britain, france and the nigerian civil war, 1967-1970

Candidate Number: 71817

HY300 2008/2009

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

HY300 BA DISSERTATION

2008/2009

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 71817

Word Count – 9,969 words

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CONTENTS

Introduction

Map of the Secessionist State of the Republic of Biafra (1967 –

1970)

July 1968 – April 1969

France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle

April 1969 – September 1970

After General de Gaulle: ‘ plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’

October 1969 – January 1970

The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy

Conclusions

Bibliography p. 3 p. 6 p. 7 p. 19 p. 27 p. 36 p. 39

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BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

On 30 May 1967, after months of tensions in Nigeria, a separatist group dominated by members of the Ibo tribe (one of the country’s three major tribes based primarily in the eastern region), declared its secession from the state of Nigeria and established the independent Republic of Biafra. The refusal of the Nigerian government to recognise

Biafra’s independence marked the beginning of a civil war that would last until January

1970. Despite global criticism of the suffering endured by the Biafran people, only a handful of states in the developing world, including Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast,

Zambia and Haiti, offered formal recognition to Biafra. Most Western states chose to adopt a neutral stance, believing that resolution of the conflict was the responsibility of Nigeria’s former colonial ruler, Britain.

1

France stood apart, declaring its support for Biafran self-determination in a communiqué given by Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information, on 31

July 1968.

2

Paris’ position towards Biafra was confirmed a little over a month later when, on 9 September, French President Charles de Gaulle, announced publically that France was assisting Biafra and was not discounting future diplomatic recognition of the breakaway state.

3

From this point on France gave the Biafrans moral and diplomatic support and was accused of aiding them with the supply of arms, flown in via Libreville (Gabon) and

Abidjan (Ivory Coast).

4

The British government was frustrated by France’s involvement in one of its former colonies. The conflict thus created tension in Anglo-French relations

1 J. De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London, 1972), pp. 179-201.

2 [T]he [N]ational [A]rchives/FCO/25/234_60, Everson to FO, 31/07/1968.

3 S. Cronjé, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran Civil War, 1967-1970 (London,

1972), pp. 194-195.

4 J. J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 230-

231.

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HY300 2008/2009 already troubled by Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of Britain’s application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 and 1967, as well as by disagreements over transatlantic relations, Cold War alliances, Rhodesia and the Concorde

Project.

5 In this context, British politicians questioned the French government’s motives for supporting Biafra in an attempt to understand and decide how to respond to French policy in Nigeria during the civil strife.

Historians of post-Independence Africa have often neglected analysis of French involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. Interpretations of France’s support for Biafra are mostly found in contemporary journalistic narratives of the war, by authors including

Suzanne Cronjé, Auberon Waugh and John De St. Jorre, 6

or historical accounts such as

John Stremlau’s ‘The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War’

.

7

French policy in

Nigeria is otherwise also briefly referenced in general historical accounts of French policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. However these studies (for example by Anton Andereggen, Robert

Bourgi, Francis McNamara and Claude Wauthier) 8 tend to concentrate on France’s relations with its former African colonial dependencies, a preoccupation that has meant

French involvement in non-Francophone Africa, in this case in Nigeria, has been neglected.

This is with the exception of two contemporary articles published in 1979 and 1980 that do concentrate on French policy during the Nigerian Civil War. Daniel Bach’s ‘Le

Général de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’ analyses the nature and motivations

5 J. W. Young, ‘Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years’, A. Capet (ed.), Britain, France and the

Entente Cordiale Since 1904 (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 165-168.

6 Cronjé, The World.

De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War.

A. Waugh & S. Cronjé, Biafra: Britain’s Shame (London, 1969).

7 Stremlau, International Politics.

8 A. Andereggen, France’s Relationship with Subsaharan Africa (Westport, 1994).

R. Bourgi,

Le General de Gaulle et l’Afrique Noire, 1940-1969

(Paris, 1980).

F. T. McNamara, France in Black Africa (Washington DC, 1989).

C. Wauthier, Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterand - Quarante

Ans de Politique Africaine , (Paris, 1995).

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HY300 2008/2009 behind Charles de Gaulle’s decision to support Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War, and is the most comprehensive analysis of France’s support for the Biafran separatists currently available.

9

Kirsty Melville’s ‘The Involvement of France and Francophone Africa in the

Nigerian Civil War’ in turn is based primarily on the contemporary journalistic accounts of the war discussed above, and consequently offers few new high-political insights on

France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War.

10

Apart from the occasional reference to British discontent with French policy, none of the historiography on the Nigerian Civil War discussed above has examined in detail

British reactions to France’s involvement in the war, a perspective that is particularly illuminating given Britain’s imperial history in Nigeria. On the basis of British Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) documents, as well as records of British Parliamentary

Debates and memoirs of British politicians involved in Nigerian and French affairs, the aim of this dissertation is therefore to examine British perceptions of French policy during the

Nigerian Civil War, following the French declaration of support for Biafra (July 1968), and determine what Britain considered France’s aims in Nigeria to be. It will also explore

British attempts to alter French Nigerian policy and assess the success of these efforts.

Finally, by considering the extent to which French policy during the Nigerian Civil War was an obstacle to good relations between Britain and France in this period, this dissertation attempts to draw some wider conclusions on the impact of the Biafran affair on

Anglo-French relations more generally in the late 1960s.

9 D. Bach, ‘Le Ge ́néral de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’, Canadian Journal of African Studies , 14, 2

(1980).

10 K. Melville. The Involvement of France and Francophone West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War (Perth,

1979).

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MAP OF THE SECESSIONIST STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA (1967 –

1970) AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (MAY 1967)

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian-Biafran_war)

BIAFRA

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July 1968 – April 1969

France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle

During its first year (May 1967 – June 1968) the French government gave minimal attention to the Nigerian Civil War, except for declaring an embargo on arms sales to both

Nigeria and Biafra on 12 June 1968 and making plans to send aid to Biafra.

11

However, over the summer of 1968, the French position changed as increased media attention and statements by politicians regarding the conflict mobilised French public opinion in favour of the Biafran cause. This set France apart from Britain in what was to become ‘a war between Great Powers in their own material and economic interests.’ 12

Official statements of French intent, particularly the declaration made by President Charles de Gaulle on 9

September 1968, as well as reports of arms being flown into Biafra from the Ivory Coast and Gabon in French aircraft (which according to British FCO sources amounted to between 100 and 150 tons per week) increased British suspicion of French involvement in the conflict.

13

France repeatedly denied its role in this arms traffic, claiming their only involvement in the conflict was as part of humanitarian relief operations including those organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as plans to collaborate the OCAM ( Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache ).

14

However, the close relations

France maintained with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, as well as much circumstantial evidence, such as reports of French officers overseeing the loading of military supplies onto

11 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 260.

12 [H]ouse of [L]ords Debate, vol.304, c.742, 21/07/1969.

13 TNA/FCO/65/266_18, Stewart to Paris, 28/10/1968.

14 TNA/FCO/65/268_100a, Stewart to Paris, 29/01/1969.

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led many British politicians to believe that

France was more involved than it claimed.

During late 1968 and early 1969 British journalists and politicians speculated about

France’s motivations for this seemingly bizarre policy that allowed the conflict in Nigeria to continue. The Guardian hypothesised that oil was the primary determinant in French policy,

16

while a report in the Daily Mirror suggested that France’s decision to support

Biafra was rooted in de Gaulle’s ‘obsessive’ hatred of the British.

