The Initial Theory: A Statement
How do learners make a transition from one conception, C1, to a successor conception, C2? The
word “conception” is different from ‘concept’ in that it marks the plurality and internal complexity
of the object of change. (In my opinion, conceptions represent cognitive structures or knowledge
structures.)
The initial theory of conceptual change was analogous to Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift and
Piaget’s notion of an accommodation. The theory of conceptual change concerns only the
alteration of conceptions, not altered belief, that are in some way central and organizing in
thought and learning. Thus, it is important to note that we did not claim that all learning involves
this form of conceptual change. There is another process named “conceptual capture” to
accumulate new knowledge without confliction with the existing cognitive structure.
The theory of conceptual change was based on the philosophy of science that suggests the
following conditions for a successful conceptual change to take place.
1. There must be dissatisfaction with current conceptions. – Learners need to find that their old
conception has become dysfunctional in order to change it. Their concepts must be “awash in a
sea of anomalies.”
2. A new conception must be intelligible. - Learners need to find that a new conception makes
minimal sense to them in order to explore it. In other word, a new conception cannot become a
candidate to replace some dysfunctional conception until learners are able to comprehend it.
3. A new conception must appear initially plausible. – It should have potential to solve or dissolve
outstanding problems with current conceptions and consistency with other well-established beliefs.
4. A new conception should suggest the possibility of a fruitful research program. – It should be
thought of a productive tool of thought.
These conditions assume that learning takes place in a conceptual context called “conceptual
ecology.” A conceptual ecology consists of such cognitive artifacts as anomalies, analogies,
metaphors, epistemological beliefs, meta physical beliefs, knowledge from other areas of inquiry,
and knowledge of competing conceptions. Two pedagogical implications of aspects of a
conceptual ecology are: First, they provide an inventory of the kinds of cognitive artifacts that
learners are likely to possess and that must be taken into account by teachers. Such cognitive
artifacts may be either assets or liabilities in instruction, depending on their capacity to promote
or frustrate progressive conceptual change. Second, they suggest the kinds of things that teachers
may provide in instruction in order to facilitate conceptual change.
Background Commitments of the Theory
The initial formulation of our theory is not grounded in any experimental evidence and is not a
general theory of cognitive development. Our theory points out that evidence from philosophy
and history of science are relevant to major conceptual revisions. In addition, this theory suggests
that the basic problem of understanding cognitive development is to understand how the
components of an individual’s conceptual ecology interact and develop and how the conceptual
ecology interacts with experience.
Epistemological theory:
Our main concern is the formation of rational belief. Epistemology seeks to specify the logical
parameters of rational belief. In other word, its chief task is to specify criteria that enable us to
distinguish true or reasonable beliefs from false or unreasonable ones. We have been substantially
influenced by those theories of rationality that have been developed by authors such as Kuhn,
Toulmin, and Lakatos. What these authors have in common is a regard for the history of science
and the practice of science as sources of information about the nature of rationality.
More recent work in philosophy of science has emphasized the role of substantive belief in
scientific reasoning and method. Scientific reasoning is generated not only by formal logic but
also by substantive belief system such as Kuhn’s paradigm or Lakatos’ research programs. These
substantive belief systems (substantive conceptions) suggest what are to count as problems and
what is to count as relevant evidence. Indeed, they provide the perceptual categories by which the
world is perceived. An argument for a given scientific conceptions is never merely stated as a
logical relationship between a set of theoretical claims and a set of unconceptualized observations.
Instead, scientific arguments must be framed against the background of current conceptions. Thus,
arguments are historically conditioned. What counts as evidence at a given period depends on
what is currently believed. Descriptions of scientific method are similarly historically conditioned
and must be formulated by historical and logical investigation.
However, the preoccupation with rational belief may generate blind spots. One thing to consider
is that learners are not likely to be as rational as scientists. The major modifications required are
to take into account the immaturity and novice standing of the learner and to de-emphasize
those aspects of the sociology of scientific communities that have figured I the philosophical
theories of conceptual change.
Misconceptions research:
Our views of epistemology can be applied to the explanations of misconception: why conceptual
change should take place in learning; why misconceptions are resistant to change.
A misconception is nor merely a mistake or a false belief. Either it must also play the kind of
organizing role in cognition that paradigm play, or it must be dependent on such organizing
concepts. A misconception, thus, may become a candidate for change. The theory of conceptual
change provides an account of how such change may be brought about.
One of the most important findings of the misconceptions literature is that misconceptions are
highly resistant to change. The philosophical literature on conceptual change in science, especially
Kuhn’s work, provides the rudiments of both an epistemological and a sociological account of
why this might be so. The epistemological account provides a view of how paradigms are
maintained that is readily applied to misconceptions. This account turns on how some concepts
are connected to others, how they function in thought, and how they structure perception. Kuhn’s
work explain why the reappraisal of one concept will require the reappraisal and modification of
others and why some conceptions will be quite resistant to change, if they are embedded in a
web of other concepts that lend them plausibility or intelligibility. When a misconception is firmly
embedded in a conceptual context, the cost required for its revision is high. Students will have to
alter other concepts as well. Moreover, unless these other concepts are altered, they will continue
to maintain the misconception. In effect, conceptions often come with their own cognitive support
group. They will resist modification so long as this support group continues to play its role.
