RATIONALITY’S SPACE OF INDETERMINATION
Assistant Florin Popa, Ph.D
The Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest
florinpopa10@yahoo.com
Abstract: The article proposes a critical analysis of an influential
perspective on practical rationality, based on the assumption that the rationality
of decisions and actions can be, in principle, perfectly defined by applying a set
of formal criteria of unidirectional adequacy of means to ends. Our critique
notes that a crucial fact is ignored: most important decisions confront us with a
space of indetermination, an area in which deliberation can not clearly delineate
between rational and irrational solely on the basis of predefined and
context-independent criteria. A more appropriate representation of rationality
seems to be offered by the complementary and flexible application of formal
criteria (which offer a minimal set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions)
and norms open to adaptive adjustments. These adjustments are not generated
by the application of postulated criteria, but by decisional practice and the
confrontation with alternative norms developed in other contexts.
Keywords: rationality, reasonableness, the space of indetermination,
decision theory, decision models.
The problem of rationality is present, more or less explicitly, in any
discussion of human capacities of knowledge, decision and action. Even a minimal
analysis of how individuals make decisions and pass from decision to action
assumes an implicit demarcation of practical rationality. This involves, among
others, questions on what criteria and norms to use, the relationship between the
reasons for taking a decision and its consequences or the relationship between the
epistemic and practical levels of rationality. Determining the truth of certain
statements is implicitly linked to our understanding of how these statements are
to be justified on the basis of evidence and to our way of making decisions or
acting on the basis of these statements. Therefore, the problem of truth is
inextricably linked to the concept of rationality, theoretical or practical.
The difficulty to operate with clearly demarcated and autonomous fields
(rationality, truth, fairness) says something about the very nature of rationality: it
must not be considered only - and, anyway, not primarily - in terms of content
(which are the required criteria for decision or action). Essentially, rationality
implies preconditions of adequacy applicable to decision-making and action.
Just as any meaningful debate and argumentation makes implicit reference to
constraints of theoretical rationality, decision-making is subject to criteria and
norms of rational adequacy. Adequacy concerns the relationship between the
reasons for decisions (opinions, preferences, desires) and the actual decision, as
well as the relationship between different (and sometimes divergent) goals
guiding decisions. This does not entail, however, the adoption of an illusory "right
model" or some unlikely infallible criteria of rational action. Rather, we have
exploratory and local adjustments of rational adequacy rules that remain
essentially preliminary and changeable.
Although any model of rational decision remains open to criticism and
adjustment, the rationality assumption, as a general requirement concerning the
adequacy of opinions, preferences, goals in respect to decisions and actions, is
maintained systematically. The rationality assumption is not part of a particular
model of decision, but implicit condition of possibility of any model.
The assumption that practical rationality can be described adequately using a
predetermined set of formal criteria has to do, to some extent, with the influence
of a methodological tradition based on the postulation of cognitive faculties as the
basis of rational behavior, and a corresponding model of formal rationality.
Specifically, it is a model based on the idea of “legitimate inference” - an inference
guided by formal, universal, a priori principles1. The strict and indiscriminate
application of this concept in social sciences and philosophy has had negative
effects, says H. Kincaid, insofar as it ignored the essentially empirical nature of
inferences underlying methodological rules. It is a reductionist attempt at
founding practical rationality on a predefined set of formal criteria and general
applicability.
Many of the explanatory models developed in decision theory and rational
choice theory are based on assumptions which, taken together, compose what
John Searle (2002) called the classical perspective on rationality2. It is not
clearly defined theory of rationality, but rather a theoretical framework partially
made explicit, based on conditions of rational adequacy concerning the relations
between opinions, desires and preferences and decisions, between decisions and
actions etc.
The classical perspective can be described as the overlapping area of several
similar approaches, which partially share a set of assumptions of rationality.
According to this approach, to be rational is to argue and make decisions in
accordance with a relevant set of formal criteria - the rules of logic, probability
theory, rational choice theory, etc.
The classical perspective approaches rationality formally and instrumentally.
