mediation by the United States to achieve conciliation with the Machado administration.
Welles concluded from this visit that no concessions, financial or economic, should be made to
Machado until Welles was sure Machado intended to work with the opposition.109
In June 1933, Welles received word from the opposition that they were open to mediation
with Machado, both by the anti-Machado organization called ABC and the Organizacion Celular
Radical Revolucionaria (OCRR). He broke his mediation down into three steps: one – getting
the opposition to finalize an agreement, two – negotiate that agreement, and three – carrying out
106
The Good Neighbor policy moved the United States away from military intervention in Latin American countries
and focused on cooperation and trade. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm
107
Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador of Cuba (Welles), May 1, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 286.
108
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, May 13, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 290.
109
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 297.
42
the agreement.110 By the end of July 1933, Welles began to have concerns about Machado’s
willingness to work with the opposition. He cabled Washington that if he were unable to change
Machado’s frame of mind, that there was no possibility that the negotiations would be
successful.111
Welles felt continued support of Machado was no longer feasible. He felt if Machado
continued to refuse to any sort of agreement with the opposition, then the United States should
withdraw its recognition of the Machado administration.112 He informed the United States there
was no hope of Cuba returning to normal, no hope economic conditions improving, and no hope
for political stability. He recommended official recognition of Machado’s government by the
United States government be withdrawn, forcing Machado to resign, allowing for formation of a
new government.113 However, if the United States were to withdraw recognition of the Machado
administration, there should be an American presence of warships in Havana to protect American
lives and businesses. Welles felt Machado resigning was the only real solution.114 The United
States government told Machado if he would step down, a shipload of relief supplies would be
sent to Cuba. Machado denounced United States intervention in Cuban affairs and called for
Cubans to defend their homeland against the American aggressors. But as Machado continued to
defy the United States, Cuban military leaders recognized this was a fight he could not win.115
The Cuban military informed Machado they were withdrawing their support and that if
he remained in office then he would face an all out revolution.116 The United States government
110
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 319.
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 329.
112
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 342.
113
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 344
114
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 9, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 345.
115
Aguilar, 141
116
Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 12, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 359.
111
43
succeeded in their attempts to avert a violent overthrow; Machado conceded and on August 12,
1933 he resigned from office and fled to the Bahamas.117
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a friend of Welles, was appointed to succeed Machado with
the intent of continuing mediation between all of the parties. However, he lacked the necessary
support from the military to govern and even mediate effectively. Welles felt the lack of support
for Cespedes’ administration meant his hopes for Cespedes being able to continue mediation
would be unfulfilled. Cespedes was unable to maintain public order and officers in the Army
were becoming increasingly dissident. Welles felt the only course of action would be for the
Cuban Supreme Court to declare the Cuban constitution under which Machado was re-elected
unconstitutional and call for new elections under the original constitution of 1901. He did not
believe the Cespedes administration could maintain power and the only was to forestall another
revolution was by holding new elections.118
On September 5, students and sodiers, led by Fulgencio Batista, the son of a laborer and a
Sergeant in the Cuban Amry, overthrew Cespedes in the Sergeant’s Revolt. Batiasta, in
conjunction with university students and the soldiers in Havana, deposed all of the Army
officers, took control of the Army, and formed a revolutionary government naming Batista as
Chief of Staff. They issued a statement that their administration was based on consent of the
Cuban people and the principles of Cuban sovereignty. They stated they felt Cespedes was not
responding to the demands of the revolution: therefore the revolutionary government would take
power until such time elections could be held.119
117
Del Aguila, 21
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 24, 1933. FRUS, Volume V,
1933, 373.
119
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 5, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 382.
118
44
The Provincial Revolutionary Government was then headed by Dr. Ramon Grau San
Martin, a professor of physiology at the University of Havana.120 He issued a statement which
included a temporary constitution; within the statement was a paragraph which referred to
international treaties spontaneously entered into in the name of the Republic of Cuba. Welles
felt that San Martin’s use of the word “spontaneously” implied that San Martin intended to
denounce the permanent treaty with the United States and by extension, the Platt Amendment.121
Heading up the first Cuban government created without United States sanction, San Martin set
about transforming Cuba. He denounced the Platt Amendment and called for its removal. He
lowered interest rates, took control of the phone and electric companies from the United States
and lowered utility rates, gave women the right to vote, and passed a Nationalization of Labor
decree requiring 50% of all employees in industry, commerce, and agriculture to be of Cuban
descent.122
The implications of these changes were more than evident to Washington. The old proAmerican government had been overthrown, the labor changes jeopardized American interests,
and the United States government saw the structures it had created being dismantled. The United
States had so established itself in Cuba that all changes would ultimately affect its interests
negatively. Welles immediately recognized the threats San Martin’s reforms posed. However,
he also understood that non-recognition of San Martin’s government by the Roosevelt
administration would serve to foster instability and potentially prolong the conflict in Cuba
between the parties. In the end, the United States issued a statement that the Roosevelt
administration desired Cuba to solve its own political problems and in keeping with the wishes
120
Perez, 194
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 14, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 436.
122
Perez, 195
121
45
of the Cuban people, the United States government would offer recognition to any Cuban
government that represented the Cuban people and was capable of maintaining law and order
throughout Cuba. However, the United States left out any mention of extending official
recognition to San Martin’s administration123
In the fall of 2003, Welles met with San Martin at his office. He told San Martin that he
felt Cubans were losing confidence in San Martin’s administration and that the United States had
concerns about the safety of American lives and property. Welles told San Martin that public
order was not being maintained and that the Cuban government was not stable. San Martin
replied that Cubans would support him if the United States extended recognition to his
administration. Welles responded that official recognition was a not a tool to be used to gain
popularity and that the United States did not intend to use is as a means of control. San Martin
told Welles that Batista wanted to be president and that he was concerned that to remove Batista
as Chief of Staff would also remove any control over the military.124
The opposition felt San Martin maintained a presidency that did not have the popular
support of the people and they blamed San Martin for his part in plunging Cuba into yet another
crisis. Opposition leaders told Welles they believed that Batista would either work to oust San
Martin’s regime or take control of the government himself and that they needed to work with
him to avoid a military dictatorship. The opposition also understood the United States
government would not impose a solution and it was up to the opposition to find a solution. But
Welles was still concerned about the safety of American lives and property. However, he also
felt that intervention, even for the protection of American interests, would give the people and
123
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), September 11, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 424
124
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 11, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 443.
46
government of Cuba the perception that they are not responsible for their actions and that the
United States government will always step in to fix whatever is wrong.125
Welles met with Batista and the opposition. Batista stated he was interested in finding a
solution that would not involve open hostility. He also told Welles that he was rigorously
opposed to Communism. The opposition asked Batista to exert his influence over the students
to work with the opposition. Batista agreed. Welles recognized Batista’s influence, but wasn’t
sure Batista would be able to accept his point of view. Welles felt the two options available were
the current San Martin government, which he called “desultory”, or the formation of a more
radical government with no hope of an election. He called upon Washington to issue a statement
expressing the unhappiness of the United States regarding the current situation stating he felt that
continued non-involvement would be perceived as a policy of weakness.126
Welles looked to Batista to bring about the change he desired. He met again with Batista.
He stressed to Batista that the San Martin government did not meet the conditions required by
the United States to gain recognition. He also told Batista that he found him to be the only
person in Cuba who represented authority. Welles told him that he, Batista, was supported by
foreign interests, that he had the support of the press, and that he had the support of the
opposition leaders. He urged Batista to use this authority and support to bring about mediation
from the different groups. Batista requested to meet with Welles again in the future; Welles
agreed. He felt since Batista held so much authority in Cuba, it was imperative for the United
States to maintain a relationship with him.127
125
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 18, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 446.
126
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1933. FRUS, Volume
V, 1933, 458.
127
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1933. FRUS, Volume V,
1933, 472.
47
Welles also felt the United States needed to take some sort of action. The first alternative
was to extend recognition to the San Martin administration and in doing so allay the antiAmerican feelings in Cuba, influence economic decisions, and strengthen and maintain the
current government. However, this meant recognition of an administration that did not have the
support of the Cuban people, concerns that the United States would incur the same sort of
reproach incurred by the Hoover administration when Hoover’s administration did not withdraw
support of Machado. Finally, Welles felt recognition of San Martin after so many meetings with
the opposition would damage the chances for future national elections based on the hostility of
the opposing factions. The second alternative was to continue to withhold recognition based on
the feeling that United States commercial and export interests could not be revived under San
Martin.128 In the meantime, Welles continued to work with Batista and the opposition.
