Though primarily restricted to the recent period of analytic philosophy beginning
around the turn of the 20th century, states of affairs have occupied a significant position in
a variety of applications in analytic metaphysics, and to a lesser extent philosophical
logic, and philosophy of language. The past 35 years have been especially active in
theorizing and deploying states of affairs. Most commonly states of affairs are spoken of
in terms of some unity of particular, property and/or relation that makes up a portion of
reality or in terms of some abstract entity that serves a theoretical purpose vis-à-vis
possible worlds. Other theories have suggested that states of affairs can serve as the
mental content of propositional attitudes playing the role traditionally played by
propositions. Philosophers like Roderick Chisholm have suggested that events and
propositions are in fact species of the larger category of states of affairs. Given the
relative newness of the concept in the history of philosophy, it is not surprising that such
varied uses of the concept exist. There has not been sufficient time for the concept to
distill into an agreed upon application. Due to the multiple controversies that surround
states of affairs and related entities like propositions and events, no agreed upon use
appears imminent. If any progress is to be made with respect to an agreed upon usage,
knowing the history of the concept would be useful in understanding why certain uses
exist today and why these uses differ in the ways that they do.
In this dissertation, two projects present themselves. The first is necessary
towards the end of understanding the contemporary use of the concept: there is need in
the literature for a comprehensive history of state of affairs. Second, with a
comprehensive history in place, a new, informed theory can be offered that respects this
history, but forces the contemporary discussion into deeper clarity and specificity.
Presenting a comprehensive history of states of affairs is not as overwhelming as
it may seem. States of affairs were not spoken of in the literature until late 19th century
Austrian philosophy. Since Wittgenstein’s Tractatus there has been a resurgence in
theorizing about states of affairs among philosophers such as Roderick Chisholm, Alvin
Plantinga, and D. M. Armstrong. This historical survey should provide manageable
categories into which various theories can be classified. For example, is the theory in
question a proposition-like theory in which states of affairs are taken to be the content of
propositional attitudes and/or truth bearers, or is the theory one that construes states of
affairs as fact-like entities which serve to make propositions true and perhaps cause
others facts or events to come into being? By systematically categorizing these various
accounts, we will be more adequately equipped to analyze the strengths and weaknesses
of contemporary theories thereby enabling us to produce a new theory that capitalizes on
the strengths of various theories, both old and new.
Resting on the comprehensive survey of the history of the concept of states of
affairs, we will be well-equipped to produce a novel theory that answers foundational
ontological questions. For any novel theory of states of affairs to be complete, that
theory should include answers to questions concerning the nature of truth, specifically a
correspondence theory of truth if this is indeed that most plausible theory available.
Additionally, questions concerning the relationship between propositions and states of
affairs and states of affairs and facts must be answered. Are states of affairs distinct from
both propositions and facts, and if so what are the relationships between these three
entities? Any theory that hopes to make progress in the contemporary discussion must
answer these fundamental questions.
The distinguishing feature of this novel theory will be an analysis of states of
affairs in terms of their logical form. Logical form will not only play a central role in the
analysis of states of affairs, but also in explicating the relations that hold between states
of affairs, propositions, and facts.
Before briefly chronicling the history of states of affairs, rough definitions of key
terms need to be stated. Most pressing of course is the term ‘state of affairs’. In spite of
the variety of theories of states of affairs that have been offered in the past hundred years
or so, more often than not states of affairs are referred to using nominalized gerundive
phrases. For example ‘snow’s being white’ refers to the state of affairs of snow’s being
white. So, very broadly speaking, a state of affairs is some entity that can be denoted by
a nominalized gerundive phrase. Explaining what that entity is we leave to the multiple
theories we will examine. Other key terms include ‘propositions’, ‘facts’, ‘conditions’,
‘situations’, ‘truths’, and ‘events.’ Each term is theory-laden, but all are relevant to our
inquiry. We will see that these terms are used throughout the various theories that we
examine. Sometimes, these terms are considered synonyms for ‘state of affairs’,
sometimes they are taken to be distinct from states of affairs. Providing any definitions at
this point would force us to make theoretical decisions that are unwarranted until our
survey of states of affairs is complete. Upon this completion, when I offer a novel theory
of states of affairs, we can define these terms with more rigor and justification. However,
minimalistic working definitions of the most prominent terms are necessary in order to
properly categorize historically notable theories of states of affairs. These working
definitions are enumerated below:
Proposition: The mental or semantic content of a belief or declarative sentence
(respectively), which is capable of being true or false.1
Fact: An entity whose existence logically entails the truth of a proposition.2
Condition: An entity whose obtaining is logically necessary for the truth of some
proposition. I will take ‘condition’ to be synonymous with ‘truth condition’.3
Situation: An entity, either possible or actual, typically named by a nominalized
gerundive phrase. I will take ‘situation’ to be synonymous with our rough use of ‘state of
affairs’.
Truths: Propositions that are true.
Events: Entities, which, if actual constitute the relata of a causal relation.
With these working definitions in place, we can not turn to a brief overview of history of
the concept of states of affairs. I have given just a brief sketch of the prominent
philosophers in the history of the concept of states of affairs with the understanding that
each of these figures’ theories will be more deeply developed in the dissertation.
1
This definition is intentionally silent on whether propositions are mind-independent or dependent,
necessary or contingently existing entities, and whether they contain physical particulars or only concepts.
Also, this definition leaves open the possibility that some propositions do not have a truth value.
2
Facts are not identical to true propositions on this definition.
3
Here I assume that synonymy is an intuitively clear semantic notion, Quine’s objections notwithstanding.
Admittedly, ‘obtaining’ is a theoretically loaded term. For the purposes of leaving this definition
sufficiently general, I remain silent on whether ‘obtaining’ and ‘is true’ are conceptually distinct, though I
believe they are.