The formal aspect concerns the nature of adequacy criteria: they describe abstract
structures or relations between variables (preferences, utilities, alternatives),
disregarding the specific context of their application. As such, respecting certain
rules, procedures or norms (e.g. the internal consistency of preferences) would
necessarily render our opinions or decisions rational. The instrumental aspect
refers to the range of rational decision: it concerns the choosing of means
according to ends, but not the selection and evaluation of ends themselves (these
are given).
The classical perspective assumes that rationality is a distinct cognitive
faculty. In this perspective, its limits are deemed to have been already fixed, as
1
2
2
Kincaid, (2000), 67.
Searle, (2002), offers an interesting analysis of the classical perspective’s assumptions.
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part of our implicit cognitive endowment, and its exercise could be prevented only
by “disruptive” factors (insufficient or erroneous information, emotions, errors of
judgment etc.). Just as we use language to communicate, we use this cognitive
faculty to form opinions, make decisions and act. But rationality is not simply
given, is not a ready-made faculty applicable to decisions and actions. Its fuzzy
boundaries are constantly specified and modified in the very process of applying
it. What means that a certain decision is rational can only be adequately specified
within the specific context of that decision and of the person deciding. The
implicit or explicit norms of rational adequacy that we apply in evaluating
decisions depend on this context.
It is not a completely formalized model, applied on the basis of a predefined
set of criteria, and at the same time it is not rationality model that can be
completely specified either at individual level (by applying necessary and
sufficient criteria to individual contexts) or at collective level (as a simple
aggregation of individual rational action, in the manner of rational choice
models).
Overall, the classical perspective includes models of decision that share
(partially or fully) the following assumptions: the “faculty of rationality” is given,
it is already fully specified at the level of each decision-maker, rational decision
concerns the unidirectional adequacy of means to ends, practical rationality
consist exclusively of formal criteria with general applicability, their application is
independent of the decision context, the subject’s aims are not themselves
subjected to rational scrutiny (they are taken as such), the subject’s decisions or
actions are completely determined by the intentional antecedents of any specific
decision (desires, preferences, beliefs, moral evaluations etc.).
Let’s analyze for a moment the assumption that, in principle, the space of
practical rationality can be perfectly specified, in the sense that any decision or
action can be, under appropriate conditions, qualified as rational or irrational.
The reasons for accepting it are not obvious by any means; in practice, the
evaluation of the rationality of many decisions or actions proves difficult, and this
difficulty cannot be reduced to insufficient information or faulty processing. Not
everything that is obviously not rational is obviously irrational. Contrary to the
normative tradition of the classical perspective, according to which practical
rationality could provide a behavioral guide based on a clear set of rules, the
decisional practice seems to suggest a more modest approach. There are many
cases in which practical rationality proceeds by elimination (negatively), without
being able to provide at the same time a clear and comprehensive method for
demarcating its own space1. Interestingly, the difficulty does not have to do with
the inadequacy of the criteria used, but with the impossibility of using a
predefined criterion of demarcation of general applicability. There is a space of
indetermination, which includes decisions that can not be regarded as rational on
the basis of a given set of formal criteria. Alternatively, we could say that it is
about decisions whose rationality is to be established or disproven, but is for the
moment indeterminable. What can be said with reasonable certainty is that these
1
Cf. Elster, (1983).
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decisions are not irrational (in the sense that not violate the minimum criteria of
rationality – for instance, adopting a self-defeating behavior or following
contradictory aims). This space of indetermination was traditionally considered
the result of our psychological and cognitive limitations concerning access to
information, processing and deliberation. The implicit assumption was that, in
principle, we have the capacity to limit or eliminate this space - that its existence
is accidental, temporary, and based only on contextual limitations (limited
capacity of obtaining and processing information, errors of judgment etc.). The
inability to find a criterion of demarcation applicable in any context was
considered to be a contextual and transitory problem, not something that has to
do with the demarcation criterion used or the underlying rationality model. The
models of rational decision based on the postulation of a rational actor share an
essential premise, according to which the rationality of our decisions or actions
may be determined comprehensively by applying a set of predefined criteria with
general applicability.
