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Chapter 2
Rape myth acceptance: Cognitive, affective and behavioural effects of beliefs
that blame the victim and exonerate the perpetrator
Gerd Bohner, Friederike Eyssel, Afroditi Pina, Frank Siebler,
and G. Tendayi Viki
Introduction
The reality of sexual violence and its harmful effects on the individual and on society
are indisputable. Recent statistics indicate a serious worldwide problem, with one in
three women having experienced some form of sexual violence, such as being
battered, coerced into sex or otherwise abused (United Nations Development Fund for
Women, 2008; World Bank, 1993). The health consequences of rape and sexual
violence are both detrimental and long lasting (Holmes, Resnick, & Frampton, 1998);
for women aged between 15 and 44, rape and domestic violence are higher risk
factors for death and disability than are cancer, war and motor vehicle accidents
(United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2008; World Bank, 1993). In sum,
‘sexual violence is the most pervasive human rights violation that we know today, it
devastates lives, fractures communities and stalls development’ (United Nations
Development Fund for Women, 2008, p. 1). Feminist writers have argued that the
prevalence of sexual violence contributes to gender inequality and supports the status
quo of male dominance by keeping all women, including those women who are not
directly victimized, in a state of constant fear (Brownmiller, 1975). Empirical research
confirms that the fear of rape is a daily reality for many women, limiting their
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freedom of movement and reducing their quality of life (Dobash & Dobash, 1992;
Gordon, Riger, LeBailly, & Heath, 1980; Mirrlees-Black & Allen, 1998).
At the same time, the attrition rates for successful prosecution of rapes through
the criminal justice system are high. The proportion of rapes reported to the police is
notoriously low, and within those relatively few cases that are reported, conviction
rates have been declining (Kelly, Lovett, & Regan, 2005; Temkin & Krahé, 2008;
United Nations, 2000). Researchers have recognised that a major cause of this
widening ‘justice gap’ are pervasive beliefs about rape, or rape myths (Brownmiller,
1975; Burt, 1980). These myths affect subjective definitions of what constitutes a
‘typical rape’, contain problematic assumptions about the likely behaviour of
perpetrators and victims, and paint a distorted picture of the antecedents and
consequences of rape. They are widely held by the general public (e.g. Gerger, Kley,
Bohner & Siebler, 2007) and by those in the criminal justice system (e.g., Brown &
King, 1998; Feild, 1978). Rape myths are propagated by the media (e.g., Franiuk,
Seefelt, Cepress & Vandello, 2008), affecting the offending behaviour of perpetrators,
the reporting behaviour of victims, the decision-making behaviour of investigators
and prosecutors and the assessement of guilt or innocence by jurors (Temkin & Krahé,
2008; Wilson & Scholes, 2008).
In this chapter, we introduce and discuss the concept of rape myths and
examine some of the research instruments that have been used to measure these
beliefs. We then review a series of interlinked studies from our laboratory, as well as
related research by others, on both general and gender-specific functions of rape myth
acceptance (RMA). In doing so, we present a theoretical framework according to
which RMA influences information processing, affect and behaviour by serving as a
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cognitive schema. We conclude with discussing applied implications of RMA
research for interventions aimed at reducing RMA and improving legal procedures.
Introduction of the Concept of Rape Myths
In the 1970s the concept of rape myths became a topic of interest and closer
inspection for various researchers (e.g.
Brownmiller, 1975; Feild, 1978;
Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1974). Within social psychology, Martha Burt (1980)
was the first to propose a definition of rape myths as ‘prejudicial, stereotyped and
false beliefs about rape, rape victims and rapists’ (p. 217). Although this definition
has been widely used, Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994), in their excellent review and
critique of prominent definitions of rape myths, point out that Burt's definition is not
‘sufficiently articulated’, nor are all the terms used explained sufficiently clearly for it
to serve as a formal definition (p. 134).
Despite definitional concerns that will be outlined in more detail below, there
seems to be a consensus as to what rape myths usually entail (for a full review on
structural issues see Payne, Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1999). We may identify four
general types of rape myth: beliefs that

blame the victim for their rape (e.g. ‘women have an unconscious desire to
be raped’, ‘women often provoke rape through their appearance or
behaviour’),

express a disbelief in claims of rape (e.g. ‘most charges of rape are
unfounded’, ‘women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them’),

exonerate the perpetrator (e.g. ‘most rapists are over-sexed’, ‘rape
happens when a man's sex drive gets out of control’), and
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
allude that only certain types of women are raped (e.g. ‘a woman who
dresses in skimpy clothes should not be surprised if a man tries to force her
to have sex’, ‘usually it is women who do things like hang out in bars and
sleep around that are raped’)
(Bohner, Reinhard et al., 1998; Briere, Malamuth & Check, 1985; Burt,
1980, 1991; Costin, 1985; Gerger, Kley, Bohner & Siebler, 2007;
Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; 1995; Payne, Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1999).
Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) emphasize the characteristics of the term
‘myth’, highlighting the specific cultural functions that myths usually serve. Their
more recent definition of rape myths as ‘attitudes and beliefs that are generally false
but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual
aggression against women’ (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994, p. 134) integrates such
functional aspects. Taking this functional view a step further, Bohner (1998, pp. 12-14)
as well as Gerger et al. (2007) pointed out that aspects such as whether rape myths are
‘false’ or ‘widely held’ should not be included in a formal definition. On the one hand,
it is often impossible to decide whether a myth is false, for example if the myth
expresses a normative belief or is stated in a way that is difficult to falsify (e.g. ‘many
women secretly desire to be raped’). Questions of prevalence, on the other hand,
should be addressed empirically, otherwise a belief that was once widely held but is
not widely held any more would by definition cease to be a rape myth. The most
recent definition we rely on for the purposes of this chapter thus describes rape myths
as ‘descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e. about its causes, context,
consequences, perpetrators, victims and their interaction) that serve to deny,
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downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit against women’ (Bohner, 1998,
p. 14).
Current Measures of Rape Myth Acceptance and Methodological Issues
The scientific progress reflected in the evolution of conceptualizations about raperelated beliefs also becomes evident at the level of instruments to measure rape myths.
We critically discuss some of the most commonly used classic measures of rape
myths as well as a recently developed scale designed to measure modern myths about
sexual aggression. The distinction between classic and contemporary versions of rape
myths predominantly rests on the degree of subtlety of the item wordings, with classic
measures being marked by rather blatant item formulations, whereas our modern
measure is characterized by its more subtle item content.
Among the most widely used classic scales are the Rape Myth Acceptance
Scale (RMAS; Burt, 1980) and the Attitudes Toward Rape Scale (ATR; Feild, 1978).
To illustrate, Buhi (2005) reviews 57 studies using the 19-item RMAS scale, thus
attesting to its wide usage. Most of these studies attest to the good psychometric
properties of this instrument (e.g. Kopper, 1996; Krahé, 1988; Margolin, Miller, &
Moran, 1989). Other researchers developed RMA scales that were modified versions
of Burt's original scale (e.g., Donnerstein, Berkowitz & Linz, 1986; Ellis, O’Sullivan
& Sowards, 1992; Fonow, Richardson & Wemmerus, 1992).
Another widely used measure of RMA is Feild's (1978) ATR. The ATR is a
32-item scale that predates the RMAS (for a report on the reliability of the ATR, see
Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). In a factor analysis, Feild identified eight interpretable
subscales (e.g. woman’s responsibility in rape prevention, sex as motivation for rape,
victim precipitation of rape). Subsequent research on the differential validity of these
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subscales, however, is lacking. As the RMAS, the ATR too has been subjected to
modifications, including Costin's popular 20-item R scale (Costin, 1985), which was
translated into several languages (Costin & Schwarz, 1987) and widely used with
German samples by Bohner (1998).
Despite their wide use, these two scales have been criticised for various
reasons (e.g. Payne et al., 1999). For example, several of Burt’s (1980) RMAS items
are too long and complex and often include several concepts within one item, which
makes them difficult to understand and answer unambiguously. This results in further
methodological problems, as it threatens the scale's reliability and validity (Hinck &
Thomas, 1999; Payne et al., 1999). Furthermore, the classic scales often feature items
whose wording is marked by a heavy usage of colloquialisms and slang terminology
(e.g. ‘put out’, ‘necking’, ‘fair game’). Payne et al. (1999) argued that the use of
colloquialisms can severely affect the cross-cultural applicability of the scales, since
particular culture-specific wordings might not be grasped by persons from a different
cultural background.
A more recent RMA measure that avoids many of the pitfalls of item wording
discussed above is the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (IRMA; Payne et al.,
1999). The IRMA comes in two versions, a 45-item long version and a 20-item short
form (IRMA-SF). In factor analyses, Payne and colleagues identified seven factors,
but again, research on the differential validity of these seven factors is lacking, and
the scale is usually treated as measuring a one-dimensional construct. The scale's
reliability and construct validity is good, and during the last decade the IRMA has
been used in both basic and applied research (e.g. Bohner & Lampridis, 2004; Loh,
Gidycz, Lobo & Luthra, 2005; Lonsway, Welch & Fitzgerald, 2001).
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More recently, however, Gerger and her colleagues (2007) have noted a
problem with the classic RMA scales. Especially in research with college students,
these scales often produce floor effects, i.e. highly skewed distributions and means
near the low endpoint of the scale. Skewed distributions have disadvantages because
statistical tests of correlational or experimental hypotheses usually require a normal
distribution of scores or error terms. Also, in applied studies aimed at reducing RMA
through appropriate interventions, any beneficial effects of the intervention may be
difficult to determine if the means of the target variable are already near the bottom of
the scale. Gerger et al. point out that the observed low means of self-reported RMA
may have two possible causes: (1) that respondents nowadays are more aware of and
so comply with socially accepted answers to explicit and blatant RMA items, and (2)
that the content of common myths about sexual aggression may have changed. They
drew an analogy with similar historical developments that took place in the areas of
sexism and racism over the last decades. For example, Swim, Aikin, Hall, and Hunter
(1995) proposed that sexist beliefs have become more subtle and covert, and
distinguish between ‘old fashioned’ and ‘modern’ sexism, where the former includes
the endorsement of traditional gender roles, discriminatory treatment of women, and
stereotypes about female competence, whereas the latter includes the denial of present
discrimination, antagonistic attitudes toward women, and a lack of support for
women's needs.
Based on these guiding ideas, Gerger et al. (2007) developed a new RMA
scale, the 30-item Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression Scale
(AMMSA). Its items were generated to reflect the content categories as shown in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Content Categories and Exemplar Items of the Acceptance of Modern
Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale (Gerger et al., 2007)
Content
Example
(a)
denial of the scope of the
problem
"Many women tend to misinterpret a wellmeant gesture as a 'sexual assault'."
