THE ÖRESUND REGION – SIX YEARS WITH THE BRIDGE
Richard Ek
The Department of Service Management
Lund University, Campus Helsingborg
Box 882
S-251 08 Helsingborg
Sweden
Richard.Ek@msm.lu.se
Towards a New Nordic Regionalism? Conference arranged by the
Nordic Network of the Regional Studies Association in Balestrand,
Norway, 4-5 May 2006
First Draft
1
Introduction
In July 2000 the bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö in the south of Sweden was
inaugurated. The bridge was a prerequisite of the realization of the Öresund region, a crossborder region politically delimited to include Sjælland and Bornholm in Denmark and the
Swedish county Skåne (figure 1). Of course, the vision of an integrated Öresund region goes
way back in time (a hundred years, fifty years, fifteen years, depending on the criteria
emphasized)1 but it has all the time been a mutual understanding among the region-building
actors that the Öresund region would really ’exist’ first when a fixed link was materialized
in Öresund. The 1st of July 2000 was the day when the region stepped out into the real
world, leaving visions, dreams and romantic notions of bridges behind ( SDS 2000.07.01).
Since that day the rate of the regional integration has been discussed as if regional
integration could be measured on a scale or indexed (there is actually an ‘Öresund
integration index’). Even if the regional integration, beginning with the inauguration of the
Öresund Bridge, often has been argued to be a fundamental, even paradigmatic societal
change,2 the discussion the six last years has been narrowly instrumental and technocratic in
character. Even simplistic. How fast forward goes the integration? Not fast enough!
In this paper I argue that one way to characterize the public discourse on and region
building practices in the now six-year-old Öresund region is through the concept of
simplicity. The Öresund region process is to a high degree regarded by its advocates as
simple in the sense of not being complicated or complex (but not in any way in the sense of
being gullible or feeble-minded). It is regarded as a difficult process, as the region builders
are up against sinewy national institutions and regulations as well as intangible national
cultural differences. It is regarded as a heterogeneous process as it involves a multitude of
different actors (even if the actors that set the tone are quite few) from local football clubs to
1
For a historical account in English, see Boye 1999: 84-141.
‘It is not only an evolution, but a revolution, and the changes that are bound to come can hardly be
imagined’ (Sven Landelius, managing director for the Öresund Consortium in SDS 1999.06.18)
[Det är inte bara tal om en evolution, utan om en revolution, och de förändringar som kommer kan
vi knappast föreställa oss fullt ut].
2
2
the Chambers of Commerce. But still, the integration process is regarded as simple,
imagined as similar to an organic process and possible to fulfil through an almost causal
formula: ‘better infrastructure, communications and transportation → higher mobility and
interaction → regional integration’. Here, the simplicity of the discourse of the Öresund
region is discussed based on two aspects of region building. Firstly, that the integration is
regarded as politically simple, since there is no disagreement among the politicians about
the regional idea per se. This means that the Öresund region is not considered to be a
political project, an apprehension with political and democratic consequences that will be
discussed below. Secondly, the geographical imagination of the Öresund region is simplistic
(perhaps also starry-eyed) in the sense that it is not sensitive towards its intra-regional
political geographies. As a consequence, intra-regional tensions are not addressed and
handled in a thorough way and are instead ‘popping up’ as (geographically based) disputes
around specific projects and co-operations.
The paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. Next section consists of
a recapitulation of the Öresund integration process so far, that is, from year 2000 until today
(spring of 2006). Without trying to answer whether the integration is a failure so far or not,
this section will through “snapshots” discuss and comment different “integration variables”
highlighted in the public discourse. In the third section, the Öresund region as a political
project that do not seem to be regarded as political by the leading region-building actors
(many of them political organizations) is discussed (integration regarded as politically
simple). Following Slavoj Žižek’s discussion on the ‘post-political’, I argue in this section
that the Öresund region (and maybe other cross-border regions as well) are managed by
management technologies rather than governed by a political polity. This gliding from
polity to management at the same time constitutes a tendency towards political simplicity.
In the fourth section, the argument that integration seems to be regarded as geographically
simple is presented. The dominant geographical imagination about regions in Europe today
gives a simplified picture of Europe’s political and economic geographies, emphasizing
centripetal ‘forces’ on the behalf of centrifugal ones. Since the complexity of the Öresund
region is not addressed in the region-building process, conflicts and disagreements rise
instead around specific issues in the process of the managing of the region. One such
3
example is highlighted in the section, the organization of hosting the America’s Cup in
Malmö in July and August 2005. Finally, in the conclusion, a rather bleak picture of the
democratic potential of regions, at least the Öresund region, is put forward.
