Session 9
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in
Africa, 1997, pp. 1-18, 61-127 and 268-279
pp. 1-18, 61-96
INTRODUCTION
The book begins with a brief narrative describing the the transition to democracy in Benin—“the
first instance on mainland Africa when a national political leader was peacefully supplanted as a
consequence of the expressed will of the people”—which the authors believe was emblematic of
the democratic transitions that occurred throughout Africa during the first half of the 1990s. They
argue that Benin’s transition embodied the three characteristics that distinguish transitions to
democracy in Africa from those in other regions of the world:
Sequential linkages/Causality
The authors argue that most of the transitions in sub-Saharan Africa were precipitated by popular
protest and followed a similar sequential/causal pattern: (1) protest (2) increased political liberties
(3) increased incidence of elections (4) democratic consolidation. Time-series data shows that
these trends peaked sequentially throughout the region, in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994,
respectively. (On pp. 4-5, time-series trendlines illustrate this sequential-peaking trend
graphically.) Bratton & van de Walle argue that the pervasiveness of this pattern suggests
causality (an interesting endorsement of mass protest among citizens of nondemocratic regimes).
Pace
For the 35 sub-Saharan nations that sustained regime changes between 1990 and year-end
1994, the median interval between the advent of transition and the inauguration of a new
government was just 35 months (pp. 4-5). While the authors marvel at how quickly these nations
reformed, they also suggest that transition may have been accelerated at the expense of durable
consolidation of democratic institutions and that instability may be a problem in the medium run.
Nonlinearity
On this point the authors explain that each of the phenomena in the sequence described above
are episodic, and therefore are not represented graphically in a linear fashion. This is perhaps
logical for elections and protests, which cannot occur continuously. It is less logical, however, in
the case of political liberties and democratic consolidation. Nothing inheres in either of these
phenomena that would preclude them from linearity, i.e., steady expansion. The authors point
out that they have not been linear, however, and cite several specific cases of backlashes against
democratization that have threatened the transition process in some countries. (Although the
authors do not explicitly link the admonition they issued in their discussion of the pace of reforms,
it seems fair to suspect that some of the backlash described here may be attributable to the
speed of transition and the consequent fragility of democratic institutions.)
Next Bratton & van de Walle consider the question of significance and ask whether the transitions
that occurred during the first half of the 1990s marked a “watershed” in African politics. Their
answer is a resounding but qualified “yes.” They argue that the reforms are significant insofar as
they have introduced fundamental changes to the sub-Saharan political landscape in the areas
of: (1) genuine political competition (2) change in leadership (3) regime. The table below
summarizes their argument regarding each.
characteristic
competition
Changes in African political landscape, 1990-1994
pre-1990
post-refo
 elections infrequent and largely ceremonial affairs in
 1990-1994: 38 of 47 countries
which result was a foregone conclusion
held competitive elections; opposi
 from 1985-1989, only nine elections held in multiparty
seats in 35 of those elections
systems—the integrity of four was seriously compromised
 average share of legislative se
change of
leadership
regime
by systematic electoral fraud, restricted franchise or physical
intimidation; in the remaining five, the space available to
opposition parties was limited
increased from 10 percent in 1989
 29 “founding” elections
 > 90 percent of incoming national leaders appointed
 11 democratic leadership trans
 prototypical regime: military oligarchies, one-party states,
or hybrids of the two
 1989: 29 sub-Saharan states governed under singleparty arrangement, 11 under direct military rule with “no
pretense of political party institutions”
 by 1994, not a single one-part
Africa; emergence of formalized, c
pp. 6-8
To counterbalance this optimistic summary of democratic advances in Africa, the authors
concede that there have been important continuities. They cite Herbst, who cautions against
excessive optimism in noting:“in open presidential contest after 1990, just as many incumbents
(15) were reelected as replaced (14).” Bratton & van de Walle also acknowledge that in many
cases a change of leadership does not translate into changes in a country’s administration or
policy, since leaders are drawn from the same socioeconomic and political pool from which
previous leaders emerged. In many cases, the patronage, inefficiency and outright fraud
remained rampant after changes of leadership.
Finally, the authors define the terms and parameters they will use in analyzing democratic
transitions.
regime:
set of political procedures that determine who can participate in politics and
under what terms—may be formal or informal
transition:
shift from one regime to another—accurately characterized as a struggle over the
rules and resources of the political game
Following a brief detour into the realm of political philosophy, the authors provide a two-faceted
definition of democracy. First, they define democracy procedurally, as a regime, and not
substantively. Secondly, they evaluate regimes based on a minimal number of criteria rather than
a comprehensive set of requirements. In the end the authors argue that the most basic
requirement for democracy is that citizens are able to choose their leaders freely, fairly and in a
binding way through rule-governed processes. “In our view, no other democratic institution
precedes elections, either in timing or importance.” The authors indicate that analysis of
democratic regimes thus defined must also encompass civil liberties, since they are essential in
ensuring that choice is free and fair, but need not incorporate more restrictive criteria such as
regime survival or consolidation.