(b)
antagonism toward
victims' demands
"Although the victims of armed robbery have to
fear for their lives, they receive far less
psychological support than do rape victims."
(c)
lack of support for
policies designed to help
alleviate the effects of
sexual violence
"Nowadays, the victims of sexual violence
receive sufficient help in the form of women's
shelters, therapy offers and support groups."
(d)
beliefs that male coercion
forms a natural part of
sexual relationships
"When a woman starts a relationship with a man,
she must be aware that the man will assert his
right to have sex."
(e)
beliefs that exonerate
male perpetrators by
blaming the victim or the
circumstances
"Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a
woman."
Note.
An English and a German version of the scale are available on-line at
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/psychologie/ae/AE05/AMMSA/index.html
Empirical studies showed that mean scores on the AMMSA, as intended by its
authors, were generally higher than the mean scores on classic scales (for direct
comparisons with the IRMA-SF, see Gerger et al., 2007). Also, AMMSA scores were
symmetrically distributed, approximating a normal distribution. Furthermore, the
scale's excellent reliability and construct validity was demonstrated in various studies.
The scale is available in English and German, and two parallel short versions are
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currently being developed (Eyssel & Bohner, 2009). For a review of the concept of
modern rape myths and research using the AMMSA scale, see Eyssel and Bohner
(2008a). Additional studies using the AMMSA with UK samples are currently being
undertaken (e.g. Calogero, Pina, Fisher & Thompson, 2009; Pina & Hallmark, 2009).
Functions of Rape Myths: Cognitive, Affective, Behavioural
Why do people endorse rape myths? It has long been posited that rape myths may
serve various psychological functions (e.g. Bohner, 1998; Brownmiller, 1975; Burt,
1980; 1991; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). They may help people to understand and
explain events in their social world, to maintain cognitive consistency, to fend off
negative affect and threats to self-esteem, and to rationalise problematic behaviour.
Here we review research on these cognitive, affective, and behavioural functions of
RMA, addressing both general functions and gender-related functions, which are
typically relevant only to women or only to meni.
Rape Myth Acceptance as a General Cognitive Schema
Early research focused on external perceivers' responsibility attributions in relation to
rape scenarios (e.g., Jones & Aronson, 1973; for reviews, see Krahé, 1991; Pollard,
1992). A central finding was that perceivers with higher RMA attributed greater
responsibility to the victim and lesser responsibility to the perpetrator. Furthermore, it
was shown that perceivers with high (vs. low) RMA perceived the trauma of the
victim to be less severe and were less likely to recommend that the victim report the
incident to the police (e.g. Frese, Moya & Megías, 2004; Krahé, 1988). Attributions
of responsibility may also be expressed in subtle linguistic choices: Bohner (2001)
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showed that students high (vs. low) in RMA who described a rape they had observed
in a film scene were more likely to use language that put the perpetrator in the
background and the victim in the focus of discourse (e.g., agentless passive: ‘she was
raped’; nominal phrases: ‘then the rape occurred’).
RMA may thus be conceived as a general schema which guides and organises
an individual's interpretation of specific information about rape cases. Generally
speaking, cognitive schemas are broad knowledge structures that people use to assist
the processing of incoming information (e.g. Neisser, 1976). Processing of
information becomes selective, with attention being focused on a potential match
between incoming information and the schema-related information stored in memory
(e.g. Bem, 1981). Importantly, schemas allow perceivers to ‘go beyond the
information given’ (Bruner, 1957), that is to infer things that were not actually present
in the stimulus material.
Applied to rape myths, this means that perceivers high in RMA may readily
use a particular piece of information contained in a rape case (e.g. that the
complainant had been drinking alcohol), or infer information that was never presented
(e.g. that the complainant may have consented because she knew the defendant), with
the result of exonerating the defendant. Recent research by Krahé, Temkin, Bieneck,
and Berger (2008) shows that even prospective lawyers fall prey to these schematic
influences. In their studies, undergraduate and postgraduate law students rated rape
scenarios varying with respect to the defendant-complainant relationship. Those law
students who were high in RMA held the defendant less liable and blamed the
complainant more, especially when the two had known each other (for related
research on rape myths within the criminal justice system, see Andrias, 1992; Burt &
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Albin, 1981; Spohn & Horney, 1993).
Although the findings we review here pertain to external perceivers, we should
note that rape victims often interpret their own experiences in terms of rape myths.
This may prevent them from labelling these experiences as rape, to find fault with
their own behaviour, and to fail reporting an incident to the police (Peterson &
Muehlenhard, 2004; Warshaw, 1988). Some research points to the conclusion,
however, that becoming a victim may attenuate people's processing being guided by a
rape myth schema (for discussion see Bohner, 1998, pp. 62-63).
Schematic influences tend to be strong when external facts are uninformative
or ambiguous (e.g. Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993).
In an ongoing research programme, we tested the hypothesis that the influence of
RMA on judgments about rape cases would increase when the available information
was mixed or uninformative. In one experiment, students received pieces of caserelated information in a sequence of five steps: (1) contradicting statements of
complainant and defendant, (2) summary of expert witness A's statement, (3)
summary of expert witness B's statement, (4) extended version of A's statement, and
(5) extended version of B's statement. The expert witnesses' statements were prepared
such that one pointed to the defendant's guilt, whereas the other suggested his
innocence. After reading each piece of information, participants were repeatedly
asked to rate the likelihood that the defendant was guilty of rape. In line with our
hypothesis, these ratings were not influenced by RMA whenever the weight of the
evidence clearly implied either guilt or innocence (i.e. after steps 2 and 4), but were
influenced by RMA whenever the evidence was completely balanced (i.e. after steps
1, 3 and 5; Eyssel & Bohner, 2008 b, Study 1).