In this perspective, rationality is detached from the "objects" to which it is
applied – individual opinions, decisions, preferences, actions. The incapacity of
determining the rational alternative in every possible situation would depend, in
other words, on the existence of factors that limit or disrupt the optimal
functioning of our cognitive faculties. In an ideal world in which these factors
would be absent or insignificant, subjects would make perfectly rational decisions.
This optimistic view about the role and possibilities of rationality is
undermined by the observation of how people actually make decisions and relate
to normative models of rational decision-making. The space of indetermination is
not simply a result of limited capacities or "disruptive" factors. Its existence is
natural and reflects the diversity of human practice whose intuitive
reasonableness cannot be adequately explained on the basis of any predetermined
set of rationality criteria.
Suppose we are in a position to decide which candidate to vote for in
municipal elections. One of the candidates is recommended by a long experience
in local government, another has a very pleasant public presence and an inspired
speech, but limited experience in local government. Apparently, the third
candidate does not have any of these qualities, but is a former university
colleague. My decision will be guided by criteria and norms, but which ones
should have priority in this context? I wouldn’t vote for him just because I know
him but - on the other hand - it is precisely my direct knowledge of him that gives
me good grounds for voting (I know he is bright, a good negotiator and has a
strong sense of fairness). I have only indirect and superficial information about
the other two candidates (they appear to have certain skills or character traits). Is
it better to vote on the basis of my direct experience, filtered by my own
subjectivity, or on the basis of public information, where it is difficult to verify the
credibility of sources and know how well founded the public opinion is? Also,
should I give priority to professional expertise, personal abilities, negotiation and
managerial skills or existing political support? Most likely, a combination in
varying proportions of these norms, probably along with others. An adequate
answer can only be given only within that specific context. It is essential that my
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choice will not be guided by a recipe of general applicability, but rather it will be
the result of "negotiations" between alternative norms and contextual limitations.
It involves discernment, not the mechanical application of a decision algorithm.
The space of indetermination is the expression of the inadequacy of classical
perspective, which operates with clear-cut differences in a context characterized
by shades, nuances and gradual progressions. The indeterminacy concerns, in this
case, the fact that the borders of practical rationality are not already drawn, but
reveal themselves only when evaluated against specific contexts. It is not the fact
that it would be impossible to qualify some decisions as rational or irrational due
to lack of information, situational complexity or limited cognitive capacities. (In
these cases, it is assumed that the norms of rational adequacy are clearly defined,
but the subject has difficulties in applying them). It is not the incompleteness of
decisional premises, but the indeterminacy of norms that makes it impossible to
clearly demarcate what is rational or not.
An alternative is offered by complementary and flexible application of formal
criteria (which offer a minimal set of necessary but not sufficient conditions) and
norms open to adaptive adjustments: "formal reasoning about the axioms
postulated (including their compatibility and consistency), as well as the informal
understanding of values and norms (including their relevance and plausibility) are
both oriented in this productive direction”1. Unlike criteria, norms, by their very
nature, cannot be fully translated into a formalized structure, they do not
represent rigid delimitations, but tentative specifications, open to changes. Norms
are contextually adjustable, but this does not entail their genetic dependence on
the context – more precisely, not on a specific context or any number of specific
contexts. Norms are context-dependent only insofar as they cannot be fully
specified outside a given context; they are neither the ever-changing result of
immediacy and concreteness, nor the manifestation of a “rational transcendence”
that distributes itself uniformly and without nuances in all possible decision
contexts.
If a criterion represents a formal condition of adequacy, a norm concerns the
substantive adequacy of behavior to the concrete situation, the exercise of
discernment with regards to the means but also ends. It values that
reasonableness that is irreducible to a purely instrumental understanding of
rationality. The mere application of a criterion of logical consistency to opinions
cannot establish the rationality of decisions in a given context, for two reasons:
firstly, because it works by elimination, not constructively, and cannot provide an
unambiguous means of selecting between several alternative decisions based on
consistent opinions and transitive preferences; and secondly, because the
rationality of decisions, understood strictly instrumentally, may conflict with its
reasonableness. The first involves a unidirectional adjustment of means
(decisions) to ends (preferences, opinions, value commitments), which does not
include an assessment of the rationality of the latter. By contrast, reasonableness
requires a bi-directional adequacy between decisional premises and decisions
themselves, which has to do with more than instrumental optimization: it aims to
1
Sen, (1999b), 366.
