The Impact of Cardoso and Faletto’s Dependency and Development
Robert R. Kaufman
Rutgers University
Prepared for conference on “International Inequality: Then and Now,” Watson Center,
Brown University, April 4 and 5, 2008
1
Dependency and Development in Latin America, by Fernando Henrique Cardoso
and Enzo Faletto, was a seminal work in the scholarly literature on Latin America. It
simultaneously challenged two highly influential, alternative bodies of thought. On the
one hand, it rejected a key assumption of the “modernization paradigm:” that the
development of poor countries would move along paths similar to those already taken by
those of the developed world. Like other dependency writers, Cardoso and Faletto
(henceforth, C&F) framed their own analysis in terms of Latin America’s role in the
international division of labor and on the premise of an unequal relation between center
and periphery. “Capitalism,” they argued, “should be studied in the hope, not of finding
how its history may repeat at a later date, but of learning how the relation between
peripheral and central [countries] was produced.” (23)
But C&F also challenged much of the dependency literature itself. In particular,
they rejected the idea that the underdevelopment of the periphery was uniformly and
irreversibly caused by the exploitation of developed capitalist economies. Dependency
and Development focused instead on historical differences in how dependent societies
had been integrated into the international economy and on how these differences
interacted with domestic political alignments and development opportunities. Relations
between center and periphery were unequal, but they were – in the view of C&F – neither
uniform nor zero-sum, as much of the rest of the dependency literature had claimed.
Directly and indirectly, the research agenda sketched in Dependency and
Development exerted a major influence in the literature on Latin America, and to a more
limited extent on other developing regions of the world. Yet the originality and
importance of its critique of other strands of dependency perspective was never fully
2
understood or appreciated by “mainstream” U.S. comparativists. Consequently, the
opportunities for debating how international constraints interacted with domestic political
conflicts and coalitions were more limited than they should have been.
One reason was the delayed publication of the English-language edition of the
book, which did not come out until 1979, fully eight years after the Spanish edition.
Lacking direct access to the Spanish version, English-speaking audiences tended to aim
their fire (or praise) at much more simplistic and a-historical claims about dependency,
most famously associated with the work of Andre Gunder Frank.1 Debate over whether
economic integration doomed the periphery to underdevelopment missed the main point
of C&F’s contribution, crowding out potentially more useful critical examinations of
their complex arguments about the experiences of specific countries or broad differences
in national development.
The timing of international developments also limited the impact of the book in
the United States. By the early and mid-1980s, just a few years after the publication of
the English version, Latin America itself had moved on. Military regimes in Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay were now on the defensive, and the region as a whole became
swept up in the “third wave” of democratization. Over the course of the 1980s, concerns
about issues raised in Dependency and Development faded and were replaced by a
narrower focus on strategic opportunities for democratization, addressed to both scholars
and political activists. The shift of attention to transitions from authoritarianism spawned
outstanding contributions to our understanding of democratization, but tended to ignore
the possible effects of underlying social conditions or international constraints.
Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. was published in English in 1969. It rapidly
became the “voice” of the dependency school in the United States.
1
3
“Ironically,” as Barbara Stallings (1992: 43) noted, “just as international variables
became especially important in the 1980s, they disappeared as the key factor from
theories of development.”
It is also ironic, I think, that much of the current political economy literature
focuses on many issues anticipated twenty-five years earlier by Cardoso and Faletto.
These issues, as Cardoso notes in his current paper, concern the way internationalized
capital markets “condition” democratic struggles for equality; how these struggles are
affected by variations in the modes of insertion into the international economy –
particularly by relative abundance of factors of production; etc. There are clearly
differences in both style and substance between the current literature and aspects of
arguments raised by C&F, including specific substantive claims about the effects of
foreign ownership, the neo-Marxist language of the text (class struggle, pacts of
domination, socialism), and methodological approaches. But there are striking parallels
as well.
In the remainder of this paper, I want to spell out some of these points of
agreement and dispute. But I also want to make a larger, “sociology of knowledge”
point: namely, that there is much to be learned from more direct engagement of these
very different traditions of analysis. Or, to put it differently, it would be wrong to repeat
the errors of an earlier, more ideological era, when practitioners in these different
traditions often talked passed each other.
