Syllabus
Name of the course: Causation and Free Will
Instructor: Ferenc Huoranszki
Number of credits: 4
Semester: 2013, Fall, Monday 9–10.40; Monday 15.30–17.10
Course level: MA, elective course
Course description: In this course we shall investigate several aspects of the metaphysics of free will,
time, and causation. First, we shall discuss the question about the nature of efficient causes of free
actions, i.e. whether they are events or agents. Second, we shall consider arguments for and against
the compatibility of free will and physical determinism. Third, we shall investigate how temporal,
causal and counterfactual asymmetries are related to our free agency. And finally, we shall discuss the
possibility of affecting the past by our actions.
Goals of the course: Students attending this course are expected to familiarize themselves with the
most important issues concerning the metaphysical problem of causation, temporal asymmetries, and
freedom.
Learning outcomes: Students are expected to acquire the ability to reconstruct and analyze
philosophical arguments or positions. These involve the understanding of validity and soundness of
the arguments, the ability to identify background principles and assumptions as well as the ability to
draw out the consequences of certain philosophical commitments. They are also expected to acquire
certain oral communication skills such as the ability to formulate arguments concisely and accessibly
in words and to give short critical comments. They should also learn how to identify and execute an
appropriate writing project. Finally, they should be familiarized with the main contemporary debates
about causation, time, and free will. Learning outcomes shall be measured by term papers and oral
presentations on the relevant topics.
Assessment: Students’ performance shall be evaluated on the following grounds. First, students are
required to attend classes regularly and to participate actively in seminar discussions. 30 % of their
final grade shall be given on the basis of this in-class activity. Second, students are required to give
one or two short presentations of some chosen topic(s). The choice of topic is optional, but overlap
should be avoided. This will make up another 30 % of their final grade. Thirdly, students are required
to submit a max. 4 000 word long term-paper. The chosen topic should be approved by the
instructor and presented in the last class of the course. The term paper’s contribution to the final
assessment of students’ performance is 40 %.
Deadline for submitting term-papers: April 13, 2015.
Grading criteria: Students should be able to make comments on the texts they have read, and
respond to the presentations of other student. Their presentation must include the logical
reconstruction of the main arguments of the relevant article/chapter and, possibly, critical remarks or
questions for discussion. Students are also expected to prepare and distribute a maximum two page
long hand-out that they distribute before their presentation. The topic of the paper can be either a
careful critical reconstruction of a particular and important argument for some position discussed in
the course; or a comparison between competing arguments about alternative solutions to a problem;
or a defense of some particular position/argument against some relevant criticism. References can,
but need not, go beyond the material included into the compulsory readings.
Topics and reading:
Week
1
Free will and causal
determinism
Week
2
Events, agents, and
choices
Week
3
The consequence
argument for
incompatibilism
Week
4
Week
5
Week
6
Week
7
Week
8
Week
9
Week
10
Week
11
Week
12
A. J. Ayer ‘Freedom and Necessity’; R. Chisholm, ‘Human
Freedom and the Self’ in G. Watson (ed.) Free Will (OUP, 1982)
15–35.
Lowe, E. J. ‘Event Causation and Agency Causation’, ‘Personal
Agency’, in his Personal Agency (OUP, 2009): 119–157.
P. van Inwagen ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and
Determinism’ in Watson (ed.) op. cit. 46–58; Lewis, D. ‘Are We
Free to Break the Laws?’ in his Philosophical Papers. Vol. II (OUP,
1986) 291–298; Slote, M. ‘Selective Necessity and the Free Will
Problem’, Journal of Philosophy 1982: 5–24.
Determinism and open Ginet, C. ‘Free Will and Determinism’ in On Action (CUP, 1990):
future
90–123; P. van Inwagen ‘Free Will Remains a Mystery’, Philosophical
Perspective 14 (2000): 1-19.
Nomic determinism
Mackie, P. ‘Fatalism, Determinism, and the Power to Do
and the past
Otherwise’, Nous 2003: 672–689; Hoefer, C., 2002. ‘Freedom from
the Inside Out’ in C. Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience,
(CUP, 2002): 201–222.
The direction of
Mackie, J. L. ‘The Direction of Causation’, in The Cement of the
causation
Universe (OUP, 1974): 160–192.
Temporal asymmetries Lewis, D. ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Nous
and counterfactual
13 (1979): 455–76; Horwich, P. ‘Counterfactuals’ in Asymmetries in
dependence
Time (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987): 157–176.
Foreknowledge,
Fischer, J. M. ‘The Basic Version and Newcomb’s Problem’ in The
freedom, and choice
Metaphysics of Free Will (Blackwell 1994): 87-110.
Agency and causal
Menzies, P. - H. Price, ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, The
asymmetry
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, (1993): 187–203; H.
Price ‘Agency and Causal Asymmetry’, Mind 101, 1992: 501–520.
Logical determinism
Freddoso, A. ‘Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism’,
and the past
Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 257–278.
Backward causation
M. Dummett ‘Bringing About the Past’, in R. Le Poidevin, R. – M.
and fatalism
MacBeath (eds.) The Philosophy of Time (OUP, 1993): 117–33.
Time travel, freedom,
Lewis, D. ‘Paradoxes of Time Travel’, in R. Le Poidevin, R. – M.
and causal loops
MacBeath (eds.) op. cit. 134–146.