[Elster, Jon (1990), Merton's Functionalism and the Unintended Consequences of Action, in Jon
Clark, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil, eds., Robert Merton: Consensus and Controversy,
London New York: Falmer Press, pp.129-35]
Merton's Functionalism and the Unintended Consequences of Action
Jon Elster
[start of page 129]
Robert Merton's article on 'Manifest and Latent Functions' (1957a:19-84) is an acknowledged
classic of modern sociology. I do not think it merits that status. It created as much confusion as it
dispelled, or more. It does not seem to have generated much good empirical research, by Merton
or by anyone else. In this article I do not try to document the latter claim in anything like a
satisfactory fashion. For the 'anyone else' part of that claim, the reader is referred to Campbell
(1982), who asserts that the concepts of manifest and latent functions, while usually referred to
in sociological textbooks, are little used in actual research. For the 'Merton' part of the claim, the
reader is referred to the brief discussion below of Merton's work in the sociology of science.
Merton's early article on 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action' (1936b)
is probably less famous than the study of manifest and latent functions, but has better claims to
the status of a classic. Ilere Merton uses what is in my opinion the appropriate language for
social scientific analysis-the causal-cum intentional terminology of intended and unintended
consequences. It is a little gem of an article, identifying several mechanisms through which the
actual effects of behaviour may deviate from the intended ones. Although he does not discuss
what I believe to be the most important mechanism, viz. the tendency for people to act on wrong
assumptions about what other people will do (Elster, 1978: Ch. 5), the article is perfectly lucid
and free of ambiguity. In this respect it contrasts favourably with the later, more famous article,
which goes beyond intentions and causes to introduce functions as a separate category.
'Manifest and Latent Functions' does make some important contributions. It contains an
impressive demolition of earlier forms of functionalism, based on the postulate of the functional
unity of society, the postulate of universal functionalism and the postulate of indispensability.
Also he makes it very clear that he does not rest his case for functionalism in sociology on
dubious analogies from biology. Finally,
[end of page 129, start of page 130]
'Manifest and Latent Functions' remains worth reading for its extensive discussion of American
machine politics, which almost amounts to an article within the article. Although I don't think
Merton succeeds in imposing a consistent and plausible structure on this problem, the sheer
richness and suggestiveness of his analysis invite further reflection.
On the critical side, the main weakness of the article is that the task of functional analysis is
never made fully clear. In particular, Merton never slates in so many words whether the task of
functional analysis is to explain social phenomena or, more modestly, to identify and describe
phenomena that might otherwise be overlooked. Clearly, manifest functions-intended and
recognized consequences of action-have explanatory power. The question on which most of the
following discussion is focused is whether latent functions-the unintended and unrecognized
effects of action-can explain the actions of which they are the consequences.
Commenting on Merton's discussion of the Hawthorne experiment, G. A. Cohen writes: 'He
identifies a function in the Hawthorne experiment, but fails to note it is not a function which
explains why the experiment took place' (1978: 283). Cohen then adds in a footnote: 'It might be
claimed in Merton's defence that he was concerned only with identifying functions of social
patterns and institutions, not with functionally explaining them. This is a highly implausible
1
reading, and if it is correct, then we may object that in an article recommending the study of
functions Merton neglected their explanatory significance'.
I shall argue that the non-explanatory reading, while not 'highly' implausible, is probably less
natural than the explanatory one. We may observe, nevertheless, that in a recent article devoted
to Merton's distinction between manifest and latent functions, Cohn Campbell (1982: 41-2) does
not cite explanation among Merton's justifications for the paradigm. Instead he cites:
1 the 'desire to eliminate what [Merton] saw as a widespread confusion between the
subjective categories of disposition and the objective ones of consequence';
2 the claim 'that the distinction would aid both "systematic observation and later analysis"
by directing observation towards "salient elements of a situation" and preventing the
"inadvertent oversight of these elements"'; and
3 the idea 'that the distinction "directs attention to theoretically fruitful fields of inquiry",
by which he means that it is not enough for spciologists to "confine themselves to the
study of manifest functions"'.
Referring to an obscure footnote in Merton (1957a: 71n90), Crothers (1987a: 71) similarly
argues that functional analysis must not be confused with explanation, the latter being causal
rather than functional.