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; States and Regimes
Let me begin by elaborating briefly on the impact of C&F on U.S. scholarship in
the 1970s. To illustrate this impact, I refer specifically to two landmark studies of that
4
period that drew heavily on the perspectives pioneered in Dependency and Development.
These are : Peter Evans’ Dependent Development (1979), and Guillermo O’Donnell’s
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (197x).
Following C&F, Evans traced the emerging alliance between the state,
multinational capital, and large domestic industrial firms, arguing that this new ruling
class had created a new pole of development in Brazil and possibly in other new
industrial countries.
A key contribution of the study was to put empirical flesh on the
conceptual bones sketched in C&F. Evans examined in detail the strategies of foreign
and domestic corporate investors within different economic sectors, and explored both
the complementarities and tensions that accompanied the formation of the new “triple
alliance.”
At a more fundamental level, Evans pushed beyond C&F in his emphasis on “the
state” as a relatively autonomous agent of development . In some circumstances, he
argued, the actors controlling the state could play a pivotal role in promoting the political
alliances and economic conditions necessary for a push toward industrialization on the
periphery.
In subsequent decades, this argument in turn contributed (along with
Skocpol and others) to a burgeoning political sociological literature that sought to “bring
the state back in” (Skocpol, Evans, and Reuschemeyer 1986; Reuschemeyer, Stephens
and Stephens 1992; Kohli 2006) as an essential actor in promoting development, the
organizing class alliances, and mediating relations with the international political
economy.
O’Donnell’s work on bureaucratic authoritarian regimes also drew on the C&F
notion of dependent development, but spoke more directly to a political science audience.
5
O’Donnell did not view bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes as inevitable outcomes of
emerging alliances between the state and international capital; nor did Cardoso. But
O’Donnell did argue that there was an “elective affinity’’ between state-led efforts to
push beyond earlier, “easier” phases of import-substitution and the emergence of
technocratic and profoundly anti-populist forms of authoritarianism in the more advanced
industrial societies of Latin America. The pursuit of new developmental projects, in turn,
were spurred by political as well as economic pressures: most specifically, by the
evolution of Cold War national security doctrines that encouraged the military to assume
a more direct and prolonged control of the state in alliance with big business and
technocratic elites.
O’Donnell’s study, like Evans’s, provided a more systematic conceptual and
empirical foundation for some of the ideas elaborated in Dependency and Development,
and also sparked a substantial debate in political science circles. Critical analysis of the
“O’Donnell model” showed that a number of his initial claims were problematic (Collier
1979; Kaufman 1979). The connection between bureaucratic-authoritarianism and
industrial “deepening” – initially emphasized by O’Donnell -- applied primarily to Brazil,
but not to the Southern Cone countries which instead moved toward more liberal, exportoriented models during the 1970s. Yet radical authoritarian projects of reform – whether
through neoliberal openings or new associations between the state and multinational
capital – did imply deep social conflicts with interests and expectations mobilized around
previous import-substituting models and national-populist alliances. This in turn
arguably contributed to our understanding of the type of authoritarianism which emerged
in the region during the 1960s and 1970s.
6
Writers such as Linz and Stepan (1979) and Valenezuela (1979) raised more
fundamental questions about the emphasis found in the dependency perspective on
structural constraints and class conflicts. Though they did not directly confront the
analysis of C&F or O’Donnell, these critics argued that neither economic structure nor
economic crises accounted adequately for the breakdown of democracy in Latin America.
The more powerful explanations, in their view, lay in the miscalculations of competing
political elites and on incentives to polarization embedded in presidential constitutions
and electoral institutions.
This emphasis on political actors and the institutional incentives that they faced
contributed significantly not only to the analysis of democratic breakdowns, but also to
our understanding of transitions away from authoritarianism (O’Donnell and Schmitter
1986). Nevertheless, as noted, this literature did not systematically address some of the
key claims of the dependent development perspective, and this remained an important
shortcoming. The central issue was not whether dependent development “required”
authoritarianism; indeed, as Cardoso states in an epilogue to the English edition, “the
same fundamental alliance which constitutes a dependent industrial capitalist state may
organize itself institutionally within a context of authoritarianism, restricted democracy,
or totalitarianism.” (210) Instead, it was whether and how the developmental alliances
and economic transformations of that period impeded the emergence of mass democracy
and whether it shaped the particular form of exclusionary authoritarianism which was
then appearing on the scene.