17

France maintained throughout the course of the war that its principal concern was the well-being of the Ibo people. This profession of humanitarian concern was however incomprehensible to British

FCO officials who interpreted increased French moral and military support for the separatists as a significant factor contributing to the Biafran will and ability to fight, and the consequent prolongation of the conflict. French policy therefore ran contrary to their humanitarian rationale as it maintained a civil war that prolonged the ‘appalling suffering of the Ibo people’.

18

Paris’ humanitarian position was further distorted by the apparent divergence between the concerns of the French population and those of certain members of the French government, particularly Charles de Gaulle’s entourage. This internal division of opinion was particularly apparent in March 1969, when the French national “Aid Biafra Week” sparked controversy within circles sympathetic to the Biafran cause. During the week fundraising was carried out in aid of Biafra with the support of the French government, the

Biafra Action Committee, formed by Raymond Offroy (French ambassador to Nigeria until his expulsion from Nigeria in 1961), and publicised across the media, particularly in the

15 TNA/FCO/65/266_23a, Wilson to Tebbit, 30/10/1968.

16 TNA/FCO/65/266_47, ‘Oil Bait’, The Guardian, 03/12/1968.

17 TNA/FCO/65/269_121, W. Wilson, ‘Blood Oil and Hate’ Daily Mirror, 07/03/1969.

18 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French talks, 31/10/1968.

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Gaullist newspaper, La Nation.

However, various religious groups and trade unions that supported the Biafran cause were opposed to the French government’s involvement in these fundraising efforts and what they perceived as the consequent debasement of the pro-

Biafran campaign.

19 This opposition to French governmental policy in Biafra from within

France itself led the British government to question further French motives and their claim to be acting solely on humanitarian grounds.

A commonly held assumption was that French policy was shaped by commercial concerns, particularly the desire to exploit Biafra’s oil and mineral resources. The close relationship between the Elysée (the office of the French President) and the Société

Anonyme Française de Recherches et d’Exploration Pétrolières

(SAFRAP), as well as

France’s need to secure new oil reserves due to the reduction of supplies from Algeria, 20

led the Oil Department of the British government to assert that there was ‘an important “oily” element’ to French policy in Nigeria.

21

Moreover, the fact that at the outset of the war the majority of SAFRAP’s Nigerian oil reserves lay in Ibo-dominated territory suggests that oil was a determining factor in France’s decision to support Biafra.

22

Nevertheless, the commercial explanation for French policy was largely discounted. France had greater investment and trading links in Federal Nigeria than in Biafra,

23

and French support for the

Biafrans continued even after Biafra’s oil fields fell into Federal hands.

24

Furthermore, the amount of oil France obtained from Nigeria was minimal, with only 3% of French oil purchases in 1966 coming from Nigeria.

25

In any case, Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy

19 TNA/FCO /65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.

20 TNA/FCO/65/267_47, Wilson to Campbell, 04/12/1969.

21 TNA/FCO 65/269_126, Wilson to Monson, 17/03/1969.

22 ‘Nigeria: France’s Biafra Bombshell’, Africa Confidential , 16 (9/08/1968), cited in C. Uche, ‘Oil, British

Interests and the Nigerian Civil War’,

Journal of African History , 49 (2008), p. 129.

23 [H]ouse of [C]ommons Debate, vol.769, c.1462, 27/08/1968.

24 Stremlau, International Politics , p. 225.

25 Z. Cervenka, A History of the Nigerian Civil War (Ibadan, 1972), p. 103.

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HY300 2008/2009 was rarely shaped by economic considerations and it was left to the more commercially minded to worry about the possible damage to France’s business interests in Nigeria.

26

For de Gaulle commercial factors came into play only when potential economic gain was linked with geopolitical concerns.

27 In the context of the Nigerian Civil War, France was keen to take control of British oil concessions in Nigeria. This desire to obtain oil was, however, less to do with the oil itself and more to do with gaining the upper hand over Britain in

West Africa.

For France, Nigeria was a large and successful Anglophone federation that posed a threat to France’s position in West Africa and the stability of Francophone Africa. The friendly and liberal relations enjoyed by Nigeria with its former colonial ruler contrasted sharply with the relations between France and its former African dependencies. Nigeria was thus

‘un pôle d’attraction’

to its weaker Francophone neighbours, and its existence posed a grave danger to Francophonie.

28

These worries were, according to British politicians, shaped by the ‘absurd historical analogies’ 29 of Charles de Gaulle and France’s memory of

Anglo-French rivalry in Africa in the late nineteenth century, as well as recent upheavals in

French Africa, particularly in Algeria.

30

French policy in Nigeria during the civil war was a remnant of ‘the old days – of Fashoda and the rival parties of French and British officers going round Borgu planting the Tricoleur [sic] and the Union Jack at each village they came to’ and dictated largely by the desire to frustrate Britain in Africa.

31 Cynicism about

France’s ‘specifically anti-British operation’ 32

shaped by de Gaulle’s obsessive desire ‘to

26 TNA/FCO/65/267_78, Anderson to Wilson, 02/01/1969.

27 Bach, ‘Le Ge ́néral’, p. 272.

28 TNA/FCO/65/266_26, P. Decraene, ‘Les grandes puissances interviennent de plus en plus ouvertement dans la guerre civile du Nigeria’, Le Monde , 01/11/1968.

29 HC Debate, vol.775, c.664, 12/12/1968.

30 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.

31 TNA/FCO/65/266_23, Wilson to Tebbit, 31/10/1968.

32 HC Debate, vol.779, c.1668, 13/03/1969.

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permeated the British media and political world.

Interpretations such as these suggest deep-rooted tensions underpinning Anglo-French contacts in Nigeria in this period.

The centrality of Charles de Gaulle to French policy was acknowledged by British journalists and politicians alike, who emphasised the shift in the French position towards the Biafran separatists following de Gaulle’s increased involvement in the Nigerian affair.

34

France’s African policy was becoming ever more the domaine réservé

of the

Elysée

, with

Jacques Foccart, Charles de Gaulle’s chief advisor on Africa from 1960 until de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, ‘master-minding the operation’ in Nigeria, with the Quai d’Orsay allegedly uninvolved.

35

British politicians did acknowledge that certain members of the

Quai were more closely associated with Biafra than others, such as Michel Debré (Foreign

Minister, 30 May 1968 - 22 June 1969) who took the Gaullist line, adopting a ‘mystic’ attitude towards the Ibos.

36

However, despite the presence Biafran sympathisers at the Quai , as well as apparent awareness of the extent and nature of French involvement in Biafra, the

French foreign ministry did not appear to be in a position to influence French policy in

Nigeria.

The Quai

’s apparent lack of weight in France’s African policy-making created many problems for the British government as they attempted to contend with France’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. In late 1968 the British Embassy in Paris proposed taking advantage of the

Quai d’Orsay’s

anxieties about French policy in the hope that they might influence the Elysée to alter its position and use its influence in Biafra to help bring

33 D. Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers (London, 1975), p. 196.

34 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.

35 H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971), p. 560.

36 TNA/FCO/65/267_58, Fielding to West African Department, 10/12/1968.

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37

However as the months passed it became increasingly apparent that, despite some positive contacts between the Quai and British diplomats in Paris, Quai statements on the Nigerian conflict were little more than an ‘echo’ of Jacques Foccart himself.

38 De Gaulle and Foccart’s control over France’s African policy was paramount, and there was not a single British politician or diplomat, in London or Paris, who could break this

Elysée

monopoly over French involvement in the Nigerian Civil War.

Whilst the FCO did not hold out much hope that they themselves could influence de

Gaulle or Foccart, they did believe that African states might be able to have an impact on

French policy in Nigeria. French support for the Biafran separatists contributed to anti-

French sentiment in Nigeria created by French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in 1960.

