Functionalism and Thinking Animals
Sydney Shoemaker (1999, 1999a, 2004, forthcoming) has argued that functionalism has the
consequence that human animals cannot think. You might think that if it did, that would be an
excellent reason to reject it. But in fact the consequence is one that many personal identity
theorists should welcome. Neo-Lockeans who think that we have psychological persistence
conditions are committed to denying that we are identical to our animals, and this denial has
potential problematic consequences that are best avoided by denying that our animals can
think. This paper will be devoted to discussion of Shoemaker’s arguments, but before turning
to those I want to say a few words about the wider context in which the question of animal
thought arises; on why people deny our animal identity, on the problems that such a denial
creates, and on how Shoemaker’s proposal fits in with the range of available responses.