INCOMPATIBILITY ARGUMENT REVISITED
Tarasov Ilia
Department of Philosophy
of the Saratov State University
Ι
Connection of the emotivist (noncognitivist) positions related to the analysis of the
moral statements with deflationist concepts of the truth looks natural enough; it is the
consistent implementation of antirealistic, pragmatic and nominalistic philosophical
attitudes. These both doctrines see as impossible the existence of those essences or
properties which are expressed by predicates of concepts analyzed by them, absence
of the empirical content and criterion of objective identification at these predicates.
Alongside with this, the postulations of existence of special functions which are
carried out by these concepts (in particular, the expression of emotions or
formulation of generalizations) – similarity of the analysis denotes the likeness of
philosophical positions(The classical example of connection of emotivism with
deflationism can be found in: 1; Less known but as a result, more interesting is the
case of 9, P. 435 ). However, despite the seeming naturality and sequence of
conjunction of these concepts, many scholars see this philosophical symbiosis as
impractical, contradictory and disputable.
Revival of these counter emotivist arguments today is observed in the works by
R.Dworkin and P.Boghossian (2; 4; Discussion of these arguments brought to life
abundant literature both supporting these arguments, and protecting emotivism.
Criticism of emotivism and deflationism and support of arguments of Boghossian can
be found, for example, in: 5, P. 514-516; 3; Discussion and overriding of the counter
emotivist arguments can be found in: 6; 7; 8).
General objective of Boghossian it not a separate criticism of emotivism and
deflationism, but the proof of self-denying character of the theoretical position
connecting them together: he asserts, that the conjunction of emotivism (moral
statements do not possess the truth value) and deflationism (the truth has no the
substantional essence) leads to contradictions (2, P. 163). P.Boghossian says the
following: «A non-factualism about any subject matter presupposes a conception of
truth richer than the deflationary: it is committed to holding that the predicate "true"
stands for some sort of real, language-independent property, eligibility for which will
not be certified solely by the fact that a sentence is declarative and significant» (2, P.
165). The example brings P.Boghossian to this conclusion, is as follows:
1. The predicate "possesses the truth condition p" does not attribute to any really
existing property (the deflationist thesis).
2. "S possesses the truth condition p" does not possess actually a truth condition
(the emotivist analysis of moral statements).
3. The point 1 supposes that the “true” does not mean any property (an explication
from the deflationist thesis).
According to P.Boghossian the conjunction of these premises brings forth the
contradiction because the negation of the truth conditions in the second thesis,
assumes that the truth has any substantional account (2, P. 175).
On the other hand, deflationism attributes the truth conditions to any meaningful,
affirmative proposition, encompassing also moral statements i.e. it asserts that the
truth does not have any special nature, property or essence.
Dworkin's argument. This argument denotes the inconsistency in the conjunction
of deflationism with emotivism. For the minimalists and deflationists the statement
'р' is truly equivalent to p (in this R.Dworkin agrees with them). R.Dworkin extends
this procedure to the moral judgements as well. Hence the statement:
1. "The use and distribution of drugs is an inadmissible and immoral action".
is equivalent to the same statement which still contains the predicate “true”:
2. It is true that "the use and distribution of drugs is inadmissible and immoral
action" (4, P. 175 ).
Thus, the second statement is false for emotivists because for them the moral
statements cannot possess the truth value. But the falsehood is one of the elements of
the truth value, hence, moral statements possess the truth value. Therefore the
emotivism is inconsistent in conjunction with deflationism.
ΙΙ
Overriding of arguments. The Boghossian’s argument seems not to be valid in
relation to deflationism. The main reason of acceptance of the deflationism for us is
not a postulation of truth in a form of the syntax language tool or minimalist negation
of possibility to detect any latent essence in the truth, but in the fact that the
dependence of the truth from a reality is expressed in casual sequences which cannot
be predicted. The truth depends on a reality, but this dependence is not substantional
and standard, i.e. it is not constant as it is casual, and the fact that «the contingency
kills the reason», is known since the times of David Hume. At the same time we do
not reject the supposition, that the true statement becomes true as a result of existence
of certain conditions in the world (presumably, existence of the subject) which makes
it as is. Now again, coming back to the Boghossian’s argument, we can tell, that the
moral statements do not possess a truth value because moral properties do not exist,
and the fact that such a position is not self-refutable or inconsistent, is clear from the
explanations hereinabove. Acceptance of the Aristotle’s thesis asserting, that the true
speech speaks about the existing, questions the finding of the truth value in the moral
statements. One more reason which does not let the moral suppositions to possess the
true value, is the fact that acceptance of this or that moral supposition is carried out
not at the expense of the truth and falsehood operators, but at the expense of other
operators (10, P. 310, 313). Besides we consider, that the moral statements cannot be
always be so unequivocally and rectilinearly treated or solved what is carried out by
means of attributing the predicate true to the statements. The cases with the sentence
«Snow is white» and with the sentence «Suicide is an immoral act» are different
enough, and unlike the first one, the second sentence hardly can be treated so
unequivocally, as the first one provides a predicate truth when it is attributed to the
sentences, namely to the non-competitive acceptance of the true sentence and to the
full rejection of the antithetic.
R.Dworkin's argument is built on somewhat wrong interpretation of equivalence
‘’р’’ true = р’. This message does not affirm the procedural equivalence of these two
sentences, it affirms (remembering G.Frege), that the term truth is not the property of
the physical objects and, that is why, its addition to the sentence does not change and
does not influence the presumable list of characteristics of any subject spoken about
in this sentence. Further on, R.Dworkin makes assumption which is not absolutely
correct that the first equivalence results in falsehood (for emotivists) of the
assumption that 'р' is true (if the 'р' is understood as the moral statement). For
emotivists the moral statement has no the value of truth, – therefore, naming the
moral statement true, we do not proceed in a false direction, we make the categorical
mistake. Let us imagine the following example (as P. Feyerabend could say). For
example, it would be a categorical mistake to measure love or other feelings in
kilograms or meters, or to tell that the point is graceful (H.Putnam's example). And
from the assumption, that the white is not kind (due to impossibility to use the
concept of kindness in relation to a whiteness), it would be strange to conclude, that
the white is malicious (the analogy with the R.Dworkin's example is clear); as the
concept the white is basically beyond any moral estimations, as well as the moral
statements are out of the truth and false estimations. Assigning to the chaotic
sequence of letters «ааооььльтыылбсстооы» the truth value, we are not mistaken
and we do not make a false assumption because we do not have at all the reason to
consider this set of letters true or false – we just use the predicate truth incorrectly
(the same occurs when we proclaim the moral statements true).
REFERENCES
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