Week 4: Divine Command Theories of
Morality
Lecture Outline:
1. Waluchow on Divine Command Theory
2. G&H on Divine Command Theory
3. The Euthyphro
4. The (Biblical) Story of Abraham
NOTE: All of the readings for this week are
biased against Divine Command Theory.
That is, no philosopher, not even Plato,
accepts that morality is a function of the
commands of a God (though this does not
mean that all philosophers are atheists).
Hopefully by the end of today’s class, we’ll
all understand why this is.
Waluchow on Divine Command Theory
(pgs 95 – 103)
The attractive aspect of Divine Command
Theory (D.C.T) is that it has the potential to
establish an objective morality – if morality
is a set of commands issued by a divine
authority, it follows that morality is both
universal and objective.
There are two versions of D.C.T. Both
provide the same objective motivation for
being moral, i.e., ‘why should I be moral?
Because God says I should.’ Where the two
versions differ is the source of morality.
Version 1: The Moral Ground version of
D.C.T.
The morally right action is that action
commanded by God. That is, the fact that
God has commanded some act is the reason
for the act being morally right.
Version 2: The Divine Index version of
D.C.T.
God commands us to do the morally right
thing in all circumstances because it is the
right thing to do. ‘Morality’ is independent
of, but known by, God.
Problems with the Moral Ground version:
This version does permit God to be both
omniscient and omnipotent, because it
leaves control of morality in His hands…
but this control gives rise to the following
two problems:
1. There is no standard by which we can
assess the choices of God as ‘morally
good’
2. Morality is wholly arbitrary. If God said
that torture was morally right, it would
have to be.
So this leaves us with the Moral Index
version (#2), where morality is independent
of God, but He has complete knowledge of
it. We might not always be able to grasp the
reasons behind God’s command, but at least
we know that He has directed us in the
morally correct manner.
Sustaining this version of D.C.T. requires at
least that we be able to accurately identify
and interpret God’s commands, and these
tasks correspond to the problems with this
version of D.C.T.
Problems with The Moral Index Version of
D.C.T.:
1. Which God, which religious text, which
prophet?
2. Even if you identify God’s commands,
how are they to be reliably interpreted
and applied?
What these problems with version 2 show is
that even if this more plausible theory is
adopted, we’ll still have to engage in moral
reasoning to interpret God’s commands,
which means we’ll need to turn to a moral
theory independent of those commands.
G&H – Introduction to D.C.T. (pgs. 33 – 37)
There are two claims that make up every
version of D.C.T.
1. God(s) command certain actions
2. These actions are morally right because
they are commanded by God(s)
[Note: Waluchow does not think all versions
of D.C.T. are characterized by these two
statements. On his account, this description
only covers version #1]
There are two questions G&H believe those
wishing to endorse D.C.T. will have to
answer.
1. Is D.C.T. defensible?
2. Even if it is defensible, are its
supporters actually morally responsible
agents?
Reasons to think D.C.T. is not defensible:
1. Which God do these commands come
from?
2. How accurate is the Bible as an
historical text?
3. How do we explain the interpretive
divisions within Christianity?
Reason to think D.C.T. undermines the
status of its followers as responsible moral
agents:
If morality is nothing more than a command,
and the command always presents us with
the right thing to do, it follows that morality
consists in nothing more than blindly
following commands, like a robot. But
humans are not robots… we have free will,
and as such, we can attempt to investigate
the reasons that underwrite any command.
But as soon we start to investigate the
reasons behind God’s commands, we stop
following D.C.T. because now we’re
questioning the validity of God’s commands
using moral reasoning.
Most moral theories recognize that it is
important to do the right thing, FOR THE
RIGHT REASONS.
Plato – Euthyphro (G&H, pgs. 38 – 53)
This is one of Plato’s ‘Early Dialogues’ and
as such, it is believed to be Plato’s
interpretation of an actual conversation
Socrates had during his life. Plato was
Socrates’ student, and because Socrates
never wrote anything down, we rely on
Plato’s ‘Dialogues’ for insight into Socrates’
philosophical position.
The ‘Socratic Method’:
This is basically an account of the rhetorical
strategy Socrates uses in every one of
Plato’s ‘Dialogues’. It goes something like
this:
1. You get the person with whom you are
debating to state their position with as
much precision and clarity as you can.
2. You ask a series of questions intended
to test the hypothesis, questions that
elicit ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers.
3. By the end of the series of questions
either the hypothesis must be rejected
and/or modified, or the discussion has
revealed some truth about the universe.
‘The Euthyphro’ opens with Socrates
waiting outside the Athenian Assembly
building in order to face charges brought by
Meletus. Meletus’ charge is that Socrates
has corrupted the Athenian youth by
inventing new gods and not recognizing the
old ones.
Socrates discovers in talking to Euthyphro
that he is at the Assembly to prosecute his
own father for murder. His father had tied
up a worker after the worker had murdered
one of his fellows, and he let him die while
waiting for advice from the religious
authority. Clearly, says Euthyphro, this was
a wrongful killing and his father needs to be
prosecuted accordingly; at least inasmuch as
religious law is concerned.
Socrates asks Euthyphro to become his
teacher in religious matters, so he can
overcome Meletus’ indictment against him.
So let’s get started: What, asks Socrates, do
the Gods find holy?
Euthyphro (E): Prosecuting wrongdoers is
holy, failing to prosecute is unholy.
Socrates (S): But this is only one example. I
want to know the essence of ‘holiness’.
E: What pleases the Gods is holy, what
displeases them is unholy.
S: Are ‘holy’ and ‘unholy’ opposites? E: yes
S: But what of the fact that the Gods
disagree and fight over which actions are
just, and which are unjust? Does this not
mean some acts will be both holy and
unholy according to your definition?
E: yes, but there are some acts that all the
Gods agree are either holy or unholy.
S: O.k. So we need to adjust our hypothesis;
those actions upon which all Gods agree are
either holy or unholy, and if there is
disagreement, then the act is neither holy nor
unholy. E: Sure.
S: So now answer this – do the Gods love
actions because they are holy (Waluchow’s
D.C.T. version 2), or are actions holy
because they are loved by the Gods?
(Waluchow’s D.C.T. version 1) Clearly on
this account, the Gods love an action
because that action is holy, not because they
love it. E: Clearly.
S: Then all you have shown me is a feature
of ‘holiness’, namely, that all holy things are
loved by the Gods. But this still does not tell
me what the essence of holiness is. Let’s try
a different approach… is holiness a part of
justice, or is it the other way around?
E: Holiness is that part of justice that
consists in ministering to the Gods.
S: What does it mean to ‘minister’ to the
Gods? Does anything humans do actually
have an impact on the Gods.
E: Yes, human actions either please or
displease the Gods.
S: But this is the same as saying that holy
acts are those that the Gods love, which as
we have already seen, is an untenable
position.
E: I gotta go.
The Story of Abraham (G&H pgs 54 – 5)
God tells Abraham to make a sacrifice of his
son. Abraham prepares to do so, and God
stops him at the last second, then rewards
him and his descendants with many
offspring.
So the question is, while Abraham might
have had faith in the all-knowing power of
God, was he nonetheless acting morally
when he lied to his son and had every
intention of killing him? If your answer is
‘no’, then you cannot support D.C.T.