Stephen C. Nelson
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Northwestern University
stephen-nelson@northwestern.edu
Supplementary Appendix for Stephen C. Nelson, “Playing Favorites: How
Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Lending Decisions,” International Organization
[forthcoming]
The appendix describes the variables used in the analysis, provides the code1 and
results for the main findings reported in the article, and presents the robustness
checks and additional results referenced in the article.
There are two main datasets used in the article. The first is organized as countryprogram-year and includes the number of conditions and relative size of loans. The
second is organized in country-year format and includes the approval of waivers for
noncompliance with performance criteria.
(1) Variables in the conditionality and loan size (IMF treatment) dataset
ccode: unique country identifier code
country: country name.
year: year in which agreement was approved (1980-2000).
agreement: type of conditional lending agreement [Standby Arrangement (SBA),
Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Structural Adjustment Fund (SAF), Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Fund (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF)]
agreement_date: date of approval of agreement (DD/MM/YYYY).
size_quota: size of total agreed disbursement/quota.
number_conditions: number of performance criteria in the loan agreement.
counter: a linear counter variable that adds 1 for each year after 1980.
use_of_imf_quotat1: ratio of total use of IMF credit and administrative resources
(in billions of SDRs) to the total IMF quota (billions of SDRs) (Dreher and Vaubel
2004).
1
All analyses for the article were run in Stata 11.2.
tbillratet1: the nominal US Treasury bill rate, which is a benchmark for world
interest rates (Dreher and Vaubel 2004).
reserves_debt: Ratio of international reserves to total external debt (World Bank,
Global Development Finance database, accessed via
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-development-finance).
debt_gni: Ratio of total external debt to gross national income (World Bank, Global
Development Finance database, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/global-development-finance).
log_gdp: the natural log of gross domestic product (World Bank, Global
Development Finance database, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator).
gdpgrow: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (World Bank, World Development
Indicators, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator).
pre_election: an indicator that takes a value of one if a legislative or executive
election is scheduled in the next six months. Since political business cycles should
only be present in competitive elections, I only included elections with multiple
candidates/parties (denoted by a score of 5 or above in the Database of Political
Institution’s electoral competitiveness index) (Beck et al 2001).
post_election: an indicator for elections that occurred in the previous six months.
Since political business cycles should only be present in competitive elections, I only
included elections with multiple candidates/parties (denoted by a score of 5 or
above in the Database of Political Institution’s electoral competitiveness index)
(Beck et al 2001).
leftgov: The Database of Political Institutions records the political party of the chief
of government and the largest party in government. The DPI discerned the
ideological orientation of parties by considering party names (defined as parties
with social democrat, communist, socialist, or left-wing in the name); if the ideology
of a party was not obvious, the coding team relied on regional and country-specific
publications that assess party orientations. DPI’s coding was cross-checked with
Inglehart and Huber’s (1995) survey of party experts. I code the variable as “1”
when either the chief or the largest party in the governing coalition is recorded as a
Left party (Beck et al 2001).
polity2: The Polity2 democracy score computed by subtracting a measure of
autocracy, AUTOC, from a measure of democracy, DEMOC; the score ranges from -10
(least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). The AUTOC and DEMOC scores are
indexes of scores on different institutional factors (such as the competitiveness and
openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive recruitment,
competitiveness of political participation, etc.) (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).
checks: a count of the total number of veto players in a political system. In countries
where legislatures are not competitively elected, this takes a value of 1, indicating
that only the executive wields a check (Keefer and Stasavage 2003).
affinity_s2un_ust1: a measure of dyadic interest similarity built from roll-call votes
within the UN General Assembly. The variable ranges from -1 to 1 with higher
values indicating closer voting profiles between dyads. The measure employed in
the analysis looks at similarity of voting with the United States (Gartzke 2006).
paris_club_debt: takes the value of 1 if a Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement
was concluded within six months (on either end) of the date of approval of an IMF
agreement (last accessed here http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/pays on
November 10, 2012).
liberalized_trade: an update and improvement of the Sachs and Warner openness
indicator, the measure takes a value of 1 in periods of openness and 0 if the country
is closed. A country is coded as closed if any of the following conditions hold: (1) the
average unweighted tariff rate > 40%; (2) the average core non-tariff barrier
frequency on capital goods and intermediaries > 40%; (3) the annual black market
premium > 20%; (4) the country has a functioning marketing board for a major
export good; (5) a socialist economic system (source: Wacziarg and Welch 2008).
proportion_neoliberal: measures the proportion of the economic policymaking
team that shares neoliberal economic beliefs. The economic policymaking team is
composed of the executive and the main economic authorities in a country, as
indicated by the signatories of IMF agreements. Policymakers are coded as
neoliberal if they (1) earned an MA or higher at a top-ranked American economics
department or (2) have significant experience with the IMF or World Bank. The
dates of entry and exit from office for policymakers were mainly collected from two
sources: the CIA’s Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments and
Keesings Record of World Events. The data were supplemented (and precise dates
were confirmed) with additional records of entry and exit dates from the archives of
the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Financial Times, New York Times, and, in
some cases, from direct correspondence with finance ministries and central banks. I
relied on several different sources to gather background information for
policymaker, including Proquest’s Digital Dissertations database, Gale’s Biography
Resource Center, International Who’s Who, The Statesman’s Yearbook, Who’s Who
in International Organizations, and numerous country- and region-specific editions
of Who’s Who. Some finance ministries and central banks provide biographical
information on their websites. I also obtained digital records of the American
Economic Review’s membership survey. Because the background information was
generated from a wide range of sources, I made sure to cross-check the coding
against multiple sources to ensure consistency.
log_size_quota: the natural log of the ratio of total size of loan disbursement (in
millions of SDRs) to a country’s quota (in millions of SDRs).
amtqta: ln(size/quota) (non-concessional loans 1984-2000), from Copelovitch’s
(2010) dataset.
pc: number of performance criteria in the loan agreement (non-concessional loans
1984-2000) (from Copelovitch’s 2010 dataset)
log_usmilaid_t1: natural log of the annual amount (in current dollars) of US military
assistance. Military assistance consists of grants and credits for military purchases,
funding for the training of foreign troops, and transfers of military equipment under
a variety of US aid programs (US AID Greenbook, last accessed here
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/ on June 27, 2012).
s15_64: average years of schooling among the population aged between 15 and 64
year (Morrisson and Murtin 2009).
s15_plus: average years of schooling among the population older than 15
(Morrisson and Murtin 2009).
s15_plus_p: average years of primary schooling among the population older than 15
(maximum is 6 years) (Morrisson and Murtin 2009).
s15_plus_s: average years of secondary schooling among the population older than
15 (maximum is 6 years) (Morrisson and Murtin 2009).
s15_plus_h: average years of higher education among the population older than 15
(maximum is 4 years) (Morrisson and Murtin 2009).
currcrash_t1: takes a value of one in the year in which a country experiences a
nominal devaluation of at least thirty percent that is also at least a ten percent hike
in the rate of depreciation compared to the previous year (Laeven and Valencia
2008).
finreform_t1: index of financial market liberalization that combines seven
components (credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, bank regulations,
privatization, capital account, and securities market) (Abiad et al 2008).
kaopen_t1: index that combines four indicators of restrictions on international
transactions compiled from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (Chinn and Ito 2008).
cap100_t1: index of capital account convertibility; ranges from 0 (inconvertible) to
100 (no restrictions on transactions that pertain to the capital account) (Quinn and
Toyoda 2008). Last accessed here on June 27, 2012:
www.centerforfinancialstability.org/hfs/Exchange_controls.xls.
telecomm_t1: index of degree of market-oriented reform in the
telecommunications sector; combines information on four components
(privatization, separation of regulatory authority from the executive branch,
elimination of political influence on the regulatory authority (depoliticization), and
liberalization of retail market to allow multiple service providers). Source: Henisz et
al 2005; also used as an indicator of economic liberalization by Giuliano, Mishra, and
Spilimbergo 2009 and Hauner and Prati 2008.
electricity_t1: index of degree of market-oriented reform in the electricity sector;
combines information on four components (privatization, separation of regulatory
authority from the executive branch, elimination of political influence on the
regulatory authority (depoliticization), and liberalization of retail market to allow
multiple service providers) Source: Henisz et al 2005; also used as an indicator of
economic liberalization by Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo 2009 and Hauner and
Prati 2008.
inf_reform_t1: infrastructural product market liberalization index that combines
telecom_t1 and electricity_t1 (Henisz et al 2005).
g5bank_t1: measure of total G-5 (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France) bank exposure
($billions, log) (Copelovitch 2010).
curracct_t1: current account balance (%GDP). World Development Indicators,
accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
ssa: sub-Saharan Africa
ea_p: East Asia and Pacifica
ee_ca: East and Central Europe + central Asia (post-communist)
la_c: Latin America and Caribbean
me_na: middle East and North Africa
sa: South Asia
(2) Variables in the waivers dataset
ccode: unique country identifier code.
country: country name.
year: year in which country was under active IMF program (1980-1997).
waiver: takes a value of 1 if a waiver is approved by the Executive Board in a year in
which a country has an active IMF program.
waiver_date: date(s) of Executive Board’s approval of waiver(s) (DD/MM/YYYY).
waivers_count: records the number of waivers for missed performance criteria
approved by the Executive Board.
agreement: type of conditional lending agreement.
agreement_date: date of approval of agreement (DD/MM/YYYY).
size_quota: size of total agreed disbursement/quota.