The FCO hoped that this discontent might be translated into a coherent Nigerian attack on

French policy. The Nigerians however were far from enthusiastic about confronting France and made few public declarations against the French. They were fearful of provoking

France, and particularly de Gaulle, into increasing support for Biafra and thus prolonging the war. They also, perceptively perhaps, believed that de Gaulle was backing the Biafrans in an attempt to reduce Anglo-Saxon influence in West Africa, and that the civil conflict was a result of great power rivalries being acted out in Africa. Thus Britain had to approach

Nigeria with caution to avoid confirming fears that the Nigerian Civil War was developing into an Anglo-French conflict.

39

British politicians also discussed working through other African leaders, particularly those from Francophone Africa such as the President of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-

Boigny (1960-1993) and Léopold Sédar Senghor, the Senegalese President (1960-1980),

37 TNA/FCO/33/536_11, Soames to FCO, 04/10/1968.


39 TNA/FCO/65/266_7, Willan to Wilson, 19/10/1968.

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HY300 2008/2009 both of whom maintained close relations with de Gaulle and Foccart. It was hoped that an

African approach would be more successful than a direct British approach as it would play on de Gaulle’s sensitivities about Africa and possibly act to counterbalance the influence of

Houphouët-Boigny on the Elysée .

40 Nigeria’s reluctance to discuss matters directly with the

French prompted a further suggestion that the Federal government could raise the issue with the Consultative Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and persuade them in turn to approach de Gaulle. The OAU however failed to make an impact on the situation.

41

And while the Emperor of Ethiopia, President Kenyatta of Kenya and several other African leaders were also considered as possible intermediaries, none of these plans made it further than the drawing board.

42

One African approach discussed at length was the suggestion that President Senghor could be induced to encourage the French to reduce their support for Biafra. Senghor supported the concept of “One Nigeria”, but was within the Francophone sphere and thus believed to be in a position to influence Paris’ policy. However, relations between de

Gaulle and Senghor were plagued with difficulties which reduced the Senegalese weight in

French policy. Matters were further complicated by the French political and economic support that was keeping the Senghor regime afloat. Moreover, Senghor’s desire to avoid criticism left him unwilling to approach France on Britain’s behalf. Although Senghor did make some statements indicating his opposition to French policy, his allegiance remained firmly rooted in Francophonie.

43

The problem that faced the British government was that, although an African approach was a good idea in theory, in reality there were few Africans leaders who would



42 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.

43 TNA/FCO/65/300.

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HY300 2008/2009 not only agree to act on behalf of the UK government, but were also in a position to influence French politicians. The potentially influential leaders of France’s former African colonies were, according to one FCO official, like schoolboys who hero-worshipped their

‘Head-Boy’ de Gaulle and were thus unlikely to make a stand against France.

44 Despite various tactics being adopted, British attempts at working through African leaders yielded few positive results. The issue here is not perhaps the success or failure of these efforts but the fact that the British government were resorting to indirect means of dealing with France.

That British politicians felt they needed to make use of such oblique methods is indicative of the height and depth of the barriers that existed between France and Britain, effectively blocking direct Anglo-French discussion of the Nigerian problem. Anglo-French disagreement over the civil war in Nigeria was part of a broader and more fundamental

Anglo-French divide rooted in a century of rivalry on the African continent.

This is not to say that the British government did not make some attempts to establish a dialogue with French politicians on Nigeria. But such approaches were extremely cautious, particularly in the light of Anglo-French disagreements over Europe, exacerbated further in the wake of the ‘Soames Affair’ (February 1969) when the British

Foreign Office leaked details of a private conversation between de Gaulle and Christopher

Soames (British Ambassador to France, 1968-1972) about the EEC

45

Moreover, the absence of any tangible evidence of French military involvement also created obstacles to discussion with the French.

46

‘The joy of it all’, according to one journalist, ‘is that France is not directly involved – or at least no one so far can prove that Paris is.’

47

44 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.

45 TNA/FCO/65/266_38a, Brief for meeting with Soames, 19/11/1968.

46 TNA/FCO/65/347_11, Moberly to Fielding, 22/11/1968.

47 TNA/FCO/65/267_55, J. Wilde, ‘Keeping Biafra Alive’, Time , 06/12/1968.

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To overcome this predicament the FCO initially avoided ministerial approaches, favouring high-level bilateral discussions. The first opportunity for such a dialogue was at the annual Anglo-French talks on Africa which began on 17 December 1968. The main objective at these talks with regard to the Nigerian situation was to persuade the French government to alter its position and stop encouraging the Biafrans to continue fighting. It was hoped that France would agree to the necessity of an early ceasefire and negotiations, and that they convince Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu (leader of Biafra, 1967-1970) of the same thing. In order to achieve these objectives the FCO planned to emphasise the potential dangers of France’s policy, particularly the possibility of Communist infiltration of Nigeria that could pose a threat to Francophone West Africa. They also proposed to highlight the potential tensions between Francophone and Anglophone Africa as a result of France’s support for Biafra, underlining the possibility of Anglo-French conflict over the Nigerian issue. British emphasis on the shared concerns of Britain and France, particularly their common interest in preventing USSR penetration and maintaining African stability, reveals the British hope that France could be induced to share their point of view, thus averting serious Anglo-French disagreement over Nigeria.

48

In the event these talks were unsuccessful and the British government was unable to convince France to alter its policy.

Attention therefore shifted towards lower-level approaches, in the hope that discussion with

French ministers at the Quai would spread upward though the French foreign office and produce more positive results.

49

A “ prise de contacte” between British diplomats and Claude Lebel and Jean Gueury

(Director and Deputy Director respectively for African Affairs at the Quai ) on 20

December 1968 was interpreted as a positive development in Anglo-French discussions on

48 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French Talks, 17/12/1968.

49 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.

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Nigeria. The British politicians sensed a ‘germ of a possible compromise’ on the French side due to Quai unease about French support for Biafra. However, Debré’s loyalty to the

Biafran cause, as well as tight

Elysée

control over Nigerian affairs, limited the scope within which Britain could work. A shift in high level opinion was necessary if the British government could have any hope of altering French policy in Nigeria.

50

The possibility of approaching Jacques Foccart was briefly discussed, but the West Africa Department of

FCO had reservations from the outset and the proposed meeting failed to materialise.

51

As the months passed Britain failed to make any sort of impact on France’s policy and French support for the Biafrans continued unabated. Attempts to bridge the divide between Britain and France over Nigeria were brought to a standstill as French politicians became distracted by internal affairs, particularly the Constitutional Referendum that took place on 27 April 1969. Because of the repeated failure of direct communication with the

French government, Britain was left to pursue other methods to alter France’s policy. It was hoped the division in French public opinion on Biafra might be exploited, particularly following the problems of the French national “Aid Biafra week” in March 1969. However

British politicians remained unconvinced about how deep this rift actually was, reducing the potential impact such an approach might have.

52

The suggestion to use unattributable propaganda to sway French public opinion was treated with reserve due to concern that the information might be traced back to the British government, leading to further difficulties in Anglo-French relations.

The British government seemed to have run out of ideas on how to deal with France and their policy in Nigeria. The minimal possibility of direct high level approaches shows

50 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.

51 TNA/FCO/65/268_93, Wilson to Campbell, 22/01/1960.

52 TNA/FCO/65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009 how far apart the British FCO was from its French counterpart and prompted the adoption of alternative lower level approaches as well as indirect methods. These efforts however had little effect on French policy. The cul-de-sac in which Britain found itself was the result of a divergence in Anglo-French aims and interpretations of the Nigerian situation as a whole. French assessments of the Biafran military position and the role of guerrilla warfare were markedly different to Britain’s, as was their interpretation of the psychology of the

Ibos and the flexibility of the Federal government.