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In another experiment, participants received either a low amount or a high
amount of case-irrelevant information about the defendant versus the complainant
(e.g. what subject the person studied or where he/she lived). We hypothesized that the
effect of participants' RMA on judgments about the defendant's guilt would increase
with increasing amounts of case-irrelevant information. As Figure 1 shows, the data
clearly supported this prediction: High-RMA participants generally perceived lower
levels of guilt than did low-RMA participants; more importantly, this effect was
particularly pronounced when a lot of irrelevant information had been provided
(Eyssel & Bohner, 2008 b, Study 2).
Figure 1: Effects of Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) on Judgments of Defendant Guilt
Increase With the Amount of Irrelevant Information Presented (Eyssel &
Bohner, 2008)
0.8
Defendant guilt
low RMA
high RMA
0.4
0
-0.4
-0.8
low/low
low/high
high/low high/high
Amount of irrelevant information about
defendant/plaintiff
A third experiment in this series showed that people's reliance on their RMA for
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making guilt judgments may increase even if people merely believe that they possess
case-related evidence, when in fact they do not. In their ‘social judgeability’ approach
to stereotyping, Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron (1992), had shown that people often
avoid using stereotypes in person judgments unless they feel ‘entitled to judge’
because they believe that relevant individuating information was presented to them
subliminally. Building on this approach, we set out to create an illusion of being
informed in some of our participants. All participants first received minimal case
information, consisting only of very brief, divergent statements of defendant and
complainant. Then they performed a vigilance task, where they had to respond
quickly to stimuli appearing on a computer screen. Embedded in the vigilance task
was the repeated subliminal presentation of masked strings of non-words that
resembled text sentences. We later told half of the participants that these strings
(which participants had not been able to recognise) had actually been sentences
containing relevant case information; we further told them that ‘psychological studies
have shown that people are capable of processing information, even if it was not
recognised consciously.’ The other half of participants were simply told that the
vigilance task had served as a distractor task (control condition). When participants
later judged the defendant's guilt, high-RMA participants gave lower guilt ratings than
did low-RMA participants. More importantly, as shown in Figure 2, the effect of
RMA on guilt judgments was stronger, as predicted, for those participants who were
under the illusion of having received additional case information (Eyssel & Bohner,
2008 b, Study 3).
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Figure 2: Effects of Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) on Judgments of Defendant Guilt
Increase With the Illusion of Being Informed (Simple Slopes Analysis;
Eyssel & Bohner, 2008)
Defendant Guilt
1
0.5
Control Condition
Illusion of Being Informed Condition
0
-0.5
-1
low (1 SD below mean)
high (1 SD above mean)
Rape Myth Acceptance
Self-Perpetuating Aspects of the Rape Myth Schema
That people draw specific conclusions about rape cases which blame the victim and
exonerate the perpetrator may be conceived as part of a more encompassing cognitive
motive, the ‘belief in a just world’. This construct describes a tendency to perceive the
world as a fair place, where people generally get what they deserve and where bad
things happen only to bad people (Lerner, 1980). Just-world beliefs thus offer
reassurance that if all necessary precautions are taken, and if people are good, nothing
bad will happen to them. If these beliefs are challenged, for example by encountering
information that an innocent person has suffered violence, one way of restoring
cognitive consistency is by blaming the victim. In the case of sexual violence, rape
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myths offer the necessary ‘explanations’ as to why rape victims ‘got what they
deserved’ (e.g. they did not protect themselves sufficiently, or they even provoked
their own victimisation). Research has shown that individual differences in the belief
in a just world correlate positively with RMA (Bohner, 1998; Lonsway & Fitzgerald,
1994). By interpreting information in a way that is consistent with rape myths (and
thus also with more general just-world beliefs), individuals thus generate ‘evidence’
that seemingly supports their own myths.
A similar self-perpetuating principle may operate at the societal level when
rape myths and jury verdicts influence each other. Sinclair and Bourne (1998) have
proposed a ‘cycle of blame’ framework, suggesting that the same rape myths that
limit convictions may in turn be strengthened by not-guilty verdicts. On the one hand,
rape myth endorsement by jury members may lead to more restrictive rape definitions
and fewer convictions (see Andrias, 1992; Burt & Albin, 1981; Rhode, 1989). On the
other hand, not-guilty verdicts may reinforce those very myths that have contributed
to the verdicts in the first place. Sinclair and Bourne tested this idea by presenting
identical case summaries but telling participants either that the jury's verdict was
‘guilty’ or that it was ‘not guilty’. Later, participants' RMA was assessed as a
dependent variable. For male participants, the ‘cycle of blame’ hypothesis was
supported, in that their RMA scores were higher after a not-guilty verdict and lower
after a guilty verdict. For women, interestingly, the opposite effect was found, in that
a not-guilty verdict lowered RMA and a guilty verdict increased RMA. The authors'
explanation for the women's discrepant results invokes the just-world hypothesis:
Because women generally fear rape victimisation more than men do (see Bohner et al,
1993), they may endorse rape myths in order to feel safer (‘If it was rape, the woman
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must have contributed to it happening’). Below we will have more to say about the
idea that rape myths may fulfil a self-protective function for women.