At the end of 1933, Welles was replaced by Jefferson Caffery, Personal Representative of
the President of the United States. Caffery held many of the same opinions Welles held
regarding intervention and even stronger opinions regarding extending recognition to San
Martin. Caffery had a very low opinion of San Martin’s administration, calling it “inept”,
“inefficient”, and “unpopular”. He felt that unless San Martin voluntarily decided to relinquish
power, the only other option would be armed intervention by the United States.129
Caffery met with Batista and San Martin. San Martin stated his main concern was the
holding of open elections and that he wanted to stay office to see that happen. However, he also
felt if the opposition convinced that wasn’t possible, then he was willing to resign and have
128
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1933. FRUS, Volume V,
1933, 490.
129
Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1934.
FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 96.
48
someone replace him that was acceptable to both San Martin and the opposition.130 Batista
recognized the validity of his position hinged on the United States recognition of the government
and as such did as Welles had desired and moved against San Martin. He transferred his support
to the opposition group, Union Nacionalista, and their leader, Carlos Mendieta, who was an
opponent of Machado. Caffery requested the United States extend recognition to Mendieta. He
was concerned that if they could not get mediation, Batista would either turn to the Communists
or declare himself a military dictator.131
On January 15, 1934, San Martin finally agreed to resign and turned the office of
Provincial President over to Carlos Hevia, Secretary of Agriculture.132 Serving just four days,
Hevia was then replaced by Mendieta on January 19, 1934 and on January 23, 1934, the United
States extended official recognition to Mendieta’s administration and the crisis brought on by the
depression gradually came to a close. 133
For the first six years, Batista served as Chief of Staff of the Army under President
Mendieta. During this time, former Ambassador Welles and other politicians, Cuban and
American, came to believe the Platt Amendment caused problems historically in Cuba as
officials used the Platt Amendment to push the United States into intervening in Cuba during
conflicts for their own benefit. As a result, in 1934, a new treaty was written and Cuba and the
United States formally agreed to abrogation of the Platt Amendment. In the Treaty of 1934, the
130
Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State, January
11, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 97
131
Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 14, 1934.
FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 98
132
Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1934.
FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 101
133
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery), January 23, 1934.
FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 107.
49
United States gave Cuba tariff benefits for sugar and Cuba gave United States concessions on
duties, taxes, and a promise of no new restrictions on payments for goods.134
In 1935, the United States released a statement in Cuban newspapers, that the new Treaty
of Relations signed on May 29, 1934 replaced the Treaty of 1903 and put an end to the “special
relations between the United States and Cuba”. The signing of the new Treaty of Relations
meant the United States would no longer intervene, directly or indirectly, in Cuba’s politics nor
favor any political party over others.135
In 1936, Laredo Bru was elected president of Cuba and things remained stable until 1940,
when Cuba was once again on the brink of revolution with Batista in the middle. Elections were
due and the opposition was refusing to name a candidate to run against President Laredo Bru.
The opposition, headed by Batista, wanted the elections postponed until June instead of having
them held in April, but was unwilling to commit to the current government. They wanted the
Constituent Assembly to exercise executive powers in the interim.136 Bru agreed to extend his
time in office if necessary to mediate with Batista. The United States was concerned that if Bru
resigned the office at the end of his term without new elections having been held Batista would
attempt to take the presidency by force and Cuba would be in a situation similar to that preceding
Machado’s downfall.137
Batista ran for president and was legally elected. While in office, he expanded trade with
the United States, worked on improving relationships with the Communists, and worked to
improve the living conditions for the general Cuban population. However, these moves to
134
Perez, 159
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Caffery), March 4, 1935. FRUS Volume IV,
1935, 476.
136
Telegram from the Chargé in Cuba (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1940. FRUS Volume V,
1940, 738.
137
Telegram from the Chargé in Cuba (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1940. FRUS Volume V,
1940, 740.
135
50
strengthen labor were not necessarily enough to disrupt the balance of his government; instead,
these moves were made to ensure he had union support of his presidency. But while he passed
social reforms to benefit workers, he could still be counted on to defend American interests if
needed. Despite his moves towards Communists, he became the symbol of stability to many
American politicians. Batista broached the idea of a military alliance with the United States. If
the United States was willing to deliver military equipment for the Cuban Army then Batista
would be able to increase the effectiveness of the Cuban military. Batista felt it inevitable that
the United States would be drawn into the war in Europe, in which case, Batista felt, because the
Cuba’s friendship with the United States and the policy of inter-American defense, Cuba would
also be drawn into the war.138 The United States agreed and under a Lend-Lease Act for the
defense of the Americas sent Cuba over $7m in arms deliveries.139 In 1942, this defense of the
Americas continued with the signing of a series of further agreements to open up Cuba as an
American military training ground.140 The rest of his presidency passed without incident and in
1944, after Ramon Grau San Martin was elected to replace him, Batista left Cuba and retired to
Miami, FL.
After World War I, the boom in the sugar market rose and then ultimately crashed. The
resulting loss in revenue brought turmoil to Cuba, this turmoil worsened as the world felt the
effects of the Depression. Machado’s hold on Cuba also deteriorated as the Depression
deepened. The implementation of the Latin American Good Neighbor Policy meant the United
States was not going to intervene in Cuba and assist in the conflict, this policy would effect many
138
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, June 19, 1941. FRUS Volume
VII, 1941, 104.
139
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics (Walmsley), October 27, 1941.
FRUS Volume VII 1941, 122.
140
Agreement between the United States and Cuba for Military and Naval Cooperation, September 7, 1942. FRUS
1942 Volume VI, 280.
51
decisions the United States made regarding Cuba. It was also during this time that Batista
entered into the political scene in Cuba. He led the Sergeant’s Revolt and worked with
American Ambassadors in Cuba to end the conflict between San Martin and the opposition.
Even as Batista left office at the end of the 1940s, he remained a serious player in Cuban politics.
52
1940 – 1960
As the war in Europe progressed, the United States wanted Cuba to lease them more land
for use as military bases. Ambassador in Cuba Spruille Braden met with President San Martin to
discuss this. San Martin stated they would lease air bases in San Antonio de los Banos and San
Julian for the duration of the war and six months after, but not longer than that. Also, as a matter
of sovereignty, the United States could not further lease the bases to anyone else. While the
Cuban government accepted the arrangements made years ago for Guantanamo Bay, San Martin
made it clear that the government of Cuba would not grant any foreign power the lease of any
Cuban territory for military purposes. Braden felt the only option was to wait until Cuba needed
something from the United States and then broach the topic again.141 The United States agreed
to this, but felt the air base at San Antonio de los Banos, Batista Field, to be of great importance
to the United States. Batista Field was generally considered to be the most outstanding airport in
the Caribbean and would suit the United States for use of the heaviest bombers. The United
States Secretary of State needed the Ambassador in Cuba to present the land lease to the Cuban
government in a way that emphasized the benefit to the Cuban people, especially the economic
benefit to the surrounding regions in terms of Cuban civilian labor and to stress the diminished
value of the base were Cuba to reject American financial support of its operations. Cuba agreed
and the land was leased to the United States.142
The war in Europe ended on the 2nd of September, 1945 and on the 24th, Cuba called for
the United States to make the necessary arrangements to begin the process of turning the bases,
141
Telegram from Ambassador in Cube (Braden) to the Secretary of State, January 12, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume
IX, 896.
142
Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, August 22, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume
IX, 906.
53
including Batista Field, back over to Cuba by the end of March.143 San Martin had concerns that
the United States was gaining more from the negotiation in returning the bases and that talks
needed to include Cuba’s need for weapons, ships, and training. He also thought the United
States should expand the opportunities of American units permanently stationed in Cuba to work
with Cuban Defense Commissions. He refused to negotiate further until the United States
returned the base to Cuba.144 The United States began to withdraw from Batista field removing
anything deemed appropriate in order for the base to be returned to Cuba. Knowing how
valuable the removed equipment was, the United States maintained it as property and refused to
surplus it to Cuba.145 On May 20, 1946 the United States turned Batista Field and the other bases
back over to Cuba. No details had been established however, regarding the basing of United
States aircraft on Cuban territory or the stationing of United States Air Force personnel on Cuban
bases.146
In June, Colonel Camilo Gonzalez Chavez, Chief of the Cuban Air Corps, requested a
meeting with the Military Air Attaché of the United States. Chavez proposed there be a
reciprocal agreement of unlimited air base use in both countries without necessity of previous
permission. The agreement would also grant preferential treatment to military personnel by
immigration and customs. Chavez further stated that the agreement would be effective June 10
and all United States military aircraft were welcome to use Cuban air bases as desired. This
change of heart, according to Assistant Military Attaché Rigley, was because the United States
had begun requiring Cuban pilots who landed in the United States to pay cash for all repairs, gas,
143
Cuban Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State, September 24, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 909.
Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to Secretary of State, December 24, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 915.
145
Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), March 22, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume X!, 703.
146
Chargé in Cuba to Secretary of State, June 19, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 709.
144
54
and any services received. He stated that Cuba realized the United States was no longer
interested in being Santa Claus and that the cash system was an embarrassment to Cuba.147
The United States continued to be interested in Cuba – Soviet relations and communist
activities in Cuba. The United States was also concerned with certain circumstances in Cuba
they felt would lead to the eventual domination of communism in Cuba. Those circumstances
were the wealth of a relative few people in Cuba driving up food prices in Cuba and causing
poorer Cubans to adopt a higher standard of living, the weakness of the other political parties
who only seemed to want to win and profit and the Partido Socialista Popular might align itself
with winning candidates of other parties, the poor actions of many Cuban officials made many
made the communists look good in contrast, and the possibility that Cuba would forge a secret
friendship with the Soviets as a form of insurance if there was trouble with the United States.
The United States also felt there were factors that would equally discourage the rise of
communism; the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the many facets of the relationship,
including the Cuban sugar market, the stronger economic growth of the United States over the
Soviets, and the presence of Cuban interests in services and industries the communists would
nationalize. San Martin walked a fine line with the communists. On one hand, he accepted their
collaboration in order to secure their votes and there was a certain comparison of his social
crusades and the communists’ social objectives. On the other hand, San Martin condoned public
attacks on the communist ideology made by his vice president.148
When Carlos Prío Socarrás was elected president of Cuba, he was very interested in
maintaining a close relationship with the United States. Prío, a former law student at the
University of Havana, participated in the coup to overthrow Machado and served as the Minister
147
Secret Report by Assistant Military Attaché (Rigley), January 17, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 710.
Secret report from the Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1946. FRUS 1946
Volume XI, 719.
148
55
of Labour under San Martin, his family also fought in the battle for Cuban independence,
because of this background, he had a sincere friendship with the United States. Under Prío a
new treaty was drafted between the United States and Cuba, the Convention of Establishment
and Economic Development. Under this treaty, the United States would provide technical
support to Cuba based on Cuba’s needs, Cuba would ensure such technical assistance would be
effectively utilized, and the United States would extend credit to Cuba.149 In Cuba, however,
there was opposition to such a treaty. The communists stated such treaty harkened back to the
days of imperialist expansionism and charged the Cuban government with the intent to betray the
Cuban people with the same kind of treaty rejected in previous years by other administrations.
As such, Prío could no longer entertain the notion of such a treaty; instead he wanted Cuba and
the United States to focus on a treaty that would stabilize market for Cuban sugar within the
United States. He was also interested in the inclusion of an economic treaty of provisions
relating to an exchange control of currency.150
The United States had to consider their policies with Cuba and in 1951, the Department
of State issued a comprehensive statement regarding the United States objectives in Cuba. With
the end of World War II and the emergence of the United States and Soviet Republic as the two
remaining Super Powers, countries began to align themselves with either the United States or the
Communist Soviets. The onset of the Cold War heightened United States vigilance in Latin
America and amplified United States concerns in fighting Communism in Cuba. The United
States wanted the continued support of the Cuban government and people regarding defense of
the Western hemisphere, to assist in the development of Cuba’s economy, to promote mutually
149
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Butler), February 23, 1949. FRUS 1949
Volume IX, 623.
150
Memo of conversation by Eugene Desvernine at the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Señor Doctor Oscar Gans,
Ambassador of Cuba, Ambassador Albert F. Nufer, Doctor José Guerra, Director of the Currency Stability Fund,
Eugene Desvernine.. August 9, 1949. FRUS 1949 Volume IX, 637.
56
advantageous trade between the United States and Cuba, and to encourage the Cuban
government to observe all of its international commitments as well as strengthen the friendship
between the United States and Cuba.151 Washington felt that Cuba was important to the United
States based not only on its proximity and historic ties, but also on its commercial relationship,
based both on imports and exports.152
Although Communists had been present in Cuba since the 1920s and had even supported
Batista during his first presidency, the Cold War brought these groups to the forefront and
Washington began to grow concerned at the increasing number of Communist groups in Cuba.
Washington felt the Communists wanted to weaken the relationship between the United States
and Cuba by discrediting the United States, disillusioning the Cuban people regarding the
motives of the United States in Cuba, and encouraging Cubans to withhold support from the
United States in the event of conflict with the Soviet Republic.153 The growth of communist
influences in Cuba could be based on many things: a resentment of United States control over
Cuban commerce, especially sugar, leftover resentment that the support by the United States
made it possible for Machado to stay in office, and resentment by San Martin and his followers
because the United States refused to offer official recognition to the San Martin administration.
Much of the Cuban population felt as if they had nothing to lose by turning to communism and
as a result the disparity of wealth in Cuba between the rich foreign national and poor Cubans was
the impetus of many poor Cubans turning to communism.154
151
Department of State statement, January 11, 1951, FRUS 1950 Volume II, 843.
Ibid, 844.
153
Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1946, FRUS 1946 Volume
XI, 530.
154
Comments by Norweb on the Question of Whether direct Coordination of the Communist Party has been
Renewed since Dissolution of the Convention, March 29, 1946, FRUS 1947, Volume VIII, 736.
152
57
Cuba still criticized the United States over the Platt Amendment and many Cuban
businessmen were concerned about their economic dependence on the United States. They were
striving to reduce their dependence on sugar by diversifying their economy. The United States
was concerned by Cuba’s adoption of nationalistic employment laws, under both San Martin and
Batista, which had a negative impact on American businesses in Cuba. Despite these issues,
Cuban President Carlos Prío Socarrás continued to want preferential treatment from the United
States, especially in regards to sugar.155
The security of the United States was still the Department of State’s first objective.
Imperative to that defense was Guantanamo Bay. United States policies in Cuba must consider
Guantanamo and must remain alert to any threatening situation that might develop.156 Second to
the security of the United States was the security of Cuba. Cuban stability and prosperity were
linked to the export markets and prices for sugar. With the United States being the largest single
market for Cuban sugar, any policy set by the United States would have a direct effect on the
Cuban economy. As such, the United States government recognized its dependence on Cuban
sugar during the past wars and its continuing dependence on Cuban sugar should another war
erupt, so it was to the benefit of the United States to have a mutually advantageous agreement
with Cuba regarding the sale of Cuban sugar in the United States.157
In 1952, Batista ran for president again. However, feeling that he wasn’t going to win,
he staged a military coup and seized power from Socarrás in March and took power on April 4,
1952. Although Batista was supported by the United States government and the Cuban elite, the
majority of Cuban people resented the seizure and multiple opposition groups, including Fidel
Castro’s and Socarrás’, popped up. Castro, a nationalist opposed to the United States, had
155
Ibid, 845.
Ibid, 846.
157
Ibid, 847.
156
58
planned to run for Congress, but when Batista took power he cancelled the elections. Castro
planned to charge Batista with violating the Cuban constitution, but Cuban courts denied his
petition. This was the basis of his opposition to Batista and what set him on the course of
revolution. Socarrás’ supporters wanted to overthrow Batista and were using the United States
as a base of operations. Batista’s administration told the United States that arms shipments from
the United States were being sent to Cuba for “revolutionary activities”. The United States
responded to these charges by stating the policy of granting safe haven to political exiles in the
United States has long been established, but the State Department would look into it.158
On July 26, 1953 Castro launched an attack on Batista. The attack failed and many of the
rebels were killed in the ensuing skirmish. Castro and his followers fled to the Oriente Province
in the east of Cuba. Fidel and his brother, Raul Castro, were both captured and sentenced to
prison.
In July 1955, the House Agricultural Committee passed a resolution which extended the
current Sugar Act until 1962 and proposed the Cooley Bill. The Cooley Bill, named after the
Chairman of the Committee Harold Cooley, provided that once consumption of sugar in the
United States passed 8.3 million tons, Cuba could only provide 25.6 percent of that sugar, the
remaining 75 percent would be provided by domestic producers and countries paying full
duty.159 Cuba sugar mill owners had serious concerns about this, stating as their oppositions that
the Cooley Bill would result in Cuba becoming the last residual supplier of the United States
sugar market and an increase in quotas of full duty countries would result in those countries
expanding their sugar production at a time when there was already a glut of sugar on the market.