Snapshots3 From a Region’s First Years
The Öresund region is a quite well researched cross-border region, especially prior to the
inauguration of the bridge.4 In public discourse, the ‘Öresund-talk’ increased to a crescendo
in the summer 2000 when the bridge was officially declared opened under celebratory
conditions (primarily adapted to look good on the TV-screen since the main target was ’30
seconds on CNN’, but nevertheless with a good public influx). Thereafter, a kind of
devotional hangover seemed to seize the regional project and the region-building actors
started to quietly observe the most tangible measure of ‘integration’ at hand at that moment:
the number of vehicles that drove over the bridge (easily measured since it is a toll-bridge)
and the number of people using the Öresund trains to travel to the other side. The owner of
the bridge, the Öresund Consortium (owned jointly in its turn by the Swedish and Danish
states) had made forecasts regarding the traffic flow after the opening of the bridge, and
after some time it was evident that those forecasts had been far to optimistic. When the
Öresund Consortium calculated that close to on average 12 000 vehicles should cross the
bridge each day the first year (Öresundskonsortiet 1999), the actual traffic in 2001 was on
average 7000 vehicles each day. Thereafter the traffic has increased each year and in 2005
the actual traffic had catched up with the traffic forecasts done six years before (and doubled
in relation to the traffic in 2001 (SDS 2006.03.16)). At the same time, people who traveled
by train increased from 4.2 million 2001 to X.X million 2005 (SDS 2005.07.01,). Even if
less and less people travel by ferry over Öresund (primarily between Helsingborg and
The recollection of a region’s first years can be presented in many ways. Here I have chosen to
focus on the public discussion that ran high especially during the time of the bridge’s ‘birthdays’
(‘one year with the bridge’, ‘two years with the bridge’ etc.).
4
References in English include Lyck & Berg 1997, Andersen 1999, Maskell & Törnqvist 1999,
Jerneck 1999, Matthiessen 2000, Berg 2001, Bucken-Knapp 2001, Linnros & Hallin 2001, Ceccato
& Haining 2004, Jensen & Richardson 2004, Stöber 2004.
3
4
Helsingør in Northern Öresund) there is no doubt that the traffic has increased (SDS
2005.03.10).
Nevertheless, from the start different voices in the public discourse has argued that the
bridge is not used as effective as it could be. Being a toll bridge after all, it can cost up to 25
Euro to drive a car single journey over the Öresund Bridge. But, as the argument goes, if the
bridge was free to use, the integration process should be sped up. Here, the financial
agreement between the Danish state and Swedish state regarding the bridge, its repayment
conditions, etc. has been pointed out as an immanent problem (with a clear state-level
dimension, as the two central states are accused of preventing growth on a (trans-) regional
scale) (KvP 2004.10.09, SDS 2005.06.29). The central – regional conflict dimension is
explicit in other areas as well. Actually, the region’s first six years is in a sense a declaration
of the tough persistence of national institutions. The governments of Sweden and Denmark
have been in constant negotiations around issues like how the trans-border commuter should
be taxed (in the country he or she lives in or works in) and differences in social security
systems and labor-market policies (SDS 2002.06.17). This where issues which were
supposed to be solved quite easily back in 1999-2000, and some steps towards a
harmonization between the two national systems has been taken, 5 but a lot of big issue
remain to be solved. In the frustration that has turned up, the region-building actors blame
the Danish and Swedish governments (SDS 2003.03.30, 2004.09.30, 2004.10.02) while the
two national governments blame each other.
Besides that the financial issues between Denmark and Sweden have been unexpectedly
difficult to solve, region-building actors has generally lamented over that politicians on state
level have not engaged sufficiently in the whereabouts of the Öresund region (SDS
2004.09.16). A special Öresund Minister has been called for repeatedly (Metro Øresund
2005.09.06). In Sweden, the geographical distance between Skåne and Stockholm has been
put forward as a reason for this, and in Denmark has the territorial and administrative
5
In 2003, a taxation agreement was reached where it was decided that people who live in Sweden
and work in Denmark pay their taxes in Denmark, but that Sweden at the same time is compensated
financially (SDS 2003.11.05). This was an agreement that was questioned by actors on the Swedish
side that meant that it would only benefit the Danish economy (SDS 2003.10.30).
5
structural reform that was initiated a couple of years ago (and will be implemented in
January 2007) drawn political interest away from the Öresund cooperation project (BT
2004.06.27). But not only some politicians seem to be not interested in the Öresund region.
