YOS 6 108 (YBC 3803)
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l. 5
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l. 8:
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pu-ut mu-kin-nu-tu ·á ˘DÙ-™15 A-·ú
·á ˘LÚ-™na-na-a ßRIG7 ·á GA∞AN ·á UNUGˆ
·á ina mu-·i ˘É-DINGIR-LUGAL-URÙ ˘gab-bi-™±EN-um-ma
˘ZALÁG-e-a ˘a-di-ma-at-DINGIR f™na-na-a-·ar-rat
DAM ˘am-ma-a ù ˘«kal*»-ba-a ßRIG7v
i-pu-u· dul-la ·á É.AN.NA ina É ˘DÙ-a
A-·ú ·á ˘MU-™±AG A ˘ki-din-™AMAR.UTU ˘DÙ-™15
ú-·e-ri-bu-ma ú-·á-a¿-mi-i◊
ù MÁ∞ GAL! ù UZ TURmu·en «ina x x (x)»
ik-ki-is ˘DÙ-a na-·i
ki-i la uk-ti-ni ¿i-†u
·á LUGAL i-zab-bil
ßmu-kin-nu ˘na-di-nu A-·ú ·á ˘™±EN-∞E∞v-BA-·á
A ˘e-gi-bi ˘mu-ra-nu A-·ú ·á ˘™±AG-DÙ-∞E∞
A ˘É.KUR-za-kir ˘mu-·e-zib-™±EN A-·ú
·á ˘™±AG-KAM A ˘™±EN-IBILA-URÙ ˘ÌR-iá
A-·ú ·á ˘™UTU-MU-GIN A ßman-di-di
ßUMBISAG ˘lu-u◊-ana-ZALÁG-™AMAR.UTU A-·ú ·á ˘™±AG-DÙ-∞E∞
A ˘da-bi-bi UNUGˆ £GAN UD 22.KAM
MU 15.KAM ™±AG-I «LUGAL» TIN.TIR«ˆ»
The second name is written over an incomplete erasure of ˘KAR-™±EN.
This clause allows for two interpretations, depending on where ina b¬t
PN belongs to. It could either mean that six oblates were doing work in
this house, or that somebody ushered someone into this house. Probably
both is implied and true: The assignment to do work in this house gave
the named individuals the knowledge and opportunity to usher somebody
into it at night.
The text is ambiguous regarding who ushered whom into Ibnaya’s house.
The verb uš∂ribu (l. 8), since it is in the subjunctive, could be
singular or plural. Dougherty (Shirkûtu p. 60) and Dandamaev (Slavery p.
540f.) have Ibni-Ištar bringing the other six people into the house. The
translation of Joannès (WHERE) makes the latter the subject of this verb
and uša¿mi◊, despite the fact that the latter is singular. On the other
hand, the second verb follows immediately and is linked by the enclitic
-ma, we therefore do not expect the subject to change. CAD ø p. 60
agrees in this respect but takes the subject of both verbs to be
singular. This, however, is not satisfactory in a legal sense. For the
six individuals to be named we can expect them to be actively involved
in this case, not just being ushered somewhere to witness a robbery.
The traces at the end of the line are difficult to guess. in view of ina
one might expect that an instrument is named that was used to kill the
animals.
The individual guaranteeing to bear witness is the owner of the house
that has been robbed. As his filiation is already given in l. 7 it is
omitted here.
The year number is 15, but based on the connection this text has with
TCL 12 117, it should probably be read as 16 (see chapter 2, around nn.
94-97).
Translation
(Concerning) testimony against Ibni-Ištar, son of Am∂l-Nanaya, a
oblate of the Lady-of-Uruk: That by night B¬t-il-šar-u◊ur,
Gabbi-B∂lumma, N‚rêa, Adimat-il, Nanaya-·arrat, wife of Amm®º,
and Kalbaya––all temple oblates doing work (on behalf) of Eanna
in the house of Ibnaya, son of Iddin-Nabû from the Kidin-Marduk
family––ushered him (Ibni-Ištar) at night (into this house), and
made (him) commit a robbery; and (furthermore) he killed a goat
and a duck with a …:
Ibnaya guarantees (to testify).
If he does not testify, he will bear a penalty of the king.
Witnesses
N®din/B∂l-a¿¿∂-iq¬·a//Egibi
M‚r®nu/Nabû-b®n-a¿i//Ekur-zakir
Mu·∂zib-B∂l/Nabû-∂re·//B∂l-aplu-u◊ur
Ardiya/∞ama·-·um-uk¬n//Mandidi
Scribe
Lû◊i-ana-n‚ri-Marduk/Nabû-b®n-a¿i//D®bib¬
Place and date
Uruk, 22nd day, 9th month, year 15 (or 16?) of Nabonidus, king of
Babylon.
Comments
The owner of a house is made to testify in a robbery case
commited at his house. Obviously he already has made an
accusation but it needs to be heard in court. The ¿¬tu clause
against him therefore does not refer to the criminal case as
such but to obstructing court procedure.