158
Memorandum of conversation, Department of State, Ambassador Campa of Cuba, Mr. Holland (ARA), Mr. Hoyt
(MID), July 1, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 820.
159
Editorial note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 827.
59
They were also concerned that this treatment of Cuba reflected a serious change in what had
been the basis of Cuban and United States economic relations for the last fifty years.160
After review of the proposed legislation and testimony by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs Holland before the Senate Finance Committee, the Committee
changed Cuba’s share of the American sugar market to 96 percent until 1956, but thereafter it
would be reduced to 29.59 percent.161 Batista was still concerned. He told President Eisenhower
that the present poor condition of the sugar market was adversely effecting Cuba’s economy and
reminded Eisenhower that sugar comprised the majority of Cuba’s exports as such Cuba relied
heavily on the American sugar market. He wanted to improve trade relations with the United
States and recommended a panel of experts be set up to study the social and economic
development of Cuba. He also suggested an expert on crop diversification be hired.162 By 1959,
Cuba was exporting only half of its sugar to the United States and 40 percent of those profits
were going to American owned companies.163
In 1955, Fidel and Raul Castro were pardoned and fled to Mexico. There, Castro formed
the 26th of July Movement named after the failed attempt to overthrow Batista, and met Che
Guevara, a revolutionary and Marxist. Guevara convinced Castro that the only way to bring
down Batista was a revolution.164 In May 1956, after repeated attempts to weaken his
administration, Batista suspended constitutional guarantees for 45 days and attempted to
reorganize the military. The fact that the military was beginning to show signs of dissent posed a
160
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary of
State, December 14, 1955. FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 829.
161
Editorial note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 830.
162
Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador’s residence, Panama City. The President, The Secretary of State, Dr.
Milton Eisenhower, Assistant Secretary Holland, Mr. Jack Neal, President Batista, Foreign Minister Gonzalo Guell,
July 23, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 833.
163
Smith, 175.
164
Julia Sweig. Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground. MA: Harvard University
Press, 2004, 6.
60
huge problem to Batista, as that was where he derived the bulk of his support. But the factors in
his favor were the general overall support of the military, the economic prosperity assisted by the
influx of tourists, feuding within oppositional groups, public apathy, and the desire of the labor
leadership for a peaceful solution.165 Nonetheless, Batista was predicting an insurrection attempt
before the end of the year. He insisted it would come from Socarrás, but his opposition also
included Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement and other, miscellaneous groups. The 26th of July
Movement was calling for a general strike and planned to use that strike to promote further
disorder. The Unites States government felt the chances of this succeeding were slim. Batista
stated he was planning to hold elections in 1957-1958.166 Batista also accused the Dominican
Republic of plotting to overthrow him by financing Socarrás who was exiled to the United
States. The United States government did not consider the thought of invasion by the Dominican
Republic to be of serious concern, but told Batista Washington would not be happy with open
conflict between any Caribbean countries.167
The United States began to grow concerned with Batista’s tactics in stopping the
insurrection, but they also felt he best represented their interests in stopping the spread of
communism.168 The continued sale of arms to Cuba by the United States was interpreted as
support for Batista and the opposition to Batista, particularly Castro, became very anti-American.
The United States felt Castro represented the most determined opposition Batista faced.
However, the United States still felt Batista, who had the support of the Cuban people and the
Cuban military and who continued to protect American interests in Cuba, had the situation under
165
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affiars (Holland) to the Secretary of State,
May 8, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI, 831.
166
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Gardner) to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957,
Volume VI, 835.
167
Editors Note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 837.
168
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Gardner) to the Secretary of State, February 15, 1957, FRUS 19551957, Volume VI, 840.
61
control and that the size and importance of Castro’s movement were greatly exaggerated. They
also felt the opposition was fractured based on conflicting objectives and ambitions.169
On August 5, 1957, the United States government received intelligence regarding a plot
to overthrow Batista within a few days. Castro’s forces planned to convince Batista to give up
control of Cuba to a junta government with Colonel Ramon Barquin, one of the opposition
leaders, serving as provincial president until order was restored. If Batista refused, then he
would be deposed by force. This attempt was thwarted by disorganization of the opposition and
Batista’s awareness of the plot and prompt action.170
Under the Military Defense Assistance Agreement, the United States government
continued to supply arms to Cuba. Batista used American supplied F-47 fighter jets and B-26
bombers to bomb rebel hideouts. Traditionally, the United States required that military
assistance program weapons, especially internally, be only used with United States permission.
Cuba had not obtained this permission. However, the United States was concerned that any
criticism by the American government of Cuba’s actions would result in a weakening of
Batista’s regime.171 Batista requested eight M-4 tanks from the United States, but in January of
that year, when they delivered seven M-4 tanks to Cuba which were then used in subsequent
internal conflicts, Washington was subjected to criticism from both Cubans and the American
people. The United States government had since been criticized by both the American people
and internationally for what was considered to be the bolstering of the Batista regime through
arms sales, so Washington decided to defer delivery of the tanks pending resolution of the
169
Editors note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 841.
Editors note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 843.
171
Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957
,Volume VI, 846.
170
62
conflict.172 Batista was convinced that this indicated American support for Socarrás. He
expressed concerns that the United States’ tolerance of Socarrás in the United States permitted
Socarrás a base from which to ship arms to Cuba in a continued attempt to overthrow Batista.
Earl Smith, the Ambassador to Cuba, told Batista this was not the case and the primary objective
of the United States was a stable government in Cuba capable of maintaining law and order and
which would also live up to its national and international obligations.173
Batista began to put pressure on the United States regarding Socarrás. He told
Ambassador to Cuba Smith that he would not be able to restore constitutional liberties, including
the holding of elections, unless the activities of Socarrás in Cuba were stopped. The United
States government had planned to convene a grand jury to investigate Socarrás’ activities in the
United States. However, Secretary of State John Dulles instructed Smith to inform Batista that
the United States had no interest in bargaining with him over the investigation and that the
investigation was strictly a judicial process. They felt Batista’s intent to use punishment of
Socarrás as a bargaining chip would only give Batista’s opposition more ammunition against
him.174
As the violence in Cuba escalated, including the possible threat of violence towards
American property and lives, and Batista’s administration began to appear to be a dictatorial
government, the United States began to consider its options. Washington held Batista and the
opposition equally responsible for the conflict. Batista had called for elections to be held in
January 1958, but there were concerns they would not be free and Batista would continue to rule
172
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State of Inter –American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under
Secretary of Political Affairs (Murphy), September 23, 1857, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 853.
173
Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, September 23, 1957, FRUS 19551957, Volume VI, 855.
174
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Cuba, November 18, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume
VI, 864.
63
behind the scenes. The two main oppositional leaders, Socarrás and Castro, had no interest in
elections; only in overthrowing Batista. The United States did not currently consider Castro to
be a Communist, even though Batista accused him of that. The United States still had concerns
about the harsh countermeasures and brutality Batista’s forces employed. Since Batista was
incapable of stopping the opposition and the opposition was incapable of overthrowing Batista,
the United States’ main concern was that this state of violence could continue indefinitely.
Washington was worried that the overthrow or assassination of Batista or the holding of
fraudulent elections would create exactly the kind of chaos the communists needed to seize
power. However, if Batista continued on the path as dictator, sooner or later another rebellion
would erupt resulting in more bloodshed. Neither situation was an outcome the United States
desired. Therefore, Smith felt the best course of action would be to work towards a free election.
This would require effort both on the part of Batista and the opposition. The first step would be
the restoration of constitutional liberties, the second step would be working with the opposition
to make an acceptable arrangement for elections, and that short of intervention; the United States
would bring pressure to bear to ensure an equitable outcome.175
By the end of December the United States government considered the situation in Cuba
to be a serious threat to American lives and property. The Director of the Office of Middle
American Affairs, Weiland, came up with a course of action to influence Batista to a favorable
outcome. Phase one would be to work on getting Batista to initiate measures which would allow
for compromise with the opposition. If phase one succeeded, then phase two would be working
on the holding of free and open elections. Phase three would only come into play if the
opposition refused to compromise; then the United States would provide full and open support to
175
Dispatch from the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957,
Volume VI, 869.