use_of_imf_quotat1: see description above
tbillratet1: see description above
reserves_debt: see description above
debt_gni: see description above
log_gdp: the natural log of gross domestic product (World Bank, Global
Development Finance database, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
gdpgrow: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (World Bank, World Development
Indicators, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
proportion_neoliberal: see description above. In the waivers dataset proportion
neoliberal is recorded annually.
polity2: see description above
instab: variable takes the value of 1 if the Polity2 regime type indicator changes (in
either direction) by at least three points during a three year period (Fearon and
Laitin 2003).
election: variable takes the value of 1 if a competitive election occurs in country j
during year t (Beck et al 2001).
leftgov: see description above
affinity_s2un_ust1: see description above
log_new_usmilaid_t1: natural log of the annual amount (in current dollars) of US
military assistance. Military assistance consists of grants and credits for military
purchases, funding for the training of foreign troops, and transfers of military
equipment under a variety of US aid programs (US AID Greenbook, last accessed
here http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/ on June 27, 2012).
paris_club: see description above
govt_consumption: government consumption as a percentage of GDP (World Bank,
World Development Indicators, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
cpi: the annual rate of consumer price inflation (World Bank, World Development
Indicators, accessed via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator)
number_binding_conditions: number of performance criteria in the currently
active program that the borrower has signed
yr2waiver: number of years from entry/failure to the receipt of a waiver from the
Executive Board (constructed using the btscs command in Stata, recommended by
Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998)
_spline1: cubic temporal spline 1 (constructed using the btscs command in Stata,
recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998)
_spline2: cubic temporal spline 2 (recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998)
_spline3: cubic temporal spline 3 (recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998)
ssa: sub-Saharan Africa
ea_p: East Asia and Pacifica
ee_ca: East and Central Europe + central Asia (post-communist)
la_c: Latin America and Caribbean
me_na: middle East and North Africa
sa: South Asia
Conditionality results
1. Main conditionality model
2. Sample statistics (based on main model)
3. Main model with region dummies on the RHS
4. Model with Copelovitch’s (2010) measure of binding conditionality (pc) as
the dependent variable
5. Model with average education level on the RHS
6. Models with additional policy environment controls (kaopen, cap100,
finreform, product market liberalization [telecom, electricity, and combined
infrastructure index]) on the RHS
7. Model with currency crash variable on the RHS
8. Model with G5 bank exposure on the RHS
9. Models with loan size on the RHS
Loan size results
1. Main loan size model (1984-2000)
2. Sample statistics (based on main model)
3. Main model (1984-2000) with region dummies on the RHS
4. Determinants of loan size (1980-2000)
5. Model with Copelovitch’s (2010) measure of loan size (amtqta) as the
dependent variable
6. Model with average education level on the RHS
7. Models with additional policy environment controls (kaopen, cap100,
finreform, product market liberalization [telecom, electricity, and combined
infrastructure index]) on the RHS
8. Model with currency crash variable on the RHS
9. Model with G5 bank exposure on the RHS
10. Model with number of conditions on the RHS
11. Model with current account balance on the RHS
Waiver results
1. Main model of the determinants of waivers (1980-1997)
2. Sample statistics (based on main model of waivers)
3. Model of the number of waivers approved by the Executive Board (19801997)
4. Sample statistics (based on model of the number of waivers)
5. Figure illustrating the effect of proportion neoliberal on the number of
waivers, holding all other covariates at their mean values
MODELS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CONDITIONALITY
(1) Main model reported in the article
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1 paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1023.3821
log pseudolikelihood = -1023.3821
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1023.3821
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
436
353.27
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0168266
.0030959
5.44
0.000
.0107587
.0228945
use_of_imf~1 |
.3046153
.1049946
2.90
0.004
.0988296
.5104009
tbillratet1 | -.0214733
.0055698
-3.86
0.000
-.0323898
-.0105567
proportion~l | -.1931968
.0532157
-3.63
0.000
-.2974977
-.0888959
pre_election | -.0158089
.0287074
-0.55
0.582
-.0720744
.0404566
leftgov |
.0160911
.0208188
0.77
0.440
-.0247129
.0568951
polity2 |
.0014156
.0026852
0.53
0.598
-.0038473
.0066785
checks | -.0078997
.0105948
-0.75
0.456
-.0286651
.0128657
affinity_s~1 | -.0532605
.0360985
-1.48
0.140
-.1240122
.0174913
log_usmila~1 | -.0012266
.0024747
-0.50
0.620
-.0060769
.0036238
paris_club~t |
.0554443
.0219359
2.53
0.011
.0124507
.0984379
liberalize~e | -.0505258
.0239604
-2.11
0.035
-.0974873
-.0035643
reserves_d~t |
.0001399
.0001936
0.72
0.470
-.0002396
.0005194
debt_gni |
.0001345
.0000667
2.02
0.044
3.76e-06
.0002653
log_gdp |
.0071397
.0078894
0.90
0.365
-.0083233
.0226026
gdpgrow | -.0014632
.0013099
-1.12
0.264
-.0040306
.0011042
_cons |
2.245814
.1932233
11.62
0.000
1.867103
2.624525
(2) Summary statistics (based on main conditionality model)
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------number_con~s |
436
12.34862
2.738826
6
26
counter |
436
10.77523
5.851412
0
20
use_of_imf~1 |
436
.3038991
.0752952
.19
.46
tbillratet1 |
436
6.662156
2.632845
3
14.1
proportion~l |
436
.0978899
.1780124
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------pre_election |
436
.0917431
.2889946
0
1
leftgov |
436
.2591743
.4386848
0
1
polity2 |
436
.1743119
6.865331
-9
10
checks |
436
2.376147
1.606246
1
9
affinity_s~1 |
436
.0629342
.2735264 -.2980132
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------log_usmila~1 |
436
11.49532
5.275688
0
21.02
paris_club~t |
436
.4587156
.4988651
0
1
liberalize~e |
436
.4495413
.4980189
0
1
reserves_d~t |
436
12.91519
25.30561 -.1692341
291.3955
debt_gni |
436
90.85591
86.51757
.4888002
1087.765
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------log_gdp |
436
22.71774
1.586531
19.00468
27.34039
gdpgrow |
436
-.2757482
5.318447
-30.9
16.53843
(3) Conditionality model with region dummies (south asia is omitted reference
category)
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1 paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow ssa ea_p ee_ca la_c me_na, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1020.0631
log pseudolikelihood = -1020.0631
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1020.0631
Number of obs
Wald chi2(21)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
436
467.01
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.016356
.0029674
5.51
0.000
.0105399
.022172
use_of_imf~1 |
.2944754
.1034807
2.85
0.004
.0916569
.497294
tbillratet1 | -.0199206
.0054617
-3.65
0.000
-.0306254
-.0092158
proportion~l | -.1515747
.0537773
-2.82
0.005
-.2569763
-.046173
pre_election | -.0209018
.0259811
-0.80
0.421
-.0718237
.0300202
leftgov |
.0022085
.0210704
0.10
0.917
-.0390887
.0435058
polity2 |
.0015692
.0027896
0.56
0.574
-.0038983
.0070366
checks | -.0054293
.0095487
-0.57
0.570
-.0241445
.0132859
affinity_s~1 |
-.111098
.0385342
-2.88
0.004
-.1866235
-.0355724
log_usmila~1 | -.0013708
.0025385
-0.54
0.589
-.0063463
.0036046
paris_club~t |
.0694245
.0195792
3.55
0.000
.03105
.1077991
liberalize~e | -.0364139
.0225175
-1.62
0.106
-.0805474
.0077195
reserves_d~t | -.0000625
.0002316
-0.27
0.787
-.0005164
.0003915
debt_gni |
.0001698
.0000583
2.91
0.004
.0000555
.0002842
log_gdp |
.0052396
.0104945
0.50
0.618
-.0153291
.0258084
gdpgrow | -.0011732
.0013421
-0.87
0.382
-.0038037
.0014573
ssa | -.0946085
.0922241
-1.03
0.305
-.2753645
.0861474
ea_p | -.1268141
.0903356
-1.40
0.160
-.3038687
.0502405
ee_ca | -.0074933
.0961277
-0.08
0.938
-.1959001
.1809135
la_c | -.1364808
.0909882
-1.50
0.134
-.3148144
.0418529
me_na | -.1355313
.0942468
-1.44
0.150
-.3202516
.049189
_cons |
2.367164
.2701908
8.76
0.000
1.8376
