Japan’s Occupation of French Indochina
and the Pacific War
東南アジア研究 VII（ベトナム）
学籍番号： ４００８Ｒ９０４－４
カルロヴァー･ペトラ
Karlová Petra
２００８年７月２９日
Content
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
I. The Sino-Japanese war and Indochina ................................................................................. 4
I.1 Japan’s move into Northern Indochina ........................................................................... 4
I.2 Japan’s encroachment in Indochina and the American foreign policy ............................. 7
I.3 Japan’s mediation of Thai-Indochina border dispute ...................................................... 9
II. Indochina and the broadening of the Japan-American rupture..........................................11
II.1 Japanese occupation of Southern Indochina .................................................................11
II.2 The United States hardens their policy towards Japan ................................................ 13
II.3 The last chance before the Pearl Harbor attack ........................................................... 14
Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 16
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................... 17
2
Introduction
The American President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Hull did not forgive the French
that they surrender Indochina to Japan in exchange for the nominal sovereignty. This supports the
common theory that the Japanese occupation of French Indochina was one of the reasons why Japan
could attack Pearl Harbor. However, it does not explain why Japan attacked the United States.
This papers aims on Indochina’s positions in the context of the international development
heading for the Pacific War. In other words, to respond the question what place the Japanese
invasion in Indochina occupied in the Japan-American clash. Was it really “a point of no return” in
the Japan-American relations? Are American blames on the French fault rightful?
The first chapter explains Indochina’s connection with the second Sino-Japanese war (the
China Incident) and with France’s surrender. It shows how the American pronouncements raised in
firmness and how the Thai-Indochina dispute influenced the Japanese decision-making on the
expansion policy.
The second chapter deals with the Japanese occupation of the Southern Indochina and its
impact on the American foreign policy. It shows that the joint defense of the French Indochina was
not the last and the final issue of Japan-American negotiations although Japan offered to yield the
Southern Indochina on November 20, 1941.
3
I. The Sino-Japanese war and Indochina
In the 1930’s extremists in the Japanese army drove Japan into the military conquest of
China. However, in the late 1930’s, the Sino-Japanese fights exceeded its naming “the China
Incident” and evolved in a war to all intents and purposes. The extended conflict entailed the
deterioration of Japan’s relations especially with Great Britain and the United States whose interests
and rights had been infringed there. Still, nobody could predict further development in the East Asia
because Japanese themselves were not unanimous about the very purpose of their expansion.1 The
internal situation at the Japanese scene was characterized by a permanent clash on the direction of
the expansion (southward or northward) as well as on its attitude towards Anglo-Saxon powers.
However, the growing success of the German encroachments in Europe furnished fuel to the
advocates of the hard-line foreign policy.
A thorn in side of Japan’s Kwantung Army was supplies to Jiang Jieshi’s army. To prevent
China from receiving this support, the Japanese army seized Hainan Island at southern Chinese coast,
close to French Indochina, in February 1939. This position enabled Japan to gain control over Burma
and Indochina routes to Southern China. After the war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Japan
intensified the effort to hinder all transport to Jiang Jieshi through the pressure on British and French
governments which were fully engaged in hostilities with Germany.
I.1 Japan’s move into Northern Indochina
The Japanese started their negotiations on the Indochina route enclosure in February 1939,
with the argument that it is a necessity for restoring the peace in China. The peaceful settlement of
the Sino-Japanese conflict was the main issue at the Brussels Conference, in November 1939, which
1 Shiraishi T., Furuta, p. 57.
4
discussed the situation of the French Indochina too.2 However, as the conference beard no real fruits,
the Franco-Japanese conversations remained without any arrangement. Meanwhile, the future
Governor General of the French Indochina, Admiral Jean Decoux, took part on the joint
Anglo-French conference in Singapore, where he talked with his British counterpart on general
measures to take in case that Japan’s attack coincides with the start of the war in Europe.3 This
Franco-British cooperation on the defense of their South East Asian dominions continued till the end
of June 1940 when France was defeated by Germany.