In sum, there is compelling evidence that RMA serves as a cognitive schema
for interpreting information in rape cases. These schematic influences affect both
laypersons and legal experts. The effects of RMA are particularly pronounced if the
available evidence is mixed or irrelevant, or if people are merely under the false
impression of being informed. Cognitive and motivational principles operating at the
individual and the societal level contribute to the perpetuation of rape myths.
Gender-Related Functions for Women: Affect Management and Self-Esteem
Protection
Our research suggests that RMA has divergent functions for the two genders. For
women specifically, an important aspect of the rape myth schema is that it pertains to
their self-categorisation. Their level of RMA determines whether they include the
threat of rape in their self-concept, or exclude this threat from their self-concept.
Specifically, women who reject rape myths would agree that any woman can be raped
and, thus, perceive rape as a potential threat to all women, including themselves;
women who endorse rape myths, by contrast, believe that rape only happens to a
certain type of woman (e.g. who behaves carelessly or improperly), whom they
perceive as dissimilar from themselves (Bohner, 1998; Bohner et al., 1993).
Based on this proposed relationship between RMA and the cognitive
representation of self and rape victims, we tested the hypothesis that women low (vs.
high) in RMA would be more likely to use gender spontaneously as a general
category when thinking about themselves or others and when solving cognitive tasks.
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In other words, we predicted that the concept of gender would chronically be more
accessible to women low (vs. high) in RMA (Bohner, Siebler et al., 1998). This
hypothesis was supported in a series of three studies. In Study 1, women were asked
to complete ten statements starting with the phrase ‘I am ...’. As predicted, low-RMA
(compared to high-RMA) women provided self-descriptions in terms of gender (e.g.,
‘a woman’, ‘female’) or gender-related roles (e.g. ‘a daughter’, ‘a sister’) both earlier
and more frequently. In Study 2, low-RMA women were more likely to use gender as
a discriminating feature when judging the similarity of pairs of target persons,
although gender was never mentioned in the task instructions. Finally, in Study 3,
women were asked to complete word fragments as quickly as possible with the first
solution that came to mind; in critical trials, where both gender-related and neutral
solutions existed, low-RMA participants were more likely to generate gender-related
solutions, and did so more quickly, than high-RMA participants.
The proposed RMA-linked differences in the accessibility of gender and in
self-categorisation have implications for affect management and self-esteem
maintenance in situations where rape is salient. A first experimental test of the effect
of fear of rape on women's self-related judgments indicated that women who were
presented with reminders of rape (in the form of rape scenarios) showed severely
impaired self-perceptions, with a particularly negative effect on their self-esteem and
trust in others. Furthermore, women faced with reminders of rape also showed an
increased acceptance of traditional gender norms (Schwarz & Brand, 1983). In
follow-up studies, Bohner and his colleagues examined the hypothesis that level of
RMA would moderate the effects of rape salience on self-esteem and affect, in line
with the assumed RMA-related differences in self-categorisation (Bohner, 1998;
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Collompton: Willan Publishing
Bohner & Lampridis, 2004; Bohner et al., 1993, 1999). The general result of these
studies was that the negative effects of rape salience on women's self-esteem that
Schwarz and Brand had observed were limited to women who reject rape myths.
Women who endorse rape myths, on the other hand, showed no decrease in selfesteem or affect after exposure to a rape scenario, or even reported somewhat
heightened self-esteem (Bohner et al., 1993; Bohner & Lampridis, 2004).
To illustrate this line of research, we review in some detail the most recent
empirical test of the effect of RMA on women’s self-esteem (Bohner & Lampridis,
2004). Female students who were either high or low in RMA participated in what they
thought was a study about ‘getting acquainted’. They expected having a first
conversation with another woman about a topic that the other woman had suggested.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three topic conditions, which were
designed to vary experimentally the salience of rape. In a rape-salient condition, the
other woman had apparently been raped and wanted to talk about this experience; in a
neutral control condition, the other woman wanted to talk about studying at their
university; and in a further control condition, the other woman had apparently been
diagnosed with leukemia and wanted to talk about her illness. This latter condition
was included to rule out the possibility that any differential reactions of high-RMA
and low-RMA participants to the rape-salient versus neutral control conditions might
be caused by general differences in emotional reactivity. After participants had read
about the alleged conversation topic, they completed scales measuring different facets
of self-esteem as well as their affective reactions in anticipation of the upcoming
conversation. (After completing these scales, the participants were debriefed, and no
conversation took place.) Results indicated that the prospect of meeting a rape victim
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Collompton: Willan Publishing
had a strong impact on women's self-esteem and affect (stronger than the effects of
reading information about rape that we had found in previous studies). Again, this
negative effect of rape salience was clearly more negative for low-RMA women than
for high-RMA women, replicating previous results (e.g. Bohner et al., 1993, 1999).
As illustrated in Figure 3 for the dependent variable gender-related self-esteem
(i.e. self-reported importance and evaluation of being a woman; Bohner & Sturm,
1997), the differential effects on low-RMA versus high-RMA women were limited to
the rape-salient condition and did not generalise to the leukemia-salient condition.
This supports the idea that RMA acts as a specific anxiety buffer related to sexual
violence (for an extended discussion, see Bohner & Lampridis, 2004).