2.896728
(4) Conditionality model using Copelovitch’s (2010) measure of number of
conditions
pwcorr number_conditions pc, sig
| number~s
pc
-------------+-----------------number_con~s |
1.0000
|
|
pc |
0.7140
1.0000
|
0.0000
poisson pc counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow,
robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -298.02225
log pseudolikelihood = -298.02225
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -298.02225
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
143
136.55
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 37 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
pc |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0229029
.0106727
2.15
0.032
.0019849
.043821
use_of_imf~1 |
-.146196
.5581001
-0.26
0.793
-1.240052
.9476601
tbillratet1 |
.0377029
.0213762
1.76
0.078
-.0041937
.0795995
proportion~l | -.2635667
.1373057
-1.92
0.055
-.532681
.0055475
pre_election | -.0934818
.0576462
-1.62
0.105
-.2064663
.0195027
leftgov |
.029267
.054033
0.54
0.588
-.0766357
.1351697
polity2 | -.0061866
.0057054
-1.08
0.278
-.0173689
.0049957
checks | -.0108204
.0277321
-0.39
0.696
-.0651742
.0435335
affinity_s~1 |
.2099169
.1017254
2.06
0.039
.0105387
.409295
log_usmila~1 |
.0031137
.008453
0.37
0.713
-.0134539
.0196813
paris_club~t |
.1973756
.0831398
2.37
0.018
.0344245
.3603267
liberalize~e | -.0426886
.0614414
-0.69
0.487
-.1631115
.0777343
reserves_d~t |
.0006389
.0004517
1.41
0.157
-.0002466
.0015243
debt_gni |
.0012155
.0011924
1.02
0.308
-.0011215
.0035526
log_gdp |
.0712876
.0206366
3.45
0.001
.0308407
.1117345
gdpgrow | -.0031387
.0048679
-0.64
0.519
-.0126796
.0064022
_cons | -.4529973
.5320464
-0.85
0.395
-1.495789
.5897944
(5) Conditionality model with average years of higher education (Morrisson and
Murtin 2009)
(5a) average number of years of education
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow s15_plus, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -606.59576
log pseudolikelihood = -606.59575
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -606.59575
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
260
245.68
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0209147
.0038585
5.42
0.000
.0133522
.0284771
use_of_imf~1 |
.2305458
.1405217
1.64
0.101
-.0448716
.5059632
tbillratet1 | -.0123882
.0066902
-1.85
0.064
-.0255007
.0007243
proportion~l | -.1823307
.0641114
-2.84
0.004
-.3079866
-.0566747
pre_election | -.0271063
.0300017
-0.90
0.366
-.0859085
.0316959
leftgov |
.0296856
.0313485
0.95
0.344
-.0317564
.0911276
polity2 |
.001793
.0029407
0.61
0.542
-.0039707
.0075566
checks | -.0174074
.0120968
-1.44
0.150
-.0411166
.0063019
affinity_s~1 | -.0919987
.0585907
-1.57
0.116
-.2068344
.0228369
log_usmila~1 | -.0033375
.0035023
-0.95
0.341
-.0102018
.0035268
paris_club~t |
.0690262
.027636
2.50
0.013
.0148607
.1231916
liberalize~e | -.0210977
.0299079
-0.71
0.481
-.0797161
.0375206
reserves_d~t | -.0034175
.0015961
-2.14
0.032
-.0065458
-.0002892
debt_gni |
.0001068
.0000894
1.19
0.232
-.0000685
.0002821
log_gdp
gdpgrow
s15_plus
_cons
|
|
|
|
.0115511
-.0016457
.0048654
2.09105
.0156713
.0022183
.0074954
.3343402
0.74
-0.74
0.65
6.25
0.461
0.458
0.516
0.000
-.0191641
-.0059936
-.0098253
1.435756
.0422663
.0027021
.0195561
2.746345
(5b) average years of higher education
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow s15_plus_h, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -606.43897
log pseudolikelihood = -606.43896
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -606.43896
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
260
240.50
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0206672
.0039453
5.24
0.000
.0129345
.0283999
use_of_imf~1 |
.2390694
.1413774
1.69
0.091
-.0380253
.5161641
tbillratet1 | -.0120578
.0064862
-1.86
0.063
-.0247704
.0006549
proportion~l | -.1788968
.064436
-2.78
0.005
-.3051891
-.0526045
pre_election | -.0336669
.0290544
-1.16
0.247
-.0906125
.0232786
leftgov |
.0251846
.031728
0.79
0.427
-.0370012
.0873704
polity2 |
.0036528
.0032799
1.11
0.265
-.0027758
.0100813
checks | -.0186485
.0121827
-1.53
0.126
-.0425262
.0052292
affinity_s~1 | -.0829698
.0618419
-1.34
0.180
-.2041778
.0382381
log_usmila~1 | -.0039119
.0034594
-1.13
0.258
-.0106922
.0028685
paris_club~t |
.0611294
.0273485
2.24
0.025
.0075273
.1147314
liberalize~e |
-.021031
.0288565
-0.73
0.466
-.0775887
.0355266
reserves_d~t | -.0029886
.001554
-1.92
0.054
-.0060343
.0000572
debt_gni |
.0001296
.0000887
1.46
0.144
-.0000443
.0003034
log_gdp |
.0205175
.015293
1.34
0.180
-.0094563
.0504913
gdpgrow | -.0018161
.0022502
-0.81
0.420
-.0062265
.0025942
s15_plus_h | -.1431308
.1510292
-0.95
0.343
-.4391426
.1528809
_cons |
1.927772
.3407556
5.66
0.000
1.259903
2.59564
(6a) Conditionality model with Chinn and Ito’s kaopen indicator
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
kaopen_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -936.7284
log pseudolikelihood = -936.72839
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -936.72839
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
399
359.39
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 73 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0183754
.0034695
5.30
0.000
.0115752
.0251755
use_of_imf~1 |
.3392677
.1178365
2.88
0.004
.1083123
.5702231
tbillratet1
proportion~l
pre_election
leftgov
polity2
checks
affinity_s~1
log_usmila~1
paris_club~t
reserves_d~t
debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow
kaopen_t1
_cons
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.0192992
-.1702955
-.0303979
.0120326
.0017585
-.0089582
-.0651196
-.0024923
.0536941
-.0025014
.0000126
.0068427
-.0019791
-.0268956
2.224512
.0060639
.0573069
.0307123
.0219994
.0026287
.0097353
.0470503
.0024692
.0215195
.001055
.0000777
.0092922
.0016997
.0109585
.2242727
-3.18
-2.97
-0.99
0.55
0.67
-0.92
-1.38
-1.01
2.50
-2.37
0.16
0.74
-1.16
-2.45
9.92
0.001
0.003
0.322
0.584
0.504
0.357
0.166
0.313
0.013
0.018
0.872
0.461
0.244
0.014
0.000
-.0311842
-.282615
-.0905929
-.0310855
-.0033938
-.028039
-.1573364
-.0073319
.0115167
-.0045692
-.0001398
-.0113695
-.0053105
-.0483738
1.784946
-.0074141
-.0579761
.0297971
.0551507
.0069107
.0101226
.0270973
.0023474
.0958714
-.0004337
.0001649
.025055
.0013524
-.0054174
2.664078
(6b) model with Quinn’s cap100 measure
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
cap100_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -652.26781
log pseudolikelihood = -652.2678
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood =
-652.2678
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
278
327.65
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 52 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0229784
.004154
5.53
0.000
.0148366
.0311201
use_of_imf~1 |
.480308
.1497668
3.21
0.001
.1867705
.7738455
tbillratet1 | -.0118326
.0073842
-1.60
0.109
-.0263053
.0026401
proportion~l | -.1326379
.0650336
-2.04
0.041
-.2601013
-.0051744
pre_election | -.0310321
.034899
-0.89
0.374
-.0994329
.0373686
leftgov | -.0318928
.024305
-1.31
0.189
-.0795297
.015744
polity2 |
.0057524
.0031482
1.83
0.068
-.0004181
.0119228
checks |
-.01188
.0139093
-0.85
0.393
-.0391418
.0153817
affinity_s~1 | -.0294104
.0559104
-0.53
0.599
-.1389928
.0801719
log_usmila~1 | -.0003636
.002887
-0.13
0.900
-.006022
.0052949
paris_club~t |
.0437032
.0276982
1.58
0.115
-.0105842
.0979907
reserves_d~t | -.0036573
.0009817
-3.73
0.000
-.0055814
-.0017332
debt_gni |
.0000104
.0000985
0.11
0.916
-.0001826
.0002035
log_gdp |
.0009808
.0115191
0.09
0.932
-.0215962
.0235578
gdpgrow | -.0001667
.0019015
-0.09
0.930
-.0038936
.0035601
cap100_t1 | -.0022714
.0005827
-3.90
0.000
-.0034134
-.0011294
_cons |
2.345376
.2759052
8.50
0.000
1.804612
2.886141
(6d) model with financial reform index (from Abiad et al)
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
finreform_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -686.08814
log pseudolikelihood = -686.08813
Poisson regression
Number of obs
=
291
Log pseudolikelihood = -686.08813
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
290.78
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0215745
.0052181
4.13
0.000
.0113473
.0318017
use_of_imf~1 |
.4166538
.1481577
2.81
0.005
.1262701
.7070375
tbillratet1 | -.0150587
.0072911
-2.07
0.039
-.0293491
-.0007684
proportion~l | -.1549828
.0780957
-1.98
0.047
-.3080475
-.0019181
pre_election | -.0262985
.0359363
-0.73
0.464
-.0967324
.0441354
leftgov | -.0049352
.023352
-0.21
0.833
-.0507044
.0408339
polity2 |
.0017272
.0032702
0.53
0.597
-.0046822
.0081367
checks | -.0060347
.0127476
-0.47
0.636
-.0310196
.0189502
