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Give a presentation and a critical discussion of John Rawls’s theory of distributive
justice.
Introduction
Before John Rawls’s influential treatise, a theory of justice, there was this strong
notion that only an improved version, if there was one, of the classical utilitarian
argument could lead us toward a greater understanding of political morality.
Utilitarianism was quite attractive from a philosophical standpoint, but its appeal
seemed to collide with our basic intuitions about fairness. This criticism came after
Rawls published his book, and was partly due to him. Rawls sets himself the task of
breaking this “utilitarianism vs. intuitionism” deadlock (Kymlicka; 2002:55). For this
purpose Rawls draws on the tradition of Enlightenment thinking, that of a
hypothetical agreement on a ‘social contract‘, and his foundational idea is that justice
has to be seen in terms of the demands of fairness (Sen 2009:53). This essay will give
a presentation of John Rawls’s theory of distributive justice. I will start by introducing
his principles of justice and give his arguments for why these principles would
unanimously be chosen by members of the society from the ‘original position’. The
presentation will be followed by a critical discussion. A special emphasize will be
given to critique raised by Amartya Sen. The discussion is centered around difficulties
with Rawls’s system of thought and will not get into alternative theories.
Rawls’s approach and the principles of justice
Rawls’s work is a philosophical argument for the liberal welfare state. But Kymlicka
argues that the welfare state is necessary, not sufficient for Rawlsian justice. The
argument is that the liberal welfare state is the right one, because this way of
organizing the state would be preferred by tolerant and reasonable human beings, if
they were given the opportunity to engage in a social contract under terms that
guarantees equal consideration of the individual (Malnes & Midgaard 2004:235).
Rawls perceives the society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage;
however this cooperative venture is both marked by conflicting interests as well as
shared interests. There exists mutual advantage of interest, since social cooperation
benefits all members of the society. Cooperation increases their living standard to a
level unattainable for the individual to reach solely by its own effort. The conflict of
interests arises because people are not just simply indifferent to how products of
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collaboration are distributed (Solomon & Murphy 2000:101). Since individuals have
their own plans and/or conceptions of the good life, they have different purposes and
ends, and therefore they make different claims on the natural and social resources
available (ibid). Rawls assumes that individuals are mutually disinterested towards
each other (not in this context) and further assumes that both natural and social
resources are moderately scarce. Explain! Under such conditions justice is relevant
whenever individuals put forward conflicting claims to the division of social
advantages (ibid). This paragraph summarises Rawls argument for why a theory of
distributive justice i necessary and relevant. (CF Nozick, who claims the opposite)
The various claims set forward by the conflicting parties are connected to the
distribution of social primary goods such as liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the social bases of self respect. He rejects individual welfare as the good
to be equally distributed. For him social justice cannot build on an assumption that
individual welfare in the sense of personal happiness is the one, final good for all
persons (Bojer 2003:43). As mentioned, primary goods are the goods to be
distributed, since these are the goods that determine social and economic inequalities
in lifetime prospects (ibid). Rawls thinks that these goods are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of one or all of these goods is to advantage of
the least favored (Kymlicka 2002:55). However this doesn’t imply that we should
remove all inequalities. If some inequalities benefit everyone, that is they don’t make
anyone worse off, then they should be allowed. The idea is that inequalities are
allowed if they improve an individual’s initial equal share, but are not allowed if they
invade his or her fair share (ibid).
The problem of choosing between various social arrangements could be solved
by defining a set of principles which in turn determines the division of advantage.
These principles are to be chosen in light of the consequences born for those
complying with them (Solomon &Murphy 2000:101). To overcome the problem of
conflicting principles Rawls breaks down his general conception of justice into two
parts and arranges them according to a principle of ‘lexical priority’ Explain lexical
(Kymlicka 2002: 55). His first principle states that, ‘each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all’. The second principle says that, ‘Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the
least advantage (difference principle), and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
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all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ Explain equality of oppotrunity.
(Difficult) (Kymlicka 2002:56). Rawls gives the first priority to the first principle, he
says that, ‘liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty‘. Further the second
principle is to be given priority over the principle of efficiency, and fair opportunity is
prior to the difference principle (ibid). Rawls gives two arguments for his set of
principles. The first argument is connected to and contrasts the prevailing ideology
that equal opportunity is fair. The second argument is that these set of principles will
be chosen from an original position of equality, which is a hypothetical situation were
the participants are constrained by a ‘veil of ignorance’.
