THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC
DISTINCTION
Though Kant (rationalist) and Ayer
(empiricist) disagree on many points, they
agree on the following:
There is a basic, fundamental difference
between analytic and synthetic propositions.
Quine intends to ‘out-empiricize’ Ayer:
 Not only are there no a priori truths
about the world…
 There is no such thing as an analytic
proposition!
In other words, every proposition is
sensitive to empirical experience.
Quine has two arguments…
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Argument I: Circularity
Quine identifies two types of analytic claim:
I. Logically true:
P=P
 No unmarried man is married
The truth of these depends only on the
logical terms (‘not’, ‘=’). They are true no
matter how we re-interpret the other words.
II. The rest:
 Plato is the teacher of Aristotle
 No bachelor is married
These can be transformed into type I by
replacing words with their synonyms.
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Synonymy
Quine: So, a full understanding of
‘analyticity’ rests on the notion of
‘synonymy’.
But is the latter any clearer than the former?
Suggestion: Yes.
 A is synonymous with B if one is defined
as the other.
Quine: how do we know that A is defined as
B?
 Check a dictionary?
 This just tells us that lexicographers
believe that A and B are considered
synonymous.
 Circular!
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Truth by definition
Okay, how about the following:
 A and B are synonymous if A = B is true
by definition.
Quine: we introduce definitions to do three
things:
1. accurately paraphrase a notion we
already have
2. Improve on a concept while preserving
old usage
3. Create a new meaning
However, paraphrase is good only if it
preserves meaning—i.e. is synonymous.
New usage is good only if it is synonymous
in old contexts.
Hence, only #3 does not rely on a prior
notion of synonymy, but it is insufficient for a
full notion of ‘analyticity’.
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Interchangeability
Perhaps A is synonymous with B if and only
if ‘A’ and ‘B’ can be interchanged without
changing the truth value of a sentence.
Quine: then ‘bachelor’ is not synonymous
with ‘unmarried man’:
 ‘“Bachelor” has seven letters’ = true
 ‘“Unmarried man” has seven letters =
false.
Reply: okay, but they can be interchanged
when it is their meanings that are under
consideration.
Quine: In other words, interchangeability
works when their meanings are the same.
 But ‘same meaning’ = ‘synonymous’
 So we still haven’t escaped the circle.
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Necessity
How about this:
 ‘All and only bachelors are unmarried
men’ is analytic = necessarily, all and
only bachelors are unmarried men.
Quine: to say that a sentence is necessarily
true is just to say that it is analytic.
 I.e., Necessarily, P will be true when
and only when ‘P’ is analytic.
In sum: all attempts to define ‘analytic’ are
circular or rest on terms that are no clearer
than ‘analytic’.
So, the analytic-synthetic distinction has
never been properly defined.
Quine also has a second argument that
would rule out even logical truths as
analytic…
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Argument II: Holism and indeterminacy
Quine: To test any claim, a whole series of
background beliefs must be accepted.
E.g.: I want to see if M1 and M2 fall at the
same rate.
 I drop each at the same time and
observe when they land.
I assume:
 Mass stays constant during test.
 Force of gravity is the same on each.
 Space-time doesn’t “warp” for one.
 My clock works properly.
 My eyes function properly.
 Etc.
If M1 and M2 don’t land at the same time,
any one of these beliefs might be false.
 I can’t pick out which one just on the
basis of that observation.
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What this tells us
Quine: Experiment can only tell us that a
system of beliefs has an error in it
somewhere.
We may choose to give up or hold on to any
belief so long as we are willing to change
others.
 No experiment can determine once and
for all how to adjust the system!
So:
 No statement or belief has individual
meaning: only entire theories are
testable against experience.
How does this impact the analytic-synthetic
distinction?
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Revision knows no bounds
Quine: Given a surprising or recalcitrant
experience, you may revise your system of
beliefs as you see fit (so long as you
preserve observational claims).
If, for example, it turns that the simplest way
to respond to an observation is to revise
classical logic, you are entitled to do so.
 Since entire systems are tested, not
individual claims, no individual claim can
be said to be non-revisable in principle.
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The web of beliefs
Beliefs form an interconnected web:
 Statements about observations are at
the periphery.
 Others are more central.
 Logic and math are near the middle.
But…since all claims are interconnected,
changes in one area can impact changes
anywhere else.
Though we may hold on to logical beliefs
very tightly—they are in the middle—there is
no reason they can’t be changed to
preserve other areas of the web.
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Conclusion
Quine: Any revision that is useful for
predicting or explaining experience is
acceptable.
 We can’t give logical laws a privileged, a
priori status—any part of the web of
belief is revisable!
Conclusion: there are no analytic truths; no
truths are necessary or empirically
untouchable.
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A rationalist response
Chisholm disagrees with Ayer and Quine.
Ayer: All a priori truths are rules about how
to use language.
Chisholm: This means that, e.g., ‘no square
is round’ is true only because it is a rule that
it is true. But the following is obvious:
(T) ‘P’ is true if and only if P
So,
 ‘No square is round’ is true if and only if
no square is round.
I.e. a certain relation between properties
must exist for the claim to be true.
Second argument: ‘No square is round’
does not refer to words so it can’t be rule
about their usage!
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Against Quine
Quine: there is no way to tell from observing
linguistic behaviour whether it is necessary
that if ‘P’ applies to x, so does ‘Q’.
Chisholm’s response: even if we can’t
empirically observe synonymy, it doesn’t
follow that there are no analytic truths.
Quine needs a principle such as:
In order for there to be analytic truths, we
must be able to determine synonymy
observationally.