affinity_s~1 | -.0171336
.0540675
-0.32
0.751
-.1231039
.0888368
log_usmila~1 | -.0005369
.003216
-0.17
0.867
-.00684
.0057663
paris_club~t |
.0585511
.0285076
2.05
0.040
.0026773
.1144249
reserves_d~t |
.0004197
.0002083
2.01
0.044
.0000115
.000828
debt_gni |
.0001151
.0000801
1.44
0.151
-.0000419
.0002722
log_gdp |
.002575
.0144239
0.18
0.858
-.0256953
.0308453
gdpgrow | -.0012228
.0016007
-0.76
0.445
-.0043602
.0019146
finreform_t1 | -.0106867
.0036669
-2.91
0.004
-.0178736
-.0034998
_cons |
2.270689
.3497887
6.49
0.000
1.585116
2.956263
(8) models with product market liberalization measures (from Henisz et al 2005)
(8a) electricity market
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
electricity_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.2273
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.2273
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1024.2273
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
436
321.77
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0162112
.003417
4.74
0.000
.009514
.0229084
use_of_imf~1 |
.3296283
.1133272
2.91
0.004
.107511
.5517455
tbillratet1 | -.0198136
.0058527
-3.39
0.001
-.0312847
-.0083426
proportion~l | -.1861455
.056968
-3.27
0.001
-.2978006
-.0744904
pre_election | -.0151156
.0283842
-0.53
0.594
-.0707476
.0405164
leftgov |
.0163778
.0212859
0.77
0.442
-.0253418
.0580975
polity2 |
.0007816
.0027452
0.28
0.776
-.0045989
.0061621
checks | -.0061765
.0098238
-0.63
0.530
-.0254308
.0130779
affinity_s~1 | -.0582286
.0365459
-1.59
0.111
-.1298573
.0134001
log_usmila~1 | -.0016209
.0024796
-0.65
0.513
-.0064808
.003239
paris_club~t |
.058567
.021717
2.70
0.007
.0160024
.1011315
reserves_d~t |
.0001951
.000197
0.99
0.322
-.0001909
.0005812
debt_gni |
.0000991
.0000618
1.60
0.109
-.000022
.0002201
log_gdp |
.0089083
.0087716
1.02
0.310
-.0082838
.0261004
gdpgrow | -.0020167
.0012694
-1.59
0.112
-.0045047
.0004714
electricit~1 | -.0611383
.0594665
-1.03
0.304
-.1776904
.0554138
_cons |
2.178908
.2211201
9.85
0.000
1.74552
2.612295
(8b) telecommunications market
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
telecomm_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.1683
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.1682
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1024.1682
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
436
340.26
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0169935
.0036896
4.61
0.000
.009762
.024225
use_of_imf~1 |
.3325228
.1115456
2.98
0.003
.1138975
.5511481
tbillratet1 | -.0194025
.0058945
-3.29
0.001
-.0309556
-.0078494
proportion~l | -.1832081
.0582012
-3.15
0.002
-.2972803
-.0691359
pre_election | -.0127172
.0284473
-0.45
0.655
-.0684727
.0430384
leftgov |
.0179294
.0206734
0.87
0.386
-.0225898
.0584485
polity2 |
.0004512
.0025999
0.17
0.862
-.0046444
.0055468
checks | -.0062173
.0097029
-0.64
0.522
-.0252347
.0128001
affinity_s~1 | -.0576162
.0362414
-1.59
0.112
-.128648
.0134156
log_usmila~1 | -.0014753
.0024555
-0.60
0.548
-.0062881
.0033375
paris_club~t |
.0605246
.0211809
2.86
0.004
.0190109
.1020383
reserves_d~t |
.0001604
.0002055
0.78
0.435
-.0002423
.0005631
debt_gni |
.0000897
.0000613
1.46
0.144
-.0000305
.0002098
log_gdp |
.0063239
.0078128
0.81
0.418
-.0089889
.0216366
gdpgrow | -.0018567
.0012704
-1.46
0.144
-.0043467
.0006333
telecomm_t1 | -.0618009
.0549031
-1.13
0.260
-.169409
.0458073
_cons |
2.223787
.1949836
11.40
0.000
1.841627
2.605948
(8c) Combined index of telecom and electricity markets liberalization
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
inf_reform_index_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.0585
log pseudolikelihood = -1024.0585
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1024.0585
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
436
336.73
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0171286
.0036649
4.67
0.000
.0099455
.0243116
use_of_imf~1 |
.3397234
.1136953
2.99
0.003
.1168848
.562562
tbillratet1 | -.0190088
.005966
-3.19
0.001
-.0307019
-.0073157
proportion~l | -.1793529
.0585832
-3.06
0.002
-.2941738
-.0645321
pre_election | -.0137163
.0283376
-0.48
0.628
-.069257
.0418244
leftgov |
.016607
.0211244
0.79
0.432
-.024796
.05801
polity2 |
.0007104
.0026756
0.27
0.791
-.0045338
.0059545
checks
affinity_s~1
log_usmila~1
paris_club~t
reserves_d~t
debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow
inf_reform~1
_cons
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.0061377
-.0579518
-.0015367
.060218
.0001737
.0000907
.0080193
-.0019168
-.0860038
2.18207
.0096274
.0361005
.0024593
.0213338
.0001979
.0000617
.0080986
.0012753
.0677068
.2080699
-0.64
-1.61
-0.62
2.82
0.88
1.47
0.99
-1.50
-1.27
10.49
0.524
0.108
0.532
0.005
0.380
0.141
0.322
0.133
0.204
0.000
-.025007
-.1287074
-.0063569
.0184045
-.0002141
-.0000301
-.0078537
-.0044163
-.2187066
1.77426
.0127317
.0128038
.0032834
.1020315
.0005616
.0002116
.0238923
.0005827
.0466991
2.589879
(9) Model with currency crash variable
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks liberalized_trade
affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow currcrash_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1006.1269
log pseudolikelihood = -1006.1269
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1006.1269
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
429
407.48
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0177038
.0031433
5.63
0.000
.0115431
.0238645
use_of_imf~1 |
.2906948
.1002939
2.90
0.004
.0941224
.4872672
tbillratet1 | -.0195405
.0057179
-3.42
0.001
-.0307474
-.0083337
proportion~l | -.1818482
.0537751
-3.38
0.001
-.2872455
-.0764509
pre_election | -.0154337
.0289536
-0.53
0.594
-.0721818
.0413144
leftgov |
.0126136
.0211026
0.60
0.550
-.0287467
.0539739
polity2 |
.0011762
.0026729
0.44
0.660
-.0040625
.006415
checks | -.0065569
.0109197
-0.60
0.548
-.0279592
.0148453
liberalize~e | -.0534817
.0241275
-2.22
0.027
-.1007707
-.0061927
affinity_s~1 | -.0615752
.0361599
-1.70
0.089
-.1324473
.0092969
log_usmila~1 | -.0008948
.0023975
-0.37
0.709
-.0055938
.0038043
paris_club~t |
.0562687
.0218119
2.58
0.010
.0135182
.0990193
reserves_d~t |
-.000117
.000309
-0.38
0.705
-.0007226
.0004885
debt_gni |
.00011
.000074
1.49
0.138
-.0000352
.0002551
log_gdp |
.0040314
.0079072
0.51
0.610
-.0114664
.0195292
gdpgrow | -.0008137
.0014941
-0.54
0.586
-.003742
.0021146
currcrash_t1 |
.0593433
.0247459
2.40
0.016
.0108422
.1078443
_cons |
2.288398
.1909675
11.98
0.000
1.914108
2.662687
(10) conditionality model with g5 bank exposure (Copelovitch)
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks liberalized_trade
affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow g5bank_t1, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -340.28984
log pseudolikelihood = -340.28984
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -340.28984
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
146
179.78
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 38 clusters in ccode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0216069
.0058833
3.67
0.000
.0100759
.033138
use_of_imf~1 |
.3243928
.208379
1.56
0.120
-.0840226
.7328081
tbillratet1 |
.0197872
.0114753
1.72
0.085
-.002704
.0422784
proportion~l | -.1839811
.068544
-2.68
0.007
-.318325
-.0496373
pre_election | -.0557766
.0302282
-1.85
0.065
-.1150228
.0034697
leftgov |
.0418474
.0255349
1.64
0.101
-.0082
.0918948
polity2 |
.0018212
.0038114
0.48
0.633
-.0056491
.0092915
checks |
.0020226
.0164122
0.12
0.902
-.0301448
.03419
liberalize~e | -.0898532
.0308732
-2.91
0.004
-.1503636
-.0293428
affinity_s~1 |
.1529003
.0600814
2.54
0.011
.0351429
.2706578
log_usmila~1 |
.0041415
.0041365
1.00
0.317
-.003966
.0122489
paris_club~t |
.1097545
.0468839
2.34
0.019
.0178638
.2016452
reserves_d~t |
.0005006
.0003377
1.48
0.138
-.0001613
.0011625
debt_gni |
.0017949
.0004853
3.70
0.000
.0008437
.0027461
log_gdp |
.0587639
.0251303
2.34
0.019
.0095094
.1080184
gdpgrow |
.001901
.0022346
0.85
0.395
-.0024787
.0062807
g5bank_t1 | -.0240605
.0134146
-1.79
0.073
-.0503525
.0022316
_cons |
.4633897
.5628177
0.82
0.410
-.6397127
1.566492
(11a) model of conditionality with log(loan size/quota) on the RHS
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks liberalized_trade
affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow log_size_quota, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log pseudolikelihood = -1005.0648
log pseudolikelihood = -1005.0648
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1005.0648
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
428
356.13
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.016775