Quite a small part of the region’s companies showed initially an explicit interest in Öresund
cooperation (SDS 2001.05.02). But nevertheless, the interest has increased, however from a
low level, and for instance the number of Swedish owned companies in Denmark are higher
than ever (SDS 2003.12.22). In a survey made in 2005, about half of the companies that was
questioned responded that the bridge had had a positive influence on theirs businesses (SDS
2005.07.02a). Whether the increased interaction and cooperation (if that is what defines
integration) between companies in Skåne and Sjælland are primarily a result of regional
factors and imperatives or rather a general internationalization of business can be discussed
in length.6 Of course, the region-building actors use whatever statistical results, success
stories and arguments at hand that are useful for them, which is hardly surprising. But
interpreting tendencies in the region in a specific way that favors an already established
image (‘we have integration, but not in a pace quick enough’) and blocking other
interpretations (‘increased interaction is not necessarily the same as integration’) seems to
me to be a good way to create a discourse of regional integration that is simplistic in its
character.
However, the established image of the integration process (‘we have integration, but it
should go faster’) held by region-building actors is not as coherent as it may seem at first
glance. For some debaters, the integration was a utopia (due to familiar arguments as to high
toll-bridge fees) while other has argued that there is a silent bottom-up integration (SDS
2005.07.02b). The Swedish ambassador in Denmark argued for instance that the integration
goes on but that the ‘development will take longer time’7 (2005.07.01b). In this reasoning,
as in the public discourse in general, integration is given a process meaning (integration as
something that ‘goes on’) and is at the same time imagined as some kind of end-station
(when the integration is ‘complete’). Whatever defines ‘complete integration’ is a source of
6
According to Lennart Berntson, historian at Roskilde University, the size of the commuter traffic
is a result of how Danish and Swedish states of the market and business trends are related to each
other rather than an ‘integration rate’ (SDS 2003.06.25).
7
“Utvecklingen tar längre tid”.
6
interpretation, but to Ilmar Reepalu, the chairman of the city executive board in Malmö, it is
the day when the traffic over the Öresund Bridge between Malmö and Copenhagen is as
intensive as on the freeways between Malmö and Lund and between Copenhagen and
Helsingør (SDS 2004.12.24). Again, regional integration is on an equal footing with
interaction in a region (the region as an absolute space, a container of society, in itself a
simplistic characterization of space).
At the same time, within the public discourse of regional integration in Öresund, the cultural
differences between the two countries have been highlighted (especially in connection to the
bridge’s birthday). When the bridge was three years old Danish academics and journalists
argued that they where quite indifferent towards the bridge (SDS 2003.06.20, 2003.06.22).
According to Tine Eiby, journalist on the Danish Weekendavisen (SDS 2003.06.20):
For the citizens in Copenhagen, the bridge has primarily meant that they are meeting
Swedish-speaking people everywhere in the central parts of the Danish capital. The
retail trade is enthusiastic. But generally you have to admit that people in Copenhagen
speak about the Swedish visitors with a slight irritation. And it hurts me, because I
know exactly how it feels. I recognize it from my own shopping in Örkelljunga. You
notice how the locals sigh at us Danes. And thinks something like: “Here they come
again. Having vacation all the time and keeps their money tight”8
In a similar vein, ethnologist Orvar Löfgren argues that the flow of one-day tourists can be
more irritating than integrating (SDS 2003.06.11). To him, the increased interaction
increases the need to stereotype the other (on the other side of Öresund). Since Swedes and
Danes are quite alike, it is the small differences that are important (like ‘the Danes wears
jogging suit when they are visiting the local pub’). Nevertheless, the small stereotyped
8
För köpenhamnarna har Bron väl först och främst betytt att man möter svensktalande överallt i de
centrala delarna av den danska huvudstaden. Detaljhandeln är begeistrad. Men generellt sett måste
man nog erkänna att köpenhamnarna talar om de svenska gästerna med viss irritation. Och det
plågar mig för jag vet precis hur det känns. Jag känner igen det från mina egna shoppingrundor i
Örkelljunga. Där märker man hur lokalbefolkningen suckar över oss danskar. Och tänker något i stil
med: “Där kommer de igen. Har semester ständigt och jämt och håller i pengarna.
7
differences works self-reassuring (Swedes dress themselves better, we do not wear jogging
suit when on the local pub).