64
Batista, supplying arms and holding elections without the opposition. Phase four would only
come into play if Batista refused to undertake the measures of phase one and phase two; then the
United States would publicly announce the cessation of sales of arms to Cuba and the withdrawal
of any military assistance program equipment based on usage of equipment by Cuba without
prior authorization from the United States. The outcomes of the actions of phase four would be
to hasten the fall of the Batista regime.176
The United States continued to supply Batista with arms. Batista assured Smith that he
would restore the constitutional guarantees that had previously been revoked no later than
January 27, 1958, provided he could rely on the cooperation of the United States. Smith felt it
imperative to his objective of stabilizing Cuba that the United States makes good on promised
arms deliveries.177 Opposition to Batista was strong in Cuba, including Fidel Castro’s forces in
eastern Cuba and support given by Cuban exiles living in the United States. In an attempt to
maintain control, Batista suspended constitutional rights six times in 1957, but based on
assurances by Smith that the United States government considered his government to be the duly
constituted government, he promised to lift the suspensions. In order to make Batista more
cooperative in terms of holding elections in June 1958, the United States decided to approve all
arms purchase requests made by Batista.178
The United States had promised armored cars to Batista; however, Congress was strongly
opposed to the sale of what was considered heavy equipment to a dictatorship. Congress wanted
Batista to take steps towards ending the violence in Cuba and to create conditions in Cuba that
176
Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), December 19, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 876.
177
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 11, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
7.
178
Memo from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State,
January 17, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 8.
65
would be conducive to fair elections in June. The United States called upon Batista to curtail
excessive brutality by his officials, remove the more “violent and sadistic” army and police
officials, and for Batista to issue an order for the Cuban Armed Forces to enforce the law
impartially and legally. If such conditions were not met, the United States would cancel the sale
of the armored vehicles.179 Ambassador Smith was to inform Batista that the armored cars
would be delivered provided Batista cooperate in creating conditions that would minimize
negative reactions in the United States and elsewhere against the United States. They
recommended Batista restrict the official publicity concerning the arrival of the shipment and
lime the use of said equipment to training and that reactions in the United States would play a
large part in whether future requests would be approved.180
Weiland read a copy of a speech Batista gave in January to the Cuban National
Convention, he felt that Batista’s speech inferred actions contrary to what had been previously
recommended by the United States and as such delivery of the armored cars should be
suspended.181 By mid-February, some felt the situation in Cuba was improving. Constitutional
rights had been restored, the campaign to overthrow Batista and destroy the economy seemed to
have failed, and conditions in Cuba returning to normal. Castro was losing prestige and the
revolutionary opposition, while outspoken, was splintered and disorganized. So, even though the
opposition was interested in the elections, unless the opposing political parties united, the
Government of Cuba had little risk and would no doubt have their candidate elected. Batista
informed the United States that Castro was being actively supported by Communists. Smith told
179
Memorandum from Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), January 17, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 13.
180
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, January 22, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
13.
181
Letter from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to the Embassy in Cuba (Smith),
February 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 21.
66
him to get proof, as such proof would negatively affect Castro’s ability to gain support from in
the United States.182
Homer Bigart, a reporter for the New York Times, spent two weeks with Castro. He
reported that Castro evidenced no anti-American bias, but instead Castro just felt the Cuban
government would need to re-examine contracts between the United States and Cuba that were
negotiated by Batista and cancel any contracts that were not in Cuba’s favor. Castro also felt the
only way Batista had been able to maintain power so long was due to backing by the United
States. Castro had terms for a ceasefire, but Bigart doubted the terms would be acceptable to the
Government of Cuba. The terms included withdrawing the military from the Oriente Province,
declaring a general amnesty, and postponing elections until Castro’s 26th of July Movement
could organize a political party with Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleo as their presidential candidate.
Castro spoke of his support from the Cuban people for his movement, but Bigart felt Castro’s
impression of the strength of his movement outside of the Oriente Province was exaggerated.183
He also met with Che Guevara. Guevara stated that he was not a Communist, but was a leftist
and liberal. He had very strong anti-American sentiments; he called the United States
imperialistic and felt that American governments for years meddled in Latin American affairs,
supported dictators, and acted contrary to the will of the Latin American people. Bigart asked
Guevara if his actions in Cuba could also be considered meddling. Guevara did not answer.
Bigart asked Castro why he would take on Guevara given Che’s reputation as a Communist.
Castro replied that he had taken him on because they needed a doctor and that it did not matter
182
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 20, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 28.
183
Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 28, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
38.
67
what Che’s political beliefs were since Castro was the leader of the movement and determined
all policy.184
Gonzalo Güell y Morales de los Ríos, the Cuban Minister of State, assured the United
States that the Government of Cuba was determined to hold open elections and maintain law and
order. He also stated that Batista would invite the world press to witness the elections and
requested a representative from the United Nations to observe the elections to ensure fairness.185
A week later Güell met again with Smith. He stated that the situation in Cuba was very serious
and that in order for the Government of Cuba to be able to hold open elections, Batista believed
constitutional guarantees would need to be suspended, Güell also stated that Batista was prepared
to postpone elections as Castro had requested. Smith told Güell that the United States hoped for
a peaceful solution. The Eisenhower administration would be disappointed if constitutional
guarantees were suspended again, that the United States government policy was one of nonintervention and would be sticking to that, and that the Government of Cuba would be criticized
by the American press if they took these actions.186
On March 12, 1958 Castro issued an ultimatum with 22 points of action. Within those
points was a call for a strike in April with an increase in attacks against Batista, orders that all
rail and highway transportation into the Oriente Province was forbidden effective April 1st, and
instructions that beginning April 1st rebel forces would fire on all vehicles entering the Oriente
Province. Officials who continued to serve in the armed forces or government after that date
184
Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 46.
Telegraph from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 4, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 50.
186
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 12, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
53.
185
68
would be considered traitors and all Cubans should stop paying taxes. In answer, Batista
suspended all constitutional freedoms.187
The United States continued to be concerned with the safety of American people in Cuba.
Batista said he could control the situation and in order to protect American lives and property he
was increasing the size of the Cuban Army. He also stated Communism was spreading and the
Government of Cuba was certain that Communists were involved in the attempted overthrow of
the government. He agreed to postpone elections as the opposition requested and, if the
Government of Cuba was voted out, he would leave office willingly on February 24, 1959 when
his term expired.188
Manuel Urrieta and other Cuban exiles met with Weiland and Deputy Director, Office of
Middle American Affairs, C. Allan Stewart in Washington, DC. Urrieta urged the United States
to cease shipping arms to Batista. He felt use of American military advisors as trainers and
supply of arms to Cuba created ill will towards the United States. Urrieta also stated Batista was
misusing arms that had been sold only for hemispheric defense which was a violation of the
United States-Cuba Military Assistance Agreement. The exiles stated an oppositional unified
front had been created with Socarrás, Castro, and others all working together. They requested
the United States withdraw its military mission from Cuba. Stewart responded there was a strict
policy of non-intervention. Urrieta responded that withdrawal of the mission was not
intervention. Weiland replied that “interpretations are put on non-intervention on the basis of
whether the act harms or helps the cause of a particular group.”189
187
Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 55.
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 14, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
57.
189
Memorandum of conversation between Manuel Urrieta (exiled 26 th of July leader), Raul Chiba (exiled member of
the Orthodox party), Angel Santos Bush (exiled 26 th of July member), William A. Weiland (Director, Office of
Middle American Affairs), and C. Allan Stewart (Deputy Director, Office of Middle American Affairs), March 17,
1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 63.
188
69
The United States felt that should Castro’s 26th of July movement be successful in its
attempt to overthrow Batista, there was nothing about its leadership that inspired confidence in
restoring order to Cuba. While the Eisenhower administration did not believe Castro to be a
Communist, they did find him to be immature and irresponsible. They felt a third alternative to
the continued rule of Batista or a Castro dominated regime would be a military civilian junta
which would overthrow Batista but deny Castro a dominant position.190 On April 9, 1958
Castro’s forces unsuccessfully attempted to launch a general strike. They also failed in an
attempt to seize arms in Havana. The strike failed for multiple reasons, not the least of which
was preparedness by Batista and lack of organization and communication by Castro. 191
The United States supplied arms to Cuba under three bases: the bilateral Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement, sales by the Department of Defense under the Mutual Security Act, and
sales by private American companies. The decision to suspend arms shipments to Cuba was to
ensure the arms were used in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement. Consequently, Batista turned to outside sources. Therefore it was recommended
that shipments continue to be withheld, sales by the Department of Defense or private dealers be
allowed provided such sales also further United States foreign policy objectives, and sales of
noncombat items continue.192
The United States government called for compliance from Cuba in regards to the Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement and requested the Government of Cuba stop using Military
Assistance Program trained men and supplied equipment in combat and that the Military
190
Memorandum from Deputy Director of Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State, April 1, 1958. FRUS
1958-1968 Volume VI, 77.