Starting with his first argument, we could ask; why do we assume that equal
opportunity is fair? Rawls claims that there is this attractive idea that individuals
deserve unequal shares of social goods, if they are the product of the individual’s
actions and choices. As such it has a strong appeal because it ensures that people’s
fate is determined by their choices (Kymlicka 2002:58). Rawls thinks differently and
says that both natural talents and social circumstances, which can disadvantage or
privileged some, are both matters of brute luck. Since brute luck is something out of
our reach it must be excluded when people make moral claims, only this can ensure a
‘right fair to go’??) (ibid). But eliminating these arbitrary contingencies is not the
way to go forward, instead Rawls argues that the basic structure of the society can be
arranged so that these differences can work to benefit the least fortunate. Such a
system is only possible if we were to arrange the society according to the difference
principle (Kymlicka 2002:59). In other words no one is entitled to benefit from their
greater natural capacities; however it is not unfair if these greater capacities are used
to advance the initial share of those less fortunate. Rawls point is that equality of
opportunity is necessary, but not sufficient, for justice.
The original position
To Rawls the common ground of a society is an agreement between its inhabitants on
what institutions and arrangements are just. He himself defines a liberal society as ’a
society that allows for a plurality of different and even incommensurable conceptions
of the good…’ (Bojer 2003:36).
To ensure a unanimous agreement, his second and main argument draws on
the tradition of a hypothetical ‘social contract’. The main reason for this usage, is to
ensure that people is treated as moral equals. Since such a point of departure ensures
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that none of us is subordinate to the will of others, we might think that the outcome
will be somehow fair. But this is not the case, considering the arbitrary contingencies
mentioned above, individuals are inclined to abuse their favorable starting points in
society and/or their greater natural capacities to their advantage when negotiating the
principles of just distribution. At this junction we need a different mechanism that
excludes some individuals bargaining power over others. Rawls develops here a
construction which he calls ’the original position’ in this position people are no longer
aware of there vested interests or their position in society, nor do they know their
natural capacities, they are behind a ’veil of ignorance’. Rawls even assumes that they
don’t even know their psychological propensities, all to ensure that no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural
chance or their social circumstances. From this original position no one can design
principles who favor them directly or indirectly. Furthermore he assumes that the
participants have general knowledge about the nature and human societies, they
understand the workings of politics and economic theory, they are also assumed to be
acquainted with the laws of human psychology, and they are fully aware of the
benefits of social cooperation and organizational life (Kymlicka 2002:63). There are
no limitations on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice must be
adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which they are to
regulate (??) (Solomon & Murphy 2000:104). Rawls says it is unfair that people's lack
of general knowledge should have anything to say, for the outcome of the ’social
contract’ (Malnes & Midgaard 2004:239). The principles of justice chosen from this
’original position’ are thus thought to be fair.
This brings us over to his central idea. Rawls argues strongly that justice
should be thought about in terms of fairness, ‘justice as fairness‘. Since individuals
are assumed to be mutually disinterested, they fail to see just distribution in terms of
fairness. Why fairness? Fairness, because central to the concept of fairness is a
demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and concerns of
others as well, and in particular the need to avoid our propensity to be influenced by
our respective interests, or by our personal priorities (Sen 2009:54). I would say
impartiality is the point, and I think that is what Rawls means by `fairness' So the
main purpose of the ‘veil of ignorance’ is that it functions as an intuitive test of
fairness, none is able to tip the table in their favor, in addition to this, Rawls claims
that the principles chosen behind a ’veil of ignorance’ is also unanimously chosen
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(Kymlicka 2002:64).
But as Kymlicka (2002) argues it isn’t clear that individuals behind a ‘veil of
ignorance’ would chose the difference principle. Why is Rawls assuming that this
would be the case? Well, we have to ask; what is the rational thing to do in such a
scenario? Rawls argues, by drawing on the theory of choice under uncertainty that it
would be highly unwise to gamble with the means to ones lifetime prospects, since
none of the individuals know their position in life they have to choose under
uncertainty. The most rational thing to do in a situation like this is according to
Rawls, to try to minimize the damage if you were to end up in a disadvantaged
position. Even if the were low probability for this to incur. By other means, you
should adopt a ‘maximin’ strategy, which is to maximize what you would get if you
by chance should end up in the minimum. And this, Rawls concludes, is the same as
choosing the difference principle (Kymlicka 2002:66).
Difficulties with the Rawlsian system
The task for Rawls was to create a theory that was more in aligning with our intuitive
conceptions about fairness, both with respect to institutions and actual behavior.
But Sen (2009) argues that ’ in the Rawlsian system of justice as fairness,
direct attention is bestowed almost exclusively on ‘just institutions’, rather than
focusing on ‘just societies’ that may rely on both effective institutions and on actual
behavioral features‘ (Sen 2009:67). Sen has a point. It seems like Rawls thinks that
the two principles are seen to both ensure the right choice of institutions and to lay the
ground for the emergence of appropriate actual behavior. This is not so obvious. Sen
(2009) further says that this makes individual and social psychology thoroughly
dependent on a kind of political ethics (ibid). Rawls on the other hand is mostly
concerned with the basic structure of the society, because the way these institutions
are specified and integrated into a social system deeply affects peoples characters in
countless ways, it both influence and shape their desires and plans, as well as the
persons they aspire to be. This is a strong argument for considering the basic
structures of society as ’the primary subject of justice’ (Freedman 2003:3-4).