53

Nigerian students who arrived in

France in November 1968 on French government scholarships were described by the

British government as ‘hostages’, whilst the French government saw them as part of a friendly Franco-Nigerian cultural exchange. The British government made the distinction between funds raised for humanitarian causes and military causes. France did not.

54

Furthermore, Britain and France had different definitions of certain key terms relating to the conflict including “federation”, “confederation” and “self-determination”.

France favoured a confederal solution to a federal solution (de Gaulle was notoriously opposed to federations, particularly those of Anglo-Saxon origin). Britain however did not believe it was possible to differentiate between a federation and a confederation as both terms could be applied equally to several different situations. Similarly, France claimed that its belief in the right of the Ibo people to disposer d’eux-mêmes

did not necessarily imply support for Biafran independence, a similar stance to that adopted by de Gaulle towards the

Québécois separatists in his infamous

‘Vive Québec Libre’ speech of July 1967. Britain however associated self-determination with independence, and thus made no distinction between the two terms. Disagreement also arose over whether or not the killings of the Ibo

53 TNA/FCO/33/536_36, Fielding to Wilson, 03/02/1969.

54 TNA/FCO/65/266_34, Anderson to Minister, 08/11/1968.

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55

France and Britain were on a different page when it came to Nigeria. They repeatedly misinterpreted and misunderstood each other’s actions and intentions, revealing deeply rooted differences which placed severe limitations on the extent to which Britain and France could enjoy positive relations. As such, the Nigerian affair was to affect other areas of Anglo-French contact and undermine potential cooperation between the two nations in Africa, Europe and elsewhere.

55 TNA/FCO/65/266_12, Moberly to Fielding, 24/10/1968

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April 1969 – September 1970

After General de Gaulle: ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’

On 27 April 1969 France went to the polls to vote in a Constitutional Referendum that would decide whether de Gaulle’s proposals to increase regional powers and reform the Senate would be brought into legislation. De Gaulle had declared his intention to resign if he was defeated. Despite early suggestions that de Gaulle would win, only 47% of the population voted in favour of the reforms. The remaining 53% voted

‘non’

and consequently, on 28 April 1969, after more than ten years as the President of the French

Republic, Charles de Gaulle resigned.

56

The British government hoped his resignation would lead to a shift in French Nigerian policy and mark the beginning of a new era in

Anglo-French relations.

In the second half of April reports that the quantity of French military supplies reaching Biafra was diminishing began to appear, suggesting a possible modification in the

French attitude towards the Nigerian situation. Distracted by internal affairs and influenced by French industrialists and businessmen fearful for future French investments in Nigeria,

France appeared to be experiencing ‘a distinct cooling off’ in their enthusiasm for the

Biafran cause.

57

Although scepticism remained about the extent to which French interest and involvement was actually decreasing, some, including Christopher Soames, were hopeful of a French policy review following the referendum.

58

There was further cause for optimism when, on 2 May, the interim President, Alain Poher, replaced Jacques Foccart with Daniel Pepy.

56 R. Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London, 2006), p. 430-431.

57 TNA/FCO/65/269_139a, BBC World Service Broadcast, 24/04/1969.


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The French media offered additional evidence of a possible shift in France’s position towards Biafra. French commentators’ interpretations of the conflict were increasingly rational and subjective, with some alluding to the need for Biafra to surrender.

59 One French journalist discussed the inevitability of a modification of French policy if de Gaulle were to resign. He also acknowledged the cynical, anti-British nature of

France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War, a movement away from the media’s former justification of French action on moral grounds.

60

This perceived movement in French intellectual thinking increased British hope that the French government would alter its position on Biafra. The appointment of Georges Pompidou as the new President of the

French Republic on 15 June further buoyed British optimism. Even before his election

British diplomats based in Paris reported that, if elected, Pompidou would not continue de

Gaulle’s ‘ emmerdements africains

’.

61

The removal of the dedicated Gaullist and supporter of the Biafran people, Michel Debré, as foreign minister, and his replacement with Maurice

Schumann on 22 June was seen as further evidence of a possible departure from de

Gaulle’s Nigerian policy.

Whilst British government officials in Paris were heralding the end of Gaullism,

British diplomats and politicians outside of France interpreted events differently. The West

Africa Department of the FCO responded to de Gaulle’s resignation with reserve, uncertain if the ‘new situation in relation to the French attitude to Biafra’ would actually lead to a policy review by the French.

62

Maurice Foley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO) predicted that Gaullist policies would survive the demise of de Gaulle himself.

63

Moreover,

59 TNA/FCO/65/269_162, Moberly to Collins, 22/05/1969.

60 TNA/FCO/65/269_158, Conversation with Decraene, 16/05/1969.

61 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.


63 TNA/FCO/65/269_151, Wilson to Hunt, 05/05/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009 contrary to the assumption of the British Embassy in Paris that Foccart would never return,

64

those based in Whitehall were not surprised by Foccart’s reappointment on 26

June.

65

His return was seen as proof of the new regime’s intention to continue de Gaulle’s

African policies, dashing hopes for a modification of France’s Nigerian policy. The British

Embassy in Paris continued to put a positive spin on ‘Foccart’s reincarnation’, emphasising

Pompidou’s attempts to disassociate himself from Foccart.

66

Christopher Soames made much of the relocation of Foccart’s office away from the Elysée

, as well as the change in

Foccart’s title, which no longer made reference to responsibility to the President.

67

That

France’s African policy no longer seemed to be the domaine réservé of the Elysée was interpreted as an early indication of the French government’s intention to change its position on the Nigerian Civil War.

Yet

‘plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose’.

68

The replacement of Debré with

Schumann and Pompidou’s election as de Gaulle’s successor produced continuity more than change. Although considered better disposed to Britain than his predecessor, 69 it did not take long for comparisons between Schumann and Debré to be drawn.

70

Furthermore,

Schumann’s reference to “Biafra” on 9 July 71

contrasted with efforts immediately after de

Gaulle’s resignation to speak of “the Ibos”, rather than “the Biafrans”, 72

suggesting renewed French commitment to the Biafran cause. Similarly, the expectation that

Pompidou would make a decisive break with Gaullism quickly disappeared when

64 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.

65 TNA/FCO/65/270_177, McEntee to Simpson-Orlebar, 04/07/1969.

66 TNA/FCO/65/270_174, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 27/06/1969.


68 Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes, January 1849, cited in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford,

1964), p. 119. The English translation of this quotation is ‘the more things change, the more they are the same.’


70 TNA/FCO/65/270_210, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 22/08/1969.



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Pompidou met one of Biafra’s most loyal supporters, Omar Bongo (President of Gabon,

1967-present day) to discuss the conflict, indicating the new French President’s intention to continue supporting Biafra.

73

As France stubbornly remained champions of the Biafran cause, the British government began to question their refusal, despite mounting pressure, to alter their position. Many of the familiar explanations of French action were repeated. The geopolitical, commercial and humanitarian concerns that continued to shape French policy were cited, as was the anti-British element of French policy-making. The absence of any fresh insight indicates the British government’s struggle to comprehend French actions and motives. Correspondence from all departments of the FCO was increasingly concentrated on the paradoxical nature of France’s support for Biafra. The incompatibility of France’s sponsorship of the Biafran cause with the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations with

Nigeria was highlighted,

74

as was the contradiction between French support for Biafra and

France’s general policy objectives in West Africa.

75 An inconsistency was also noted in the continued vigour of Franco-Nigerian trade, which contributed more to the Federal Nigerian economy than France gave to Biafra in the form of military support.

