1
TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
PHI323
Outline of Lectures:
I. Introduction
Introduction to the lecture topic through an examination of P.Strawson’s use of transcendental
arguments in his books Individuals and The Bounds of Sense. Reconstruction and assessment of
B. Strouds influential criticism of these arguments and their underlying strategy.
II. Transcendental Arguments: Objections
Distinction of the general types of transcendental arguments. Outline of three main objections to
TAs: verificationism objection, idealism objection and modal objection.
III. Knowledge, Justified Belief and Scepticism
This section of the lecture program will offer background informations about epistemology and
draw contrast between different forms of scepticism
IV. Transcendental Arguments: Strategies
Consider various TA strategies as response to epistemic and irrationalist scepticisms, and
consider which (if any) avoid these three objections. Are there weaker kinds of transcendental
arguments?
V. Problem of the External World
The traditional problem of scepticism concerns our knowledge of the external world: I cannot
know with certainty that I am not now asleep dreaming, or being deceived by an evil demon, or a
brain-in-a-vat, and that the objects I seem to experience do not exist outside my consciousness (=
Cartesian scepticism).
This is also problem of rational belief, as well as knowledge: our experience cannot provide
adequate grounds for believing in a subject-independent material world (= Humean scepticism).
Consider TAs as used to address this problem:
(i) Putnam’s refutation of the BIV hypothesis
(ii) Strawson’s objectivity argument
(iii) Kant’s refutation of idealism
(iv) Hegel on perception
VI. Problem of Causality: Humean Scepticism
The problem of the rational status of our beliefs concerning causality and causal relations.
Consider TAs as a response to this problem:
(i) Kant's Second Analogy
VII. Problem of Other Minds: Solipsism and Interpretation
The problem of knowledge regarding other minds: I cannot rule out the possibility that no other
minds exist, only bodies?
And the problem of rational belief: my experience of others cannot provide adequate grounds for
believing that they have a mental life, or any mental life resembling my own.
Consider TAs as used to address this problem:
(i) Wittgenstein on other minds
(ii) Strawson on other minds
(iii) Davidson on other minds
READING LIST
2
The core secondary text employed in the seminar is
Robert Stern: Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism, Oxford 2000
It is recommended to read the following pages:
Lecture topic II: pp. 43-65, lecture topic III: pp.14-42, lecture topic IV: 66-125, lecture topic V:
pp.126- 178, lecture topic VI: pp.179-215, lecture topic VII: pp.216-238
Particularly important items on the reading list are marked with an asterix.
1. Introduction
*
Strawson, P F
Individuals, Methuen, 1959
The Bounds of Sense, part 1 and part 2, Methuen, 1966
‘Skepticism, Naturalism and Transcendental Arguments’, in P.F.
Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Methuen,
1985, pp.1-29
*
Stroud, B
'Transcendental Arguments', Journal of Philosophy, LXV, 1968,
pp.241-56; reprinted in R.C.S.Walker (ed), Kant on Pure Reason,
OUP, 1982, pp.117-131
‘Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability’, in
P.Parini (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, Kluwer
1994, pp. 231-251
‘The Goal of Transcendental Arguments’, in R.Stern,
Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, OUP 1999,
pp. 155-172
Shoemaker, S
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Cornell UP, 1963, pp.168-169
II. Transcendental Arguments: General Studies
‘Transcendental Arguments’, Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2006), http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/trans-ar.htm
Bieri, P, R-P.Horstmann and L.Krüger (eds), Transcendental Arguments and Science,
Reidel, 1979
Brueckner, A
'Transcendental Arguments I & II', Nous, 17, 1983, pp.551-75 and
18, 1984, pp.197-225
Cassam, Q
'Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and
Transcendental Idealism', Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 1987,
pp.355-78
Cassam, Q
The Possibility of Knowledge, Oxford UP 2007, part 1
Glock, H J(ed.)
Strawson and Kant, OUP 2003 (esp. the papers of Grundmann and
Westphal)
Bardon, A
*
3
Grayling, A C
Grayling, A C
*
*
*
*
The Refutation of Scepticism, Duckworth, 1985
'Transcendental Arguments', in J.M.Dancy and E.Sosa (eds),
Blackwells Companion to Epistemology, Blackwells, 1992, pp.5069
Guyer, P
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, CUP, 1987, pp.417-28
Grundmann, T
‘Transcendental Arguments in Defence of Intuitions’,
http://www.essex.ac.uk/tnp/transarg.html
Harrison, R
On What There Must Be, OUP, 1974, Chap 1
Peacocke, C
Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content, Clarendon
1989
Rosenberg, J F
'Transcendental Arguments Revisited', Journal of Philosophy,
LXXII, 1975, pp.611-24
Sacks, M
‘The Nature of Transcendental Arguments, International Journal of
Philosophical Studies, 13 (4) 2005, pp. 439-460
Schaper, E and W. Vossenkuhl (eds), Reading Kant, Blackwell, Parts I and II
Stern, R
Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism, Clarenden 2000
Stern, R (ed.)
Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Clarendon,
1999
Strawson, P F
Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Methuen, 1985, Chap
1
Taylor, C
'The Validity of Transcendental Arguments', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 79, 1978-9, pp.151-65
Vahid, H
‘Scepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Arguments’,
http://www.essex.ac.uk/tnp/transarg.html
Walker, R
‘Kant and Transcendental Arguments’, in P.Guyer: The Cambridge
Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, CUP 2006, pp. 238268
Wilkerson, T E
'Transcendental Arguments', Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 1970,
pp.200-212
Wilkerson, T E
'Transcendental Arguments Revisited', Kant-Studien, 66, 1975,
pp.102-115
Wilkerson, T E
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, OUP, 1976, Chap 10
Transcendental Arguments: Critical Studies and Responses
(i) Verificationism objection
Hacker, P
'Are Transcendental Arguments a Form of Verificationism?',
American Philosophical Quarterly, 9, 1972, pp.78-85
Rorty, R
'Verification and Transcendental Arguments', Nous, 5, 1971, pp.314
*
Stroud, B
'Transcendental Arguments', Journal of Philosophy, LXV, 1968,
pp.241-56; reprinted in R.C.S.Walker (ed), Kant on Pure Reason,
OUP, 1982, pp.117-131
*
*
(ii) Idealism objection
Bell, D
‘Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalistic Anti-Realism’, in
R.Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects
Cassam, Q
'Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and
Transcendental Idealism',
Grundmann, T/Misselhorn, C: ‘Transcendental Arguments and Realism’, in H.J.Glock,
Harrison, R
On What There Must Be, Chap 1
Harrison, R
'Transcendental Arguments and Idealism', in G.Vesey (ed),
Idealism Past and Present, CUP, 1982, pp.211-224
Pippin, R
‘The Idealism of Transcendental Arguments’, Idealistic Studies, 18,
1988, pp.97-106
4
Williams, B
'Wittgenstein and Idealism', in G.N.A.Vesey (ed), Understanding
Wittgenstein, Macmillan, 1974, pp.???; reprinted in Williams,
Moral Luck, CUP, 1981, pp.144-163
(iii) Modal objection
Blackburn, S
'Morals and Modals', in his Essays in Quasi-Realism, OUP, 1993,
pp.52-74
Craig, E J
'The Problem of Necessary Truth', in S W Blackburn (ed),
Meaning, Reference and Necessity, CUP, 1975
Craig, E J
'Arithmetic and Fact', in I.Hacking (ed), Exercises in Analysis,
CUP, 1985
Harrison, R
'Atemporal Necessities of Thought', in Schaper and Vossenkuhl
(eds), Reading Kant
Korner, S
'The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions', The Monist, 51,
1967, pp.317-331
Korner, S
Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, Penguin, 1971, Chaps 12
and 13
Schaper, E
'Arguing Transcendentally', Kant-Studien, 63, 1972, pp.101-116
Thompson, M
'On a priori truth', Journal of Philosophy, 78, 1981, pp.458-482
Wright, C
Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Duckworth, 1980,
Chap XXII
III. Scepticism and Epistemology
(i) Scepticism
Alston, W P
The Reliability of Sense Perception, Cornell UP, 1993
Aune, B
Knowledge of the External World, Routledge, 1991
Ayer, A J
The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin, 1956, Chap 1
Fogelin, R J
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, OUP,
1994
Fumerton, R
Metaepistemology and Scepticism, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995
Hookway, C
Scepticism, Routledge, 1990
Nozick, R
Philosophical Explanations, OUP, 1981, pp.167-290
Sosa, E
'Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge', Mind, 97,
1988, pp.153-188, Section A
*
Stroud, B
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, OUP, 1984
Stroud, B
'Understanding Human Knowledge in General', in M.Clay and
K.Lehrer (eds), Knowledge and Scepticism, Westview Press, 1989,
pp.31-50
Williams, M
Unnatural Doubts, Princeton UP, 1996
Weintraub, R
The Sceptical Challenge, Routledge, 1997
*
*
(ii) Epistemology: General Studies
Audi, R
Epistemology, Routledge, 1998
Bonjour, L
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard UP, 1985
Dancy, J
Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Blackwell, 1985
Dancy, J & E.Sosa (eds), A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell, 1992
Lehrer, K