.0031346
5.35
0.000
.0106314
.0229187
use_of_imf~1 |
.3083585
.1117112
2.76
0.006
.0894086
.5273084
tbillratet1 | -.0238864
.0059056
-4.04
0.000
-.0354611
-.0123116
proportion~l | -.2001057
.0538541
-3.72
0.000
-.3056577
-.0945537
pre_election | -.0208739
.0299302
-0.70
0.486
-.0795359
.0377882
leftgov |
.0158145
.0213192
0.74
0.458
-.0259704
.0575994
polity2 |
.0015206
.0026912
0.57
0.572
-.0037542
.0067953
checks | -.0086296
.0106006
-0.81
0.416
-.0294065
.0121472
liberalize~e | -.0554982
.0240965
-2.30
0.021
-.1027264
-.0082699
affinity_s~1 | -.0584193
.0365281
-1.60
0.110
-.130013
.0131745
log_usmila~1 | -.0010056
.0024819
-0.41
0.685
-.0058701
.003859
paris_club~t |
.0521521
.0224522
2.32
0.020
.0081467
.0961576
reserves_d~t |
.0001851
.0001896
0.98
0.329
-.0001864
.0005567
debt_gni |
.0001178
.0000675
1.75
0.081
-.0000144
.00025
log_gdp |
.0048544
.0083658
0.58
0.562
-.0115422
.021251
gdpgrow | -.0012915
.0013094
-0.99
0.324
-.0038579
.0012748
log_size_q~a |
.0149132
.0147652
1.01
0.312
-.0140261
.0438525
_cons |
2.256252
.1977546
11.41
0.000
1.86866
2.643844
(11b) model of conditionality with loan size/quota (unlogged) on the RHS
poisson number_conditions counter use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1
proportion_neoliberal pre_election leftgov polity2 checks affinity_s2un_ust1
log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
size_quota, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log_gdp gdpgrow
log pseudolikelihood = -1006.6122
log pseudolikelihood = -1006.6122
Poisson regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1006.6122
Number of obs
Wald chi2(16)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
428
323.78
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 77 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
number_con~s |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------counter |
.0151502
.0032884
4.61
0.000
.0087051
.0215953
use_of_imf~1 |
.2978782
.1127924
2.64
0.008
.0768092
.5189472
tbillratet1 | -.0214708
.0057883
-3.71
0.000
-.0328157
-.0101258
proportion~l | -.1967539
.0560789
-3.51
0.000
-.3066665
-.0868413
pre_election |
-.017906
.0296687
-0.60
0.546
-.0760557
.0402436
leftgov |
.0207927
.02113
0.98
0.325
-.0206213
.0622068
polity2 |
.000337
.0026196
0.13
0.898
-.0047974
.0054713
checks | -.0071012
.010068
-0.71
0.481
-.0268341
.0126318
affinity_s~1 | -.0576341
.0373898
-1.54
0.123
-.1309167
.0156486
log_usmila~1 | -.0016136
.0025343
-0.64
0.524
-.0065806
.0033535
paris_club~t |
.0557687
.0223335
2.50
0.013
.0119958
.0995416
reserves_d~t |
.0001851
.0002013
0.92
0.358
-.0002094
.0005797
debt_gni |
.0000931
.0000641
1.45
0.146
-.0000325
.0002187
log_gdp |
.0066853
.008541
0.78
0.434
-.0100548
.0234254
gdpgrow | -.0019695
.0012903
-1.53
0.127
-.0044985
.0005595
size_quota | -.0000168
.0000813
-0.21
0.836
-.0001761
.0001425
_cons |
2.26148
.2067259
10.94
0.000
1.856305
2.666656
MODELS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF LOAN SIZE
(1) Main model reported in the article
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow if
year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 178
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3081
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
375
78
1
4.807692
11
0.1938
257.48
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -.0073549
.5881579
-0.01
0.990
-1.160123
1.145413
tbillratet1 |
.0297294
.0269948
1.10
0.271
-.0231794
.0826381
proportion~l |
.6508339
.1710892
3.80
0.000
.3155052
.9861625
post_elect~n |
.2526153
.0983903
2.57
0.010
.0597739
.4454566
leftgov |
.1027414
.0562915
1.83
0.068
-.007588
.2130707
polity2 | -.0060594
.0047473
-1.28
0.202
-.015364
.0032453
affinity_s~1 |
.0786026
.1677944
0.47
0.639
-.2502684
.4074736
log_usmila~1 | -.0149584
.0086774
-1.72
0.085
-.0319657
.002049
paris_club~t |
.105967
.0618337
1.71
0.087
-.0152248
.2271589
liberalize~e |
.0971888
.0543999
1.79
0.074
-.0094331
.2038106
reserves_d~t | -.0022996
.0008533
-2.69
0.007
-.0039721
-.0006271
debt_gni |
.0004034
.0003792
1.06
0.287
-.0003398
.0011467
log_gdp |
.1252639
.0350078
3.58
0.000
.0566498
.1938779
gdpgrow | -.0113526
.0068163
-1.67
0.096
-.0247124
.0020072
_cons |
1.030035
.8396306
1.23
0.220
-.6156108
2.675681
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0897794
(2) Descriptive statistics for main model of determinants of loan size
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------log_size_q~a |
375
4.090931
.6406176
2.649008
7.569928
use_of_imf~1 |
375
.3076533
.0766151
.2
.46
tbillratet1 |
375
5.772267
1.683858
3
9.4
proportion~l |
375
.1012
.1798556
0
1
post_elect~n |
375
.0693333
.2543595
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------leftgov |
375
.2613333
.4399481
0
1
polity2 |
375
.8666667
6.73909
-9
10
affinity_s~1 |
375
.0534152
.2892329 -.3112583
1
log_usmila~1 |
375
11.86715
4.761983
0
21.02
paris_club~t |
375
.488
.5005238
0
1
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
liberalize~e
reserves_d~t
debt_gni
log_gdp
gdpgrow
|
|
|
|
|
375
375
375
375
375
.5013333
13.9353
95.6579
22.74524
-.0736093
.5006662
27.02713
91.4095
1.581002
5.305177
0
-.1692341
.4888002
19.00468
-30.9
1
291.3955
1087.765
27.34039
16.53843
(3) Loan size (1984-2000) with region dummies
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
ssa ea_p ee_ca la_c me_na if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 178
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3081
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
20
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
375
78
1
4.807692
11
0.2446
735.25
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.0181322
.5854295
0.03
0.975
-1.129289
1.165553
tbillratet1 |
.0258881
.027269
0.95
0.342
-.0275581
.0793344
proportion~l |
.6715702
.1624871
4.13
0.000
.3531013
.9900391
post_elect~n |
.2321982
.0980981
2.37
0.018
.0399295
.4244669
leftgov |
.1158242
.0534984
2.17
0.030
.0109693
.2206791
polity2 | -.0060507
.0062821
-0.96
0.335
-.0183634
.0062621
affinity_s~1 |
.0645599
.192494
0.34
0.737
-.3127215
.4418413
log_usmila~1 | -.0154423
.00828
-1.87
0.062
-.0316708
.0007862
paris_club~t |
.1315414
.0603188
2.18
0.029
.0133187
.249764
liberalize~e |
.1056399
.0550371
1.92
0.055
-.0022307
.2135106
reserves_d~t | -.0025046
.0010912
-2.30
0.022
-.0046434
-.0003659
debt_gni |
.000398
.0003626
1.10
0.272
-.0003127
.0011087
log_gdp |
.1091804
.0338741
3.22
0.001
.0427885
.1755723
gdpgrow | -.0113402
.006642
-1.71
0.088
-.0243584
.0016779
ssa | -.1657694
.1166217
-1.42
0.155
-.3943436
.0628049
ea_p |
.3123912
.2702373
1.16
0.248
-.2172642
.8420465
ee_ca | -.0954279
.1406336
-0.68
0.497
-.3710647
.1802089
la_c | -.2230803
.1049454
-2.13
0.034
-.4287695
-.0173912
me_na | -.1808147
.2015599
-0.90
0.370
-.5758649
.2142355
_cons |
1.54244
.8195345
1.88
0.060
-.0638183
3.148698
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1208498
(4) Loan size (1984-2000) with higher educational attainment variable
(4a) average number of years of education
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
s15_plus if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 109
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
861
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(15)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
221
41
1
5.390244
11
0.2745
174.65
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.3292911
.722522
0.46
0.649
-1.086826
1.745408
tbillratet1 |
.0089478
.0349684
0.26
0.798
-.0595891
.0774847
proportion~l |
.6772522
.1912784
3.54
0.000
.3023534
1.052151
post_elect~n |
.3569587
.1641317
2.17
0.030
.0352664
.6786509
leftgov |
.0773565
.0697462
1.11
0.267
-.0593436
.2140566
polity2 | -.0072271
.0071423
-1.01
0.312
-.0212257
.0067714
affinity_s~1 | -.3198504
.2091245
-1.53
0.126
-.7297269
.0900262
log_usmila~1 |
.0005256
.0121734
0.04
0.966
-.0233338
.0243849
paris_club~t |
.0728017
.0826826
0.88
0.379
-.0892532
.2348566
liberalize~e |
.1880918
.0874749
2.15
0.032
.0166441
.3595395
reserves_d~t | -.0093047
.0047113
-1.97
0.048
-.0185387
-.0000707
debt_gni |
.0003299
.0005077
0.65
0.516
-.0006651
.0013249
log_gdp |
.1396186
.0363286
3.84
0.000
.0684159
.2108213
gdpgrow | -.0155703
.0086597
-1.80
0.072
-.0325431
.0014025
s15_plus |
.0131883
.0195232
0.68
0.499
-.0250764
.051453
_cons |
.4449855
.9144368
0.49
0.627
-1.347278
2.237249
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0810494
(4b) average number of years of post-secondary education
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
s15_plus_h if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 109
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
861