This common effort means that both France and Great Britain were fully aware of the Japan’s
peril, but they did not have means to face up it successfully.
The validity of their apprehension showed to be true during the following year. Although the
there was made no definitive decision on the direction of the expansion, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs drafted “A Policy towards the South Seas Adjusted to the New Developments in Europe” of
May 1940 which underlined the strategic importance of Indochina for the settlement of the China
issue and the building a new order in East Asia.4 At the same time, Japanese policy makers worried
“that Germany might intervene in the French Indochina, and made them feel obliged to link their
policy toward French Indochina with that toward the Axis powers, especially Germany.” 5 Although
the German government did not give its official endorsement with the Japanese interests in French
Indochina,6 Japan did not waste its chance to use France’s surrender.
Since conversations of Major-General Tsuchihashi and Lieutenant-Colonel Nishiura in Hanoi
were far from the achieving the Japan’s demands to stop supplies to China an inspection unit under
the commandment of Major-General Nishihara was sent to Indochina in June 25. On July 4,
2 Tachikawa, pp. 31–32.
3 Decoux, p. 391.
4 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 47.
5 Shiraishi T., Furuta, p.61,
6 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 49.
5
Governor-General Catroux, aware of Indochina’s defencelessness, tried playing for time7 and thus
proposed a deffence aliance against Jiang Jieshi in return for the Japanese acknowledgement of the
territorial integrity of French Indochina, on July 4. However, the Japanese response to this issue
asked further concessions as utilization of military facilities and stationing troops in Indochina which
was unacceptable for the French side.
8
For the consecutive bargaining, Nishihara received a support from Colonel Satō, the vice chief
of the staff of the South China Army from Canton who insisted upon the usage of Indochina for
Japanese military purposes. Catroux kept refusing, and on July 24, was replaced by Admiral Decoux
who was appointed as a new Governor-General. This, however, did not help the Japanese much
because Decoux’s attitude was much the same. In the meantime, Franco-Japanese negotiation on the
governmental level had been in progress in Tokyo from mid-July. Japan’s Foreign Minister
Matsuoka made clear to French Ambassador Arsène-Henry that Japanese demands was a miliary
necessity that should be met even in case of the French disallowance.9 The Vichy Government
mainly wished to assure France’s sovereignty and the territorial integrity of French Indochina.
Therefore, Arsène-Henry received instructions to accept the agreement after Japanese would
incorporate French demands into its text. On August 30, 1940, the Matsuoka-Henry agreement was
concluded and guaranteed Japan’s military privilege in Northern Indochina.
Further negotiations were to proceed in Hanoi. However, Decoux kept refusing conversations
until he received instructions from the Vichy government.10 At this time, Operation Division Chief
Tominaga arrived to Hanoi to inform Nishihara about the accomplishments in Tokyo. Tominaga
regarded Decoux’s attitude as insencerity and was ready to undertake military operations. Although
Governor-General reopened conversations, Tominaga did not change his plan. This came to light on
7 Legrand, p. 26.
8 Hata, pp. 162-3.
9 Hata, p. 172, Tachikawa, p. 75.
10 Hata, p. 176.
6
September 22.
On this day, a military agreement was signed by General Martin, the commander of the French
forces in Indochina, and Nishihara.11 Thus, finaly, the Japanese received Indochina’s consent to use
its Tonkinees airports and to station troops there in order to attack Jiang’s army. However,
concurrently with the planned entry of Japanese force into French Indochina, the Fifth division of
the 22nd Army in Guangxi Province crossed the Tonkinese border according to Tominaga’s scheme,
but without any approval from the Imperial Headquaters.12
This two-day fights was France’s only armed resistance to the Japanese occupation of
Indochina. Therefore, the French effort to defend Indochina might seem insufficient which supports
the American point of view. However, what was the response of the United States to the Japanese
drive in Northern Indochina?