A second critique raised by Sen (2009) is connected with Rawls perception of
the primary goods According to Sen, Rawls fails to acknowledge the wide variety
between people, with respect to their differences in health, need and mobility (Bojer,
Forelesningsnotat.6). Since Rawls considers health to be a natural good, it is regarded
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by him as not being subject to distribution. What about differences in need? For
example, a pregnant woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support than
another person, who is not bearing a child. She can do far less with the same level of
income and other primary goods (Sen 2009:66). Is it then reasonable to think that
individuals value a marginal increase of social primary goods equally? Sen thinks
otherwise, and argues that we should move our focus to actual assessment of
freedoms and capabilities (ibid).
As we saw earlier, Rawls allows inequalities to exist if it is to the advantage
for the least fortunate; there is a pragmatic compromise hiding behind this argument.
G. A Cohen arguments in his book Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), that ’the
accommodation of inequality for reasons of incentives limit’s the reach of the
Rawlsian theory of justice. The concession to incentives may make good practical
sense, but can it be a part of a plausible theory, specifically, of justice?’ (Sen
2009:61). Cohen claims that ‘a society that can be seen as perfectly just should not
have the impediment of incentive-based inequality‘. Thus it is not so obvious that
individuals in the ’original position’ would appreciate the incentive argument as much
as Rawls thinks they would. Sen argues that this is another reason why we shouldn’t
concentrate so much on ideal justice in developing a theory of justice (Sen 2009:62).
Rawls theory has been subject to a lot of critique. Among them, the absent of
direct dialogue between the participants. His assumption that the participants of the
‘social contract’ are mutually disinterested are also a lose one. However I shall limit
my self and end this section by critique written from a feminist perspective.
Rawls conceives the just society as consisting of heads of families, and in his
argument for the ’social contract’ women’s role are not mentioned any particularly
(Bojer, Notes, lecture.6) In ’The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) he insist that
the family is outside the public sphere (Bojer 2006:60). Martha Nussbaum oppose this
and argues different, she says ’the state is present in the family from the start,… it is
the state who says what this thing is and controls how one becomes a member of it’
moreover the family has the role of distributing economic goods to individuals, and
thus their role cannot be overlooked in a discussion of distributional justice.
Furthermore Rawls imposes the constraint that the social contract should only include
the rights and duties of adult citizens. Bojer (2006) argues that, ’the souls know that
they will themselves start their life as helpless infants, and that the social contract will
govern their own childhood’, and this will help ensure that the contracting parties
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would choose to view the family as part of the basic institutions of society to be
covered by the contract. These individual ’souls’ will in enlightened self-interest seek
to ensure that their childhood is protected from abuse, neglect and starvation (Bojer
2006:61). These ’souls’ would furthermore not settle unless equal rights between men
and women, with respect to economic independence, where guaranteed. To support
this claim, she points to the fact that, in the ’original position’ the parties will realize
that there are 50 percent chance for them to be incarnated either as a male or female.
If participants of the ‘social contract‘ takes the arguments given above into
consideration, Bojer sees no reason why they wouldn’t agree to policies that
guarantees economic justice to women and children (Bojer 2006:61).
Conclusion
Rawls contribution was a vitamin injection to the topic of distributional justice. Some
of his critics seem to think that his theory could be extended to capture more diverse
cases and meet further challenges. However, being subject to critical scrutiny for over
three decades, contemporaries seem to have abandoned his basic ideas. But his
fundamental idea that justice is to be viewed in terms of fairness, which is a Rawlsian
hallmark, is by large still seen as a common point of departure for further elaboration
on distributional justice (Sen 2009:54).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bojer, Hilde (2003). Distributional Justice: theory and measurement (Routledge
frontiers of political economy).
Freedman??
Kymlicka, Will (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
Malnes, Raino, and Midgaard, Knut (2003). Politisk Tenkning (Universitetsforlaget,
Oslo).
Murphy, Mark C. and Solomon, Robert C (2002) What Is Justice?: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, Oxford New York).
Sen, Amartya (2009). The Idea Of Justice (Penguin Books Ltd, England).
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I enjoyed reading this paper, and in particular I appreciate that Rajeevan has
gone beyond the strict reading list. It is on the whole fairly well written. But i
cannot recommend that you take this paper as a model for your exam paper.
There are too may direct quotations from literature that you will not have access
to at the exam.
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