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ensure that a certain decision is consistent and appropriate with regards to the
overall set of aims and commitments of the decision-maker. This involves an
analysis of the rationality of aims – of their “internal” consistency (as related to all
other aims) and "external" consistency (in relation to the decision-maker’s
conduct), as well as their relative weight. As such, the "rational adequacy" of a
given decision is not assessed against predefined elements (constant preferences,
fixed aims), but against the horizon of a gradual convergence with other practices
and norms of rationality of the subject, as well as of other subjects.
The pretense of being able to fully specify a decision model with general
applicability a priori can lead to counter-intuitive results, perceived as
unreasonable. The rationality of decisions (analytical, formalized) cannot ignore
the reasonableness of decisions (informal, contextual, intuitive). If the classical
view of rationality appeals to criteria and rules applicable independently of any
context, reasonableness calls for norms that are defined and reconfigured largely
on the basis of relevant prior experience, and its application is nuanced and
contextual (which does not imply that they are generated by the context, but only
that they cannot be properly specified outside given contexts). Thus understood,
reasonableness cannot cover the entire area of practical rationality, but rather
provides the conditions of its exercise.
Unlike rationality (who implicitly carries the ambition of full formalization),
reasonableness is flexible, contextual and non-reductionist. It calls for aims,
norms and principles - generally, value commitments which, in the tradition of
instrumental rationality, are either ignored or taken for granted, without
attempting an evaluation of their own rationality 1. It is useful, we believe, to
reconsider and redeem reasonableness and its role in rational conduct. This
reconsideration recognizes the essential role of that intuitive and experiential
given of any rational evaluation, which brings together common sense (i.e. the
spontaneous, unmediated recognition of just proportions) and discernment (i.e.
the capacity to determine what is relevant, appropriate to the situation or
essential).
If the classical model involves fixed and predefined criteria, applicable
regardless of context, the norms are adjustable, open to new practice that can
change the contours of the space of indetermination. Also, if rationality remains
essentially individual (its collective instances being always defined by reference to
the rationality of an individual or individuals), reasonableness feeds itself on the
social, interactive background that informs and demarcates all individual
decisions. It implicitly refers to that interactive environment in which rationality
norms and practices are defined but also called into question.
Ultimately, reasonableness refers to rationality that is aware of its limits,
open to evidence and opposed to dogmatism. In contrast with the theoretical
hybris of the classical perspective on rationality - mainly rational choice theory –
reasonableness implicitly recognizes the limits of any formalized model of
1 W. H. Newton-Smith makes the distinction between minirat and maxirat evaluation of the
rationality of decisions. A maxirat evaluation includes not only an assessment of means (alternative
choices for decision), but also of the grounds for decision – opinions, preferences, aims
(Newton-Smith 1994, 315-320).
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rationality and rejects as inadequate the transformation of these limits
(preliminary and changeable) in fixed boundaries of rationality as such. The
constant call to reasonability can prevent the transformation of reason into an
object of rationalism, i.e. of a conception of rationality which tends to immunize
itself to criticism, becoming prisoner of its own assumptions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Elster, Jon, (ed.), (1986), Rational Choice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
[2] Harold, Kincaid, (2000), Formal Rationality and Its Pernicious Effects
on Social Sciences, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2000; 30.
[3] Habermas, Jurgen, (2000b), Conştiinţa morală şi acţiune comunicativă,
Ed. All, Bucureşti.
[4] Newton-Smith, W. H., (1994), Raţionalitatea ştiinţei, Bucureşti, Ed.
Ştiinţifică.
[5] Popper, Karl R., (1998), Mitul contextului, Ed. Trei, Bucureşti.
[6] Searle, John, (2002), Rationality in Action, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press.
[7] Sen, A.K., (1977), Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4
(Summer, 1977).
[8] Sen, Amartya, (1995), Rationality and Social Choice, The American
Economic Review, March 1995.
[9] Sen, Amartya, (1999a), Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[10] Sen, Amartya, (1999b), The Possibility of Social Choice, The American
Economic Review; iunie 1999.
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