Account for the communist victory in the Second Indochina War.
In 1958, the Vietnamese communists set out to establish control over the whole of
Vietnam. Seventeen years later, they had not only achieved this goal, but had also
established dominance over Cambodia and Laos. They were able to do so as a result
of a series of political, military, economic and social factors.
More than anything else, the communists demonstrated a greater level of
commitment to victory than the US and its allies did. They were prepared to fight for
as many years as necessary in order to reunify Vietnam. The US, on the other hand,
was not prepared to pay the human and financial cost – not for a war the American
people never fully understood. It was simply too far away for them to take seriously.
The VC/NVA’s efforts were also aided by America’s mistakes. The US failed to
understand the nature of the war, seeing Ho Chi Minh as a puppet of Moscow, rather
than a nationalist leader who had fought the French and the Japanese. For this reason,
the US chose to fight the war on a purely military level, instead of searching for a
solution which addressed the nationalist and political aspirations of the people.
Perhaps the most crucial error America made was to send its own ground troops – a
development which allowed the communists to portray the GIs as invaders. In
addition, the US commanders insisted on fighting a war of attrition in South Vietnam.
They thought they could win by simply killing enough VC; but the more they
bombed, the easier it became for the VC to recruit. The so-called ‘body count’ never
led to a reduction in enemy numbers. Hence, more American troops were needed just
to hold the line.
America’s errors were matched by the enemy’s military advantages. The
Vietnamese communists had the support of both Russia and China, and shared
borders with China, Laos and Cambodia. It was virtually impossible for the US to seal
these off. Because the VC were fighting a guerrilla war in the South, their troops
required only minimal supplies. Much of their weaponry could be captured from the
ARVN, or purchased from corrupt officials. The rest could be transported down the
Ho Chi Minh trail.
The single most important decision the Vietnamese communists made during the
war was to launch the Tet Offensive. Although a resounding military defeat for the
VC and the NVA, Tet was a propaganda triumph. The American people were
confronted with images of the VC entering the US embassy, and became convinced
that victory was not in sight. Increasing numbers decided that they wanted out.
The US government now began negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the
conflict. But with public opinion turning against the war, the Nixon administration
found itself with diminished bargaining power. All the communists had to do was
wait the US out. By the time an agreement was reached, they had been able to get the
US to agree to a peace which effectively divided South Vietnam in two. The NLF
were able to set up their own government (the PRG) and keep their military forces in
place. In addition, the North Vietnamese were permitted to maintain 150,000 soldiers
inside South Vietnam. Under such arrangements, the North could resume hostilities at
any time it liked, once the last American soldiers had returned home.
South Vietnam experienced other difficulties too. Despite the size of its army
(almost a million men, 40,000 armoured vehicles, 1,000 planes and helicopters) its
troops were poorly trained and badly led. Only a few elite units were a match for the
enemy. The situation became worse in the second half of 1973, when oil prices
increased dramatically. Without American aid to rely on, South Vietnam could not
pay its bills. Hence, many of its planes and vehicles could not be used.
In addition, the South Vietnamese government was unpopular, mainly because the
regime was very corrupt. Its leaders had grown rich during the war, while a majority
of the population suffered. Even though most people did not support the communists,
they were unwilling to sacrifice any more for General Thieu and his cronies.
Finally, the US found itself crippled by the Watergate scandal. In its wake, Congress
called a halt to all bombing operations in Indochina, eliminating the one means
America still had to support its ally in South Vietnam.
Finally, President Thieu made a crucial mistake, once the communists attacked
South Vietnam in March 1975. Thieu did not believe the ARVN could defend the
entire country, so he ordered it to abandon the northern provinces and regroup further
south. As the ARVN forces retreated, the NVA cut them off, then moved south and
with surprising speed to take Saigon. By the end of April, the war was over.
Hence it can be seen that the communists achieved victory in the Second Indochina
War because of their greater commitment, their superior strategies and the errors of
judgment committed by their enemies.