191
Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 82.
192
Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to Acting Secretary of
State, May 6, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 92.
70
Assistance Program supported unit be returned its equipment.193 Smith felt that this in addition
to the current arms policy would only serve to further strain relations between the United States
and Cuba and serve to strengthen the Communists. He requested the Government of Cuba be
allowed to send a letter explaining they have not violated the terms of the Military Defense
Assistance Agreement, since they are fighting Communists, protecting lives and property, and
attempting to prevent an overthrow of the government.194
The United States faced a dilemma in Cuba. On one hand the Batista regime was
becoming more disliked due to repression and on the other hand it was becoming more likely
Batista supported candidates were going to win the election and Batista would continue in power
behind the scenes. The Government of Cuba was engaged in an all out offensive in the Oriente
Province against Castro’s forces and was using United States trained men and United States
supplied equipment. This brought about much criticism both by Cubans and Americans. The
Government of Cuba charged that Castro was a Communist, but the United States found nothing
to support that. The suspension of shipments of arms to Cuba had not resulted in any change of
the political situation, so the United States saw no reason to reconsider the decision.195
On June 26, 1958 Castro’s forces kidnapped eleven Americans from the Moa Bay Mining
Company. On June 27, they kidnapped twenty four United States Naval personnel, including
eleven Marines. By the end of June, a total of forty three Americans and three Canadians had
been abducted. The United States felt the rebels were doing to this to force United States
intervention in Cuba. However, the United States still felt a policy of non-intervention was best.
193
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, June 13, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
106.
194
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, June 16, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
108.
195
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under
Secretary of Political Affairs (Murphy), June 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 113.
71
The United States received the demands for the release of the American hostages; no more arms
shipments, assurance Guantanamo Bay would not be used to supply arms, and compliance by
both the United States and Government of Cuba with the Military Defense Assistance
program.196 Raul Castro claimed he ordered the kidnappings without the authority of Fidel and
stated he blamed the United States for supplying arms and for supporting Batista and sought to
publicize the situation. This illustrated to the United States that the rebel program was not
clearly defined beyond the fanatical hatred of Batista and while Batista believed there was a
Communist influence, Fidel Castro continued to claim otherwise.197
In a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out that as
of the first kidnap incident the Government of Cuba had suspended all air and ground attacks
against the rebels in an attempt to ensure the safety of the hostages. He felt that so long as the
attacks were suspended the rebels would either not release the captives or would release them
over an extended period of time while increasing demands from the United States. The
reputation of the United States had been damaged and would continue to suffer if they did not
secure a release of the hostages.198 Smith also felt the United States needed to take a firm stand,
regardless of the release of the hostages. The rebels had achieved their goals: publicity,
cessation of attacks by the Government of Cuba, and dealing directly with the United States.
Smith believed kidnappings would continue and the only way to stop them was with a
sufficiently severe penalty.199
196
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
125.
197
Telegraph from Embassy in Cuba to Department of State, July 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 127.
198
Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 10, 1958. FRUS 19581968 Volume VI, 140.
199
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 12, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
149.
72
As Raul delayed the release of the captives, Smith began to believe the rebel forces were
holding the Americans in an attempt to give them time to mount an offensive. Smith thought the
United States had underestimated the size and extent of the rebel movement and did not feel the
Cuban Army was capable of defeating the rebels in the hills.200 On July 18, 1958 the rebels
unexpectedly released the hostages. When they returned, the released hostages reported that
couriers had arrived at the detention center just prior to their release.201 Correspondingly, on
July 20, 1958 the opposition groups signed a unity pact with the 26th of July Movement. Smith
felt the recent kidnappings really highlighted the Communist’s influence on Raul Castro.
Ultimately, the Communists and the 26th of July movement shared the same goal, the overthrow
of Batista. It was clear to the United States that the strength of the Communist party in Cuba, if
not reflected in their numbers, was definitely reflected in their organization and dedication.202
In a memo, C. Allan Stewart laid out his thoughts concerning Cuba. He felt Batista’s
regime was unpopular and he did not have the public’s support of honest elections, conversely,
Fidel Castro’s insurrection was gaining strength rapidly. Also, that the United States policy of
withholding arms from Batista was approved by opposition forces and he felt that a change in
that policy could lead to reprisals against Americans in Cuba. Stewart was concerned that the
United States decision not to sell ten T-28 trainers to Cuba could result in Batista cancelling
contracts with the United States and ordering United States missions to leave Cuba. He also
though that ff Batista did not get control of and improve the situation in Cuba, then Castro would
only grow stronger and all out support of Batista by the United States would draw strong
criticism and only delay the inevitable. Lastly, he believed the United States needed to consider
200
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 17, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
154.
201
Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI 157.
202
Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 24, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 160.
73
alternative courses of action to resolve the situation before Castro grew so strong that he would
be able to dictate how Cuba would be governed.203 Smith felt there were two alternatives
confronting United States policy. One, that the United States allow the situation in Cuba to
continue status quo, the end result being a polarization of centers of power by Batista and the
opposition with the United States being blamed by all sides. Two, the United States discreetly
work with the opposition to get them united behind one candidate. He also felt the current policy
needed to be modified to allow Batista to effectively fight the Communist infiltration in the
Oriente Province.204
Smith met with Batista. Batista felt that in light of the continued rebel activity he could
not reinstate constitutional guarantees, but if the United States would give him arms and
equipment he would station men to defend American properties. He stated that by withdrawing
support from the Government of Cuba, the United States was providing aid and comfort to the
Communists. Batista also assured Smith that elections would still be held in November.205
The United States had several alternatives for action in Cuba. Stick to the current policy
of neutrality, the concern being the longer the conflict continued, the more advantageous to the
Communists. Work toward unification of opposition and replace Batista through open elections.
This would have been ideal if the obstacles to it, including disruption of the elections by
revolutionaries and people not wanting to vote, were not so overwhelming. Encourage the
military to overthrow Batista and establish a provincial government. This would mean direct
intervention in Cuban politics and no real guarantee of success. Support Batista within legal
203
Memorandum from Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), July 24, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 162.
204
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 25, 1958, , FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
173.
205
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, August 1, 1958, , FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
180.
74
confines. The United States did not believe the Batista regime had the support of the Cuban
people nor would it continue for any period after February 24, 1959. Give moral and material
support to the opposition. Given the infiltration of Communists into Castro’s 26th of July
movement this was the least favorable of the alternatives. So long as there was a chance of the
opposition uniting and putting up a candidate the United States could not rule out the electoral
method as a solution. While it was recognized that strict neutrality was not an ideal solution, it
was believe that it best served the interests of the United States.206
The United States still has to answer the question should arms sales to Cuba resume now
that the hostages had been released. Rubottom recommended there be no change in policy
regarding the shipment of arms, that the United States take no further action to ensure
compliance by the Government of Cuba to the Military Defense Assistance agreement, and the
ten t-28 trainers not be sent.207
Although Smith thought Batista would hold honest elections as he promised, he felt that
the opposition would prevent the elections from solving the political problems in Cuba. He
thought it would be necessary for the newly elected President to remove Castro from the
opposition, potentially by making him a Senator. He also thought if Batista remained in Cuba
after his term, this would only cause more problems for whoever succeeded him. Batista
intended to restore constitutional guarantees forty five days prior to the election, provided the
Government of Cuba could control the 26th of July movement, but felt the lack of support, via
arms sales, from the United States was the reason they were failing in these efforts. 208 Much of
the contention between the United States and Cuba lie in the fact that Cuba requested the ten T206
Paper prepared by the Embassy in Cuba, August 8, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 186.
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State,
August 11, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 192.
208
Memorandum of conversation between Embassy in Cuba (Smith) and Foreign Minister Guell, August 15, 1958.
FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 195.
207
75
28 trainers and the United States failed to deliver them. The United States felt that based on the
overwhelming evidence that Cuba would use the delivery of the planes to demonstrate renewed
support for Batista by the United States, the negative reaction such delivery would cause in the
United States, and that promises by the Government of Cuba that the planes would not be used
for this purpose were not satisfactory, that the Government of Cuba be informed the T-28s would
not be shipped.209
In September 1958, Terrence Leonhardy, Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, met with
Ernesto Betancourt, an agent for the 26th of July movement. Leonhardy expressed concerns that
many of the anti-American articles being circulated by the 26th of July movement followed the
Communist party line and had been printed by the Communist party. He asked Betancourt why
Castro did not disavow the Communist party publicly. Betancourt stated that Castro was hesitant
to do so since he had no other social program to present to the Cuban people, had previously
been accused of supporting the higher classes, and did not want to anger them since their
presence was so strong in the 26th of July movement. Betancourt also felt the members of the
26th of July movement that were Communist were also young and would become more
conservative as they matured. He thought the United States could counter their negative image
by gradually withdrawing troops from Cuba, sure to be perceived by the opposition as a sign the
United States was gradually withdrawing support from Batista.210
Smith felt it best for United States interests if Batista remained in power until February
1959, when his term ended. If he were overthrown, the Communists might use the ensuing
209
Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), August 29, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 201.