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Collompton: Willan Publishing
Figure 3: Rape Myth Acceptance Moderates Effects of Rape Salience on Women's
Gender-Related Self-Esteem (data from Bohner & Lampridis, 2004)
Conversation topic:
studying
leukemia
rape
7
Self-Esteem
6
5
4
3
2
1
low
high
Rape Myth Acceptance
In sum, RMA was shown to serve as an anxiety buffer that allows women to feel less
vulnerable to sexual assault and to protect their self-esteem. The more they endorse
rape myths the less threatened and vulnerable they feel about their own possibility of
victimisation (see also Bohner, 1998). However, women who reject rape myths may
experience negative effects on their self-esteem because they do not believe that only
certain women are at risk of being raped, but rather construe rape as a potential threat
to all women, including themselves (Bohner & Schwarz, 1996). The beliefs of women
low in RMA thus seem to be more realistic, but this greater realism comes at a cost, as
the rejection of rape myths makes low-RMA women prone to negative affective
reactions when confronted with the topic of sexual violence. Nonetheless, high-RMA
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women's illusion of invulnerability may be even more problematic, as it seems to
prevent these women from learning self-defence strategies and from engaging in
protective behaviours that have been shown to be effective in the case of an attack
(e.g. shouting, talking to the attacker; Bohner, 1998, pp. 66-69). As noted above,
women high in RMA who become rape victims may also be less likely to report the
incident to the police because they are less likely to label their own experiences as
rape (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2004; Warshaw, 1988).
Gender-Related Functions for Men: Rationalisation of Aggressive Tendencies
Research conducted with male participants has focused on behavioural functions of
RMA. Given the high prevalence of sexual violence, it is plausible to assume that
many men harbour aggressive sexual tendencies. The endorsement of rape myths may
serve both to rationalise these tendencies and to turn them into actions. From the
beginning, feminist writers have noted this rationalising function of rape myths
(Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980). In our own research, we (Bohner, Reinhard et al.,
1998) have drawn parallels between the content and functions of rape myths and the
"techniques of neutralization" which have been proposed to explain juvenile
delinquency (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and other socially deviant behaviours (e.g.
Schahn, Dinger, & Bohner, 1995). Among the neutralising beliefs that Sykes and
Matza described are denial of injury (‘no harm was done’), denial of responsibility (‘It
was not my fault’, ‘I was provoked’), and denial of victim (‘they had it coming’). By
endorsing these beliefs, an offender may avoid perceiving his own criminal acts as
norm violations.
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Accordingly, we concluded that the prevalence of rape can be linked to the use
of rape myths as mechanisms that neutralise or trivialise rape and sexual violence. In
line with this reasoning, several studies have shown RMA to be highly correlated with
measures of self-reported rape proclivity (e.g. Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003;
Malamuth, 1981; Malamuth & Check, 1985; Quackenbush, 1989). Going beyond
these correlational findings, we conducted an extensive research programme to
examine the causal role of men's own RMA and of the perceived RMA of others in
predicting rape proclivity.
To assess rape proclivity, we developed an instrument that contains several
scenarios in which an acquaintance rape is described (but the word ‘rape’ is never
used). Participants indicate for each scenario whether they would have behaved like
the perpetrator and how much they would have enjoyed getting their way in this
situation. Averaging participants' responses across scenarios yields a valid measure of
rape proclivity that is less affected than earlier measures by tendencies to answer in a
socially desirable way (see Bohner, Reinhard et al., 1998; for a recent adaptation
addressing more general tendencies toward sexual aggression, see Eyssel, Bohner,
Süssenbach & Schreiber, 2009; for a laboratory measure of milder forms of sexual
aggression, see Siebler, Sabelus, & Bohner, 2008). In our initial studies, we
manipulated the temporal order in which we assessed men's RMA and rape proclivity
to vary their relative salience. Our reasoning was that a causal impact of RMA on rape
proclivity should be indicated by higher correlations between the two measures if
RMA had been assessed first. If, however, RMA was a result of pre-existing rape
proclivity, then the reverse order should yield higher correlations. The results of three
studies, two conducted in Germany and one in the UK, were clearly in line with the
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Collompton: Willan Publishing
first alternative: Making participants' own RMA accessible to them (by presenting the
RMA scale before the rape proclivity measure) consistently yielded a higher
correlation than did the reverse order (Bohner, Reinhard et al., 1998; Bohner, Jarvis,
Eyssel, & Siebler, 2005).
Furthermore, Bohner et al. (2005) found evidence for a chronically high
accessibility of RMA in men who had been sexually coercive before. These men
generally showed a high correlation between RMA and rape proclivity, and were
faster in responding to RMA items than were men who had not been sexually
coercive. This indicates that sexually coercive men may use rape myths to justify their
actions (Bohner, 1998; Burt, 1980), and that therefore, these myths may become more
cognitively accessible to them in future situations, including future sexual encounters.
Thus, RMA as a cognitive schema in men may indeed facilitate sexual aggression
(Bohner et al., 2005).
Another line of our research looked at normative effects of others’ perceived
RMA on men’s rape proclivity (Bohner, Siebler, & Schmelcher, 2006; Eyssel et al.,
2006). Bohner et al. (2006, Study 2) asked male students to complete an RMA scale.
Then they provided participants with manipulated feedback about the alleged level of
RMA in their peer group. Depending on experimental condition, participants learned
that their fellow students had either low, high, or very high RMA scores. Later,
participants completed our scenario measure of rape proclivity. As shown in Figure 4,
both participants' own RMA and the level of perceived RMA in their peer group
influenced their self-reported rape proclivity. Importantly, the two variables had an
interactive effect: Higher perceived RMA in participants' peer group increased rape
proclivity especially in those students whose RMA was high to begin with.