76

That France was prolonging the conflict, whilst at the same time being a position to help end the war, was also difficult for British diplomats and politicians to comprehend.

77

United in their incomprehension of French policy, the British government increasingly denounced French motives. France’s intentions for support Biafra were viewed as dishonourable, particularly their desire to exploit Nigerian oil and frustrate Britain in

73 TNA/FCO/65/270_181, BBC Report, 21/07/1969

74 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.

TNA/FCO/65/270_184, Stewart to Lagos, 30/07/1969.


76 Stremlau, International Politics , p. 233.

77 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009

West Africa. Paris was condemned for allowing the conflict to continue and, as a result, damaging British interests in Nigeria. Such criticism shows how France’s Nigerian policy was no longer seen as a minor irritant, but part of a direct attack on Britain. Sir Leslie Glass

(British High Commissioner to Nigeria, 1969-1971) was particularly open in his criticism, stressing the ‘malice and greed which originally inspired’ the French support for Biafra. He advocated publicising France’s role in the war in an attempt to turn opinion against the

French government both inside and outside France. The British Embassy in Paris however had reservations about Glass’ plan due to fears that exposing French activities could

‘stiffen Gaullist determination’ 78 and prompt an upsurge in approval of France’s support for

‘“gallant little Biafra” against the threat of… Federal Nigerians armed to the teeth by the wicked British and the Russians!’ 79

Fears for their reputation, which was particularly at risk if they became associated with the USSR, deterred British politicians from being too overt in their attacks on France. The British Embassy in Paris was more reluctant than British government officials elsewhere, perhaps due to its close proximity to the French government and its Cold War policies of non-alignment.

The British Embassy in Paris also opposed suggestions made by John Wilson (Head of the West African Department of the FCO, 1968-1973) and others that Britain should try to persuade Nigeria to take firm action against France, particularly targeting French commercial concessions in Federal territory.

80 This previously discarded idea for a Nigerian approach was resurrected in the hope that Nigeria might be more willing to tackle Paris now de Gaulle was no longer in power.

81

Nigeria however remained unwilling to criticise

France due to its persistent worries about provoking France to intensify its support for

78 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.

79 TNA/FCO/65/270_202, Palliser to Johnston, 8/08/1969.

80 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.


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Biafra, which could in turn lead to Biafran victory.

This was a scenario which British politicians were also anxious to avoid.

82

The possibility of working through Senegal was once again explored due to the close relationship between Senghor and Pompidou.

Although critical of the France’s support for Biafra and its nurturing of a ‘cold war in

Nigeria’, 83

Senghor preferred to maintain a more neutral stance.

84

In any case, Senghor’s influence over the French President was counterbalanced by the ardent Biafran supporter,

Houphouët-Boigny, and his connections to Pompidou.

85

Whilst the different departments of the British FCO debated the merits of these indirect attacks, British politicians and diplomats discussed possible direct approaches to the French. The renewed interest in direct contacts shows the increased anxiety amongst

British politicians and diplomats about the Nigerian situation and the resulting negative consequences for Anglo-French relations. However, once again the British FCO struggled to agree on the exact line to take with the French. Whilst those in Whitehall favoured dealing with low level Quai officials, the British Embassy in Paris believed that only a top level directive would allow ‘a “real wind of change” to blow ‘through the corridors of the

Quai

’.

86

France’s repeated denial of involvement in the arms traffic to Biafra continued to act as a barrier to any high or low level contacts,

87

as did Britain’s desire to avoid being accused of reviving old colonial rivalries.

88

Fears of making the situation worse on the ground in Nigeria, and, above all else, concerns about risking Britain’s EEC membership

82 TNA/FCO/65/270_183, Johnston to Foley, 30/04/1969.

83 TNA/FCO/65/300_26, Report of Senghor interview with Figaro , 05/08/1969.

84 TNA/FCO/65/300_23, Davidson to Moberly, 10/06/1969.

85 TNA/FCO/65/270_200, Talks between Simpson-Orlebar and Ogunsulire, 06/08/1969.

86 TNA/FCO/65/270_211, Palliser to Johnston, 20/08/1969.

87 TNA/FCO/65/270_206, Freeman to FCO, 15/08/1969.

88 TNA/FCO/65/271_217a, Glass to Johnston, 03/09/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009 and permanently damaging Anglo-French relations, led the British government to be extremely cautious in their approaches to Paris.

89

It did appear however that, given the failure of indirect methods and the escalation of the problems in Nigeria, discussion with Paris was necessary if Britain was ever to bridge the widening channel that separated British and French interpretations of the

Nigerian Civil War. This incongruity was patent in the different views Britain and France held about Biafra’s secession. France believed Biafra’s declaration of independence from

Nigeria was a legitimate attempt to gain self-determination. Britain on the other hand, characterised it as a rebellion. The British government attributed this different reading of events to the contrasting styles of colonial and post-colonial policy the two countries adopted,

90

differences that meant France failed to understand Britain’s African policy as well as the history and ambitions of the Ibo people.

91

Here it is apparent that the Anglo-

French divide over Nigeria stemmed, not from the situation in Nigeria itself, but from a century of disagreement and dispute over African and imperial policy.

Yet, although British politicians did not agree with France’s assessments of the war, such as their description of the Nigerian Civil War as a religious war and their concentration on the ‘Islamic bogey’ over the threat of Communist infiltration, they did hope that, by presenting an accurate picture of the hostile influences in Nigeria, at least some elements of French policy might be brought into line with that of Britain. As such the possibility of Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria became an item on the agenda in this period.

92

The ‘somewhat easier atmosphere of the post-de Gaulle period’ contributed to rising British expectation that Britain and France might be able to collaborate on peace


90 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.

91 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.

92 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009 efforts.

93

Furthermore, the French pro-Biafran campaign was now seen as part of an internal feud between the moderate majority and a hard-line Gaullist minority, with Jacques

Foccart and the Union des jeunes pour le progrès (UJP) mobilising public opinion about

Biafra to attack Pompidou and the new regime. The FCO questioned whether Britain was really the main target of France’s Nigerian policy, raising hopes that the Anglo-French breach could be repaired.

94

As optimism grew among British politicians and diplomats, Anglo-French differences were increasingly regarded as insignificant in comparison with the shared threats that were created by the Nigerian Civil War, particularly the risk of Soviet expansion in Africa.

95

In discussions with the French, British politicians placed emphasis on the shared desire for African stability, in the hope that France might be persuaded to cooperate in a peace plan where both Britain and France would use their respective influences to help bring about a settlement.

96

It appears therefore that British politicians and diplomats believed the only way to bring the conflict to a close was to overlook the impasse that divided Britain and France. The need to stabilise Anglo-French relations was not only essential for ending the Nigerian Civil War, but also for resolving tensions between Britain and France in Africa and elsewhere.

93 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.



96 TNA/FCO/65/271_231, Conversation between Stewart and Schumann, 20/09/1969.

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October 1969 – January 1970

The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy

In October 1969 the Nigerian government began preparing for a final assault against

Biafra which was intended to defeat the breakaway state and bring it back under the Federal rule.

97

Alongside hopes that the war might end soon, a modification of France’s Nigerian policy was also anticipated. The British media reported a transformation of the French attitude towards the war. According to one British journalist reporting from Paris

‘unofficial French support for Biafra’ was to be ‘discouraged’, with a guarantee from

Pompidou himself ‘that there should be no further French involvement, official or otherwise, in internal Nigerian affairs.’ 98

The British government however largely discounted such reports as speculative and based upon tenuous evidence, recognising that a major shift in France’s position, as predicted by the British press, was extremely improbable.