210
Memorandum of conversation between the Office of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt,
September 19, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 207.
76
chaos to emerge stronger, if not the victors, in Cuba.211 The United States still had concerns
about the political environment in Cuba not being conducive to holding free elections. They
based this on three factors: the repeated suspension of constitutional guarantees, the stated
purpose of the rebels to disrupt the elections, and the lack of confidence in any of the candidates.
The United States felt that elections would be held and that Batista’s candidate, Andrés Rivero
Agüero, would win. If Agüero could maintain the support of the military, then potentially he
would be able to block any overthrow of the government as well as block any gains the
Communists or the 26th of July movement hoped to make.212
The 26th of July movement continued to grow stronger and was unequivocally opposed to
the coming elections. They also had been demanding tax payments from American sugar
companies operating in eastern Cuba. In a meeting with Leonhardy, Betancourt stated he felt he
failed in his attempts to bring about a better relationship between the 26th of July movement and
the United States. He also understood the United States support of Batista, but felt that the
United States needed to understand the strength and dominance of the Castro movement and the
fact that it would prevail in Cuba.213 During the first nine months of 1958, American companies
in Cuba sustained over $2million in losses due to disruptions caused by rebel forces, including
arson, theft of equipment, and disruption of electrical service.214
On November 3, 1958 elections were held in Cuba. Even though the United States
government felt their concerns regarding constitutional guarantees, intent of the rebels to disrupt
elections, and weakness of the candidates would result in an apathetic response, they held the
211
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, September 24, 2958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 214.
212
Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, September 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 217.
213
Memorandum of conversation between the Office of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt,
September 30, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 233.
214
Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Weiland) to Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), October 10, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 240.
77
position that this was an internal matter in Cuba and therefore would not get involved. There
was a very small voter turnout, less than five percent in Havana, and Rivero Agüero was
declared the winner.215
Smith felt the United States needed to determine to what extent Communists had
infiltrated the 26th of July movement. He also thought, as did former President Marquez
Sterling, that to stop more youths form joining the movement the United States needed to step up
support for the Government of Cuba and renew the sale of arms. If the United States were not
willing to do that then it should at least stop air drops of arms to rebels from Cuban exiles in
Florida, enforce neutrality laws, and give no moral aid to the Castro movement.216 Batista told
Smith that he felt that by refusing to sell arms to the Government of Cuba, by refusing to
officially recognize the state of civil war in Cuba, and ignoring the ease in which the rebels
obtained arms and ammunition from the United States that the United States was, in fact,
intervening in Cuban affairs.217
Weiland met with Ricardo Artigas, a former general who served under Batista and a
Cuban exile residing in the United States. Artigas stated the Castro movement was growing
stronger and that a Castro victory would result in serious, adverse consequences for the United
States. He also felt that whether Batista remained in office or Agüero succeeded him, the
revolution would just intensify. Artigas thought the Cuban military should overthrow Batista
while blocking Castro’s bid for power. He stated the Cuban military needed support from the
United States to do this and, by support; he meant the United States should have American
military officers in Cuba discreetly tell Cuban officers that there should be a change in
215
Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 249.
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 6, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 251.
217
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 16, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 258.
216
78
government. Weiland told Artigas the United States would not get involved and Cuba needed to
work this out internally.218 The holding of elections and the pending swearing in of Agüero had
no impact on the continuing impasse in Cuba. Castro, while continuing his guerilla warfare, was
not capable of overthrowing Batista and the Cuban military was incapable of suppressing the
rebels. In terms of breaking the political deadlock between Batista and the rebels, the United
States felt the Cuban military held the most importance. The Cuban military could depose
Batista and install a junta, then promise the opposition a place in the provincial government.219
The United States could not commit to supporting Agüero once he took office unless he
illustrated that he was taking positive steps to restore stability in Cuba and that limiting Batista’s
role in Agüero’s government would be a key factor in obtaining such support. The United States
felt that unless Batista left Cuba and absented himself from the Government of Cuba, Agüero
had no chance for success.220 Smith met with American businessmen in Cuba. They felt the
situation in Cuba was deteriorating rapidly and that without support from the United States
Batista would not last until the end of his term. They were concerned the 26th of July movement
was Communist and an overthrow by Castro would be more bloody and violent than when
Machado was overthrown. They wanted the United States to promote a military civilian junta
which would enlist wide public support and ultimately weaken the Castro movement. Smith
considered the support of a junta to be dangerous to the United States and instead proposed that
Batista turn the Government of Cuba over to Agüero early and that the United States give full
support, including militarily, to Agüero. He specifically felt that if the United States maintained
218
Memorandum of conversation between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland)
and Ricardo Artigan, Department of State. November 18, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 259.
219
Special National Intelligence Estimate, November 24, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 265.
220
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 270.
79
its current course of non-intervention Communists would be the only ones to profit from the
chaos and the United States would have to intervene for humanitarian reasons anyway.221
On December 4, 1958 the 26th of July movement formed an executive committee and
decided once they had overthrown the Government of Cuba, they would legalize Communism.222
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, became more concerned that Batista
would not be able to regain control of the situation in Cuba. The Government of Cuba was
consistently losing ground to Castro in the conflict and businesses, American and Cuban, were
paying the price.223 While Cubans were paying the heaviest price for the conflict in Cuba,
American businesses also suffered due to kidnapping, extortion, and depredation both by the
Government of Cuba and the rebels. The United States had been concerned with the
deteriorating situation, but continued to adhere to the non-intervention policy. However,
consideration had to be given to what could be done within the confines of that policy to help
stabilize the situation.224
On December 9, 1958 the United States sent special emissary William Pawley to meet
with Batista. Pawley told Batista if he were to depart Cuba to the United States, the United
States would stop Castro. However, the government that the United States would install would
be made up of Batista’s enemies. This would force Castro to either lay down arms or admit he
was in it for the power. Batista did not accept the offer.225 Batista’s position continued to
deteriorate. The Cuban Armed Forces were showing signs of demoralization and many had been
arrested for complicity in a military conspiracy against the Government of Cuba or for refusing
221
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 2, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 276.
222 222
Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 5, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968
Volume VI, 278.
223
Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 278.
224
Circular telegraph from the Department of State to certain diplomatic missions in the American Republics,
December 8, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 279.
225
Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 281.
80
to fight. The rebels were damaging the economy through attacks on sugar plantations and the
constant drains on the economy by the Government of Cuba to fight the rebels were
compounding the problem. There was considerable talk in Cuba that a military junta was needed
to overthrow Batista and stop Castro, but no one knew who could lead it. There was concern that
if Castro could not be stopped the civil war would spread and the military, tired of the conflict,
would either join Castro or turn on Batista, moves that would only serve to strengthen Castro
regardless.226
Dulles felt that Batista would never muster enough strength to stop Castro and that Castro
was bound to emerge victorious from what had become a civil war. President Eisenhower
suggested that Batista be persuaded to turn the Government of Cuba over to his successor and it
was agreed that such an attempt be staged to look like a coup.227 Smith met with Guillermo Belt,
a former Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Belt felt that Batista should leave Cuba, at
which point they would establish a junta government and the United States should give full
support including arms, at which point the junta government would declare the election results
null, dissolve all political parties, negotiate peace with Castro, and punish members of the Batista
regime responsible for human rights violations. He believed that if Castro gained power there
would be massive bloodshed, a social revolution would occur, and Communist would control
Cuba.228 Castro’s ability to start with thirteen men and then grow to the size his movement was
then indicated a large portion of the population either supported him or was anti-Batista. As
such, if Batista was not overthrown, the civil war would just continue. On the flipside, if he were
226
Special National Intelligence Estimate, December 16, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 295.
Memorandum of a discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, December 18, 1958. FRUS
1958-1968 Volume VI, 312.
228
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 29, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 315.