Apart from legal and cultural differences in the Öresund, the increased interaction does have
material and constant consequences. The Öresund Consortium work actively to get people
to live and work on different sides of the sound. Integration in this sense seems to imply a
constant crossing of the sound in people’s everyday life (wake up, bring children to school,
go to work, shop something on the way back home after work, drive the children to sport
activities etc.). The Öresund should be crossed at least twice each day in a plausible timegeographical diagram (and not just something you do from time to time, visit to a concert
etc.). The Öresund Consortium therefore for instance help real estate agents to sell real
estates in Skåne to Danes (SDS 2006.03.19a), and even if the house prizes in Malmö has
increased by 78% from year 2000 to 2006, they are still much cheaper then the house prizes
in the Copenhagen area. As a consequence, the migration from Sjælland to Skåne has
increased fivefold between 2000-2006 (SDS 2006.03.19b) and between 2004 and 2006 the
number of Danish income-tax return forms sent to habitants in Skåne increased from 6 000
to 16 000 (SDS 2006.04.119).
However, even this seemingly more tangible integration variable (migration) can be
discussed whether it implies a genuine regional integration. As a Danish couple answered
about the thought of and possibility to move to Malmö: “If we should be honest, we should
not be interested if it was not for the nearness to Copenhagen and the much lower house
prizes”10 (SDS 2006.03.19c). Among the questions asked about housing in Scania by Danes,
a majority seems to be about how close the house or apartment is to the freeway and the
train station back to Copenhagen (ibid.). But on the other hand, in the visions of the
Öresund region it is very much imagined and presented as a traffic- and infrastructure
9
About half of these were sent to Danes living in Skåne and half to Swedes working in Sjælland
(SDS 2006.04.11).
10
Ska vi vara ärliga så hade vi inte varit intresserade alls, om det inte var för närheten till
Köpenhamn och de betydligt lägre priserna.
8
region, a regional monotopia constituted by functional non-places of transport and
communication.11
From Polity to Management, Towards the Post-Political Cross-Border Region.
The history of the social production of the Öresund region revolves around (besides the
focalization on the fixed link) the establishment of region-building organizations, interorganizational co-operations through networks and the implementation of projects that in
some sense promote regional integration. Actually, a distinction between organizations,
networks and projects has not always been easy to make, as several organizations are
formed as networks and as projects has metamorphosed into organizations/networks. As has
been stated elsewhere,12 the inter-organizational structure, or maze, of new and old13 actors
working to create an Öresund cross-border region is clearly adapted to fulfill the conditions
for funding from the EU, primarily from the INTERREG programmes. To just give one
example of the organizational maze, or haze (particularly from a democratic point of view,
see below), the branding project “Birth of a Region” was initiated by the Öresund
Committee14 in April 1997 (together with at least 15 private, public and quasi-public
organizations) in collaboration with the London-based marketing/branding company WolffOhlins.15 The project was financed partly by INTERREG IIA funding. Two years later, a
11
Monotopia is an analytical term presented by Jensen and Richardson (2005), indicating a
conceptualization of Europe as a transnational territory organized and physically arranged in order
to gain frictionless mobility and highest possible speed in transport and communication. Non-places
(Augé 1995: 77-78) then, is the places of a hypermodernity, where: “…people are born in the clinic
and die in the hospital, where transit points and temporary abodes are proliferating under luxurious
or inhuman conditions…where a dense network of means of transport which are also inhabited
spaces is developing…a world surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary
and ephemeral…(Augé 1995: 78, compare Relph’s (1976) notion of “placelessness”).
12
See further Perkmann 2002 and 2003.
13
New in the sense that they were obviously created in an Öresund regional integration context (for
instance Medicon Valley Acadeny, Öresund Food Network, Copenhagen Malmö Port). Old in the
sense that they existed before the attempts to create a CBR (cross-border region) in the Öresund, for
instance local and regional municipalities, regional chambers of commerce and local place
marketing organizations like Wonderful Copenhagen and Copenhagen Capacity.
14
The Öresund Committee consists of political representatives from regional and local authorities
from both sides of the border and a secretariat that is responsible for carrying out the daily work.
15
See further Hospers 2004 and Pedersen 2004.
9
brand-book was presented to the public (on the theme the “Human Capital”). At the same
time, Wolff-Ohlins recommended that a more tangible regional identity should be anchored
among the public, and a network-based organization, Öresund Identity Network, was
established in order to work towards that goal in the year 2000.