Six named temple oblates who had access to this house for work
on behalf of the temple (maybe they were allowed to spend the
nights there as well) abused this situation by conspiring to let
a burglar in at night. The criminal (also a temple slave), did
not only rob but also killed two animals. The way this fact is
stated seems to indicate that the people who let him in did not
intend him to do this; he rather acted on his own behalf.
The criminal charge is twofold: the group of six is accused of
instigating and actively supporting a robbery, thereby betraying
the trust the temple had bestowed on them, while Ibni-i·tar
committed the robbery and killed animals.
This case may have an additional twist. The presence of the
group of six in Ibnaya’s house is explained by them “doing work
on behalf of Eanna”. What sort of work could this be? Why do
they stay the night there instead of in the temple precinct?
Could there be an implied suspiscion that Ibnaya appropriated
temple personnel for his own ends? Is this the main reason why
he is made to repeat his accusation––or why he may not wish to
do so?
Note: YOS 6 108 is also dealt with by Kozuh.
Shalom Holtz has a new transliteration of YOS 6 108; he also has
a discussion of this, pp. 159ff. Holtz has this guy agrees to
testify so the court won’t issue a summons document.
Jursa suggests based on
what he has said out
suggest that this is the
Cornelia wants to know
testify?
older law that this guy has to repeat
of court now in court. Cornelia also
meaning of I guaranteeing to testify.
why this guy has to be compelled to
We have looked at YOS 6 208; YOS 7 96, YOS 6 175. The question
is whether guaranteeing testimony means that only the guarantor
has to testify or whether either the gurantor or the guarantor
brings has to testify. Two formulae are used: Put mukinnutu sha
and lumukinu abaqu. We have to decide what these mean and
whether or not they are the same. In YOS 6 208 Cornelia says, in
this case the guy has to testify again because the statement is
before the local assembly in a village. This fellow has to come
to the real court in Uruk to accuse again. But he does get to
bring other evidence.
Put mukinnutu sha
Put mukinnutu sha is in Cyr 311; Nbn 343; Sack 80; TCL 12 96;
YOS 6 108; YOS 6 208; YOS 6 175; YOS 7 96 (according to Shalom
Holtz).
Translate: Quarantees testimony regarding PN. We don’t know
whether they have to testify, they have to repeat what they have
said out of court or in a lessor court now in the higher court;
or can bring anyone and anything to support their statment.
mukinu abaqu
Mukinu abaqu is in Nbk 361.365.366.419; OIP 122 34; YOS 7 192.
alaku ukinu
On the day when...PN1 PN2 lift the head of PN3 then PN3 will
alaku ukinu.
See e.g., BIN 1 113 he has already given some testimony to the
mar bani, the temple officials shall say it before the temple
officials and establish his case.
Bruce now suggests that the homeowner is under suspicion. He has
cut a deal. He will testify against the thief. He will now only
be subject to the hitu sha shari and not the 30 fold penalty.
So final list:
1) He has to testify to clear himself of negligence supervision.
2a) He has to testify to clear himself of the theft
2b) He made a deal to clear himself that he can’t be prosecuted
for theft only
3) He accuses so he has to repeat what he has said out of court
or in a lessor court now in the higher court
4) He can bring anyone and anything to cooberate his prior incourt statement.
5) He has improper stuff in his house (people, goods and/or
animals) so he does not want to testify at all about this
He won’t be tried for theft as represented in YOS 6 175--but
there are counter arguments.
We have collated this text--it is year 16! So, the knife case is
one day before.
Cornelia suggests taht the knife is mentioned in this text and
is the weapon that was used to slaughter the animals! I think
this is a strong possibility and they want our guarantor to nail
this guy!
Rachel and Bruce’s old remarks:
Only four texts contain zabālu: GCCI 2 101, YOS 6 108, YOS
7 116, and YOS 7 192.
First, the violation is one that has historically been
dealt with by the royal branch of the justice system, such as in
a false accusation case (e.g., YOS 6 108).1
He makes other statements that appear to reflect the idea
that bearing-sin language does, in fact, refer to a punishment.
For instance, with respect to the bearing-sin clause in YOS 6
108, he writes, “A severe penalty was imposed in case of
default.”2
Even the documents that contain some duty assumed through
either an oath or promise declaration do not all reflect an
1
Joannès, “Textes judiciaire néo-babyloniens,” 208-9.
2
Dougherty, Shirkûtu, 61. See also his comments on YOS 7 177 (“Principle of
Suretyship,” 101).
exchange.3 A few, for instance, are judicial orders (e.g., YNER 1
2, YOS 6 108, and YOS 7 192). These cannot be viewed as
containing a bargained-for-exchange.
In some instances, the guarantor is not guaranteeing the
appearance of a specific person but, rather, some unnamed
witness who can provide specific testimony (YOS 6 108 and YOS 6
175).