For the origins of misconceptions, while some authors (e.g., McCloskey) believe that they are
generated by misperceiving the world, we think that they are generated and maintained by other
concepts in a student’s conceptual ecology. Moreover, the fact that students misperceive the
world is seen as a phenomenon in need of an account.
Critique of the Theory
The theory was based on the assumption that learners have well-articulated conceptions about
most topics.
The assumption that misconceptions or prior conceptions are clearly articulated and expressly and
symbolically formulated is doubtful in two different respects. First, it seems entirely possible that
misconceptions, especially those of younger or novice learners, exist in either iconic or inactive
forms of representations. They may have just “intuitions” about how something works. Second,
misconceptions have developmental histories. They are generated by various factors in a
conceptual ecology. Those factors function to select for or prefer some representation of a
misconception when the opportunity to do so exists. For example, a student doesn’t have any
idea about moving object, but when he was asked, he uses the images and way of talking about
moving objects that can lead him to answer with a misconception that forces are transferred to
objects and erode during motion. Those images and way of talking provide a context for one’s
judgment about how something works. Therefore, what is most important in instruction is
understanding the factors in learners’ conceptual ecologies that generate and maintain
misconceptions. These factors can account for both the durability of misconceptions and their
commonalities across learners and even sometimes cultures. We emphasized initially the
importance of creating dissatisfaction with current conceptions, but this emphasis is appropriate
only when misconceptions are highly articulated like a paradigm. If the factors in conceptual
ecology are the causes of misconceptions, we had better root out the factors and replace them
with more felicitous concepts. In sum, what requires is a focus on the learner’s conceptual ecology
and how that ecology structures learning.
The theory was too linear.
The second assumption was that conceptions or misconceptions are cognitive object acted on by
the conceptual ecology, but are not themselves part of it. Thus, we did not much attend to the
ways in which conceptions or misconceptions interact with that ecology. However, scientific
conceptions and misconceptions are also part of a conceptual ecology, and all the parts of a
conceptual ecology must be seen as dynamic and in constant interaction and development.
Current conceptions or misconceptions function to influence new perceptions or new ideas. We
tend to perceive only the world that is consistent with our current conceptions and not attend to
counter examples. Misconceptions may interact with current features of a conceptual ecology.
The theory was overly rational.
We underestimate the range of factors that might function as part of a conceptual ecology. The
factors that we consider in the conceptual change were those logically relevant to appraising the
worth of two competing scientific conceptions. We may rely too much on philosophy of science
as a source of models of rationality. There are other factors that affect learners’ choices between
two competing scientific conceptions. For example, for some learners the problem to be solved in
the classroom is that of discovering how to get a good grade. In this case, they tend to become
rote learners. For others, the problem may be discovering how to maintain self-esteem in the face
of a subject that is unintelligible. Their response could be to devalue the subject matter. Or
students may conceptualize the task as a piece of academic work instead of a scientific inquiry. In
sum, other variables such as motivation and the view as to the nature and value of subject matter
should be in an account of a conceptual ecology. These factors can affect the approach taken to a
subject, the matter in which it is represented, and the conception of the subject matter developed.
These effects, in turn, may influence further learning.
Revisions Needed in the Initial Theory
Five modifications required are as follows: 1. A wider range of factors needs to be taken into
account in attempting to describe a learner’s conceptual ecology. Motives and goals and the
institutional and social source of them need to be considered. The idea of a conceptual ecology
thus needs to be larger than the epistemological factors suggested by the history and philosophy
of science. 2. Current scientific conceptions and misconceptions are not only objects on which a
learners’ conceptual ecology acts, they are themselves parts of the learner’s conceptual ecology.
Thus they must be seen in interaction with other components. 3. Conceptions and misconceptions
can exist in different modes of representation and different degrees of articulateness. They may
not exist at all but may easily appear to do so, because under instruction or in research they are
generated by other elements of a conceptual ecology. 4. A developmental view of conceptual
ecologies is required. 5. An interactionist view of conceptual ecologies is required.
Empirical Support for Revisions
In the research, three items were asked to college students who have taken at least two semesters
of college physics: epistemological view, qualitative physics, learning attitude. The results suggest
the following. On the epistemological side they show a belief that the physical world is rational
and a rejection of epistemological relativism both support and are supported by a growth in
physics competence. On the side of our learning attitude items, they suggest that having
confidence in one’s ability to understand physics, approaching learning as a matter of
understanding the material instead of learning it by rote, and valuing learning science for its own
sake tend to facilitate and are facilitated by growth in physics competence. However, one should
be cautious about moving too quickly from the premise that some set of epistemological view or
attitudes about learning facilitates the learning of science, to a conclusion that these views or
attitudes are true and should be promoted. Treason is that empirical connection does not
guarantee the truth.
Further Research Needed
Our conclusion suggests that the conceptual ecology that interact with instructions need to be
described, that how they interact should be understood, and that the instructional strategies that
interact in productive ways with the students current concepts need to be devised.
For instructional purposes, we suggest three lines of inquiry. 1. There is a need for investigation of
the sources of misconceptions prior to classroom instruction. 2. There is need to expand the
account of a conceptual ecology, considering the attitudes that novices have toward the nature of
science and scientific inquiry, and including the learner’s perceptions of the classroom task. 3. An
account of how the students come to see the world as a rational place is needed.