At the same time, even if the amount of organizations, networks and projects can be seen as
staggering,16 the really important and active organizations are quite few, maybe around 20
or so [check who is linked to whom on the Internet]. If these organizations are studied a bit
further, it is quickly revealed that they are connected to each other not just by co-operation
but by being represented in each other boards, advisory boards etc. A study of the
individuals involved discloses that the organizational core of the regional integration
process revolves around quite a few leading politicians and civil servants (Ek 2003: 38-41).
This close involvement and centralization increases the isomorphic mechanisms working in
this organizational field17 and crystallizes a self-acclaimed regional elite (Lovering 1995 &
1999) that all know each other, professionally as well as in a personal sense. An important
contributory cause to the establishment of these tight organizational and personal ties was
the many conferences in the 1990’s. To Christian Tangkjær, these, at least a hundred regionbuilding conferences and workshops (on themes like “When vision becomes reality” and
“Challenge: Öresund”) could be described as a “travelling road show” (Tangkjær 2000).
These numerous conferences are to P. O. Berg another indication that the Öresund region to
a high degree was evoked and incanted, a sort of social alchemy that brought the region to
“life” (Berg 2000: 82).
These attempts to “dream up a region” are quite typical for its time, the late 1990’s.
Strategic long-term planning increased and was regarded more and more important in the
context of deepened European integration. The more ad hoc – based planning philosophy of
the 1980’s was to some degree replaced by a more complex planning philosophy and
planning policy, especially regarding a sensitiveness regarding spatial scale. Different
national and regional planning policies were explicitly related towards the EU (Healey
According to Berg (2000: 60), more than 500 organizations had been involved in the “production
of the region”.
16
10
1998). At the same time, a more ambitious and active planning apparatus crystallized on a
EU-level, manifested through documents like the ESDP (Faludi 2004). This return of
strategic planning was not, however, a return to the ambitious, spatial science – based
planning of the 1960’s (like locational analysis) (Barnes 2003) but more of a corporate
management-like planning, ‘management planning’, a discursive practice that incorporated
a business-like set of concepts (like ‘vision’), tools (SWOT-analysis, bench marking) and
(growth above all) philosophies.
In the case of the Öresund region, the geographical vision of a competitive Öresund crossborder region became a semantic magnet, a word-driven process that almost got a life on its
own.18 Right before the opening of the bridge, this geographical vision almost seemed to
have a strong narrative control of the organizations involved in the region-building process.
Whatever circumstance, the vision about the Öresund as an integrated trans-border region
that would oust Stockholm and Berlin was incanted. Even if the vision worked as a message
towards the region’s inhabitants (you should like this region!, see below) and a place
marketing phrase in general, in retrospection, it also seemed to work autocommunicative
(Luhmann 1995). The different Öresund organizations communicated primarily with
themselves rather than to the public sphere in the region, and in the process, legitimated
their own existence (Falkheimer 2004: 205).
However, in order to be able to gather around a vision that every organization could accept,
the vision became by necessity a simplistic one, reduced to a set of rhetoric catch-all slogans
like “increased competitiveness”, “enlarged labor market”, “unique possibilities” and “the
most dynamic region in the ‘Europe of the regions’”. Seemingly an inclusive vision (come
join us!), the vision of the Öresund was actually excluding, a rhetoric tool that colonized the
future by claim that “this is the only way towards development and progression” (Ek 2003:
102). Due to its need to be simplistic, the geographical vision of the Öresund region left out
more difficult and complex issues regarding democracy, transparency, social and spatial
equality and the future citizen of the region. Especially, in order to keep the geographical
17
See Meyer & Rowan 1977, DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Scott 1991.
11
vision simplistic, the Öresund citizen was given an instrumental and obedient rather than a
participatory and active role.
The instrumental role given the citizen of the region is of course a result of the management
planning practices and philosophies. As the formulations of vision in companies can be seen
as a leadership technique that disciplines the employed, the geographical visions created by
the Öresund region-building organizations had a distinct disciplinary function. And as
according to critical management theory approaches (Parker 2002, Alvesson & Willmott
2003) the employees are primarily resources for the companies (the realisation of the
company managements’ goals and ambitions and the shareholders wishes and demands), the
management planning practices and philosophies indicate a view of the region’s citizens as
resources that can fulfil the vision. In order to fulfil the vision, the citizens should preferably
(besides accept the vision per se, and become “marketing ambassadors” for “their” region
(Kotler et al 1993)) be a part of the implementation of the region with their bodies, that is,
travel across the whole region, especially over the Öresund, in their everyday life (as the
region is constituted by regional and trans-border interaction, leading to integration etc.
according tot the formula mentioned above).