But how could Quine defend this?
 It can’t be observed.
 It’s not true by definition (which Quine
rejects at any rate).
 It appears to be a synthetic a priori
claim.
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The upshot of this
Chisholm:
 The traditional empiricist account of a
priori knowledge is implausible.
 So is Quine’s denial of a priori truth.
So, we should reject empiricism and defend
the analytic/synthetic distinction and the
possibility of a priori knowledge.
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Reviving the a priori
Chisholm: certain relations hold necessarily:
 Red includes coloured
 Square excludes round
Could we learn these by observation
(induction)? Chisholm thinks not:
1. There are no actual squares.
2. Induction presupposes a priori truths.
Defence of #2:
Say we observe the world and find no red
things that are non-coloured. We want to
conclude ‘red includes coloured’ or ‘all red
things are coloured’.
We must first know that ‘any observation of
a non-coloured red thing contradicts “all red
things are coloured”’.
 I.e., we need deductive logic to perform
induction, so at least some claims are
knowable a priori
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Axioms
Okay, if knowledge requires a priori truths,
what is the nature of such propositions?
Chisholm: A priori truth = once you accept
it, you see it is true. Note:
 You must really accept it; you must
reflect on it and understand what it says.
 It must be certain, i.e. there is nothing
more reasonable to accept than it.
Chisholm calls these ‘axioms’.
Also: suppose that:
 E is known a priori
 If E then H is known a priori.
 Then, if you understand H, it is also
known a priori.
Thus, a priori reasoning can expand your
knowledge.
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In sum
Some claims are such that if you
understand them, you see they are true.
 They can’t be known by observation.
 Empiricist accounts of how they could
be known independently of observation
are implausible.
So, either some propositions are known a
priori, or else we must remain sceptical.
But it is absurd to remain sceptical about:
 No square is round.
 All bachelors are unmarried.
 Etc.
Chisholm: so, a priori knowledge is
possible.
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Analyticity revived
Chisholm: “All S is P” is analytic =
1. Either S is the same as P, or
2. S is a conjunction of logically
independent terms, one of which is P.
P and Q are logically independent =
 Neither P nor not-P entails Q or not-Q.
 Neither Q nor not-Q entails P or not-P.
#2 tells us what it is for a predicate to be
contained in a subject.
E.g.: ‘all fathers are parents’ is analytic
because
 ‘Father’ = ‘male parent’.
 ‘Male’ does not entail ‘parent’ and vice
versa.
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Why logical independence?
Consider: ‘All fathers are parents’.
 Here the predicate, ‘parent’ has truly
been ‘analyzed out’ of the subject
because ‘father’ = ‘male and parent’.
But now consider: ‘Everything that is a
father and a parent is a parent’.
 Has ‘parent’ really been analyzed out of
the subject?
Chisholm: No. The second ‘parent’ in the
subject is redundant.
 It is already logically implied by ‘father’.
 So, we haven’t really analyzed ‘father’.
Genuine analysis involves breaking down a
concept into its ‘atoms’, its most basic parts.
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Synthetic a priori propositions
Are all a priori claims analytic (e.g. Ayer)?
Chisholm: consider ‘All squares have
shape’. This is a priori.
If it is analytic, then ‘square’ can be reduced
to logically independent concepts, one of
which is ‘has shape’, i.e.:
‘Everything that is ____ and has shape has
shape’.
 We need to fill the blank with something
that preserves the original meaning and
is logically independent of ‘has shape’.
 Can this be done?
Chisholm: no.
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Some attempts
I.
‘Everything that is square and has
shape has shape’.
I.e., ‘Square’ = ‘square and has shape’.
Problem: ‘Square’ entails ‘has shape’, so
they are not logically independent.
II. ‘Everything that is (i) either square or
without shape and (ii) has shape, has
shape.
Problem: these are not logically
independent.
 I.e., not-(ii) entails (i).
 If ‘has shape is false’ then ‘without
shape or square’ is true.
Chisholm: try others—there is little hope
here.
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Upshot
1. It is implausible to deny that we know
that ‘All squares have shape’.
2. This claim can’t be confirmed
observationally.
3. This claim is not analytic.
Therefore,
4. Synthetic a priori knowledge is
possible.
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Metaphysics
The picture of metaphysics that emerges
from Chisholm:
1. Metaphysics involves reflection on
concepts such as ‘person’, ‘object’,
‘time’, ‘cause’, ‘substance’, etc.
2. Some claims involving these concepts
are such that if you understand them,
you see they are true.
3. Thus, a priori, metaphysical
knowledge is possible.
4. Logic is knowable a priori.
5. We can use logic to build on and
extend the knowledge gained in #2.
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A sceptical objection
Objection: Suppose you reflect on a
proposition and become certain it is true.
 How do you know that this kind of
experience guarantees truth?
Surely you need to know a general
principle, such as:
 ‘Any proposition whose contemplation
gives rise to a feeling of certainty must
be true’.
 But people have made mistakes about
what they were certain about.
 So no such principle is sensible.
Chisholm: If all knowledge requires
application of principles, then principles are
only known if there is a principle to justify
them.
 This leads to a regress.
Knowledge can’t get off the ground unless
some of it is a priori and foundational.
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Summary
Quine
There are no
necessary truths
There is no analyticsynthetic distinction
All claims are
empirically revisable
There is nothing for
metaphysical
speculation to
accomplish other
than pragmatic ends
Chisholm
All a priori knowledge
is of necessary truths
Not all necessary
truths are analytic
There is synthetic a
priori knowledge
Metaphysics is
possible and can
give rise to
knowledge
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