99 The best anyone could hope for was a minor modification that might bring the war to a speedier conclusion, thus reducing the threats posed by the continuance of the conflict and removing the obstacle that stood in the way of constructive Anglo-French relations.

Those within the British government most hopeful of a small change on the French side could be found at the British Embassy in Paris. They believed discussions between the

French and British foreign ministers in New York in late September had prompted top level

Quai officials to reconsider France’s Nigerian policy and, as a result, propose talks on the issue with the British government. Although Nigeria was to be discussed under the veil of

97 De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War , p. 368.

98 TNA/FCO/65/272_259, J. Smalldon, ‘French support for Biafra relief ‘will be discouraged’’, The Daily

Telegraph , 30/10/1969.

99 TNA/FCO/65/272_264, Simpson-Orlebar to Wilson, 07/11/1969.

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HY300 2008/2009 talks on the Middle East, the fact that the French government had proposed the meeting at all was interpreted as an indication of a possible change in their policy and an alignment of

Anglo-French objectives in Nigeria.

100

Optimism about a shift in France’s position was heightened further when Claude Lebel (Director for African Affairs at the Quai ) contacted the British Embassy in Paris to arrange talks with London sooner than expected.

101

Schumann’s speech to the French National Assembly on 4 November, in which he repeated many elements of de Gaulle’s speech of 9 September 1968, but omitted the passage in which de Gaulle had acknowledged the possibility of future diplomatic recognition of the breakaway state, was also perceived as a signal that France would soon give up the idea of

Biafran self-determination.

102

The replacement, in December 1969, of Lebel with Bruno de

Leusse de Syon, who lacked an ‘emotional or irrational commitment to “Biafra”’, was seen as another positive development in France’s Nigerian policy.

103

British government officials in London and Lagos did not share however the

British Embassy’s optimism that a change would take place in France’s position towards the Nigerian Civil War, proof perhaps that a little more perspective was needed to obtain an accurate interpretation of events. Assessments of French policy from outside of the

Embassy were increasingly cynical, focusing on the dishonourable and irrational motivations that shaped France’s continued support for Biafra, revealing the growing

British disillusion with French policy. British diplomats disregarded the French government’s declaration of commitment to the right of the Ibos to disposer d’eux-mêmes

, citing as evidence France’s opposition to self-determination in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the support they had given to the governments of Cameroon and Chad respectively

100 TNA/FCO/65/271_235, Palliser to Tebbit, 03/10/1969.

101 TNA/FCO/65/271_237, Palliser to Arthur, 06/10/1969.



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HY300 2008/2009 against movements striving for increased autonomy.

104

Yet, as has previously been discussed, British and French conceptions of “self-determination” (and other important terms relating to the conflict) were quite dissimilar, posing serious problems for Anglo-

French contacts in Nigeria. This difference in interpretation was symptomatic of the fundamental misunderstandings that existed between Britain and France which created insurmountable obstacles to improving Anglo-French relations.

Avowed champions of the Biafran cause continued to dictate France’s Nigerian policy, a dominance that British politicians remained unable to destroy. Charles de Gaulle continued to exercise a significant influence over the French political scene in the months since his resignation, making a reduction in France’s support for Biafra seem unlikely.

Foccart also maintained his near absolute control over French African policy, with Nigerian policy remaining the domaine réservé

of the

Elysée

, despite earlier hopes that the Quai control was increasing.

105

Moreover, Houphouët-Boigny, a dedicated Biafran supporter, continued to act as a valued advisor on African affairs to high-ranking French decisionmakers, including President Pompidou himself.

106

His ability to influence French actions in

Nigeria stemmed from the great significance that French politicians attached to their relations with Francophone African leaders in their pursuit of West African hegemony.

107

The desire to avoid falling out with their African friends, a legacy of France’s imperial policy in Africa, created an obstacle to any real change in France’s attitude towards the

Nigerian conflict. As long as Houphouët-Boigny continued to support Biafra, so too would

France.

104 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.



107 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 271.

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Other legacies of colonialism were perceived to have an impact on France’s

Nigerian policy, acting as a barrier to any possible alteration of France’s position. The

British High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Leslie Glass, expressed serious doubts that there would be a modification in French policy, emphasising the role of Foccart in running what he described as ‘an autonomous empire which seems to have inherited some of the frustrated mystique of Frenchmen embittered by events in Indo-China and Algeria’.

108

This association between France’s imperial failures and their support for Biafra shows the deeprooted forces that British politicians and diplomats believed to be at work in France’s

African policy-making. France’s determination to support Biafra was rooted in its imperial past, undermining any British hopes that France might alter its Nigerian policy in any significant way.

Alongside these analyses of French motives ran pessimistic British assessments of

France’s role in the war which concentrated on the negative consequences of France’s involvement. France was identified as being at the heart of the problem in Nigeria, and was accused by the FCO of pursuing a policy in direct opposition to Britain, as well as being

‘mainly responsible for keeping Biafra alive and for keeping the war going.’ As a result the

British government was more and more convinced that it was necessary to take a firm stance with France, rejecting ‘the fiction’ that France was a neutral bystander in the conflict.

It was vital that Britain ‘do everything possible to try to induce the French to change their policy.’ 109

It was not only France’s perceived responsibility in maintaining the conflict in

Nigeria that determined the decision by British politicians and diplomats to adopt a firmer line with France. The recognition that France’s role in the conflict was having a detrimental

108 TNA/FCO/65/272_262, Glass to Johnston, 06/12/1969.


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HY300 2008/2009 impact on Britain’s interests in Nigeria contributed to a hardening British attitude towards

France over the Nigerian problem. In the earlier months of the conflict the British government had been willing to disregard the fact that France were pursuing a policy which endangered British material interests in the region to avoid upsetting Anglo-French relations or damaging Britain’s position in Europe. However, as evidence mounted of the damage to British commerce in Nigeria as a result of France’s support for Biafra, the need for a frank approach to the French to persuade them to alter their policy was advocated as essential.

110

In mid-November 1969 arguably the most damning reports of French involvement in the war hitherto available were brought to the British government’s attention. There was now concrete evidence that the Biafran Air Force was using weapons of French manufacture against British oil installations in Nigeria. Moreover, British businessmen working in Nigeria began to raise concerns about the potential threat posed to British property and citizens as a result of French involvement in the war. Although some of the reports were subsequently deemed false, the British government was becoming increasingly anxious about the adverse publicity it would receive if it was seen to be neglecting the safety of British nationals, emphasising its concern to preserve its own reputation.

111

This, combined with the threat to British commerce and the persistence of fighting in Nigeria, prompted British politicians to discuss plans to approach Paris immediately and insist that they ‘put matters right.’ 112

The French government needed to be aware that in supporting

Biafra they were not only fuelling serious problems in Nigeria, but also creating a ‘major

110 TNA/FCO/65/272_246, Tebbit from Bendall, 14/10/1969.



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HY300 2008/2009 irritant’ in Anglo-French relations.

113

The urgency of this rhetoric illustrates the intensifying need to resolve Anglo-French tensions for the sake of Nigeria, but also for

Britain itself. Despite being quick to criticise France for acting in its own self-interest,

British politicians and diplomats were slow to recognise that they were in fact doing the same.

In order to persuade France to change its position, British politicians once again underlined again the threat of instability in Francophone Africa if the Soviet Union was allowed to penetrate Nigeria and religious and ethnic tensions in the region were left to multiply as a result of the continuance of the conflict.

114 Alongside these arguments, the potential irreversible damage to Franco-Nigerian relations was emphasised, as was the risk that Nigerian antagonism towards France might be extended to Francophone West

Africa.

