Multi-Hazards Roundtable – Notes for July 12, 2006
Parrington Forum - Room 3009
Introductions by Robert Zimmerman and Hilda Blanco
Carl Cook: Recovery in New Orleans after Katrina
Because of technical difficulties for the presentations from Kobe University, Carl Cook
began with a discussion of New Orleans and the different levels of authority in handling
disasters, particularly local vs. state, and problems of interoperability. Some key points
included:
 Long term community recovery plans have beendesigned for rebuilding Iraq, and the
US facing special problems, e.g. trailer parks with no power, water, security and no
tolerance for temporary refugee camps
 In New Orleans, schools rebuilt in different places with consolidation, instead of
trying to rebuild all schools.
 Politics are playing a much larger role than in past recovery efforts
 It’s important for recovery efforts to hire planners for all states that were impacted,
and to know people ahead of time
Discussion:
 Need to regionalize resources through counties in Puget Sound area – most resources
are in urban areas. Need to change mentality from “all emergencies are local
emergencies.”
 City of Seattle is taking lead in developing emergency plans and changing mentality,
but the rest of the country is not moving as quickly
 911 was an epiphany for new York – first time they needed outside resources
 Pacific NW gone beyond talking and starting to make things happen regionally:
interconnected three counties, City of Seattle and State in fiber information network
to transfer data, monitor through same software, with video conferencing between
mayor, governor and three county heads – effective in blurring jurisdiction lines
 Valuable to describe Puget sound experience as example of how it can be done
 Federal government centralizing command and control function, though evacuation
needs are unique to geography (e.g. evacuations make sense for Lehar and possibility
of warning, not wanted for earthquakes) - Homeland Security demanding evacuation
plans everywhere
 Knee-jerk reaction to Katrina where fiefdoms and city councils cause problems in
Louisiana – state operation much better in Mississippi and FEMA’s operation was
more effective.
 Different visions for long term and short term recovery efforts – long term should be
staffed by planners.
 ESF 14 FEMA recovery group was designed from 911: City decided to do long term
recovery, but State wanted to drive timeline: FEMA assisted State, and the Mayor
decided not to deal with money coming through State.
 In Florida, ESF14 designed for huge disasters and is driven more by local
communities.
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Different parts of river systems have different needs – in New Orleans different parts
of town were impacted in different ways. It needs to be decided through collaboration
between local communities rather than federal government.
Best scenario is for locals think ahead of time – use HAZIS/GIS for planning. What
forums are we going to use?
How are disasters defined? What about incidents that occur once in a great while?
How can you determine who has authority and when they need to give up authority?
Katrina perfect storm – translate to Florida dealing with hurricanes every year, and
dealing without federal intervention: Economic Recovery plan being put together in
this region.
But what about 911 type event? Knowledge and expertise necessary: engineers
understood 911 problems. NIMS is a model built on fire model, with 20 years to
integrate into fire practice. The model is there: work off scenario based training and
exercises
Interoperability – connections between systems through organized control and
command system – work out authority process to find single point connections and
find how to bridge breaks in systems
Visitors from Kobe University
Two presentations from Kobe University visitors, including Professor Tsutomu
Shigamura, Center of Excellence on Safety and Urban Environment, Professor Masakazu
Moriyama, Professor Yoshimitsu Shiozaki, and Dr. Tanaka Takahiro. The first on the
Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake of 1995 was by Professor Shigamura:
 The earthquake was sudden and dreadful: Evacuation process worked well, using
strong structures like schools for housing. Electricity recovered in two or three days,
but water and gas took much longer.
 Temporary housing built three months after earthquake, not good for elderly.
Conditions were terrible in winter.
 Small community center designed after earthquake – still standing - transitional
shelters (paper container houses) designed by architects
 Transitional shelters shuffled community: 48,000 units 2-6 months remained 2 to 4
years
 City planning destroyed continuity of neighborhoods in Intensive Reconstruction Area
 Infrastructures rebuilt quickly without any reflection
 Rehabilitation of cultural heritage is still going on
 Terrible mistakes were made with public housing terrible mistakes, e.g. skyscrapers
for elderly
 Revitalization of damaged area not yet successful – local economy less people
neighborhood long construction
 Reconstruction process reveal hidden paradox –oral-conventions, ownership and
occupations, conflict with codes, etc.