In his most general statement of the 'central orientation of functionalism' Merton refers to 'the
practice of interpreting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which
they are implicated' (1957a: 46-7). It is hard to see what interpreting could mean other than
explaining. Further on he argues that the latent functions of conspicuous consumption are
'gratifying and go far toward explaining the continuance of the pattern' (ibid.: 58, emphasis
supplied); or, still further on, that they 'help explain the persistence and the social location of the
pattern of conspicuous consumption' (ibid.: 69; emphasis supplied). He observes that labelling
the Hopi rain dance a superstitious practice of primitive folk 'in no
[end of page 130, start of page 131]
sense accounts for the group behaviour' (ibid.:64; emphasis supplied), and adds that 'given the
concept of latent function, however, we are reminded that this behavior may perform a function
for the group'. By implication this latent function does 'account for' the practice in question.
Other statements are less explicitly explanatory, but point in the same direction. Thus he refers to
'consequences [of a structure] which may provide basic social support for the structure' (ibid.:
72n91). With respect to the political machine he claims that 'the functional deficiencies of the
official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat
more effectively' (ibid.: 73). The first statement suggests that consequences are important in
maintaining (and thus explaining) institutions, the second that they are instrumental in creating
(and thus explaining) them. At a more general level he makes two provisional assumptions: that
'persisting cultural forms have a net balance of functional consequences either for the society
considered as a unit or for subgroups sufficiently powerful to retain these forms intact' (ibid.:
32), and that 'when the net balance of the aggregate of consequences of an existing social
structure is clearly dysfunctional, there develops a strong and insistent pressure for change'
(ibid.: 40). These statements amount to saying that because dysfunctional elements tend to
disappear, persisting forms can be assumed to be functional and to persist because they are
functional. I return to this argument. Here it is cited only as evidence for Merton's explanatory
intentions.
We cannot conclude, however, that Merton intended all his analyses to have explanatory import.
His comments on the Hawthorne experiment, for example, do not lend themselves to this
reading; nor would it be a substantively plausible account (Cohen, 1978: 257-8). Here functional
2
analysis - like much of what goes for 'dialectics'-seems to be little more than the discovery of
surprising, paradoxical and counterintuitive consequences or, perhaps, the identification of
valuable consequences (see below). His general statements about 'drawing attention to' the
unintended and unrecognized effects of social phenomena also point in this direction. It is
inherently satisfactory for the mind to discover that good sometimes leads to evil and evil to
good; that less can be more and more can be less; or that individual rationality can bring about
collective irrationality and vice versa. And it is easy to mistake the thrill of discovery for the
thrill of explanation, which is what seems to have happened to Merton between the 1936 essay
on unanticipated consequences and the 1949 article on manifest and latent functions. This
comment, of course, is speculative and ad hominem. No part of my case rests on it.
Before I say more about the issue of explanation, I want to discuss some other ambiguities in
Merton's paradigm of functional analysis. The classification of consequences in intended versus
unintended and recognized versus unrecognized suggests four categories rather than merely two.
Also, we have to ask, as Merton rarely does: intended by whom? recognized by whom? These
questions, in turn, are related to another: functional for whom?
In any given item of functional analysis, there are two groups of individuals involved: those who
engage in practices we want to explain and those who benefit from these practices, i.e. those for
whom they are in some sense functional.1 The question of intention arises only for the first
group, the question of recognition may arise for both. The two groups may coincide, overlap or
be totally disjoint. In the last case, the possibility arises that the effects are unintended by those
who produce them but recognized by those who benefit from them. If, moreover, the latter have
[end of page 131, start of page 132]
the power to sustain the activities from which they benefit, we have the ingredients of a filter
explanation (Nozick, 1974: 21-2; Elster, 1984: 30). Although he has no place for this kind of
explanation in his general dichotomous scheme, Merton tacitly admits it when he refers to
activities that have a net balance of functional consequences for subgroups sufficiently powerful
to retain these forms intact (ibid.: 32).2 It is hard to see how power to maintain the beneficial
activities would be relevant unless the benefits were also recognized by the beneficiaries.
The other category missing in Merton's paradigm is that of benefits which are intended but
unrecognized. This case arises mainly when the benefits are unrecognized by the beneficiaries,
as in paternalism. It is clearly of less theoretical interest than those which involve behaviour
maintained by their unintended consequences. Merton would perhaps count it as a manifest
function, since the effects will usually be recognized by those who intentionally produce them.