CHAPTER 2: NEOPATRIMONIAL RULE IN AFRICA
Book asks whether regime transitions in SSA resemble democratization in other parts of the
world. Answer: Africa differs in several significant respects, and these differences critcally affect
the dynamics and outcomes of distinctive democratization processes. Chapter 2 reviews the
nature of formal and informal political institutions in post-colonial Africa. Bratton/Van de Walle
establish frameworks in which to look at distinctions among neopatrimonial regimes in SSA –
based on the assumption that virtually all governance in SSA is neopatrimonial.
Neopatrimonial Rule: Derived from concept of patrimonial authority, which Max Weber uses to
designate principle of authority in the smallest and most traditional polities, where ordinary folk
are treated as extensions of the “Big man’s” household.
Weber distinguishes patrimonial authority from rational-legal authority, in which public sphere and
private sphere carefully separated, and written laws and bureaucratic institutions
In neopatrimonial rule, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office. One
individual, often president for life, dominates state apparatus and stands above the law. Officials
occupy bureaucratic positions to acquire personal wealth ad status. Theorists suggest that
neopartimonialism is a master concept for comparative politics in the developing world. Bratton
and Van de Walle make distinction that neopatrimonial practices is the core feature of politics in
Africa.
Three informal political institutions typically stable, predictable and valued in Africa’s
neopatrimonial regimes:
Presidentialism: Systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who
resists delegating all but he most trivial decision-making tasks.
Clientilism: Awarding of personal favors – typically form of public sector jobs – distribution of
pulbic resources through licenses, contracts and projects.
State Resources; Use of state resources for political legitimation – closely linked to the reliance
on clientelism.
As consequence of both clientelism and use of state resources, neopatrimonial regimes
demonstrated very little developmental capacity.
Distinguishing among neopatrimonial regimes according to extent of political competition (or
contestation) and the degree of political participation (or inclusion):
Political competition – varied extent in which some members of political system allowed to
compete over elected positions or public policy.
Political participation – varied in the degree of political participation allowed.
Some sense of extent of political participation can be gleaned from voter turnout rates: which
average from 85.2% to 39.3% in different countries.
Five modal regimes: Bratton and Van de Walle layout five modal regimes, but argue that
countries’ governance can transition between and among these modes.
Plebiscitary One-Party system – Extremely limited competition but encouraged a high degree
of political participation (ex: Ethiopia, Kenya)
Military Oligarchies Exclusionary form of neopatrimonial rule – elections few or entirely
suspended – all decisions made by narrow elite behind closed doors. (Liberia, Nigeria)
Competitive One-Party Systems (Oxymoron?) Tolerates limited political competition at the
mass as well as elite levels. Allow for two or more candidates in party primaries.(Cameroon,
Zambia)
Settler Oligarchies “Exclusionary democracy” – reproduced functioning democracies within their
own microcosmic enclaves.(Namibia, SAfrica)
Multiparty Systems Display relatively high levels of both participation and competition.
(Botswana, Zimbabwe)
TRANSITIONS FROM NEOPATRIMONIAL RULE –
Looking at the extent to which the neopatrimonial nature of regimes affects process of
democratization.
Neopatrimonial practices cause chronic fiscal crises and inhibit economic growth. Tends toward
particularistic networks of personal loyalty…recipe for social unrest. Mass popular protest likely
to break out, usually over issue of declining living standards, and to escalate into calls to remove
incumbent leaders. Endemic fiscal crises undercut capacity for rulers to manage political
change…eventually government can’t meet civil payroll, and ultimately can’t meet military payroll.
Ultimately, power is so concentrated that the disposition of the regime is synonymous with the
personal fate of the supreme ruler. His overthrow or flight becomes the primary objective of the
opposition throughout the transition, typically the single unifying issue of the opposition.
In Neopatrimonial regimes, transitions are struggles to establish legal rules.
Batton/Van de Walle argue that the pervasiveness of clientelism means that the state has actively
undermined capitalist forms of accumulation. Property rights are imperfectly respected and there
are disincentives vs. private entrepreneurship and long-term productive investments. Thus,
during transitions, middle-class elements align with the opposition.
In conclusion: political transitions are characterized by considerable uncertainty and some
serendipity – the outcome of political struggles depends on the way that power was exercised by
the rulers of previous regimes.