Theory of Knowledge, Routledge, 1990
Pollock, J
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Hutchinson, 1987
(iii) Justification and Rational Belief
5
Alston, W P
Alston, W P
Audi, R
Foley, R
Foley, R
Goldman, A
Lycan, W G
Plantinga, A
Salmon, W C
Schmitt, F
Sosa, E
Strawson, P F
'A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology', in M.Clay and
K.Lehrer (eds), Knowledge and Scepticism, Westview Press, 1989,
pp.1-29
Epistemic Justification, Cornell UP, 1989
The Structure of Justification, CUP, 1993
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard UP, 1987 (Chap 3 in
OC)
Working Without a Net, OUP, 1993
'What is Justified Belief?', in his Liasons, MIT, 1992, and in
G.Pappas (ed), Justification and Knowledge, Riedel, 1979;
H.Kornblith (ed), Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT, 1985;
L.P.Pojman (ed), The Theory of Knowledge, Wadsworth, 1993
Judgement and Justification, CUP, 1988
Warrant: The Current Debate, OUP, 1993
‘Should We Attempt to Justify Induction?’, Philosophical Studies
VIII (1957), pp.33-44; and in H.Feigl, W.Sellars and K.Lehrer
(eds), New Readings in Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1972, pp.500-10
Knowledge and Belief, Routledge, 1992
'Beyond Scepticism to the Best of Our Knowledge', Section B
Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen, 1952, pp.248-63
IV. Strategies
*
*
*
*
*
*
Cassim, Q
‘Self-Directed Transcendental Arguments’, in R.Stern (ed.)
Hookway, C ‘Modest Transcendental Arguments and Sceptical Doubt: A Reply to
Stroud’, in R.Stern (ed.)
Rorty, R
‘Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism’, in P.Bieri et
al. (eds.)
Sacks, M
‘Transcendental Arguments and the Inference to Reality, in R.Stern (ed.)
Stern, R
Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism, pp 14-43, 89-125
Stern, R
‘Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty’ (On his homepage)
Stroud, B
‘The Goal of Transcendental Arguments’, in R.Stern (ed.)
V. Problem of the External World
(i) General
Descartes, R
Hume, D
Dicker, G
(ii) Kant
Kant, I
*
Allison, H E
Ameriks, K
Aquila, R E
Bennett, J
Meditations on First Philosophy
Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II
Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, Routledge 1998,
Chap 6
Critique of Pure Reason, trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood,
Cambridge UP 1998, 'Transcendental Deduction' (pp.219-277) and
'Refutation of Idealism' (pp.326-333)
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Yale UP, 1983, Part II
'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument', KantStudien, 69, 1978, pp.273-287
'Personal Identity and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism"', KantStudien, 70, 1979, pp.259-78
Kant's Analytic, CUP, 1966, Chaps 8, 9 and 14
6
Bird, G
Bubner, R
Cassam, Q
Guyer, P
Walker, R C S
Wilkerson, T E
'Kant's Theory of Knowledge', in Schaper and Vossenkuhl (eds),
Reading Kant
'Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction',
Review of Metaphysics, 28, 1975, pp.453-67
'Inner Sense, Body Sense and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism"',
European Journal of Philosophy, 1, 1993, pp.111-127
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, CUP, 1987, Parts II and IV
Kant, Routledge, 1978, Chaps II and VI
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Chap 3
(iii) Hegel
*
*
Hegel, G W F
Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, OUP 1977,
chapter 1 „Sense Certainty“
Horstmann, R.
‘Hegel’s Phenomenology as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology,
Inquiry,49, 2006, pp.103-118
Pinkart, T
Hegel’s Phenomenology, Cambridge UP 1994, pp.20-45
Solomon, R
In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of GWF Hegels Phenomenology,
Oxford UP 1983, pp. 319-424
Stern, R.
Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism, pp 164-178
Taylor, C.
‘The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology’, in A. MacIntyre
(ed.),Hegel, University of Notre Dame Press, 1976, pp. 151-188
(iv) Strawson
Strawson, P F
Strawson, P F
Cassam, Q
Harrison, R
Rorty, R
*
(v) Putnam
Putnam, H
*
Putnam, H
Bieri, P
Breuckner, A C
Dell'Utri, M
Nagel, T
McCulloch, G
Wright, C.