This does not affect my main point, however, which is that for some explanatory purposes we
need to distinguish between actors and beneficiaries. Filter explanations, in particular, rest on
this distinction.
When Merton says that dysfunctions create a 'strong and insistent pressure for change', he must
imply that these are somehow recognized. On the other hand, he does assert the existence of
'latent dysfunctions' (ibid.: 51n) which, presumably, are not recognized. I do not see how these
statements can be reconciled. To bring out the point, consider two definitions of the Marxian
concept of alienation (Elster, 1985: 74 ff.), as either sense of a lack of meaning or lack of a sense
of meaning. One can see how the former 'dysfunction' could set up a pressure for change,
provided that the victims not only perceive the problem but correctly identify its cause. The
latter, however, cannot act as a causal agent in social change. For another example, consider the
belief in witches. Although these tend to be dysfunctional by inducing conformity and stifling
innovation (Thomas', 1973: 643-4), they provide an element of stability rather than of change.
And if there can be stable bad situations, there can also be unstable good ones, like cooperation
in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
3
Moreover, when the outcome but not the cause of a dysfunction is perceived, as is often the case
if the causal chains are protracted or complex, we should not expect any pressure for change; or,
if there is pressure for change, we should not in general expect it to be successful in doing away
with the problem. Environmental and economic crises often defy understanding: they generate
change, but no solutions. Hence we see that in addition to the distinction between recognition by
actors and recognition by beneficiaries, we need to distinguish between recognition of the
consequences themselves and recognition of the causal responsibility for these consequences.
Merton rightly emphasizes the need to identify the alternatives which are excluded by the
activity which is subject to functional analysis or explanation (1957a: 57). But he does not draw
the full implications from this insight. For one thing, he does not make it clear whether an
activity, to be functional, must also be optimal within the set of alternative arrangements. For
another, he does not explain what determines the realization of one among several equifunctional (or perhaps equi-optimal) arrangements. Merton suggests, for instance, that the rain
ceremonial of the Hopi can be 'accounted for' in terms of its contribution to group unity. Now
one might think, first, that an optimal common activity would be one that both contributed to
group unity and achieved its manifest purpose, thus avoiding waste and disappointment. If he
believes that the lack of success of the
[end of page 132, start of page 133]
manifest purpose was essential to fulfilment of the latent function, he should say so and explain
why; if not, he should explain the absence of another arrangement with a larger 'net balance' of
benefits. Second, one might ask why the rain ceremonial, rather than any of the innumerable
other joint activities one could imagine, was realized as a 'means' (ibid.) to group unity.
A final set of ambiguities has been so well charted by Cohn Campbell that I need only cite from
his discussion:
Altogether there are at least four different meanings which Merton gives to the manifestlatent distinction. There is, first of all, that presented in the explicit formulation, i.e. the
contrast between conscious intention and actual consequence. Secondly... Merton himself
comes to use the dichotomy to refer to the commonsense knowledge (or sometimes the
perspective of another discipline) and sociological understanding. Thirdly, there is the
usage which equates manifest with the formal and official aims of organizations and
latent with the purposes fulfilled by unofficial or illegal ones. Finally, there is the
suggestion that manifest and latent relate to different levels of bnderstanding, with the
former equal to apparent or surface meaning while the latter concerns the deeper or
underlying reality of the phenomenon in question. (1982: 33)
The first distinction is used in Merton's discussion of the Hopi; the second in his discussion of
conspicuous consumption; the third in the discussion of the political machine; while the last is
present throughout. Combined with the other ambiguities and inconsistencies that ~ have been
discussing, this confusion creates something close to conceptual chaos.
Let me now confront the problem of explanation more directly. The central task for any
explanation-by-consequences is to provide a mechanism by which the consequences uphold or
maintain the behaviour one wants to explain. In the absence of some kind of feedback from
effect to cause, explanation by consequence remains a totally mysterious notion.3 It is
metaphysically impossible for an event to be explained by another event that occurs at a later
time. Merton's only reference to mechanisms is his suggestion that dysfunctional entities tend to
disappear. Else-where (Elster, 1983: 61ff.) I have discussed a similar argument (proposed by
Stinchcombe, 1975) at some length, concluding that it does not work. It amounts essentially to
asserting that non-dysfunctional institutions, including as a special case the functional ones,
maintain themselves over time, because they do not set up any pressure for change. The
argument is vulnerable in at least three respects.