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Figure 4: Participant's Own Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) and Perceived RMA Norm
Jointly Affect Men's Rape Proclivity (data from Bohner, Siebler & Schmelcher,
2006)
3
Rape proclivity
RMA norm:
2.5
low
high
very high
2
1.5
1
low
high
Participant's Rape Myth Acceptance
Additional research confirmed that the effect of others' RMA on men's rape proclivity
was quite robust. Eyssel et al. (2006) found that the effect was independent of whether
the level of peers' RMA was presented to participants as a social norm (as in Bohner
et al., 2006) or whether participants merely considered that level of RMA as a
judgmental anchor ("Do you think the mean response of students at your university is
higher or lower than X?"). In two further studies, Bohner, Siebler, Pina, and Viki
(2009) showed that the perceived RMA of an outgroup (foreign students or pensioners)
can be just as effective in influencing rape proclivity as can the perceived RMA of
one's ingroup (native students). Interestingly, when participants expected the
outgroup's level of RMA to be high and then learned that the outgroup's level of RMA
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was actually low, the effect on reducing rape proclivity was greater than that of
learning about the ingroup's low level of RMA (Bohner et al., 2009, Study 2). In sum,
for men, RMA serves as a means to rationalise and justify their own tendencies to
engage in sexual aggression. Furthermore, the perceived RMA of others may provide
a social norm for men’s sexually aggressive behaviour (Bohner et al., 2006; Eyssel et
al., 2006). These results corroborate Berkowitz's (2002) proposal that men who
believe that their peers are using coercive methods to obtain sexual relations are more
likely to engage in similar behaviours themselves. They may be seen as the laboratory
equivalent of applied work conducted by Berkowitz and his colleagues (Berkowitz,
2002; Fabiano et al, 2003). Longitudinal research by Loh et al. (2005) also, tentatively,
indicates that level of RMA in fraternity memberships (in the U.S.) has some
influence on actual rape perpetration.
Applications
We have discussed the detrimental effects of rape myths, which may nurture false
beliefs about a just world, provide women with illusory feelings of safety, and offer
men ways of rationalising tendencies toward committing sexual violence. Our
theoretical analysis and empirical results thus show that RMA is one of the main
factors that need to be addressed in order to prevent sexual violence and ameliorate
negative attitudes toward victims. Indeed, existing programmes of sex-offender
treatment have aimed at correcting distorted beliefs about sexual violence (e.g.
Marshall, 1999; Seto & Barbaree, 1999). In this final section we will focus on the
primary prevention of sexual offending, mainly addressing general rape prevention
programmes directed toward individuals that have not offended.
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A plethora of educational programmes, especially in the U.S.A., address
sexual violence on college campuses (e.g. Fonow et al., 1992; Foubert, 2000; Foubert
& Marriott 1997; Foubert & McEwen, 1998; Gidycz et al., 2001; Hanson & Gidycz,
1993, Lonsway et al., 1998; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Malamuth & Check, 1984;
O’Donohue, Yeater, & Fanetti, 2003). Most of these programmes use various
methodologies, including video presentations, seminars on victim empathy, or
training for involvement in rape victim support, to change false beliefs surrounding
rape in order to reduce sexual violence, usually relying on the self-reported likelihood
to sexually aggress or on self-reported behaviour as criterion measures.
Although many of these intervention programmes lack a clear theoretical basis,
some (e.g. Foubert, 2000; Foubert & Marriott, 1997; Foubert & McEwen, 1998;
Gilbert, Heesacker, & Gannon, 1991; Heppner, Humphrey, Hillenbrand-Gunn, &
DeBord, 1995) rely on Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) elaboration likelihood model
(ELM), a theory of persuasion that specifies the conditions for lasting attitude change.
In numerous studies, Petty and Cacioppo have demonstrated that information
perceived to be personally relevant leads to high-effort processing, which in turn may
produce attitude change that is resistant to subsequent challenges if the information is
of high argument quality. Interventions designed to successfully change attitudes
should therefore use well-argued messages and establish high personal relevance of
these messages to their target group (Foubert & McEwen, 1998).
Other programmes (O’Donohue et al., 2003; Schewe & O’Donohue, 1993;
Yeater & O’Donohue, 1999) rely on theoretical models that are widely used in the
etiology of child sexual abuse or adult sexual assault, as well as several cognitive and
information processing models, for example Finkelhor's four-factor model (1986) and
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Bandura's social learning model of aggression (1973). According to these models,
rape myths are cognitions that make liable conduct ethically acceptable, minimise the
consequences of that behaviour, and devalue the victim (O’Donohue et al., 2003; see
our earlier discussion of rape myths as neutralising cognitions: Bohner, Reinhard et al.,
1998). Most of these programmes appear to be successful in reducing RMA in college
males as well as reducing the likelihood of these males to engage in sexually coercive
behaviour (Fonow et al., 1992; Foubert, 2000; Foubert & Marriott 1997; Foubert &
McEwen, 1998; Gilbert et al., 1991; Hanson & Gidycz, 1993, Lonsway et al., 1998;
Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Malamuth & Check, 1984; O’Donohue et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, existing programmes have their limitations. The reported effects
are often relatively short-term (e.g. Foubert & McEwen, 1998), and we lack
information on the long-term effectiveness of interventions (e.g. O’Donohue, Yeater
& Fanetti, 2003). Furthermore, most of the existing programmes are aimed at college
males (in particular fraternity members), whereas there is very limited current
research addressing the reduction of RMA in females. Moreover, a systematic
evaluation of the above programmes has not yet been undertaken, thus making the
assessment of success of such programmes very difficult (for a review, see Lonsway
& Kothari, 2000).