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(14)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
221
41
1
5.390244
11
0.2816
138.41
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.2832419
.7043885
0.40
0.688
-1.097334
1.663818
tbillratet1 |
.0146371
.0340072
0.43
0.667
-.0520157
.08129
proportion~l |
.6713846
.190489
3.52
0.000
.298033
1.044736
post_elect~n |
.3565888
.166185
2.15
0.032
.0308721
.6823055
leftgov |
.0738376
.0694737
1.06
0.288
-.0623284
.2100036
polity2 | -.0047475
.0066439
-0.71
0.475
-.0177694
.0082743
affinity_s~1 | -.2888564
.2119269
-1.36
0.173
-.7042254
.1265127
log_usmila~1 | -.0008647
.0122533
-0.07
0.944
-.0248806
.0231513
paris_club~t |
.0592441
.0834391
0.71
0.478
-.1042935
.2227816
liberalize~e |
.190528
.0893165
2.13
0.033
.0154709
.365585
reserves_d~t | -.0086603
.0046892
-1.85
0.065
-.017851
.0005303
debt_gni |
.000352
.0005141
0.68
0.494
-.0006557
.0013596
log_gdp |
.1559595
.0360211
4.33
0.000
.0853594
.2265596
gdpgrow | -.0159699
.0087109
-1.83
0.067
-.033043
.0011033
s15_plus_h | -.1389184
.3019826
-0.46
0.646
-.7307934
.4529566
_cons |
.1356216
.9060093
0.15
0.881
-1.640124
1.911367
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0996533
(5) Size of loan (1980-2000)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow,
pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 222
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3081
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
444
78
1
5.692308
15
0.3410
156.67
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -1.191274
.6046349
-1.97
0.049
-2.376336
-.0062109
tbillratet1 |
.1153032
.0186149
6.19
0.000
.0788187
.1517876
proportion~l |
.4060778
.1936858
2.10
0.036
.0264605
.785695
post_elect~n |
.2586247
.106562
2.43
0.015
.0497671
.4674824
leftgov |
.1331417
.0535295
2.49
0.013
.0282258
.2380576
polity2 | -.0083788
.0049878
-1.68
0.093
-.0181547
.0013972
affinity_s~1 |
.3685499
.1639013
2.25
0.025
.0473092
.6897906
log_usmila~1 | -.0131854
.0078506
-1.68
0.093
-.0285724
.0022015
paris_club~t |
.0470928
.0586689
0.80
0.422
-.0678962
.1620817
liberalize~e |
.0560757
.0605587
0.93
0.354
-.0626173
.1747686
reserves_d~t |
-.003274
.000932
-3.51
0.000
-.0051007
-.0014474
debt_gni |
.00036
.0003725
0.97
0.334
-.00037
.0010901
log_gdp |
.141124
.0336813
4.19
0.000
.0751098
.2071382
gdpgrow | -.0067404
.0067443
-1.00
0.318
-.019959
.0064782
_cons |
.620181
.7996211
0.78
0.438
-.9470476
2.187409
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1338977
(6) Model of loan size using Copelovitch’s (2010) measure (amtqta)
xtpcse amtqta use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow,
pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 90
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
703
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(11)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
156
37
1
4.216216
8
0.4505
140.70
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
amtqta |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.1489628
1.351272
0.11
0.912
-2.499481
2.797407
tbillratet1 |
.074157
.0448191
1.65
0.098
-.0136869
.1620008
proportion~l |
1.018262
.3122236
3.26
0.001
.4063149
1.630209
post_elect~n |
.2565714
.1034474
2.48
0.013
.0538181
.4593247
leftgov |
.1963798
.0999613
1.96
0.049
.0004593
.3923003
polity2 |
-.015021
.0079988
-1.88
0.060
-.0306983
.0006563
affinity_s~1 | -.0119878
.1964961
-0.06
0.951
-.3971131
.3731376
log_usmila~1 |
-.011926
.0130019
-0.92
0.359
-.0374091
.0135572
paris_club~t | -.1656114
.1310995
-1.26
0.206
-.4225616
.0913389
liberalize~e |
.0727987
.1286409
0.57
0.571
-.1793329
.3249303
reserves_d~t | -.0008735
.0011308
-0.77
0.440
-.0030899
.0013429
debt_gni |
.0015893
.0019601
0.81
0.417
-.0022524
.0054311
log_gdp |
.2221239
.0631804
3.52
0.000
.0982925
.3459552
gdpgrow | -.0079258
.009927
-0.80
0.425
-.0273822
.0115307
_cons | -6.191663
1.393539
-4.44
0.000
-8.922949
-3.460378
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1215724
(7) Model of loan size with currency crash variable
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
currcrash_t1 if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 175
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3003
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
367
77
1
4.766234
11
0.1960
154.08
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -.0040225
.5758025
-0.01
0.994
-1.132575
1.12453
tbillratet1 |
.0298429
.0263901
1.13
0.258
-.0218807
.0815665
proportion~l |
.6174319
.1685392
3.66
0.000
.2871012
.9477627
post_elect~n |
.2990401
.105566
2.83
0.005
.0921345
.5059457
leftgov |
.1068326
.0602328
1.77
0.076
-.0112215
.2248866
polity2 | -.0059754
.0046898
-1.27
0.203
-.0151673
.0032165
affinity_s~1 |
.0773671
.1758302
0.44
0.660
-.2672537
.4219879
log_usmila~1 | -.0158486
.0083353
-1.90
0.057
-.0321855
.0004883
paris_club~t |
.1099389
.0615422
1.79
0.074
-.0106816
.2305594
liberalize~e |
.0963775
.0544046
1.77
0.076
-.0102535
.2030085
reserves_d~t | -.0016712
.0006775
-2.47
0.014
-.0029992
-.0003433
debt_gni |
.000481
.0004033
1.19
0.233
-.0003095
.0012715
log_gdp |
.1294276
.0343431
3.77
0.000
.0621165
.1967388
gdpgrow | -.0123305
.007526
-1.64
0.101
-.0270812
.0024202
currcrash_t1 | -.1501474
.0933589
-1.61
0.108
-.3331274
.0328327
_cons |
.9495556
.833677
1.14
0.255
-.6844213
2.583533
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho |
-.098145
(8) Loan size models with additional liberalization measures
(8a) model with capital account openness (Chinn and Ito)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow kaopen_t1 if
year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 161
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
2701
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
336
73
1
4.60274
11
0.1796
1373.40
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -.0950436
.5446713
-0.17
0.861
-1.16258
.9724926
tbillratet1 |
.019264
.0274644
0.70
0.483
-.0345652
.0730932
proportion~l |
.6454137
.1620666
3.98
0.000
.3277691
.9630584
post_elect~n |
.2202052
.1196696
1.84
0.066
-.0143429
.4547533
leftgov |
.1020595
.0605769
1.68
0.092
-.0166691
.2207882
polity2 |
-.004827
.0045684
-1.06
0.291
-.0137809
.0041269
affinity_s~1 |
.0206239
.2197661
0.09
0.925
-.4101097
.4513576
log_usmila~1 | -.0172349
.008663
-1.99
0.047
-.0342141
-.0002557
paris_club~t |
.1015978
.054813
1.85
0.064
-.0058337
.2090294
reserves_d~t | -.0024921
.002769
-0.90
0.368
-.0079193
.0029351
debt_gni |
.0006133
.00037
1.66
0.097
-.0001119
.0013384
log_gdp |
.1458688
.0410924
3.55
0.000
.0653291
.2264085
gdpgrow | -.0080898
.0084342
-0.96
0.337
-.0246205
.0084409
kaopen_t1 | -.0004243
.0367941
-0.01
0.991
-.0725393
.0716908
_cons |
.7092072
.954305
0.74
0.457
-1.161196
2.579611
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0932808
(8b) model with financial reform index (Abiad et al)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow finreform_t1 if
year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 118
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
1596
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(11)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
257
56
1
4.589286
11
0.2750
197.66
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
-.446311
.7896003
-0.57
0.572
-1.993899
1.101277
tbillratet1 |
.0351219
.0323566
1.09
0.278
-.0282959
.0985397
proportion~l |
.7348291
.1708057
4.30
0.000
.4000561
1.069602
post_elect~n |
.2908715
.1080204
2.69
0.007
.0791555
.5025875
leftgov |
.0861445
.0675472
1.28
0.202
-.0462456
.2185346
polity2 | -.0085132
.0055582
-1.53
0.126
-.019407
.0023806
affinity_s~1 | -.1262336
.1686877
-0.75
0.454
-.4568554
.2043881
log_usmila~1 | -.0180886
.0119618
-1.51
0.130
-.0415332
.0053561
paris_club~t |
.0552722
.0905705
0.61
0.542
-.1222428
.2327872
reserves_d~t | -.0021091
.0007296
-2.89
0.004
-.0035392
-.0006791
debt_gni |
.0002905
.0004482
0.65
0.517
-.0005879
.001169
log_gdp |
.1643246
.0478533
3.43
0.001
.0705338
.2581154
gdpgrow | -.0105256
.0078055
-1.35
0.178
-.0258241
.0047729
finreform_t1 |
.0131752
.0096061
1.37
0.170
-.0056524
.0320028
_cons |
.218425
1.147934
0.19
0.849
-2.031484
2.468334
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho |
-.051976
(8c) model with cap100 (Quinn)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow cap100_t1 if
year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 120
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
1378
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
15
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(11)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
234
52
1
4.5
11
0.2594
102.73