The instrumental view on the citizen is also reflected in the selection of integration
stimulating project focused on culture, history and language. Here, a multitude of INTERREG
– based projects have been crucial. These projects can be broadly categorized into three
groups. Projects that aim to strengthen a regional identity and a regional imagined
community (stressing aspects like the close affinity between Swedish and Danish culture,
tradition and language, and common historical ties (Scania was a part of Denmark until the
middle of the 17th Century)), projects that direct people’s awareness of the regional benefits
regarding societal utilities (larger supply of employment and education possibilities) and
projects that allude to people’s need for hedonism, pleasure and recreation (a regional future
implies enlarged supply of entertaining and cultural activities).
18
For a discussion regarding the importance of visioning in planning, see Shipley & Newkirk 1998
& 1999, Shipley 2000 & 2002.
12
The attempts to create a regional identity are central here. The characters of this identity are
based on ethnicity, culture, historical ties, (almost a) common language, in large essential
factors. People should preferably have a regional rather than a national identity, have an
Öresund identity above all. Here, the focus on language, history and culture, especially
directed towards children and young people, shows parallels to how national identities was
created and institutionalised in the 19th Century. The regional imagined community is, in
sum, based on ethnicity and culture rather than civilian or political membership (with
implies that it is an obvious exclusive dimension present, the Öresund citizen, in the place
marketing material for instance, is strikingly often a white Scandinavian, even if both
Malmö and Copenhagen are the most multicultural (and in Malmö’s case, segregated) urban
agglomeration in Sweden and Denmark). The Öresund citizen is usually described as an
ancestor to the Vikings, Christian and a spokesperson for the Scandinavian welfare state
model (ironically, since the Öresund region-building is based on neo-liberal principles and
guidelines) (Ek 2003: 184-190). Often, romantic stories about two people on the either side
of the Öresund that has fallen in love are highlighted (heterosexual couples that is) and
exposed in media, symbolising the “marriage” between Scania and Sjælland. The
representation of the Öresund citizen is never a political, actively participating human that,
for instance, questions the motives behind the integration, questions the methods and
strategies chosen by the Öresund regime, or, argues that it lacks a substantial social vision
that outline a future with less ethical and employment-based segregation and reduced social
and economic inequality.
In a recent study by the political scientists Patrik Hall, Kristian Sjövik and Ylva
Stubbergaard (2005) it is obvious how the civil servants and the politicians working to
create a functional Öresund region do not regard the “Öresund project” as political, as “nonpolitical politics (Hall et al 2003: 83). After interviews with 20 higher civil servants and
politicians Hall et al conclude from the answers they have received that (what the authors
regards as) political questions about democracy, transparency and public participation are
by the interviewed redefined as administrative or technical issues and that the citizens has
been de-politicised to utility optimizers. The citizens of the region are regarded by the
interviewed as economic individuals rather than members of a political collective. The idea
13
that the region has to be “publicly anchored” (folklig förankring) is not related to
democracy, but about identity, information and the solution of functional problems (Hall et
al 2003: 102) in the eyes of the self-acclaimed regional elite in Öresund. The Öresund
citizen is primarily a commuter, consumer and clients in the cross-border region, that has to
be enlightened how much he or she can benefit on the realization of an integrated region and
postfordist trans-border regional economy (Ek 2003: 199-201, Hall et al 2003: 108).
Writing about the political condition in a more general sense, the psychoanalytic social
thinker Slavoj Žižek’s (1998: 198) that:
…we are dealing with another form of the degeneration of the political, postmodern
post-politics, which no longer merely ‘represses’ the political, trying to contain it and
pacify the ‘return of the repressed’, but much more effectively ‘forecloses’ it…Postpolitics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological divisions behind and confront
new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes
people’s concrete needs and demands into account.
To Žižek, post-politics is characterized as the replacement of conflicts among global
ideological visions with collaboration of “…enlightened technocrats (economists, public
opinion specialists…) and liberal multiculturalists, via the process of negotiation of interest,
a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus” (ibid.). In order
to apply Žižek’s thoughts in the context of this paper, a stronger clarification has to be
made, but the strata of “enlightened technocrats” could eventually be likened with the
regional elite, knitted together as a regime of multi-level governance (politicians and civil
servants on local, regional, national and EU-level). This thought will be briefly returned to
in the conclusion.