Ex post, it became clear during the 1980s and 1990s that the time of exclusionary
B-A regimes had passed, and that mass democracies could in fact survive – indeed, even
7
engineer – “neoliberal” transformations. Yet the eclipse of bureaucratic-authoritarianism
– and the survival of democracies -- owed much to the winding down and end of the Cold
War, an international change that fundamentally altered the context of the causal
arguments that had been advanced by C&F and O’Donnell. In itself, therefore, the
eclipse of B-A regimes did not disconfirm their earlier analyses. More important,
although most democracies survived the 1980s intact, many failed during that decade to
adapt to the new realities of the global economy. These failures in turn contributed
significantly to a reversal of democracy in Peru under Fujimori, and to deep political
crises in Bolivia and Argentina during the middle and late 1980s, and to a broader
tendency for elected presidents to attempt to impose reforms by decree (Haggard and
Kaufman 1995).
In the new post-1980 context, to be sure, the specific arguments advanced during
the preceding decade no longer provided a suitable framework for understanding these
developments. But the “democratization literature” might well have been strengthened
by closer attention to the way international structural constraints conditioned the
opportunities for domestic political coalitions. Indeed, as I will discuss in the final section
of the paper, the questions raised in contemporary international political economy have
evolved very much along these lines.
Modes of Insertion: Colonialism, Inequality, and Underdevelopment
What light does the C&F perspective cast on debates about contemporary
struggles for equality and democracy? In the next three sections of this paper, I highlight
several interrelated ways that their work anticipated current political economy research.
The first concerns their emphasis on “modes of insertion” into the international economy
8
and their effects on long-term prospects for development. In both Dependency and
Development and in his essay for this conference, Cardoso emphasizes the distinction
between enclave economies, in which the export sector was controlled by foreign
companies, and locally-controlled export sectors with more extensive backward linkages.
These distinctions, argued C&F, helped account for types of responses to later economic
shocks of the early 20th century, especially the emergence of national-populist alliances
and the changing role of the state in more recent experiences of industrialization.
The post-dependency literature on development and underdevelopment places
much less emphasis on differences between foreign versus domestic ownership and
emphasizes instead the legacy of the colonial period. But a growing body of important
research focuses, as did C&F, on the domestic and international power relations that
shaped Latin America’s entry into the international system, and their long-term impact on
economic and political institutions.
Influential articles by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) have focused on economic and social conditions at the
time of colonization. Acemoglu et al highlight the legacy of differences in the precolonial health climate on both contemporary institutions and economic performance.
Low mortality rates at the time of colonization encouraged the establishment of settler
societies, and institutions based on property guarantees and checks against state
predation. “Efficient” institutions persisted over time, providing the foundation for
sustained growth. In areas with high mortality rates, including the Caribbean, Central
America, and much of South America, colonial elites were motivated to establish
extractive institutions aimed at maximizing opportunities for the exploitation of labor and
9
raw materials, with negative implications for long-term development. Once established,
these institutions locked in power relationships that were difficult to change, leading over
time to a widening gap between settler societies and those with extractive institutions.
Engerman and Sokoloff elaborate a similar argument, but focus on factor
endowments of the pre-colonial societies -- particularly, the availability of mineral
resources or climates and land suitable for plantation agriculture. Opportunities to
exploit such resources created strong incentives for colonial elites to monopolize access
to productive resources and to forcibly extract surpluses from the labor of the underlying
population. Like Acemoglu et al, they posit a strong tendency for these systems to
reproduce themselves and retard economic and social development. As is also the case
with Acemoglu et al, a key difference with the analysis in C&F is that the identity of the
elites that control these systems – eg., whether they are foreign or domestic – is not
considered an important factor.