4
1 The basic premise, that non-dysfunctional institutions remain stable over time, is false.
Adaptively neutral phenomena are often subject to drift.
2 Even if dysfunctional institutions tend to disappear, there is no presumption that they
will be replaced by functional ones. Perhaps disequilibrium is a more fundamental feature
of societies than equilibrium (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
3 There may be many non-dysfunctional alternatives to a given dysfunctional institution.
We would like to know which of them will emerge and at what time, not simply that one
of them ultimately will. Are the functional ones more likely to emerge than those which
are merely neutral from the adaptive point of view? And if so, why?
Merton has nothing to say about the two most frequently cited mechanisms by which behaviours
or institutions could be upheld by their consequences: natural
[end of page 133, start of page 134]
selection and reinforcement (see van Parijs, 1981, for a thorough discussion). Evolutionary
biology and animal psychology have charted these mechanisms in the utmost detail, but it
remains to be shown that either can be used to support functional explanation in the social
sciences. In any case, for the present exegetical purposes there is no need to discuss them at
further length, since they seem very far in spirit from Merton's paradigm. In particular, both
mechanisms rest on the notion that alternatives to an unsatisfactory state are generated randomly,
whereas Merton argues more obscurely that they are generated by a 'pressure for change'.
I conclude by a brief comment on the language of functions in Merton's sociology of science. I
shall first quote two passages at some length, and then suggest that they may give us a key to
Merton's main interest in functions:
Multiple discoveries can thus be seen to have several and varied functions for the system
of science. They heighten the likelihood that the discovery will be promptly incorporated
in current scientific knowledge and will so facilitate the further advancement of
knowledge. They confirm the truth of the discovery (although on occasion errors have
been independently arrived at). They help us detect a problem which I have barely and far
from rigorously formulated, to say nothing of having solved it: How to calculate the
functionally optimum amount of redundancy in independent efforts to solve scientific
problems of designated kinds, such that the probability of the solution is approximately
maximized without entailing so much replication of effort that the last increment will not
appreciably increase that probability. (Merton, 1973: 80)
[C]onsidered in its implications for the reward system, the Matthew effect [the award of
disproportionate credit to senior authors for joint work or multiple discoveries] is
dysfunctional for the careers of individual scientists who are penalized in the early stages
of their development, but considered in its implications for the communication system,
the Matthew effect, in cases of collaboration or multiple discoveries, may operate to
heighten the visibility of new scientific communications. This is not the first instance of a
social pattern's being functional for certain aspects of a social system and dysfunctional
for certain individuals within that system. (ibid.: 447-8)
It is hard to believe that Merton here is using 'function' in an explanatory sense. The idea that
redundancy or the disproportionate attention to seniority are explained by the benefits these
phenomena confer on the growth of knowledge is too implausible to entertain. Merton is simply
calling attention to certain consequences of behavioural patterns in science. The question is, why
would he want to do this? One answer, mentioned earlier, could be that the consequences are
surprising, counterintuitive or paradoxical. In the present case this does not seem to be the case.
5
It is pretty obvious that the chances of a problem being solved increase with the number of
scholars working on it, but that each new scholar creates a smaller increment of success (at least
beyond a certain number). The Matthew effect owes its fame, I believe, more to the lucky choice
of a phrase than to any surprising insights it has yielded.
Another, more plausible answer is that the identification of consequences can be important for
policy reasons. Research councils need to know about the optimal degree of redundancy of
funding. Journal editors might want to resist claims for more democracy in science, e.g. for the
alphabetical listing of authors. In Merton's discussion of the political machine the policy aspects
also form an important theme, and serve as basis for a warning to politicians against replacing
the machine with another system that does not deliver the same goods.
What, then, are we to conclude? Does Merton simply restate Mandeville's insight, that 'those
who can enlarge their view, and will give themselves the leisure of
[end of page 134, start of page 135]
gazing at the prospect of concatenated events, may, in a hundred places, see Good spring up and
pullulate from Evil, as naturally as chickens do from eggs'? Or does he claim, more ambitiously,
that the evil we observe in the cause can be explained by the good we see in the effect? I have to
report that after many readings and re-readings I still do not know. Perhaps Merton has been
playing the oldest game of all, that of suggesting the strong claim without actually sticking his
neck out and embracing it explicitly? More charitably and more plausibly, does his laudable love
for rich empirical detail and for fine conceptual distinctions make it difficult for him to stand
back from his material and perceive the larger structure of the argument? The force of the 1936
essay on unanticipated consequences, written before his mind was uncluttered with the
formidable array of facts that he has since mastered and assimilated, might support this answer.
