Japan in War and Peace
The American Occupation
Lecture Structure






Intro: an experiment without parallel?
The Position of the Emperor
The drafting of the Constitution
Japanese influence on reforms
The historiographical debate
The Cold War and Occupation policy
1. Views on the Emperor’s War Responsibility
The emperor was integral to the expansion of Japan, whether the trigger was pulled
late or soon. Economically, he belonged with the liberals, because of his huge
investments. Militarily, he belonged with the militarists, as the ritualistic fount of
military morale. Socially, he belonged with both liberals and militarists because he
was the keystone of the arch of economic and social privilege under which the people
passed on their way to 'work, obey, fight.' Our failure to identify the Japanese
emperor with Japanese imperialism is akin to our failure to detect that timing, not
principle, was what divided 'liberals' from militarists. It is the institution that counts;
the personal character or predilections of any individual emperor are more or less
irrelevant. (Owen Lattimore Solution in Asia c.1946)
His [the emperor's] indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion
among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He
is a symbol which unites all Japanese.
Destroy him and the nation will
disintegrate......It would be absolutely essential to greatly increase the occupational
forces. It is quite possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required
which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years. (General
MacArthur's secret telegram to the Army Chief of Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower 25
January 1946)
2. The New Constitution
Constitution of the Empire of Japan - 1889
From the preamble:
The right of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors,
and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in the
future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the present Constitution
and of the law.
Chapter I: The Emperor
Article I: The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of
Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.
Article III: The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
Article IV: The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of
sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present
Constitution.
Article V: The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the
Imperial Diet.
Article VIII: The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public
safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting,
Imperial Ordinances in the place of law.
Article XI: The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.
Article XIII: The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.
Constitution of Japan - 1947
From the preamble:
We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in
the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the
fruits of peaceful co-operation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout
this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war
through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the
people and do firmly establish this Constitution.
Chapter I. The Emperor
Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the
people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign
power.
Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the
Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.
Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are
provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.
Chapter II. Renunciation of War
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land sea and air
forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognised.
3. Mark Gayn on the Occupation (Japan Diary 1948)
A democracy is not a democracy when its Constitution springs not out of a
nation’s soil, but out of the conqueror’s office. A democracy is not a democracy
when this democratic Constitution is served by an undemocratic government,
interpreted by an undemocratic supreme court, and enforced by an
undemocratic police. A democracy is not a democracy when we – its mentors –
profess our devotion to free speech, and then allow our censors to bar a free
discussion by the Japanese people . . . A democracy, finally, is a sham when a
political and social system supposedly democratic is erected on a foundation of
feudalism, complete with an emperor.
Force and repression are not the answers to unrest. The answer is enlightened
social reform. Had we supplied it, we would need have no fear of communism or
Russia.
The men who drew the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan
understood this fact. The men who took over in Washington, and the men who
executed the policy did not . . .
“Our greatest error,” Justice William Douglas of the Supreme Court said
recently, “would be to fashion our foreign policy merely in terms of anticommunism. We will fail miserably if we do no more than that. For then we will
end by railing and ranting at the specter of communism, but do nothing to
eliminate the conditions on which communism thrives. If we follow that course,
war will soon appear as the only alternative.”
The policy of “containment” and of “get tough” has proved its bankruptcy. It
has committed us to alliances with feudal and undemocratic men and factions,
opposed by their own peoples and surviving only with our aid. A military and
political system based on such alliances rests on rotten props. It is no match for
the dynamics of communist policy and slogans.
4. The Historiography of the American Occupation
Affirmative Views
R. Ward (involved in the occupation himself) ‘Reflections on the allied Occupation &
Planned Political Change in Japan in R. Ward (Ed.), Political Development in Modern
Japan, 1968
R. Ward. “Conclusion.” In Showa Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 19261989, ed. by Stephen S. Large. (1998.)
K. Kawai Japan’s American Interlude esp. Chp. IX ‘Labor, Agriculture & Economic
Recovery’.*
H. Fukui ch. 4 ‘Postwar Politics, 1945-1973 (pp. 154-184) in The Cambridge History of
Japan Vol. 6
Negative Views
J. Dower Japan in War and Peace: Essays on History, Race and Culture. London:
Harper Collins, 1995. Chap. 5 ‘Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia.’
J. Halliday A Political History of Japanese Capitalism Ch. 7 ‘Japan Under the American
Occupation’
J. Moore Japanese Workers & the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947 Ch. 7 ‘The
Conservative Reaction’.*
J. Rubin ‘From Wholesomeness to Decadence: The Censorship of Literature Under the
Allied Occupation’ Journal of Japanese Studies 11, 1, 1985, pp 71-103*
M. Shaller Douglas MacArthur; The Far Eastern General Ch. 10 ‘Occupied Japan and
American Politics’ 1945-1949’.
Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans & the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 Ch.
3 ‘T A Bisson: The Limits of Reform in Occupied Japan’.