The analysis of Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006) share more of the spirit, if
not the specifics, of C&F. While the nationality of owners is not important in their
analysis, the identity of the colonial powers is. Spanish colonial powers were more likely
reproduce the full panoply of mercantilist institutions found at home in societies already
characterized by dense populations and hierarchical controls, and were less likely to do so
where such social infrastructures were lacking. British colonists, conversely, had
stronger incentives to reproduce the liberal institutions of the home country in poorer,
less populated areas where they would encounter less social resistance, but (unlike the
Spanish) tended to prefer indirect colonial rule in societies with wealthier and more
complex pre-colonial civilizations. Lange et al show that the type and level of colonial
10
institutions accounted for much of the “reversals” of fortune” in the late 18th and early
19th centuries in which once wealthy colonial societies began to fall behind their poorer
counterparts.
Despite important disagreements, these authors and C&F converge around key
causal assumptions, noted above, about the importance of the power relations and
institutions that mediated the integration of Latin America into the international order.
Such convergence provides a conceptual foundation for a constructive debate about the
types of power relations and the types of institutions – including the nationality of
property owners -- that mattered most.
The authors also share the view that these arrangements had an enduring impact.
Elites that benefited from earlier institutions acquired power resources that allowed them
to maintain their dominant position as circumstances changed. History matters! But
such claims also highlight how much remains to be done. Neither the contemporary
authors nor C&F spell out clearly the way (and extent) to which the formation of early
institutions “lock in” elite dominance across the centuries since independence. In
Acemoglu et al, for example, inferences about the effects of path dependence are the
based primarily on quantitative analysis, which shows a marked statistical relationship
between early institutions and contemporary growth rates. This approach is useful, but
obviously not fully satisfactory.
C&F’s approach, though highly compressed, points to the need for a fuller
historical examination of the way the legacies of the past affect the response to new
challenges and development opportunities. Unlike the other authors cited, C&F point to
a series of turning points or critical junctures in the post-colonial period that can be
11
viewed as important opportunities for change. In deed, throughout the book, the authors
show that existing systems of domination are continuously subject to challenge and
reordering, and that their continuity cannot simply be assumed. This in turn implies the
need for a more extended historical analysis which problematizes the continuity of the
“path” of a country’s development as it moves through different historical conjunctures.2
Enclave economies, capital mobility and political radicalism
As Cardoso suggests in his current essay, aspects of the dependency perspective
he elaborated with Faletto are also highly relevant to differences among the left parties
and populist movements that have emerged in the region since the late 1990s. In the late
20th and early 21st centuries, the enclave characteristic of societies like Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Ecuador may help to account for the radical, anti-market populism that has
swept those countries. These are contrasted with more “social democratic” parties that
have emerged in societies with more diversified export sectors and more mobile forms of
capital. This argument, like the preceding one, maps closely to a growing number of
studies in contemporary political-economy.
In highly unequal societies such as most of the ones in Latin America,
redistributive conflicts are exacerbated by the predominance of “sticky” assets that are
not easy to shift into other sectors of the economy (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson
2006).
The nationality of the owners, as well as differences between public and private
ownership, clearly play a role in such circumstances. Where the “enclave” is privately
controlled, particularly by foreign companies, sunk investments are hostage to
distributive popular-sector and radical nationalist demands. Capitalists associated with
2
Important studies focusing on post-colonial critical junctures are Collier and Collier (1991 ) and Mahoney
(2001).
12
these sectors, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in polarizing responses. This
has been the case in Bolivia, for example, since the late 1990s. Privatized utility and
power companies also face strong popular opposition, particularly from middle-class
consumers faced with higher charges (Murillo, Baker). As a consequence, governments
often face significant pressures to renationalize. Public companies in the export sector
attract less direct opposition, but also encounter major pressures to finance distributive
programs, as in the petroleum sectors in Venezuela and Ecuador.
Where capital is more diversified and mobile, exit options provide businesses
with a second line of defense against radical distributive pressures, and this in turn
creates strong incentives for representatives of low-income groups to move toward the
center. The best known case here is Brazil after 2002. The PT and Lula had already
begun to migrate toward the center in the 1990s, after losses in successive presidential
elections seemed to show that they could not win with the radical anti-market appeals of
the preceding decade. Lula’s most definitive embrace of the market came, however,
during the presidential campaign of 2002 and in the first term of his presidency, in
response to economic crisis and the threat of capital flight. Maintaining financial stability
meant maintaining credibility with mobile capital, and this in turn motivated the Lula
government to sustain and even deepen the strict fiscal discipline pursued by the
preceding Cardoso government. Differences in the degree of capital mobility, in short,
encourage “left” governments to behave far more cautiously than their more radical
populist counterparts in “enclave” economies.