*
(vi) Davidson
Davidson, D
The Bounds of Sense, Methuen, 1966, Part 2, Section II
Individuals, Methuen, 1959, pp.1-86
'Transcendental Self-Consciousness', in Pranab Kumar Sen and
Roop Rekha Verma (eds), The Philosophy of P F Strawson, Indian
Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1995, pp.161-178
'Strawson on Outer Objects', Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 1970,
pp.213-221
'Strawson's Objectivity Argument', Review of Metaphysics, 24,
1970-1, pp.207-224
'The Meaning of "Meaning"', Philosophical Papers, vol II: Mind,
Language and Reality, CUP, 1975
Reason, Truth and History, CUP, 1981, Chaps 1-3
'Scepticism and Intentionality', in Schaper and Vossenkuhl (eds),
pp.77-114
'Brains in a Vat', Journal of Philosophy, 83, 1986, pp.148-67
Breuckner, AC
‘Transcendental Arguments from Content
Externalism’, in R.Stern (ed.),
'Choosing Conceptions of Realism: The Case of Brains in a Vat',
Mind, 99, 1990, pp.79-90
The View from Nowhere, OUP, 1986, pp.71-74
‘Content Externalism and Cartesian Skepticism’, in R.Stern (ed.)
'On Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat', in P.Clark
and B.Hale (eds), Reading Putnam, Blackwell, 1994, pp.216-241
'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in his Inquiries into
Truth and Interpretation, OUP, 1984, pp.183-198
7
Davidson, D
Davidson, D
*
Davidson, D
*
Davidson, D
Davidson, D
Davidson, D
Bieri, P
Farrell, F B
Fogelin, R J
Foley, R
Klein, P
Maker, W
Rovane, C
McGinn, C
'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in E.Le Pore (eds),
Truth and Interpretation, Blackwell, 1986
'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association, 68, 1987, pp.441-58,
reprinted in D.Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective,
OUP 2001, pp15-39
'What is Present to the Mind?', in Johannes Brandl and Wolfgang L
Gombocz (eds), The Mind of Donald Davidson, Grazer
Philosophische Studien, vol 36, 1989, pp.3-18, reprinted in
D.Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, OUP 2001, pp.
53-69
'The Conditions of Thought', in ibid., pp.193-200
'Epistemology Externalized', Dialectica, 45, 1991, pp.191-202
‘The Myth of the Subjective’, in Burger, Benedikt (eds.),
Bewusstsein, Sprache, Kunst, Oesterreichische Druckerei 1988, pp.
45-54, reprinted in Krausz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and
Confrontations, University of Notre Dame Press 1989 and
D.Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, OUP 2001,
pp.39-53
'Scepticism and Intentionality', in Schaper and Vossenkuhl (eds),
pp.77-114
Subjectivism, Realism and Postmodernism, CUP, 1994, Chap 3
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Chap 9
Working Without a Net, pp.67-75
'Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism', in E.Le Pore (ed),
Truth and Interpretation, pp.369-86
'Davidson's Transcendental Arguments', Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 51, 1991, pp.345-360
'The Metaphysics of Interpretation', in E.Le Pore (ed), Truth and
Interpretation, pp.416-29
'Radical Interpretation and Epistemology', in E.Le Pore (ed), Truth
and Interpretation, pp.356-68
VI. Problem of Causality
(i) General
Anscombe, G E M
'Casuality and Determination', in E.Sosa (ed), Causation and
Conditionals, OUP, 1975, pp.63-81
Armstrong, D M
What is a Law of Nature?, CUP, 1983
Harre, R and E.H.Madden, Causal Powers, Blackwell, 1975
Strawson, G
'Realism and Causation', The Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 1987,
pp.253-277
Strawson, P F
'Causality and Explanation', in B.Vermassen and M.B.Hintakka
(eds), Essays on Davidson, OUP, 1985, pp.115-135; or Strawson,
Analysis and Metaphysics, OUP, 1992, Chap 9
(ii) Hume
Hume, D
Hume, D
A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the
Principles of Morals, Book I, Sections I-VIII
Beauchamp, T L and A.Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, OUP, 1981
Blackburn, S
'Hume and Thick Connexions', in his Essays on Quasi-Realism,
OUP, 1993, pp.94-110
8
Dicker, G
Fogelin, R J
Fogelin, R J
Mackie, J L
Popkin, R H
Rosenberg, A
Strawson, G
Stroud, B
*
Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, Routledge, 1998, Chaps 35
Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature, Routledge,
1985, Chaps I, II, IV and V