I.2 Japan’s encroachment in Indochina and the American foreign policy
In the question of defense, French Indochina relied on the British cooperation and the
American support. In May 1940, Admiral Decoux paid visit to the British admiral in Hong Kong for
the last time, as France’s defeat was close and no relief was to come from England to the Far East. In
June, Governor-General Catroux asked Washington to supply war material to Indochina; however,
there was no chance to receive it in time.13 The United States gave priority to European affairs,
therefore on June 23, American State Secretary Hull recommended the French Ambassador in
Washington to accept the Japanese ultimatum, but refused to do it officially.14 During June 1940, the
American Ambassador in Tokyo Grew met Japan’s Foreign Minister Arita for several personal
11 The French were forced to changed their mind after the Japanese government re-present its ultimatum on September 19 and a demonstration of
Japanese flote took place in the Tonkin Gulf on September 21.Gaudel, p. 73.
12 Shiraishi M., pp. 39–40 and 48–49.
13 Gaudel, p. 74. Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 93.
14 Gaudel, p. 73.
7
conversations without any concrete result.15
In July 1940, a number of persons advocating hard-line policy towards Japan increased around
President Roosevelt. Moreover, the newly adopted National Defense Act entitled the American
president to issue an embargo iron scrap and aviation fuels to Japan.16 This constituted a warning to
the Japanese as they imported 90 % of the oil from the United States.
Japan’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Matsuoka tried to persuade Ambassador Grew that
Japan was forced to present the ultimatum to French Indochina because the Governor-General was
“unco-operative” and “was using obstructive tactics”. Matsuoka confidently added that “Japan had
asked permission to move forces across Indo-China and to be given temporary use of airports as
‘compensation’ for complying with the French request.”17 This explanation sounds like irony in the
light of the fact that Nishihara received instructions to ask for this concession in the response to
Catroux’s proposal for an alliance which was meant to buy time for Indochina. However, at this time
the United States only assured that they would never approved French concessions to Japan.18 The
American resolution to impede Japanese advance showed in the form of the loan to the Jiang Jieshi’s
government and the realization of embargo of all scrap.
After Japan’s occupation of Tonkin, the American Government became concerned about the
Japanese alignment with Axis powers. Ambassador Grew was convinced that the Tripartite Pact of
September 27 is primarily aimed against the United States and it is based on the presumption that
Germany will beaten Great Britain. 19 Consequently, Washington government recommended
American citizens in the Far East to evacuate which raised inquietude at Japan’s Foreign Ministry in
early October. At the same time, Matsuoka got alarmed by rumors about a total embargo against
15 Grew, p. 321.
16 Roth, p. 58.
17 Grew, pp. 331–2.
18 Roth, p. 73. Opt.cit. Departement of State Bulletin, September 28, p. 253.
19 Grew, p. 333.
8
Japan. At this situation, Japanese fears provided Grew with an interesting piece of information that
both Premier Konoe and Emperor were not in favor for the Tripartite Alliance.20 Generally said, the
pact did not induce much enthusiasm in Japan. As it became obvious subsequently, Japan remained
Germany’s ally only on paper - in contrast to the reality of the increasing Anglo-American
cooperation.
At this moment, obviously, Japan took up American’s enemies quarrel. But still, not only the
American, but also the Japanese could not predict the development of their relations as well as the
place of Indochina in it.
I.3 Japan’s mediation of Thai-Indochina border dispute
The occupation of the Tonkin did bring the settlement of the China Incident which was the
main pretext for Japanese demands to the French authorities. But it provided Japan with an
opportunity to expand its influence in South East Asia. This was Thai request for restitution of its
former territory seized by French Indochina. As the French authorities insisted upon Indochina’s
integrity, the Thai army launched attack along the Indochina border. Japan readily offered its good
offices to prevent the Anglo-American intervention and to oblige the Thai government. On
September 23, American Minister to Thailand Grant reminded the United States’ declaration on the
maintenance of status quo in Indochina.21 Also, French Ambassador appealed to the Japan’s pledge
of the territorial integrity.22 However, all American, British and French representatives did not
reinforce their pronouncements with serious steps. Therefore, they could not stop this Japanese
ambition and induce Thailand to keep distance from Japan.