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.6011546
.6984227
0.86
0.389
-.7677286
1.970038
tbillratet1 |
.0013648
.0321613
0.04
0.966
-.0616701
.0643998
proportion~l |
.7752506
.1835886
4.22
0.000
.4154235
1.135078
post_elect~n |
.2275945
.1334489
1.71
0.088
-.0339606
.4891497
leftgov |
.0785918
.0681091
1.15
0.249
-.0548996
.2120832
polity2 | -.0088459
.006368
-1.39
0.165
-.021327
.0036352
affinity_s~1 | -.2423304
.16596
-1.46
0.144
-.5676061
.0829453
log_usmila~1 | -.0105352
.0120391
-0.88
0.382
-.0341315
.013061
paris_club~t |
.0431688
.0901213
0.48
0.632
-.1334657
.2198033
reserves_d~t | -.0000889
.0034443
-0.03
0.979
-.0068396
.0066619
debt_gni |
.0005602
.0004539
1.23
0.217
-.0003294
.0014498
log_gdp |
.1599432
.0501323
3.19
0.001
.0616857
.2582007
gdpgrow | -.0113506
.0098311
-1.15
0.248
-.0306192
.0079181
cap100_t1 | -.0007967
.001931
-0.41
0.680
-.0045813
.0029879
_cons |
.2158098
1.227255
0.18
0.860
-2.189565
2.621185
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0777487
(8d) With infrastructure reform (neither individual component are significant
or change finding for proportion_neoliberal)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
inf_reform_index_t1 if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 178
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:
ccode
year
correlated (unbalanced)
common AR(1)
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
=
=
=
=
375
78
1
4.807692
Sigma computed by pairwise
Estimated covariances
Estimated autocorrelations
Estimated coefficients
selection
=
3081
=
1
=
16
R-squared
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2
max =
=
=
=
11
0.1956
234.32
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.0535381
.6254185
0.09
0.932
-1.17226
1.279336
tbillratet1 |
.0276171
.028004
0.99
0.324
-.0272698
.0825041
proportion~l |
.6698333
.1665432
4.02
0.000
.3434147
.9962519
post_elect~n |
.2494736
.098099
2.54
0.011
.0572032
.4417441
leftgov |
.1007104
.0558323
1.80
0.071
-.0087189
.2101397
polity2 | -.0055011
.0049576
-1.11
0.267
-.0152178
.0042156
affinity_s~1 |
.0785414
.1672645
0.47
0.639
-.2492909
.4063737
log_usmila~1 | -.0148411
.0086883
-1.71
0.088
-.0318698
.0021877
paris_club~t |
.1079961
.0616004
1.75
0.080
-.0127385
.2287307
liberalize~e |
.1039878
.054045
1.92
0.054
-.0019385
.2099141
reserves_d~t | -.0023053
.000861
-2.68
0.007
-.0039927
-.0006178
debt_gni |
.0003899
.0003796
1.03
0.304
-.000354
.0011339
log_gdp |
.1269423
.0350769
3.62
0.000
.058193
.1956917
gdpgrow | -.0111929
.0069262
-1.62
0.106
-.024768
.0023823
inf_reform~1 | -.0902509
.1785902
-0.51
0.613
-.4402813
.2597795
_cons |
.9905592
.8415576
1.18
0.239
-.6588633
2.639982
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0922805
(9) loan size model with G5 bank exposure (Copelovitch)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
g5bank_t1 if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 81
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
780
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(9)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
149
39
1
3.820513
8
0.4816
356.50
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 |
.9181087
1.117189
0.82
0.411
-1.271542
3.107759
tbillratet1 |
.0100824
.0427951
0.24
0.814
-.0737945
.0939593
proportion~l |
.8836933
.2345652
3.77
0.000
.4239538
1.343433
post_elect~n |
.3065094
.1123883
2.73
0.006
.0862323
.5267865
leftgov |
.0980394
.0908484
1.08
0.281
-.0800202
.2760991
polity2 | -.0067891
.0089795
-0.76
0.450
-.0243887
.0108105
affinity_s~1 |
-.232909
.1735314
-1.34
0.180
-.5730242
.1072063
log_usmila~1 | -.0200222
.0161996
-1.24
0.216
-.0517728
.0117283
paris_club~t | -.0586986
.1269387
-0.46
0.644
-.307494
.1900967
liberalize~e |
.0736502
.1153346
0.64
0.523
-.1524015
.2997018
reserves_d~t | -.0009347
.0009002
-1.04
0.299
-.002699
.0008297
debt_gni |
.0015736
.0015953
0.99
0.324
-.0015531
.0047003
log_gdp |
.2134587
.0681629
3.13
0.002
.0798618
.3470556
gdpgrow | -.0141758
.0087724
-1.62
0.106
-.0313694
.0030179
g5bank_t1 | -.0123382
.0330477
-0.37
0.709
-.0771106
.0524342
_cons | -1.223918
1.564852
-0.78
0.434
-4.290973
1.843136
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1184716
(10) model of loan size with number of conditions on the RHS
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
number_conditions if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 177
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3081
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
372
78
1
4.769231
11
0.1984
227.58
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -.0736161
.5880192
-0.13
0.900
-1.226113
1.07888
tbillratet1 |
.0410538
.0269702
1.52
0.128
-.0118069
.0939144
proportion~l |
.7033675
.1729012
4.07
0.000
.3644875
1.042248
post_elect~n |
.252607
.1006838
2.51
0.012
.0552704
.4499436
leftgov |
.1007203
.0578036
1.74
0.081
-.0125727
.2140133
polity2 | -.0066349
.0048234
-1.38
0.169
-.0160886
.0028189
affinity_s~1 |
.0617358
.1623339
0.38
0.704
-.2564327
.3799044
log_usmila~1 | -.0149512
.0087025
-1.72
0.086
-.0320077
.0021053
paris_club~t |
.1020021
.0620033
1.65
0.100
-.0195221
.2235263
liberalize~e |
.1138183
.0585688
1.94
0.052
-.0009745
.228611
reserves_d~t | -.0022359
.0008218
-2.72
0.007
-.0038466
-.0006252
debt_gni |
.000378
.0003848
0.98
0.326
-.0003762
.0011322
log_gdp |
.1250897
.0362441
3.45
0.001
.0540526
.1961269
gdpgrow | -.0123155
.006914
-1.78
0.075
-.0258666
.0012356
number_con~s |
.0213281
.0103453
2.06
0.039
.0010518
.0416045
_cons |
.7023172
.8264263
0.85
0.395
-.9174486
2.322083
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho |
-.081629
(11a) model of loan size with current account balance (1984-2000)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
curracct_t1 if year>=1984, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 168
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3003
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
354
77
1
4.597403
11
0.2120
69.40
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -.0566102
.5654142
-0.10
0.920
-1.164802
1.051581
tbillratet1 |
.0235328
.0267246
0.88
0.379
-.0288464
.0759121
proportion~l |
.6465827
.1475118
4.38
0.000
.3574649
.9357005
post_elect~n |
.2461619
.1063699
2.31
0.021
.0376806
.4546432
leftgov |
.0876408
.0538348
1.63
0.104
-.0178735
.1931551
polity2 | -.0074544
.004935
-1.51
0.131
-.0171268
.0022181
affinity_s~1 | -.0645913
.1658637
-0.39
0.697
-.3896783
.2604957
log_usmila~1 | -.0182129
.0102789
-1.77
0.076
-.0383591
.0019333
paris_club~t |
.0906349
.0587204
1.54
0.123
-.0244549
.2057248
liberalize~e |
.1129076
.0579147
1.95
0.051
-.000603
.2264183
reserves_d~t | -.0018402
.0008115
-2.27
0.023
-.0034306
-.0002497
debt_gni | -.0000431
.0004447
-0.10
0.923
-.0009147
.0008285
log_gdp |
.138538
.0356246
3.89
0.000
.0687151
.2083608
gdpgrow | -.0126257
.0070741
-1.78
0.074
-.0264908
.0012393
curracct_t1 | -.0094501
.0054194
-1.74
0.081
-.020072
.0011718
_cons |
.8131644
.8072324
1.01
0.314
-.768982
2.395311
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.0510854
(11b) model of loan size with current acct balance (1980-2000)
xtpcse log_size_quota use_of_imf_quotat1
tbillratet1 proportion_neoliberal
post_election leftgov polity2 affinity_s2un_ust1 log_usmilaid_t1
paris_club_debt liberalized_trade reserves_debt debt_gni
log_gdp gdpgrow
curracct_t1, pairwise corr(ar1)
Number
(note:
(note:
(note:
of gaps in sample: 209
computations for rho restarted at each gap)
estimates of rho outside [-1,1] bounded to be in the range [-1,1])
at least one disturbance covariance assumed 0, no common time periods
between panels)
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Group variable:
ccode
Time variable:
year
Panels:
correlated (unbalanced)
Autocorrelation: common AR(1)
Sigma computed by pairwise selection
Estimated covariances
=
3003
Estimated autocorrelations =
1
Estimated coefficients
=
16
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(14)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
419
77
1
5.441558
15
0.3284
1376.70
0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Panel-corrected
log_size_q~a |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~1 | -1.195378
.5966509
-2.00
0.045
-2.364792
-.0259638
tbillratet1 |
.1059165
.0191572
5.53
0.000
.068369
.1434639
proportion~l |
.4080395
.1819338
2.24
0.025
.0514558
.7646231
post_elect~n |
.2706312
.1122536
2.41
0.016
.0506183
.4906442
leftgov |
.113768
.0484647
2.35
0.019
.018779
.2087571
polity2 | -.0091028
.0051863
-1.76
0.079
-.0192678
.0010622
affinity_s~1 |
.255937
.1728135
1.48
0.139
-.0827712
.5946451
log_usmila~1 | -.0158226
.0089355
-1.77
0.077
-.033336
.0016907
paris_club~t |