14
From an Öresund that would not become one city, to the
Öresund as a spatial billiard ball
The discussion about an integration of an Öresund region (or Örecity as it was called then)
was evoked in the end of the 1950’s and in the beginning of the 1960’s, Torsten
Hägerstrand declared some years later in an interview that “Örecity will never become one
city (Tidningen Vi 1967, original emphasis). The Örecity discussion was in several ways a
predecessor to the region-building process in the 1990’s. The discourse focused on the
building of (several) fixed links over the Öresund, the importance of infrastructure and
transportation, and the cross-border urban agglomeration as a strong economic competitor to
other urban centers in Northern Europe. Some similarities are evident. Regional identity,
cultural kinship and ethic similarity was not an issue, as it has been in 1990’s and forward.
Further, the Örecity of the 1960’s was a public planning project; private actors and the
business life did not have such a central role in the discussion or in the visioning practice
(see further Ek 2003: 234-261).
Eventually, the Örecity discourse ran out of steam in the end of the 1960’s and the
beginning of the 1970’s, for several reasons (among them economic recession in the 1970’s
and increased environmental awareness – canalized as an outspoken resistance towards the
plans to build both bridges and tunnels over and under Öresund). One prominent reason was
also, however, that the idea of a strong center, Malmö and Copenhagen, as an “engine” that
should by necessity dominate the future trans-border Örecity met a strong resistance among
different actors, especially municipalities and cities in the geographical periphery.
Actually, the history of the Öresund integration process from the late 1950’s and forward is
filled with different conflicts within the region, and among the regime of regional
organizations (besides the inter-regional conflict lines between Copenhagen and Stockholm
as geo-economic rivals in the Baltic Sea Region and between Scania and Stockholm, as a
national centre and periphery – based conflict). One intraregional conflict line could (and
perhaps still can) be drawn between Northern (Helsingborg and Helsingör) and Southern
Öresund (Malmö and Copenhagen). Initially, in the 1950’s, it was planned that the fixed
15
link should be build between Helsingör and Helsingborg, but through a mobilization of
support, and arguments, the planned position of a fixed link was changed, and placed
between Malmö and Copenhagen (Ek 2003: 86-90).
Another geographically based conflict line could (and can to some degree still) be drawn
between Western and Eastern Scania, at the same time a centre – periphery relationship. The
arguments against the idea of a Örecity was that Scania should “capsize” if Copenhagen and
Malmö should be “allowed” to be a strong urban agglomeration. The development in the
Ruhr district, with urban sprawl, pollution and heavy industries was set up as a warning
example, not only by local municipalities in East and Northeast Scania, but also by primary
regional organizations like “Skånes planeringsinstitut”. For instance, the county governor of
Malmöhus County argued that: “…it is untenable to form an opinion of Örecity as an
administrative unit, and secondly, the region that relates to the name must be protected from
a coherent urban settlement on both sides of the most beautiful channel in the world. That
would be a pollution of the environment without equal with such an abnormity of city
buildings” (SkD 1966.12.21).19
The fear that a realized Örecity should imply a “regional urbanization” in the Öresund, and
that the regional balance should be altered in a not acceptable way was thus a strong
argument in the planning discourse of Öresund in the end of the 1960’s and even more so in
the 1970’s. In the 1990’s, this state of unrest is still present, and the different geographical
conflict lines can still be drawn, but this is nothing that affects the contemporary regional
discourse, and particularly, is not especially discussed among the regional actors that are
engaged in the integration process. When in the 1960’s the Örecity vision revolved around
ideas how to organize the territory when it came to societal needs and functions, and
questions regarding regional balance and social equity the vision of a Öresund region in the
1990’s had much more focus on economic growth and competitiveness, everything else has
been secondary in importance. Rather than an inward-looking developmental perspective,
19
Det är ohållbart att bedöma Örestad som en administrative enhet och för det andra måste den
region som namnet avser bevaras från en sammanhängande stadsbebyggelse på ömse sidor om
världen vackraste farled. Det vore en miljöförstörelse utan like med en sådan abnormitet i
tätortsbebyggelse.
16
the 1990’s management planning introduced an outward-looking competition perspective.
The (cross-border) region is not an end in itself, but a means to secure growth, a concept
that is seldom, actually never, discussed or questioned in the regional Öresund discourse
(growth to whom, where, at what costs etc.).