'Hume's Scepticism', in David Fate Norton (ed), The Cambridge
Companion to Hume, CUP, 1993, pp.90-116
The Cement of the Universe, OUP, 1974
'David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism', in V
C Chappell (ed), Hume, Macmillan, 1966
'Hume and the Philosophy of Science', in David Fate Norton (ed),
The Cambridge Companion to Hume, CUP, 1993, pp.64-89
The Secret Connexion, OUP, 1989
Hume, Routledge, 1977, Chaps I-IV
(iii) Kant
Kant, I
Kant, I
Allison
Beck, L W
Buchdahl, G
Critique of Pure Reason, 'Second Analogy' (pp.304-316)
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Preface and §§14-39
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Part 3, Chap 10
Essays on Kant and Hume, Yale UP, 1978, Chap 8
'The Kantian "Dynamic of Reason", with Special Reference to the
Place of Causality in Kant's System', in L.W.Beck (ed), Kant
Studies Today, La Salle, 1969, pp.341-374
Friedman, M
'Causal Laws and the Foundation of Natural Science', in P.Guyer
(ed), The Cambridge Companion to Kant, CUP, 1992, pp.161-199
Guyer, P
Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, CUP, 1987, Part III, Chap 10
Guyer, P and R.Walker, 'Kant's Conception of Empirical Law', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supp Vol 64 (1990), pp.221-58
Lovejoy, A O
'On Kant's Reply to Hume', in M.S.Gram (ed), Kant: Disputed
Questions, Quadrangle Books, 1967, pp.284-308
Mackie, J L
The Cement of the Universe, Chap 4
Melnick, A
Kant's Analogies of Experience, U of Chicago Press, 1973 (Chap 3
in OC)
Strawson, P F
The Bounds of Sense, Part 2
Walker, R C S
Kant, Chaps VII.3
Walsh, W H
Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, Edinburgh UP, 1975, §25
Wilkerson, T E
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Chap 4
VII. Problem of Other Minds
(i) General
Ayer, A J
The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin, 1956, pp.214-222
Ayer, A J
'One's Knowledge of Other Minds' in his Philosophical Essays,
Macmillan, 1954
Dancy, J
Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Chap 5
Russell, B
Human Knowledge, Allen & Unwin, 1948, Part VI, Chap 8;
reprinted in L.P.Pojman (ed), The Theory of Knowledge, pp.468470
*
Williams, B
'Knowledge and Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind',
Philosophical Review, 77, 1968, pp.216-228; reprinted in Williams,
Problems of the Self, CUP, 1973, pp.127-135
(ii) Wittgenstein
9
*
Wittgenstein, L
Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 1953, §143-155, 179ff
(esp. 198 & 202). Cf. the corresponding sections in:
Baker, G/ Hacker, P M S An Analytic Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations, vol 1-4, Blackwell 1980 ff.
Chihara, CS and J.A.Fodor, ‘Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of
Wittgenstein’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1965),
pp.281-95
Kripke, S A
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages, Blackwell, 1982
Malcolm, N
'Knowledge of Other Minds', Journal of Philosophy, 55, 1958,
pp.969-78; reprinted in his Knowledge and Certainty, PrenticeHall, 1963, and in G.Pitcher (ed), Wittgenstein, Macmillan, 1966,
and in L.P.Pojman (ed), The Theory of Knowledge, pp.482-88
Pears, D
The False Prison, OUP, 1988, vol 2, Chaps 12-18
*
(iii) Strawson
Strawson, P F
Ayer, A J
Hacker, PMS
Plantinga, A
Reinhardt, L R
Smith, G W
*
Individuals, pp.87-116
'The Concept of the Person', in his The Concept of the Person and
Other Essays, Macmillan, 1964, pp82-128
‘Other Minds and Professor Ayer’s Concept of a Person’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 32 (1971-2), pp.34154
‘Things and Persons’, Review of Metaphysics, 14 (1960-61),
pp.493-519
‘Wittgenstein and Strawson on Other Minds’, in P.Winch (ed),
Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Routledge, 1969
'The Concepts of the Sceptic: Transcendental Arguments and Other
Minds', Philosophy, 49, 1974, pp.149-168
(iv) Davidson
For Davidson, see 5 (vi) above, and:
Davidson, D
'Radical Interpretation', in his Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation
Grayling, A C
The Refutation of Scepticism, Chap 3
Mulhall, S
On Being in the World, Routledge, 1990, Chap 4
Root, M
'Davidson and Social Science', in E.Le Pore (ed), Truth and
Interpretation, pp.272-304, 1980, Chap XXII