Since the United States and Great Britain did not demonstrate enough determination to
20 Grew, pp. 346–7.
21 Roth, p. 78.
22 Gaudel, pp. 106–113
9
intervene, in the end of January 1941, France and Thailand agreed on the Japanese mediation which
accelerated Japan’s resolution for the Southern advance. On May 9, France and Thailand signed a
peace treaty in which Indochina yielded a vast territory.23
In reality, the Japanese army offered a military alliance to the Bangkok government in the
early stage of the border dispute. The reason for this was the plan of the Army General Staff to
launch attack on Singapore in late March 1941 because the Army expected that Germany would
restrain Great Britain from the defending its Asian dominions.24 Therefore the military alliance both
with Indochina and Thailand was desirable for the Japanese advance to the South. In March,
Thailand agreed to entre the agreement with Japan. However, negotiations extended over months
because of the difference of opinion among Japanese policy makers, and because of the Thai anxiety
about the treaty terms. Finally, the military alliance was concluded in December 1941 - after the
Japanese invasion to Thailand.
In June, Germany’s attack on Soviet Union changed the international situation. The Japanese
government sustained a shock because it got in a diplomatic plight: Japan pledged itself to the
alliance to Germany as well as the non-aggression to Soviet Union. Although, the northern advance
had not been completely rejected yet, the Japanese policy makers agreed on “Measures for
Advancing the Southern Policy” on June 25.25 This document took up again the decision of January
37 (during Thai-Indochina negotiations) which stated a basic strategy for establishing the Japanese
control over French Indochina and Thailand.26 According to that, the Japanese domination of the
French Indochina was essential for the security and defense of East Asia and should resolve Japan’s
encirclement by ABCD powers (i.e., America, Great Britain, China, and Dutch East Indies).
23 Legrand, p. 54. Nagaoka, p. 234. Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, pp.253–454.
24 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p.229. However, Nagaoka brings a different image of the situation: “that it was Thailand, not Japan, which proposed a
military alliance, and it was Matsuoka who refused the proposal.” (Nagaoka, p. 234.) Apparently, this constitutes one of many cases when Japan’s
Foreign Minister opposed to the army demands as Murakami explains Matsuoka’s non-military attitude. (Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p.212).
25 Nagaoka, p. 235.
26 Iriye, p. 131
10
II. Indochina and the broadening of the Japan-American rupture
II.1 Japanese occupation of Southern Indochina
Military leaders made their calculations concerning Japan’s expansion. Some of them were
even convinced that the war with the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands is inevitable.
However, Japan’s official stance to the new international situation remained indistinct. In early July,
the Japanese Government basically denied its intention to attack Soviet Union. However, Foreign
Minister Matsuoka noted to this that “the future developments would largely decide Japan’s future
policy” which yielded a possibility of the attack at changed conditions.27 This statement means that
nobody could rely on the Japanese pronouncement since the Japanese Government itself was not
sure about Japan’s future.
As for Indochina, Matsuoka was said to demand only Indochina’s rice, not military
provisions,28 and opposed the Army’s request for stationing troops in Indochina.29 However, the
British invasion to Vichy-controlled Syria deepened Japanese fears of Great Britain’s military power.
Thus, the army plan for occupation of Southern Indochina received green light. On July 12, Japanese
Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Katō in France to submit Vichy government with Japanese
demands: 1. military cooperation for Indochina’s defense, 2. support for Japanese forces to Southern
Indochina, 3. use of air and naval bases, 4. freedom of residence and action for Japanese in
Indochina, 5. financial support for troops, 6. approval of arrangements concerning the entry of
Japanese troops.30 Two days later, the document was presented to French Vice-Premier and Foreign
Minister Darlan with the notion that Japan expects the answer “by July 20, failing which, force
would be employed.” 31 Admiral Darlan was not susceptible to these one-sided concessions.
27 Grew, p. 398
28 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 226.