NOTES
1 I am assuming, for simplicity, that all benefits are ultimately benefits to people, not to some
abstract entity like 'society' or 'science' This may be a dubious assumption in some cases. In a
society divided on ethnic, religious or similar grounds, an institution may benefit 'society' by
ensuring a minimal level of integration even if all individuals would be better off were it to break
up into two or more autonomous units. Also 'science' as a system of knowledge may well benefit
from practices that provide few tangible benefits to identifiable individuals.
2 Elsewhere, however, Merton (1957a: 65) opposes the analysis of latent functions to analysis in
terms of 'manipulation by powerful subgroups'.
3 G. A. Cohen (1978, 1982) disagrees with both statements. First, he argues, an explanation by
consequences can be backed by a consequence law rather than by a mechanism. Second, the
underlying mechanism (which must be assumed to exist but need not be exhibited for the
explanation to be valid) can take the form of causally efficacious dispositions rather than of
feedback loops. For the present purposes. these disagreements are of secondary importance.
[end of page 135, start of page 136]
Interchange
BOUDON REPLIES TO ELSTER
I am always surprised by the ease with which the title 'classic' is granted - or refused - to social
scientists by social scientists. While it may take centuries for a musical work to become a classic,
as in the case of Charpentier's Medée, for a sociological paper it often takes only one or two
years. The two texts of Robert Merton discussed by Professor Elster are somewhat older, but I
have no opinion as to whether they have 'the status of a classic'. 1 know only that they are
6
important, and I have the feeling that Elster is unfair to the text on 'Manifest and Latent
Functions'.
Although I cannot go into detail here, it seems to me that Merton has shown in this text - and this
is not a negligible achievement - that the concept of function can have a positive and fruitful use,
but also a negative and dangerous one. While he does not use these exact words, he has made
clear in the paper that the concept of function is acceptable when it is used as a kind of shorthand
notation summarizing social processes which can also, though more awkwardly, be described
without using the concept of function. To put this idea into the form of a methodological
theorem: the notion of function is useful only if it is not indispensable. Thus, when Merton
showed how, at the time he conducted his analysis, the Democratic Party machine met needs
among the lower classes which were not satisfied by a public social security system of the type
developed, say, in Germany or France, and how this also served the interests of the Party, then he
gave an illuminating example in which the word 'function' is used in a purely nominal way. This
example and many others suggest that function is an acceptable and useful concept when it is
entirely dissociated from any functionalist view of society. This implies a sharp distinction-again
using non-Mertonian vocabulary-between what might be called methodological functionalism
and substantive functionalism. As I have tried to show elsewhere (Boudon, 1980: 195-202),
Merton was probably the first sociologist to suggest clearly that the notion of function was useful
and perfectly acceptable in the first context, and dangerous and unacceptable in the second.
As to Merton's notion of latent function, one may not like the concept, but it points, if not to the
major function, at least to one of the major duties of the social sciences. Manifest functions are
visible and do not need the social sciences to be detected. Latent functions are not only invisible
but sometimes half-consciously hidden. Social actors have good reasons not to recognize their
existence. Thus, because producers of collective goods, such as political parties or trade unions,
are exposed to the free-riding of their potential members, they have to create or take
[end of page 136, start of page 137]
advantage of a variety of mechanisms in order to fulfil their manifest function more effectively.
For example, to increase their organizational strength, trade unions may apply a range of indirect
and direct pressures on non-members in order to force them to join. But these mechanisms will
have to remain latent for obvious social reasons. No trade union wishes to admit or let it be
widely known that it is forcing people to join its organization. A study such as Olson's Logic of
Collective Action (1965), among others, confirms the usefulness of the notion of latent function.
ELSTER REPLIES TO BOUDON
[Ed. note: Elster refrained from writing a rejoinder as he felt there was nothing in Boudon's
contribution with which he disagreed.]
[end of page 137]
[Elster, Jon (1990), Merton's Functionalism and the Unintended Consequences of Action, in Jon
Clark, Celia Modgil and Sohan Modgil, eds., Robert Merton: Consensus and Controversy,
London New York: Falmer Press, pp.129-35]
7