115

Both of these outcomes would create serious problems for France if it wished to maintain its treasured position in the region and, as such, it was hoped that by highlighting these threats, France might be persuaded to alter its position. The fact that Britain was able to identify correctly the connection France felt to Africa demonstrates Britain’s own attachment to the continent, and a shared Anglo-French bond that could perhaps act as a foundation for compromise in Nigeria.

Tactics for approaching France continued to be a matter of contention within British diplomatic circles. Whilst in agreement about the necessity of ‘a personal approach’, exact tactical details continued to be debated, with tensions once again arising between Whitehall and the British Embassy in Paris. Christopher Soames suggested that Michael Stewart

(Foreign Secretary, 1968-1970) should tackle Schumann about Nigeria at the NATO

113 TNA/FCO/65/272_277, Brief on France’s attitude to Nigeria and Biafra, 09/12/1969.


115 TNA/FCO/65/272_283, Letter from Wilson to Palliser, 19/12/1969.

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Summit (4-5 December) which both British and French foreign ministers would be attending. Stewart was however far from enamoured with such a plan, proposing instead that Soames should discuss Nigeria with Schumann in more private surroundings. Soames planned to warn Schumann’s officials of the British intention to raise the issue with them.

Stewart, on the hand, did not want to allow the Quai time to prepare for the discussion and thus favoured a more surprise approach to ‘shock’ Schumann ‘to call M. Foccart to order.’ 116

Division amongst the British about the precise line to take with the French is symptomatic perhaps of how much depended on Anglo-French discussions on Nigeria. The fact that neither Soames nor Stewart were personally willing to take responsibility for approaching France emphasises the difficulties involved in tackling France about their support for Biafra and the way in which the disagreement over Nigeria troubled Anglo-

French communications overall.

The establishment of a dialogue on Nigeria was further frustrated by the continued clash between British and French interpretations of the war. France believed an Ibo victory was possible and that a united Nigeria would collapse. This contrasted with the British view that the Biafrans could not win and that a “One Nigeria” could survive.

117

France and

Britain also interpreted the USSR’s role in the conflict differently, with the French maintaining that the USSR might reconsider its policy despite the fact Britain thought such an occurrence would be unlikely. France continued to differentiate between “selfdetermination” and “independence”, a distinction that British politicians had never understood.

118

Another contentious issue was whether genocide was taking place in Nigeria.

116 TNA/FCO/65/272_268-171, Correspondence between Stewart and Soames, 26-28/11/1969.


118 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.

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Britain insisted that the Federal government had no genocidal intentions.

119

The French government, on the other hand, reiterated the belief it had expressed throughout the conflict, that genocide against the Ibo people was imminent.

120

Pessimism also surrounded France’s humanitarian initiatives in the final weeks of the war. French criticism of the Federal government and their attempts to mobilise international opinion about the suffering of the Biafran people was seen as a desperate final attempt by France to reverse the poor military situation in Biafra and save their Nigerian policy. As a result the British government sought to disassociate itself from France to avoid upsetting Nigeria, demonstrating how it was not only the French who felt an attachment to their former colonial territories.

121

Despite the British government’s desire to distance itself from France’s Nigerian policy, Britain’s own commitment to its former imperial dependencies mirrors France’s attachment to its ex-African empire. It is possible to suggest therefore that, despite the appearance of hostility, underneath the surface Britain and France understood each other better than has hitherto been suggested.

The fall of Biafra on 14 January 1970 signalled the collapse of France’s Nigerian policy. Throughout the conflict Britain and France had consistently stood on different sides, disagreeing over numerous issues and repeatedly failing to understand each other’s aims.

This Anglo-French mésentente

in Nigeria was, according to John Wilson, the result of the different styles of diplomacy that Britain and France adopted. France’s foreign policymaking was ‘devoid of any moral content’ and based ‘on ruthless self-interest pursued with determination and entire lack of scruple’. Such a ‘fundamental’ difference in outlooks,

119 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.

120 TNA/FCO/65/751_8, Glass to FCO, 10/01/1970.

121 TNA/FCO/65/751_12, Stewart to Lagos, 11/01/1970.

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HY300 2008/2009 which had endured despite the ‘passing of de Gaulle’, posed grave problems for the future of Anglo-French relations.

122

However France’s recognition that its Nigerian policy was ‘in ruins’ following the fall of Biafra reignited hopes amongst British politicians and diplomats that past disagreements could be put behind them and Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria could be achieved.

123

Despite the differences between Britain and France during the Nigerian Civil

War, a flicker of hope about a future Anglo-French entente cordiale still glimmered brightly on the British side of the channel.

122 TNA/FCO/65/751_2, Wilson to Burroughs, 07/01/1970.

123 TNA/FCO/65/751_25, Palliser to Wilson, 14/01/1970.

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Conclusions

France’s support for the Biafran separatists during the Nigerian Civil War was a major source of contention for Anglo-French relations in the late 1960s, particularly in the final eighteen months of the Biafran war when French involvement directly opposed British policy in the region. British politicians, diplomats and journalists offered various interpretations of French participation, oscillating between optimism and pessimism according to the location of the commentator. Those based in Paris, and thus closest to the

French government, generally adopted a positive perspective on French action, expressing their hope throughout the conflict that France would modify its policy. In stark contrast were the reports that came from on the ground in Nigeria. Here the experience of fighting and a close association with the Federal government led journalists and diplomats alike to respond negatively to French policy. A more balanced position was maintained by Londonbased politicians, perhaps due to more ready access to both sides of the story.

Amongst these varying interpretations there was a degree of consensus. The British government and media shared the view that France’s policy in Nigeria was shaped by

Charles de Gaulle himself, whose lasting influence on French African policy survived the course of the conflict, despite his resignation in April 1969. The Gaullist conception of

France’s world role which stated that French grandeur was reliant on status in Africa was significant. This notion was born in part from France’s colonial experience, the legacy of which was entrenched in much of France’s Nigerian policy. The British government was to discover to its cost this immovable rock on which French support for Biafra was founded.

As the conflict progressed, and French involvement persisted, British responses became progressively pessimistic, focusing on the dishonourable motives for French policy

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HY300 2008/2009 in Nigeria. According to this negative interpretation, France was supporting Biafra to preserve its own standing in West Africa, an aim that they hoped to achieve by challenging

Britain’s position in the region. Cynicism about French intent grew as British material interests in Nigeria, particularly the highly valuable oil concessions, fell under attack. Thus, many questioned if it was Britain, and not Nigeria, which was the real target of French policy, increasing British resentment towards France.

From July 1968, when France issued its first statement in support of Biafra, the

FCO repeatedly discussed ways and means of convincing the Quai to alter its position towards the Nigerian Civil War, and thus influence those in Elysée to do the same. In spite of this, the British government was reluctant to make a firm stand, preferring indirect methods of communicating their concern to the French government. However, as the threat to British interests in Nigeria grew ever more acute, British politicians and diplomats increased their commitment to induce a change in France’s position. This suggests that perhaps the British government’s concern for its own interests was greater than its distress about the unravelling situation in Nigeria.

All attempts to alter French policy nevertheless resulted in disappointment, as can be seen by the support France gave to Biafra until its collapse in January 1970. The failure of these efforts can be attributed to numerous factors including the difficult personal relations that existed between British and French politicians and Britain’s concern for its position in Europe. The principal reason however for the FCO’s inability to persuade

France to alter its stance, as well as the main cause of the Anglo-French disagreement over

Nigeria, was the fundamental disparity between Paris and London’s attitudes. These differences stemmed from centuries of rivalry across the globe which had created discord between British and French conceptions of diplomatic conduct, foreign policy and

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HY300 2008/2009 colonialism. The clash in Nigeria was just one manifestation of this inherent Anglo-French divide which, in turn, created a significant obstacle to improving relations between Britain and France. In the years since the end of the Nigerian Civil War this division has persisted in Anglo-French interaction on the African continent. An examination of these contacts, particularly in areas of Anglophone Africa such as South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) where, as in Nigeria, France intervened outside of its traditional sphere of influence, is necessary for a fuller understanding of the depth of this Anglo-French divide.