3
In the Neo-Babylonian period, contracts rarely contained an oath clause (Oelsner et al.,
“Neo-Babylonian Period,” 946; cf. C. H. W. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts
and Letters [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904], 233). Moreover, throughout the ancient Near East,
where an oath appears in a contract, it typically addresses peripheral matters and does not bind
the party on the primary contractual terms. On this point, Westbrook maintains: “Documents
recording the standard contractual forms may also record a promissory oath, by one or both
parties. For the most part, the oath relates to ancillary matters: either special terms not usually
found in that type of contract, or (most frequently) a promise not to deny, contest, or alter the
terms of the completed contract in the future. In the third millennium, oaths are sometimes
recorded for central obligations of the contract, e.g. repayment of a loan. This type of oath
disappears in the second millennium, where only ancillary oaths are recorded. By the first
millennium, it is rare to find any mention of an oath in the records of standard contracts”
(“Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 66).
YOS 6 108 records a situation in which the court orders a
person to guarantee the appearance of a witness.4 The text makes
clear that a crime has taken place. Someone has apparently
broken into a certain Baniya’s house and killed two temple
animals there. The primary suspect is Ibni-Ištar. Six other
individuals aided and abetted him, by allowing him to gain entry
to Baniya’s house. The court, composed of high-ranking temple
officials, does not seem to have sufficient evidence to convict
Ibni-Ištar. As a result, the court issues an order to Baniya
that he shall serve as a guarantor of “testimony concerning
Ibni-Ištar.” This means that Baniya is now required to produce a
witness who will provide incriminating testimony against IbniIštar.5 The tablet does not specify exactly whom he will bring;
it is Baniya’s responsibility to locate a suitable witness. His
household appears to employ a number of servants, including the
co-conspirators and possible other eyewitnesses. The court’s
probable reasoning then is, because Baniya owns the house, he is
the one with the best access to, and control over, the most
likely witnesses. The text concludes by stating that, if Baniya
does not produce this testimony, “he will bear a sin of the
4
See the Appendix for an edition of this text. Our comments on YOS 6 108 come in large
measure from B. Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes, BZAR 4 (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2004), 76, 169-71. For other discussions of the document, see Dougherty,
Shirkûtu, 60-61; and Joannès, “Textes judiciaire néo-babyloniens,” 209. Cf. Dandamaev, Slavery
in Babylonia, 540-41; and M. San Nicolò, “Parerga VII: Der §8 des Gesetzbuches Hammurapis
in den neubabylonischen Urkunden,” AnOr 4 (1932) 336.
5
The language of the text indicates that the testimony will disfavor Ibni-Ištar; see Wells,
Law of Testimony, 76, 119-20.
king.” One could say that the court will cite him for contempt.6
This would be a action based in the administration of the
judicial system.
YOS 7 192 seems primarily to be about theft.7 Its
conditional verdict refers to the standard thirty-fold penalty
for theft of temple property and to bearing a sin of the king.
As is typical with conditional verdicts, the condition that must
be met before the verdict takes effect is that a witness come
forward and offer testimony incriminating the defendant. The
text begins with an oath that is sworn by the defendant, Šamašmudammiq. He avows his innocence, by stating that he did not
take a temple donkey from the possession of a certain Bel-lumur,
nor did he carry off the message of Nabugu that was in Bellumur’s possession. The conditional verdict follows. It states
that when Bel-lumur is able to bring a witness who can
incriminate Šamaš-mudammiq on these two counts, then he (Šamašmudammiq) will be required to pay thirty donkeys to the temple
and will bear a sin of the king. Because Bel-lumur has the
6
This is contrary to the view of Joannès, who states that bearing a “sin of the king” in
this text refers to punishment for false testimony (Joannès, “Textes judiciaire néo-babyloniens,”
208-09). Joannès is, however, assuming that Baniya’s testimony has already been heard by the
judges and that Baniya now bears an obligation to produce a corroborating witness. If he should
fail, according to Joannès, the court will deem his testimony false. Even if Joannès should be
right that Baniya gave testimony before YOS 6 108 was drawn up, there are no other occurrences
of the bearing-sin language that support this conclusion. Furthermore, persons appear to have
been found guilty of false testimony in the Neo-Babylonian period only when they are guilty of
wrongful prosecution and their accusation has been clearly refuted (see Wells, Law of
Testimony, 149-55).
7
See the Appendix for an edition of this text. See additionally, G. Ries, “Zur Strafbarkeit
des Meineids im Recht des Alten Orients,” in Festschrift für Dieter Medicus zum 70. Geburtstag,
ed. V. Beuthien et al. (Cologne: Heymanns, 1999), 463-64; cf. San Nicolò, “Der §8 des
Gesetzbuches Hammurapis,” 336 n. 1.
responsibility to produce additional evidence, he is undoubtedly
the accuser in the case. Moreover, as the one who had possession
of the donkey and the message of Nabugu, Bel-lumur was probably
the one assigned to deliver it. This may also mean that he has
better access than others to evidence and that the court holds
him partly responsible for helping to resolve the situation (as
was true for Baniya in YOS 6 108).