29 Nagaoka, p. 235.
30 Nagaoka, p. 237.
31 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 322.
11
However, General Pétain, having just lost Syria, held by French Indochina 32 and considered
Japanese pledge of French sovereignty in Indochina both essential and sufficient for the new
Franco-Japanese treaty.
Soon, rumors of Japanese intentions reached British and American authorities who noticed the
Japanese mobilization in Japan and in North East China. Anglo-American conversations proceeded
about steps the United States will take in case Japan dominates whole Indochina. Also Darlan was
hoping for the American help, but the American Government was ready to issue an economical
embargo, not its troops. Germany, too, busy with its war, refused any intervention for the French
sake. Thus, the Vichy government was forced to comply with Japanese demands on July 21.33
Further negotiations were to take place in Hanoi. Their progress was so rapid that the treaty was
signed in the evening at the same day, on July 23, 1941. Thus, Governor-General Decoux and
General Sumita settled details of stationing of the Japanese troops.34 Five days later Japanese forces
entered Southern Indochina. The Protocol for the Joint Defense of French Indochina assured
formally the Japanese rule in Indochina till Japan’s defeat in 1945.
The French consent with the Japanese occupation of Indochina were not determinate only by
the fear from Japan’s military power that could deprive France of Indochina, but also by the
geographical isolation of French Indochina in consequence of France’s surrender. As they could not
count on the British cooperation from June 1940, Japan remained the only potential economic
partner; therefore Indochina needed to maintain good relations with Japan.35
32 Tachikawa, p. 138.
33 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, pp. 331–332.
34 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 336.
35 Tachikawa, p. 120.
12
II.2 The United States hardened their policy towards Japan
The Allies, watching closely Franco-Japanese negotiations, were not fooled by Japan’s and
France’s pronouncements that the joint defense treaty was concluded in a friendly spirit without any
pressure from Japan or Germany. Drastic measures followed quickly.
On July 21, President Roosevelt excluded Japanese ships from using the Panama Canal.36 On
July 25, he ordered to freeze Japanese assets in the United States. Great Britain and Netherlands took
the same steps which restrained Japan from buying any commodity from these countries and their
dominions. In the first place, these steps concerned strategic materials as petroleum.37
Obviously, the Japanese Government did not expect such response to its occupation of French
Indochina. Foreign Minister Toyoda was anxious to know the exact formulation of Roosevelt’s
orders and kept repeating Japan’s favorite formula of the “encirclement” and of “peaceful intentions”.
Toyoda literarily said to Ambassador Grew that “Japan has no intention at all of making the southern
part of Indo-China a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas.”38 He failed to receive the
understanding as well as Japanese Ambassador in Washington Nomura, who argued that seizing the
Southern Indochina was the only way how to obtain rice, raw materials and to prevent actions of
Gaullist and Chinese agitators there.39 The Japanese words were not trusted any more.
Americans knew very well that if they cut Japan off its present sources of oil, Japanese would
seek to obtain it by other way, i. e. by dominating South East Asia. As Ambassador Grew pointed out
in October 1940, “export embargoes of a drastic nature on products so important as
petroleum…would be viewed by the Government and people of Japan as imperfectly disguised
sanctions, which might, and probably would, cause some sort of retaliatory steps”.40 In this context,
36 Legrand, p. 82–83.
37 Legrand, p. 82–83. Gaudel, p. 120. Roosevelt also prohibited export to Japan of petroleum products on August 1. But the reason for that is still
obscure because the freezing of assets was enough to disable the export to Japan. Yoshida, Mori, p. 13.
38 Grew, p. 407.
39 Murakami, Japan’s Thrust…, p. 344.
40 Grew, p. 336.
13
the American effort to avoid the war with Japan sounds doubtful. Therefore, the Japanese occupation
of Southern Indochina is often regarded as “a point of no return” which led to the Pacific War.41
According to Yoshida, it was the embargo that persuaded the hesitant Navy to join the pro-war
faction and this accelerate the process for the Southern expansion and the war with the United
Stated. 42 But was this really the moment when both Japan and the United States decided
unambiguously to go to war?