And yet, despite the deep gulf that existed between Britain and France, and their failure to come to an agreement over the Nigerian issue, the collapse of France’s Biafran policy in 1970 fostered a new hope of a future realignment of Anglo-French African policy.

Furthermore, beneath the surface, and perhaps unseen by British politicians and diplomats, the shared Anglo-French concern for their former colonies created a foundation upon which future cooperation could be built.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL

The National Archives - Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors



[T]he [N]ational [A]rchives/FCO/25/234 - France and Nigeria (1967-68)



TNA/FCO/33/46 – Overseas visits by General de Gaulle (1967-8)



TNA/FCO/33/62 - Reports of UK Ambassador's interviews with General de Gaulle

(1967-8)



TNA/FCO/33/536 - Relations between France and Nigeria (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/33/534 - Visit to London by M. Schumann, French Foreign Minister (1969)



TNA/FCO/38/249 – Recognition of Biafra by countries outside the UK (1967-68)



TNA/FCO/38/250 – Recognition of Biafra by countries outside the UK (1968)



TNA/FCO/65/266 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French relations (1968)



TNA/FCO/65/267 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French relations (1968-9)










39


HY300 2008/2009









TNA/FCO/65/273 – French relief operations to Biafra (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/286 – Kenya: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/299 – Ivory Coast: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/306 – Gabon: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/307 – Gabon: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1969)



TNA/FCO/65/300 - Senegal: suggestion that African leaders could be asked to pressurise France not to support Biafra (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/347 – French arms supplies to Biafra (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/446 - Comments by journalists covering Biafra war (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/452 - Auberon Waugh's comments on Nigerian civil war (1969)



TNA/FCO/65/467 – French Deputies (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/ 544 – Ivory Coast: Bilateral Relations with France (1968-9)



TNA/FCO/65/751 - Attitude of France towards Civil War in Nigeria (1970)



TNA/FCO/65/752 - Attitude of France towards Civil War in Nigeria (1970)



TNA/FCO/95/617 – Gabon: support for Biafra (1969)

40


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British Parliamentary Debates (Available online at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/)



[H]ouse of [L]ords Deb 13 February 1968 vol. 289



HL Deb 11 March 1968 vol. 290



[H]ouse of [C]ommons Deb 27 August 1968 vol. 769



HC Deb 31 October 1968 vol. 772



HL Deb 05 November 1968 vol. 297



HC Deb 12 December 1968 vol. 775



HL Deb 25 February 1969 vol. 299



HL Deb 04 March 1969 vol. 300



HC Deb 13 March 1969 vol. 779



HC Deb 27 March 1969 vol. 780



HC Deb 12 June 1969 vol. 784



HL Deb 21 July 1969 vol. 304

Memoirs



A. Smith with C. Sanger, Stitches in time: The Commonwealth in World Politics ,

London, Andre Deutsch, 1991.



M. Stewart, Life and Labour: An Autobiography , London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980.



D. Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers , London, Peter Davies, 1975.



H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record , London,

Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971.

41


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SECONDARY SOURCE MATERIAL



A. Andereggen,

France’s Relationship with Subsaharan Africa

, Westport, Connecticut,

Praeger, 1994.



D. Bach, ‘Le Ge ́néral de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’, Canadian Journal of

African Studies , Volume 14, No. 2, 1980; also in La Politique Africaine du Général de

Gaulle (1958-1969): actes du colloque organisé par le Centre Bordelais d’Études

Africaines, le Centre d’Étude d’Afrique Noire et l’Institut Charles-de-Gaulle, Bordeaux,

19-20 Octobre.

Paris, Éditions A. Pedone, 1980.



D. Bach, ‘France’s Involvement in Sub-Saharan African: A Necessary Condition to

Middle Power Status in the International System’, A. Sesay (ed.), Africa and Europe: from Partition to Interdependence to Dependence?

, London, Croom Helm, 1986.



O. Balogun, The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis, 1966-1970 , Benin City, Nigeria,

Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1973.



R. Bourgi,

Le General de Gaulle et l’Afrique Noire, 1940-1969

, Paris, Librarie

Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980.



A. Capet (ed.), Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904 , Basingstoke,

Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.



Z. Cervenka, A History of the Nigerian Civil War , Ibadan, Onibonoje Press, 1972.



J-L. Clergerie, La Crise du Biafra , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994.



E. M. Corbett, The French Presence in Black Africa , Washington D.C., Black Orpheus

Press, 1972.

 S. Cronjé,

The World and Nigeria: the Diplomatic History of the Biafran Civil War,

1967-1970 , London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972.

42


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 C. K. Daddieh and T. M. Shaw, ‘The Political Economy of Decision-Making in African

Foreign Policy: Recognition of Biafra and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of

Angola (MPLA)’, International Political Science Review , Volume 5, No. 1, 1984.



J. De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War , London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.



F. Forsyth, The Biafra Story , Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969.

 R. Joseph, ‘The Gaullist Legacy: Patterns of French Neo-Colonialism’,

Review of

African Political Economy , No. 6, 1976.



R. Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 , London, Penguin,

2006.



A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: a documentary source book. Vol.

2, July 1967 – January 1970 , London, Oxford University Press, 1971.



A. H. M. Kirk-Greene and C. C. Wrigley, ‘Biafra in Print’, African Affairs , Vol. 69, No.

275, 1970.

 Y. Kristilolu, ‘Business as usual: Britain, Oil and the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970’,

African Economic History Workshop , 25 April 2007, London School of Economics and

Political Science.

 R. Luckman, ‘French Militarism in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy , No.

24, 1982.

 G. Martin, ‘The Historical, Economic and Political Bases of France’s Africa Policy’,

The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 23, No. 2, 1985.

 G. Martin, ‘Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations’,

The Journal of

Modern African Studies , Volume 33, No. 1, 1995.

43


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

F. T. McNamara, France in Black Africa , Washington DC, National Defence University,

1989.



K. Melville. The Involvement of France and Francophone West Africa in the Nigerian

Civil War , Perth, African Studies Seminar, School of Human Communication, Murdoch

University, 1979.

 O. Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on

Nigerian Foreign Relations’, African Affairs , Volume 75, No. 298, 1976.



J. J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 ,

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.

 C. Uche, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War’, Journal of African History ,

49, 2008.



R. Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian civil war : facing the future , New York :

Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

 M. Vaïsse, La Grandeur: Politique Etrangère du General de Gaulle, 1958-1969

, Paris,

Fayard, 1998.



A. Waugh and S. Cronjé,

Biafra: Britain’s Shame

, London, Joseph, 1969.

 C. Wauthier, ‘France and Africa: Long Live Neo-Colonialism’, A Journal of Opinion ,

Volume 2, No. 1, Spring 1972.



C. Wauthier,

Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing,

Mitterand - Quarante Ans de Politique Africaine , Paris, Seuil, 1995.

44

britain, france and the nigerian civil war, 1967-1970

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

HY300 BA DISSERTATION

2008/2009

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 71817

Word Count – 9,969 words

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britain, france and the nigerian civil war, 1967-1970

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

HY300 BA DISSERTATION

2008/2009

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 71817

Word Count – 9,969 words

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