 Working toward re-planning as neighborhood agreement
 Many kinds of disaster need various counter measures
 Victims face similar problems in restoration and reconstruction after initial phase and
emergency
 100 billion dollars damage and 160 billion dollars for reconstruction
 Creative reconstruction – not only to recover former level but reconstruct high level
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society fit for 21st century – development oriented reconstruction
Problems include fiscal crisis in local governments and environmental crisis - coal
power plant, exhaust, etc.
Recovery of livelihoods and community restoration are crucial, and must be main
target.
Light and shadow in reconstruction process:
Success (light) with infrastructure, roads, railway, port, etc. and big companies,
housing construction industry – total reconstruction
Port of Kobe – facilities recovered and Hanshin expressway reconstructed quickly,
earlier than planned
Problems (shadow) local reconstruction: population, housing reconstruction for
victims, community development
Is quick reconstruction the best way?
Three stages of housing recovery
1. Evacuation – schools, local meeting room, tents, etc.
2. Temporary housing – constructed – all demolished by March 20000
3. Permanent housing
Solitary deaths – single males most vulnerable population: 70% solitary deaths were
single males (social structures among women)
Discussion:
 In New Orleans there is no reconstruction plan as in Kobe where there is a strong
government.
 Communities are different than before - no group working for neighborhood
reconstruction - private property owners in New Orleans can do what they want - no
way to build housing for underclass of New Orleans
 Kobe has aggressive government-oriented readjustment program – nothing similar in
US since urban renewal
 Good and bad points to both – but good to have neighborhood involvement with
government plan
 Protest action to city government March 1995
 Workshop process of urban reconstruction program – necessary that people from
damaged areas help to redevelop area, but often they want everything to be the same
as before.
 Community center in Kobe created with help of local people and sustained traditional
Japanese characteristics from rural areas
 Two large redevelopment projects in Kobe, but local governments have no money to
implement local plans
Luanne Johnson, PhD. Training Officer with Washington Division of Emergency
Management - Received her PhD at the University of Washington and trained as a
social scientist in instructional design and risk communication
 Conducted study of Katrina and hurricanes in Florida:
 56% in New Orleans do not feel vulnerable to hurricane and flooding less than a year
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after Katrina
56% with no survival plan
58% with no survival kit
83% with no changes to home
Californians cancelled or allowed no renewal of earthquake insurance with
assumption that FEMA or government will bail people out – even on the heels of
Katrina
Not fair to work with idea that preparedness every individual’s responsibility - disaster
preparedness is shared responsibility
Currently there is no effective messaging and government is not paying attention to
academia.
Studies in effective messaging show that fear level and emotional base are effective,
but communicators in disaster messaging are trained not to show reality and extent of
disasters.
Effective messaging involves four components:
Two involving threat
Two involving response
Goal is to have four elements in perfect balance
Threat:
1. Personal vulnerability
2 . Personal consequence
Response:
1. Response efficacy
2. Self-efficacy
After five decades of research from health scientists there is a paradigm shift in
emergency management because of fear of engaging fear.
Self-efficacy: In Aberdeen an evacuation plan was developed involving routes
marked with yellow arrows to show how to get on high ground. The goal was
evacuating everyone – including “seasoned” citizens – in 20 minutes. Practiced until
everyone knew the routes.
Messaging comes down to choice – make a choice/accept consequences
The neighborhood is the viable unit: In Puyallup Valley – kids practiced evacuations
for Lehar – learned through drills how to get all seasoned citizens out in time.
Messaging in community without neighborhood as basic unit results in conflicting
messages
Disaster preparedness exercises effective as way to build community: Drop in
property crimes in neighborhoods with disaster plans
Discussion:
 Emergency workers often take extra risks even when understanding risk and efficacy
Recovery Restoration conference in New Orleans – long term recovery panning group –
(People who attend will report back to this group)
Next meeting Wednesday, September 13 – Economic issues in Recovery