.0334751
.0565486
0.59
0.554
-.0773581
.1443084
liberalize~e |
.0585374
.0622674
0.94
0.347
-.0635044
.1805793
reserves_d~t | -.0028449
.0009407
-3.02
0.002
-.0046887
-.0010012
debt_gni | -.0001191
.0004226
-0.28
0.778
-.0009474
.0007092
log_gdp |
.1537768
.0340597
4.51
0.000
.0870209
.2205326
gdpgrow | -.0069509
.0071364
-0.97
0.330
-.0209379
.0070362
curracct_t1 | -.0117143
.0054252
-2.16
0.031
-.0223475
-.0010811
_cons |
.4107701
.7719716
0.53
0.595
-1.102267
1.923807
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1009154
Commands to replicate model of waivers
(1) Main model of determinants of waivers
logit waiver use_of_imf_quota tbillrate proportion_neoliberal polity2 instab
election leftgov affinity_s2un_ust1 log_new_usmilaid_t1 paris_club
reserves_debt debt_gni
govt_consumption cpi gdpgrow log_gdp
number_binding_conditions _spline1 _spline2 _spline3 ssa ea_p ee_ca la_c
me_na, robust cl(ccode)
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
log
log
log
log
log
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
=
=
=
=
=
-342.10458
-310.93215
-309.08309
-309.06419
-309.06417
Logistic regression
Number of obs
Wald chi2(25)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood = -309.06417
=
=
=
=
682
110.52
0.0000
0.0966
(Std. Err. adjusted for 78 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
waiver |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~a |
2.331664
1.964857
1.19
0.235
-1.519386
6.182714
tbillrate | -.0501811
.0544464
-0.92
0.357
-.1568941
.0565319
proportion~l |
2.547827
.6052923
4.21
0.000
1.361475
3.734178
polity2 |
.0285349
.0193833
1.47
0.141
-.0094557
.0665254
instab | -.4377722
.2688093
-1.63
0.103
-.9646288
.0890844
election | -.0254621
.2593527
-0.10
0.922
-.5337841
.4828599
leftgov |
-.529578
.2012032
-2.63
0.008
-.923929
-.135227
affinity_s~1 | -.9965247
.756747
-1.32
0.188
-2.479721
.4866721
log_new_us~1 | -.0101387
.0170939
-0.59
0.553
-.043642
.0233647
paris_club |
.387726
.232446
1.67
0.095
-.0678599
.8433118
reserves_d~t |
.0007637
.0031515
0.24
0.809
-.0054131
.0069406
debt_gni | -.0005525
.0016395
-0.34
0.736
-.0037658
.0026607
govt_consu~n |
.0034076
.0238844
0.14
0.887
-.043405
.0502203
cpi |
.0004016
.0001786
2.25
0.025
.0000515
.0007517
gdpgrow |
.0141547
.0196485
0.72
0.471
-.0243557
.052665
log_gdp | -.0252436
.1215866
-0.21
0.836
-.263549
.2130618
number_bin~s |
.0098827
.0493564
0.20
0.841
-.0868542
.1066195
_spline1 | -.0653508
.0491361
-1.33
0.184
-.1616557
.0309541
_spline2 |
.058718
.0428929
1.37
0.171
-.0253505
.1427865
_spline3 | -.0243365
.0183002
-1.33
0.184
-.0602043
.0115312
ssa |
.506317
.3549219
1.43
0.154
-.1893173
1.201951
ea_p |
.663895
.5346009
1.24
0.214
-.3839035
1.711693
ee_ca |
1.898267
.640829
2.96
0.003
.6422651
3.154269
la_c |
.3881921
.3243777
1.20
0.231
-.2475765
1.023961
me_na |
1.467116
.4610191
3.18
0.001
.5635347
2.370697
_cons | -2.159066
3.235958
-0.67
0.505
-8.501427
4.183295
(2) Descriptive statistics for model of determinants of waivers
sum waiver use_of_imf_quota tbillrate proportion_neoliberal polity2 instab
election leftgov affinity_s2un_ust1 log_new_usmilaid_t1 paris_club
reserves_debt debt_gni
govt_consumption cpi gdpgrow log_gdp
number_binding_conditions _spline1 _spline2 _spline3 ssa ea_p ee_ca la_c me_na
if e(sample)
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------waiver |
682
.2008798
.4009524
0
1
use_of_imf~a |
682
.2916276
.0695242
.19
.42
tbillrate |
682
6.860851
2.739252
3
14.1
proportion~l |
682
.1202639
.1971558
0
1
polity2 |
682
-.1524927
6.892093
-9
10
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------instab |
682
.2096774
.4073771
0
1
election |
682
.1906158
.393075
0
1
leftgov |
682
.3093842
.462579
0
1
affinity_s~1 |
682
.0437248
.2621463 -.3112583
1
log_new_us~1 |
682
11.27909
5.445191
0
21.02
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------paris_club |
682
.2727273
.4456886
0
1
reserves_d~t |
682
12.4901
23.65685 -.1692341
291.3955
debt_gni |
682
92.11219
98.13161
.4888002
1087.765
govt_consu~n |
682
14.10662
5.86474
2.975538
54.51542
cpi |
682
79.56472
575.1233
-14.94
11749.63
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------gdpgrow |
682
-.1980897
5.281776
-30.9
16.53843
log_gdp |
682
22.76759
1.555014
19.00468
27.13899
number_bin~s |
682
11.90029
3.212316
0
26
_spline1 |
682
-43.39773
82.55032
-465
0
_spline2 |
682
-91.47031
192.519
-1131
0
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------_spline3 |
682
-105.9183
240.5941
-1485
0
ssa |
682
.4296188
.495385
0
1
ea_p |
682
.0395894
.1951357
0
1
ee_ca |
682
.1055718
.3075144
0
1
la_c |
682
.3020528
.459485
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------me_na |
682
.0630499
.243231
0
1
(3) negative binomial model of the determinants of the number of waivers
nbreg waivers_count use_of_imf_quota tbillrate proportion_neoliberal polity2
instab election leftgov affinity_s2un_ust1 log_new_usmilaid_t1 paris_club
reserves_debt debt_gni
govt_consumption cpi gdpgrow log_gdp
number_binding_conditions if waiver==1, robust cl(ccode)
Fitting Poisson model:
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2:
log pseudolikelihood = -201.52643
log pseudolikelihood = -201.52572
log pseudolikelihood = -201.52572
Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2:
log pseudolikelihood = -259.69778
log pseudolikelihood = -215.48033
log pseudolikelihood = -215.48033
Fitting full model:
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
0:
1:
2:
3:
log
log
log
log
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
pseudolikelihood
Negative binomial regression
Dispersion
= mean
Log pseudolikelihood = -201.52572
=
=
=
=
-201.90933
-201.52598
-201.52572
-201.52572
Number of obs
Wald chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
=
=
=
136
111.09
0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 58 clusters in ccode)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
waivers_co~t |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------use_of_imf~a | -1.950509
.8597165
-2.27
0.023
-3.635523
-.2654961
tbillrate |
.0264178
.0263375
1.00
0.316
-.0252027
.0780383
proportion~l |
.4806618
.2147807
2.24
0.025
.0596994
.9016242
polity2 |
.004879
.0093031
0.52
0.600
-.0133548
.0231128
instab |
.253568
.135009
1.88
0.060
-.0110447
.5181808
election |
.0946081
.1313086
0.72
0.471
-.1627521
.3519683
leftgov | -.3865112
.1434943
-2.69
0.007
-.6677548
-.1052677
affinity_s~1 | -.5586879
.266972
-2.09
0.036
-1.081943
-.0354324
log_new_us~1 | -.0041453
.0087054
-0.48
0.634
-.0212075
.0129169
paris_club | -.0592902
.1099647
-0.54
0.590
-.274817
.1562367
reserves_d~t | -.0049559
.0014671
-3.38
0.001
-.0078313
-.0020805
debt_gni | -.0009993
.0005681
-1.76
0.079
-.0021127
.0001142
govt_consu~n | -.0042942
.0102418
-0.42
0.675
-.0243677
.0157793
cpi | -.0000729
.0000292
-2.50
0.012
-.00013
-.0000157
gdpgrow | -.0186595
.0080847
-2.31
0.021
-.0345051
-.0028138
log_gdp | -.0833533
.036348
-2.29
0.022
-.154594
-.0121125
number_bin~s |
.0628064
.0307153
2.04
0.041
.0026055
.1230073
_cons |
2.478112
.982146
2.52
0.012
.5531414
4.403083
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------/lnalpha | -24.60324
.
.
.
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------alpha |
2.07e-11
.
.
.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------(4) descriptive statistics for model of determinants of number of waivers
Variable
|
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------waivers_co~t |
136
2
1.270754
1
7
use_of_imf~a |
136
.2985294
.0739422
.19
.42
tbillrate |
136
6.530882
2.208452
3
11.6
proportion~l |
136
.18875
.2180433
0
.67
polity2 |
136
.5808824
7.11863
-9
10
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------instab |
136
.1911765
.3946814
0
1
election |
136
.1985294
.4003675
0
1
leftgov |
136
.2647059
.4428074
0
1
affinity_s~1 |
136
.0338237
.2860119 -.2980132
.8227848
log_new_us~1 |
136
11.99044
5.141148
0
20.99
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------paris_club |
136
.3308824
.4722703
0
1
reserves_d~t |
136
15.06505
32.09654
.0489943
291.3955
debt_gni |
136
92.69572
92.95437
.4888002
945.7621
govt_consu~n |
136
14.20273
5.307436
2.975538
29.0578
cpi |
136
215.2655
1220.673
-5.91
11749.63
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------gdpgrow |
136
-.0602143
5.683213
-22.5511
14.89202
log_gdp |
136
23.06849
1.711138
19.46244
26.93345
number_bin~s |
136
12.22059
1.987707
8
16
(5) Figure illustrating the impact of proportion neoliberal on the predicted
number of waivers (all other covariates held at the mean values; calculated
using Clarify [King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 1998])