The research we have reviewed in this chapter may provide additional insights
that can be used in interventions aimed at reducing RMA in both males and females.
Evidence for a causal influence of RMA on rape proclivity (Bohner, Reinhard et al.,
1998; Bohner et al., 2005) is in keeping with most of the aforementioned programmes
on rape prevention that show a reduction of RMA followed by a reduction in rape
proclivity (e.g. Foubert & McEwen, 1998; Gilbert et al., 1991; O’Donohue et al.,
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2003). In addition, our work on RMA as a social norm may form the basis for new
types of intervention. We have shown that presenting normative information about
others' denouncement of rape myths may effectively lower both RMA and rape
proclivity in male participants (Bohner et al., 2006, 2009). Such normative
information about low RMA is effective when it pertains to reference groups that the
recipient belongs to (peer group norms), but may even be more effective when it
pertains to an outgroup that the recipient expects to be higher in RMA (Bohner et al.,
2009). Turning these experimental findings into interventions may require some
changes of procedure. In an intervention setting, there are ethical constraints against
telling recipients that their peer group (or a given outgroup) strongly rejects rape
myths unless this is in fact true (although perceptions of peer group norms are often
distorted toward seeing norms as more pro-violent than is warranted: Berkowitz,
2002). But if a single communicator who is clearly identifiable as a group member
strongly argues against rape myths, then the effect of this communication on
recipients' attitudes may be as large as feedback about the attitude of the group as a
whole. Compared to the feedback of group norms, this approach would provide the
advantage that it should always be possible to find individual group members who are
willing to endorse an anti rape myth position and to collaborate in an intervention
programme. These assumptions will of course need to be tested and evaluated in
future research.
So far, we have focused on the possibility of changing RMA as a means of
changing problematic behaviour. Might it be possible, alternatively, to keep people
from using their rape myths, without necessarily changing RMA? Research by Krahé
and her associates has examined this possibility with respect to rape-case related
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Collompton: Willan Publishing
judgments. In a study conducted in Germany (Krahé et al., 2008, Study 2),
prospective lawyers judged various rape scenarios in terms of defendant liability and
complainant blame. To examine if information about the legal code might reduce
participants' reliance on rape myths, the researchers provided half of the sample with
the legal definition of rape from the German Criminal Code prior to reading the case
scenarios. These participants were explicitly instructed to ‘base [their] assessment of
the cases that follow on the definition provided by the law’ (p. 472). The other half of
the sample was not given the legal definition. Disappointingly, this experimental
intervention had no effect whatsoever: Participants' judgments of defendant liability
and complainant blame as well as their sentencing recommendations were strongly
affected by their RMA no matter if they had been reminded of the legal code
beforehand or not (see also Schewe, 2002). A different type of intervention, however,
promises to be more successful: In an earlier study with psychology students (Krahé
et al., 2007), the researchers tried to foster greater accuracy by making participants
accountable for their judgments. They did so by informing half of the sample at the
outset that they might be asked to explain and justify their judgments about a rape
case in subsequent mock jury sessions. This experimental intervention significantly
reduced the impact of stereotypic beliefs about rape on participants' judgments about
an ex-partner rape case.
Further research is again needed to corroborate these findings and determine
their long-term effects. Interventions similar to those employed by Krahé et al. (2007,
2008) might also be tested as a means for improving the judgments and behaviour of
people involved in victim support (e.g. social workers), of police officers who interact
with rape victims, and of judges and juries involved in rape cases.
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Conclusion
In sum, the research presented in this chapter highlights the wide impact rape myths
have on men and women who endorse them (in terms of liable behavioural
inclinations, and/or self esteem), on attitudes toward victims and perpetrators of
sexual violence, and on judgments about rape cases. It also emphasises how crucial it
is to recognise the implications of RMA as a social norm, and to challenge their
apparent normativity by the use of broadly targeted educational campaigns. Such
interventions may destroy comfortable illusions, but will ultimately help to reduce
sexual violence.
Acknowledgements
Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by a grant from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft to Gerd Bohner and Friederike Eyssel (BO 1248/6-1). The
authors would like to thank Philipp Süssenbach for his helpful comments on a
previous draft.
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Endnotes
i
Many of the studies reviewed in this section used an experimental approach, often including the
temporary deception of participants. Such methodology is sometimes necessary in order to test causal
hypotheses and to avoid motivated response distortions. It always requires the careful consideration of
ethical issues, especially when materials contain sensitive information such as descriptions of sexual
violence. In all of our studies we followed applicable ethical guidelines as laid down by the American
Psychological Association, the British Psychological Society and the German Society for Psychology
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie). Participants always gave informed consent to participate, and
they were informed that they could terminate participation at any time without giving a reason. When a
study involved deception, participants were thoroughly debriefed immediately after the experimental
session. The debriefing always included educational information about rape myths and their
detrimental consequences. In studies with female participants we employed screening procedures to
avoid assigning participants who may have experienced sexual violence themselves to conditions in
which they would be exposed to information about rape.