How does the threat of exit and the corresponding incentive to adopt cautious
macroeconomic policies affect the capacity of governments to address underlying issues
13
of social distribution? The possibility of a regressive “race to the bottom” has been a
recurrent theme in the literature on globalization. Yet, as I will elaborate more below,
experiences in countries such as Brazil and Chile do not indicate that this is happening.
As both the Cardoso and Lula governments have shown, there is room for maneuver even
in circumstances of globalization and tight budget constraints. Democratic governments
have been able to reallocate scarce fiscal resources and develop social programs in ways
that have begun to reduce poverty and incrementally reduce income inequality within the
framework of a market economy. Economic openness, to be sure, does place limits on
the range of viable choice available to national governments; and there are certainly no
guarantees that they will adopt progressive social policies. In large measure, as implied in
C&F’s book, this will depend on domestic political forces as well as international
constraints.
Globalization and constraints on social policies
In this final section, we look more broadly at the constraints and opportunities
within the new global context. Within the international political system, developed
country governments continue to exercise extensive influence over the rules of
international trade and finance. But as Cardoso suggests in his current paper, political
asymmetries between developed and developing world have diminished considerably.
American hegemony, initially thought to be unassailable after the fall of the Soviet
Union, has been increasingly challenged by regional great powers such as Russia, China,
and Brazil, as well as by oil states and other developed countries. The IMF, while still an
important player for many poor countries, no longer wields the extensive influence in
Latin America that it did during the debt crisis of the 1980s. Its power has been reduced
14
by alternative sources of international credit, by cross-conditionalities, and by the
compliance problems that had always plagued IFI loan agreements (Kahler 1992). The
World Bank, though an important source of policy advice, acts more through the
diffusion of ideas (a “knowledge bank”) than through the leverage of conditional loans.
Despite these changes, the importance of the international constraints facing the
countries of Latin America should not be underestimated. More than any single source of
political power, these constraints operate through international market forces not directly
controlled by governments, forces to which Latin American economies have become
increasingly exposed. In general, they face higher levels of volatility than they did
during the import-substituting era. Moreover, shallow domestic capital markets and
uncertain access to external lending also limits the capacity for fiscal stimuli during
periods of downturn (Wibbels 2006); unlike the OECD countries, fiscal policies tend to
be pro-cyclical throughout the region, limiting the ability of states to cushion their
populations from economic shocks or to sustain comprehensive welfare systems.
Liberalization has also altered the balance of economic power among domestic
political forces, but in ways more in line with the dependency perspective than with the
predications of liberal economic theorists. Early expectations based on the HeckscherOhlin model were that labor, an “abundant factor” relative to capital, would gain from the
opening of import-substituting economies. However, such gains did not materialize in
the land or mineral rich countries of the region. Nor was this the case in middle-income
countries where investment in higher-end industrial production widened the gap between
the wages of skilled and unskilled labor. Although the biggest increase in inequality can
15
be attributed to debt and inflationary crises of the 1980s, the liberal reforms of the 1990s
did not reduce these inequalities and probably increased them in some cases.
As Cardoso and Faletto emphasized over thirty years ago, however, such
developments are far from uniform across the region; indeed, they are less so today than
ever before. They are affected not only by variations in the domestic economic structure
– a point implicit in the preceding paragraph – but by the insertion of governments, and
underlying political alliances, into the economy and society. Increasingly, the core causal
assumptions sketched out in Dependency and Development have been echoed in much of
the contemporary political-economy research on “globalization.” Integration into the
international economy conditions (but does not directly determine) the opportunities and
incentives faced by domestic political interests; conversely, domestic political choices
and institutions can play a major mediating role.
