Name __________________________
Date: ________________
Section: 12.1
12.2
(circle one)
Modern World History
Containment and the Truman Doctrine
Do Now: Refresh your memory of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe by reading the
following summary (source: BBC, “Soviet power in Eastern Europe,” GCSE Bitesize,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir2/sovietexpansionineasterne
uroperev1.shtml).
Twenty million Russians died during the Second World War, so Stalin said he wanted a
buffer zone of friendly states around Russia to make sure that Russia could never be
invaded again.
Stalin was planning the takeover of Eastern Europe. During the war, Communists from
the occupied countries of Eastern Europe escaped to Moscow and set up Communist
governments in exile there. As the Red Army drove the Nazis back, it occupied large areas
of Eastern Europe.
In the countries that the Red Army "liberated", communist-dominated governments took
power. The Communists made sure that they controlled the army, set up a secret police
force, and began to arrest their opponents. Non-Communists were gradually beaten,
murdered, executed and terrified out of power. By 1949, all the governments of Eastern
Europe, except Yugoslavia, were hard line Stalinist regimes.
In 1946, in a speech at Fulton in the USA, Churchill declared that an Iron Curtain had
come down across Europe, and that Soviet power was growing and had to be stopped.
Stalin called Churchill's speech a "declaration of war". In 1947, Stalin set up Comintern an alliance of Communist countries designed to make sure they obeyed Soviet rule.
Now, answer the following question: If you were President Truman, how would you direct
the United States to respond to Soviet expansion?
Excerpts from George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs,
July 1947
A native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, George F. Kennan (1904-2005) graduated from Princeton
University in 1925 and soon thereafter went to work for the U.S. State Department as an
expert on Russia. He spent much of the 1930s attached to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, where
he witnessed firsthand the internal workings of the Soviet Union, including the show trials in
which Stalin condemned thousands of suspected political opponents to death. This experience
convinced Kennan that there was little hope for lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union
and the West. In May 1944 he was appointed deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow,
where in 1946 he drafted a telegram that laid out his views on why the Soviets were behaving
as they were. This telegram proved to be highly influential among many of Truman’s foreign
policy advisers, who encouraged him to publish an article clarifying some of his ideas. What
follows is a much shortened version of that article, which appeared in the July 1947 issue of
the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs. Because the author was a prominent official in the
State Department, he used a false name (“X”) rather than his own.
[1] [I]t is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union
must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with...
threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin
[the Soviet government] is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no
means unamenable [unresponsive] to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other
government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it
cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The
Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly
conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political
affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness…
[2] It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political
intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a
partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no
abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy
coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure
toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
[3] Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in
general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet
society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential.
This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a
policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he interests of a peaceful
and stable world.
[4] It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could
exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early
fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase
enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin
a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent
years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in
either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.
1. What policy is Kennan cautioning against in Paragraph 1? What is his rationale?
2. In Paragraph 2, what does Kennan predict about the possibility of friendly relations
between the US and the USSR? Which of the three causes of the Cold War does this
argument reflect?
3. In Paragraphs 3 and 4, what does Kennan predict about the long-term future of the
Soviet Union? How does this prediction help him justify containment, rather than a
more aggressive approach to confronting the Soviets?
4. Summarize containment, in your own words.
5. How do you think the United States might implement containment? List as many
different specific actions as you can think of.
Name __________________________
Date: ________________
Section: 12.1
12.2
(circle one)
Modern World History
HW 5.5: The Truman Doctrine
Instructions
1. Add the following to your unit study guide:
a. Concepts: containment
b. Timeline: Long Telegram sent; Truman Doctrine announced
c. People: George F. Kennan; Harry Truman
2. Carefully read the following text (source: “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” U.S.
Department of State. Office of the Historian,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine).
3. Answer the following questions in complete sentences and in your own words on a
separate sheet of paper:
a. Summarize the Truman Doctrine in your own words.
b. How did the Truman Doctrine represent a change in America’s foreign
policy?
c. In what context was the Truman Doctrine declared? What conflict did the
United States seek to resolve, and which side did the US support?
d. What two arguments did Truman make in support of his new doctrine?
With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States
would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under
threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively
reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional
conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away
conflicts.
The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint
session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The immediate cause for the speech was a recent
announcement by the British Government that, as of March 31, it would no longer provide
military and economic assistance to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek
Communist Party. Truman asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the
Communists. He also asked Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation,
too, had previously been dependent on British aid.
At the time, the U.S. Government believed that the Soviet Union supported the Greek
Communist war effort and worried that if the Communists prevailed in the Greek civil war,
the Soviets would ultimately influence Greek policy. In fact, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had
deliberately refrained from providing any support to the Greek Communists and had forced
Yugoslav Prime Minister Josip Tito [another Communist leader] to follow suit, much to the
detriment of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. However, a number of other foreign policy
problems also influenced President Truman’s decision to actively aid Greece and Turkey. In
1946, four setbacks, in particular, had served to effectively torpedo any chance of achieving
a durable post-war rapprochement [settling of tensions] with the Soviet Union: the
Soviets’ failure to withdraw their troops from northern Iran in early 1946 (as per the terms
of the Tehran Declaration of 1943); Soviet attempts to pressure the Iranian Government
into granting them oil concessions while supposedly fomenting irredentism [supporting an
independence movement] by Azerbaijani separatists in northern Iran; Soviet efforts to
force the Turkish Government into granting them base and transit rights through the
Turkish Straits; and, the Soviet Government’s rejection of the Baruch plan for international
control over nuclear energy and weapons [supported by the US] in June 1946.
In light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the appearance of Soviet
meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece
provided the necessary catalyst for the Truman Administration to reorient American
foreign policy. Accordingly, in his speech, President Truman requested that Congress
provide $400,000,000 worth of aid to both the Greek and Turkish Governments and
support the dispatch of American civilian and military personnel and equipment to the
region.
Truman justified his request on two grounds. He argued that a Communist victory in the
Greek Civil War would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which would undermine
the political stability of the Middle East. This could not be allowed in light of the region’s
immense strategic importance to U.S. national security. Truman also argued that the United
States was compelled to assist “free peoples” in their struggles against “totalitarian
regimes,” because the spread of authoritarianism would “undermine the foundations of
international peace and hence the security of the United States.” In the words of the
Truman Doctrine, it became “the policy of the United States to support free peoples who
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”
Truman argued that the United States could no longer stand by and allow the forcible
expansion of Soviet totalitarianism into free, independent nations, because American
national security now depended upon more than just the physical security of American
territory. Rather, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of extensive foreign
commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the Truman Doctrine
committed the United States to actively offering assistance to preserve the political
integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best interest of
the United States.