227
81
overthrown the struggle for power among the opposition would still prevent the return of peace
to Cuba.229
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the effects of the arms embargo on Cuba. Cuba was
forced to purchase arms from other nations, the embargo weakened Cuba’s goodwill towards the
United States, and impaired the ability of Cuban forces to defeat the rebels and protect American
interests in Cuba. Therefore, it was recommended the United States stop the embargo of arms to
Cuba, re-emphasize the importance of the Good Neighbor Policy, and restore United States-Cuba
relationships.230
The United States had been concerned with the thought of full out civil war in Cuba and
the establishment of Communism there. The United States government had urged the
Government of Cuba for many months to strengthen its military and support and end the internal
strife so that the United States could give the requested support. The Government of Cuba failed
to do so and as such the Eisenhower administration felt this was what ultimately hurt Batista.
The United States felt any increase in military support at that point would expose them to
widespread criticism, reprisals against American interests in Cuba, and alienating Cubans. Nor
did the United States feel that such an increase at that time would have solved the crisis in
Cuba.231
The United States did not set out to weaken Batista, but by not continuing to send arms, it
sapped his strength and hampered his ability to fight Castro. On January 1, 1959, Batista
229
Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Central American and Pan-American Affairs (Stewart) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), December 29, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 316.
230
Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 321.
231
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, December 31, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume
VI, 330
82
departed for Santo Domingo and many members of his administration fled to the United
States.232
World War II bought a new era to the relationship between Cuba and the United States.
With the onset of the Cold War, the United States became focused on stopping Communism and
looked to Cuba to aid them in this fight. This was also the time Fidel Castro came on the scene,
while not originally a Communist, he did harbor strong anti-American feelings and his hatred of
Batista and what he stood for ran deep. As the conflict between Castro and Batista escalated, the
United States grew concerned that Batista was using weapons the United States provided in a
manner not keeping with their arms agreements. As a result, the United States made the decision
so stop supplying weapons to Batista. This decision would eventually lead to the fall of Batista
as the Cuban Army became demoralized and he lost the support of the Cuban people, and,
ultimately, the support of the United States government.
232
Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 1, 1959. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI,
332.
83
Conclusion
So, as the United States considers a future Cuba without Fidel Castro as president, it is
important to understand how the United States past relationship with Cuba contributed to the
relationship the United States has with Cuba today. That relationship, initially based on trade
agreements, soon became one based on politics, economics, and the military. The bases for this
relationship were also the bases for the end of friendly relations between Cuba and the United
States.
When the Spanish American War ended, the United States government passed the Treaty
of Reciprocity with Cuba to assist Cuba’s economy as well as build good relations with Cuba.
However, this relationship was soon strained, when after World War I, Cuban sugar producers
found that American sugar buyers were reselling Cuban sugar for a profit. When the Depression
hit, in an effort to protect the American economy, the United States government passed a series
of acts that cut the Cuban share in the American sugar market by half, sending the Cuban
economy into a tailspin. Tensions were raised again in the 1950s when the United States
government limited how much Cuban sugar would be bought for the American sugar market.
Batista warned Eisenhower that this reflected a serious change is what had been the basis of
United States and Cuban relations for fifty years and would have a profound negative impact on
the Cuban economy.
From the end of the Spanish American War, the United States was also involved in
Cuban politics. When Machado was president of Cuba, the United States government supported
him in spite of his actions towards the Cuban people. As the situation worsened in Cuba during
the Depression, opposition to Machado called upon the United States to intervene. Aware of the
worsening situation in Cuba, the United States government still refused to intervene and this
84
nonintervention was seen as further support for Machado. On the flip side, when San Martin
took over the presidency after the Sergeant’s Revolt, the United States refused to officially
recognize his administration. The United States government was concerned about decisions and
policies San Martin was setting. The United States government knew that without official
recognition, San Martin would be hard pressed to restore stability to Cuba and this lack of
recognition could also prolong conflict in Cuba.
When Batista took office again in 1952, he once more had the support of the United
States government; however, he did not have the support of the Cuban people. Castro planned to
charge Batista with violating the Cuban constitution. His petition was denied by the Cuban
courts. This denial and the continued support of Batista by the United States government set
Castro on the course to revolution that would eventually bring about the fall of Batista and the
end of good relations between the United States and Cuba.
Over the years, the United States and Cuba signed a variety of agreements regarding the
sales of arms in Cuba, not the least of which was the Military Assistance Program. Under this
program the United States provided financial assistance, military training to Cuban military
personnel, as well as arms, which included fighter jets, tanks, and other vehicles. The purpose of
the assistance was to assist the United States during the Cold War and provide “hemispheric
defense”. However, Batista began to use arms provided under the Military Assistance Program
to subdue his opposition, most notably, Fidel Castro. As the United States government became
more concerned about Batista’s use of the weapons, they began to decline requests from Batista
for more assistance and more specifically, more weapons. This in turn negatively effected
Batista’s ability to fight Castro and eventually led to Batista’s downfall.
85
Even though economics, politics, and the military were the foundations for the good
relationship between the United States and Cuba, as each of these foundations began to become
strained over time, they eventually became the cause for the failure of that relationship.
86
Appendix A
Cuban Presidents
Governors
1 Jan 1899 - 23 Dec 1899
23 Dec 1899 - 20 May 1902
President
20 May 1902 - 28 Sep 1906
Provisional Governors
29 Sep 1906 - 13 Oct 1906
13 Oct 1906 - 28 Jan 1909
Presidents
28 Jan 1909 - 20 May 1913
20 May 1913 - 20 May 1921
20 May 1921 - 20 May 1925
20 May 1925 - 24 Aug 1933
(left Cuba on 12 Aug 1933)
12 Aug 1933 - 13 Aug 1933
13 Aug 1933 - 5 Sep 1933
5 Sep 1933 - 10 Sep 1933
10 Sep 1933 - 15 Jan 1934
15 Jan 1934 - 18 Jan 1934
18 Jan 1934 (hours)
18 Jan 1934 - 11 Dec 1935
11 Dec 1935 - 20 May 1936
20 May 1936 - 24 Dec 1936
John Ruller Brooke
Leonard Wood
Tomás Estrada Palma
Non-party/PM
William Howard Taft
Charles Edward Magoon
José Miguel Gómez y Gómez
Aurelio Mario Gabriel Francisco García
Menocal y Deop
Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso
Gerardo Machado y Morales
Alberto Herrera y Franchi
(provisional [acting for Machado])
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada
(provisional [acting for Machado to 24 Aug
1933])
Executive Commission of the Provisional
Government
- Ramón Grau San Martín
- Guillermo Francisco Leopoldo Portela y
Möller
- José Miguel Irisarri y Gamio
- Sergio Carbó y Morera
- Porfirio Franca y Álvarez de la Campa
Ramón Grau San Martín
Carlos Hevia y de los Reyes Gavilán
(provisional)
Carlos Manuel Agustín Márquez Sterling y
Loret de Mola
(acting)
Carlos Mendieta y Montefur
(provisional)
José Agripino Barnet y Vinageras
(acting to 13 Dec 1935, provisional from 13
Dec 1935)
Miguel Mariano Gómez y Arias
Partido Liberal
Partido Conservador
Partido Popular Cubano-Liga
Nacional
Partido Liberal
Military
ABC Sociedad Revolucionaria
Partido Revolucionario Cubano
Partido Liberal
Partido Conservador
Partido Popular Cubano-Liga
Nacional
Partido Liberal
Partido Revolucionario Cubano
Partido Revolucionario Cubano
Military
Unión Nacional
Unión Nacional
Unión Nacional
87
24 Dec 1936 - 10 Oct 1940
(b. 1875 - d. 1946) UN
10 Oct 1940 - 10 Oct 1944
10 Oct 1944 - 10 Oct 1948
10 Oct 1948 - 10 Mar 1952
10 Mar 1952 - 1 Jan 1959
14 Aug 1954 - 24 Feb 1955
1 Jan 1959 - 2 Jan 1959
2 Jan 1959 (hours)
2 Jan 1959 - 17 Jul 1959
Federico Laredo Brú
Rubén Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar
Unión Nacional
Coalicion Socialista
Democratico
Ramón Grau San Martín
Partido Revolucionaro CubanoAuténtico
Carlos Prío Socarrás
Partido Revolucionaro CubanoAuténtico
Rubén Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar
Military/Partido Acción
(Chief of State to 4 Apr 1952; provisional to Progresista/Partido Acción
24 Feb 1955)
Unitaria
Andrés Domingo Morales y del Castillo
(acting for Batista)
Anselmo Alliegro y Milá
Partido Progresista
(acting) (did not take office)
Carlos Manuel Piedra y Piedra
Non party
(interim) (did not take office)
Manuel Urrutia Lleó
Non party
88
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