One outward sign of these complex influences is that spending on social welfare
policies has increased over the last two decades. In the larger welfare states of the region,
this has been accomplished primarily through the reallocation of resources away from
other parts of the budget – a clear indication of a major shift in political priorities
(CEPAL, Social Panorama), particularly in the face of severe fiscal constraints. The
shift in categories of social spending – from relatively regressive social security
expenditures to more progressive health and education sectors – is still another sign of
changing political priorities. Perhaps most important is the evidence of ongoing efforts to
establish innovative social programs – such as Bolsa Familia and Progresa that operate
within the realities of budget constraints, but have had measurable effects on poverty
levels and human capital.
16
Ongoing research continues to explore the international and domestic political
influences on such policies; firm conclusions are yet to be reached. Yet it does seem
likely that democratization has played an important role. Democratic regimes, to be sure,
have had to adapt policy to respond to the more competitive international environment.
But electoral competition has also strengthened incentives for political authorities to
address the social needs of low-income voters, and this has had an impact on policy.
Despite pressures of globalization, for example, health and education expenditures tended
to increase more rapidly under democracies than authoritarian regimes (Kaufman and
Segura 2001). Democratic regimes have also been found to be more likely to sustain
social spending during periods of economic shock (Rudra and Haggard 2005).
Political factors other than democracy itself appear to affect not only spending,
but more direct measures of social welfare outcomes. For example, a study by Isabela
Mares (2005) shows that coverage and generosity of social protections vary with the
political strength of groups highly exposed to external risk and with the capability of state
institutions (as measured by the “rule of law” index). Studies by Huber et al (2006) show
the importance of the long-term strength of left parties in the Latin American countries.
Poverty rates and inequality decrease in countries where left parties have enjoyed
significant legislative strength for long periods of time.
Such studies by no means provide “final answers” to questions posed by either
the dependency perspective or contemporary political economy. They do, however,
establish at least a rebutable presumption that the effects of globalization are likely to be
conditional rather than direct, and that they are highly mediated by the social and political
forces within individual countries.
17
A brief note on method
The articles cited above use quantitative and/or formal methods to examine
contemporary issues of globalization. These, of course, are not the only way such issues
can be investigated. Indeed, qualitative approaches to the study of development have
grown in the methodological rigor with which they treat issues of case selection, concept
formation, and causality. Nevertheless, quantitative and formal methods above represent
a growing trend in the political science literature, and it is important to address their
potential contributions and limits.
In his introduction to the English edition of Dependency and Development,
Cardoso raised serious questions about whether such approaches were appropriate to the
concepts and complex causal arguments of the dependency perspective. But whatever
the merits of his criticism in 1979, I believe it should be reconsidered today. Both formal
theory and quantitative method can be highly useful tools for capturing some of the
complex causal relations emphasized in the dependency perspective.
Formal theory – particularly game theoretic models – address the consequences of
individual choices as they respond to the tradeoffs associated with structural constraints
and with expectations about the actions of others. Such models are sometimes criticized
– often correctly – as overly abstract and a-historical. But this problem is not necessarily
built into the approach. On the contrary, in many respects, the emphasis on the
interdependence and tradeoffs associated with the choices of individual agents is
potentially well positioned to build in parameters which capture the complexities of the
post-dependency world.
18
Quantitative analysis in turn has moved away from the simplistic linear arguments
of an earlier period to the examination of more complex social interactions. Indeed, in
some respects, the causal language and interaction terms introduced into this literature
closely parallels the earlier dependency argument: that international constraints condition
domestic political conflicts and choices about economic policy – and conversely, that
responses to these constraints will be conditioned by domestic society and politics. This
emphasis on conditional effects maps closely to the ontological assumptions about
causality implicit in the dependency literature.
Whatever the utility of these approaches, however, they cannot fully displace
more qualitative and historical approaches. Formal models can theorize about political
choices, but only systematic historical analysis can determine whether the identity and
motivations of the actors have been correctly predicted. Quantitative analysis can
demonstrate correlations consistent with theoretical expectations, but can never directly
reveal the causal mechanisms behind the correlations. These require case studies and
well designed small-n comparisons which allow us to get inside the structure and
organization of national states, private actors in the global market place, and groups that
challenge or align with them politically. The key point is that, in the early 21st century,
what were once rival methodological approaches have become, at least potentially,
complementary.
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