II.3 The last chance before the Pearl Harbor attack
Although American strategists asked Roosevelt to postpone the war with Japan until the
settlement of the European affairs, war preparations were in process on the Japanese side. The
imperial conference on September 9 drafted “Outline of the Execution Plan of the Imperial Policy”
which stated task “to complete all preparation for the state of war by the end of October” and to be
ready “to open war immediately against the United States” in early November.43 Still, on September
6, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe invited Roosevelt to the summit conference and his Foreign
Minister Nomura kept bargaining in Washington till late November44. It is interesting that Grew
considered Prince Konoe to be only person who can bring Japan to an understanding with the United
States,45 although it was Konoe, and not Matsuoka, who went in for the occupation of Indochina.
Therefore, his effort to reach consensus might look insincere in this light.46
However, the American attitude in the negotiations is questioned too. Especially, the Hull
Note of November 26 requesting the restoration of status quo in China which meant the complete
Japanese surrender there. But Japan was ready to give in Southern Indochina only (on November 20).
41 Tachikawa, p. 9.
42 Yoshida, Mori, p. 14.
43 Fujiwara, p.152.
44 Grew, pp. 428–456.
45 Grew, p. 447
46 Tsunoda, pp. 93–94, Fujiwara, pp. 156–158.
14
It is irrevocable that Japan could not draw off China, but it seems Konoe’s group was open to a
temporary settlement which could at least defer the outbreak of war.47 The same attitude might take
effect on the American side if the British support to the Japan-American interim agreement at the
price of stopping supplies to Jiang would have come sooner.48 The Secretary of State himself
admitted that an agreement with Japan could be reached if he had accepted the compromise.49
Nevertheless, advocates of the soft-line policy failed to achieve a result both in Japan and in
the United States. Changes in the Japanese government only deepened Japan’s absorption in the idea
of war. The new Prime Minister Tōjō took the Hull Note as an ultimatum. However, that means that
the last stage of the Japan-American negotiations before the Pacific War was rather about the belief
in a possibility of finding a slightest consensus on the interim situation in the East Asia; and the loss
of this belief meant the real “point of no return” in the Japan-American relations before the outbreak
of the Pacific War.
47 Tsunoda, pp. 93–94.
48 Klein, Conroy, p. 137.
49 Graebner, p. 116.
15
Conclusion
The Japan-American relations kept worsening with the ascendance of the Japanese Army’s
encroachments in the South East Asia. Especially, the Japanese occupation of Northern and than
Southern Indochina resulted in gradated measures of the United States. Nevertheless,
Japan-American conversations from September to November 1941 demonstrated that the main point
of the disagreement was not the question of French Indochina, but the question of the maintaining
the status quo in the East Asia in general. As Murakami stated, “French Indochina was caught in an
inevitable collision of the opposing policies of the United States and Japan concerning China and
Pacific.”50
Through this paper, we could see how Japan’s foreign policy and expansions plans
developed in the close linkage to the development in Europe. Especially, the timing of the invasion
to French Indochina followed Germany’s successes of the aggression against France and Soviet
Union. Concurrently, struggles among Japanese policy makers kept the direction of Japan’s move
obscure even after Japan’s occupation of Southern Indochina since the United States expected that
Japan would take advantage of the German offensive in Russia in October 1941.51
Therefore, the primary causes that drove Japan into the war with the United States laid in
the predominance of the military extremists in the Japanese politics together with the power vacancy
in the Far East due to the German aggression in Europe which made room to the Japanese ambitions.
In this sense, Japan got a free hand in French Indochina too. It is clear that France was not in
position to avoid the Japanese invasion; therefore the American blame for the Pearl Harbor attack
could be felt unfair from the French point of view.
The same attitude can be applied to the question if the United States did really make
all-out efforts to deter Japan from the war.
50 Murakami, Indochina…, p. 148.
51 Heinrichs, p. 171.
16
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