As a consequence, the eagerness to keep the regional vision and integration together has
been much more pronounced. Here, rather than to see the center – periphery relationships
from an intra-regional perspective, the center – periphery relationship is regarded from an
inter-regional point of view. The center of the Öresund region is primarily competing with
other centers in other regions, and by a fruitful collaboration between center and periphery
and a mobilization of all regional resources, the center would be able to compete effectively
with Berlin, Amsterdam and Hamburg, the story goes. If increased inequality is a necessity,
something that is needed in order to rival Berlin, then increased inequality is something that
the periphery will gain from as well. Europe of the regions has been an geographical
imagination there increased rivalry and competition between regions has been discursively
framed within a geo-economic logic of grammar, the functional region is bound to compete
for economic lebensraum (Ek 2005). In a sense, there is a parallel here to how the Europe of
the nations was, according to classic geopolitical thinking (for an overview, see for instance
Ó Tuathail 1996, ch. 2), bound to compete for political lebensraum.
In order to keep the regional vision simple, not risking the unity of the regional regime and
loose competitiveness because of internal disagreement, the center – periphery relationship
that do exist has not been thoroughly contemplated, but been reformulated as a “win-win
situation”. But the territorial conflict lines can still be observed as they are actualized in
different circumstances (but never outspoken). Municipalities in Eastern Scania, market
themselves as “the front side of the Öresund region” (which they are regarded from the
other side of the Baltic Sea), Helsingborg and Helsingør cooperate in order to be a ”mayor
player” in the north of the region, and among at least some civil servants on the Swedish
side think that cooperation with Danish organizations should be kept to a minimum since
“they always try to push us around” (higher civil servant, Position Skåne).
17
In the organization of one recent event, the hosting of Malmö-Skåne Louis Vetton Acts 6
and 7 of the 32nd America’s Cup Valencia between the 24th of August and the 4th of
September, the latent conflict line between the center and the periphery in Scania was
revealed. To be able to host the event, Malmö and Scania had to bid over competing cities
like Kiel, and offered 20 million Skr. It was decided by the leading politicians that Position
Skåne, the common place marketing organization of every municipality in Scania, should
pay this and other costs. In order to do that, Position Skåne had to cut down or skip planned
projects all together. This was tourist and marketing projects that was either aimed to
strengthen the Öresund co-operation or market the periphery against tourists. The estimated
total cost of 40 million Skr was to optimistic, and the real cost was later calculated to over
100 million Skr. The event was said to be a major happening that the whole of Scania
should benefit from, but quite quickly an anxiety rose in the periphery that only Malmö
should benefit (and perhaps Copenhagen as the closest major city) among politicians in the
peripheral municipalities (Ek forthcoming).
Several politicians in Scania also expressed a discomfort about how the process had been
handled. The initiative came from Öresund Yacht Club, an exclusive network that tries to
attract different sailing competitions to Malmö, that contacted a few leading regional and
Malmö-based politicians. They in there turn decided that Malmö and Scania should try to
attract the America’s Cup qualifying match without allow any true transparency or wider
engagement from other political actors in the region. Not even the management of Position
Skåne was allowed to have any say in the process, something that also raised protests from
the periphery, especially from the southern periphery (Ystad) where a marketing campaign
about Wallander tourism (after the writer Mankell’s crime stories taking place in and around
Ystad) aimed for the German market (where Mankell’s police crime books are very popular)
was skipped due to Position Skåne’s new financial situation (Ek, forthcoming).
In the aftermath of the event, including several evaluations that have been slightly or very
critical about how the event was organized and executed, in no way the center – periphery
dimension has been discussed. The promoters of the event have either dismissed the more
critical evaluations that actually treat the center – periphery aspect or admitted that “next
18
time we will handle this better”. The region is still regarded as almost singular entity, not
the least in the explicit assumption “what is good for the region is good for everyone in the
region” and the implicit assumption “growth is good for the region, that is, for everyone in
the region”. The Öresund region is regarded as simple geographically speaking, as
containing local and regional actors that in every situation has an agreement what should be
done, how and why, in the context of regional development. This mean that the complexity
of the region, and the regional regime are not addressed in the continuous debate about what
way the region should take in the future. Conflicts and disagreements, and in this case,
objections from actors in the periphery to how specific high profile strategies and projects
are decided and executed, are not treated seriously and sometimes even dismissed as
ignorant and mislead. In a sense, this neglect could be counter productive when it comes to
the work of continue the regional integration process.
A bleak conclusion
In their very constructive disquisition on ‘making European monotopia’, Ole B. Jensen and
Tim Richardson discuss the increasingly influential discursive conceptualization of Europe
or the European Union as a transnational territory organized and physically arranged in
order to obtain frictionless mobility and the highest possible speed in transport and
communication (Jensen & Richardson 2004). Here, mobility is especially stressed and
infrastructure has a special significance in the political and economic discourses of
European integration as in the European spatial planning and policy discourse. As a
consequence, the importance of a strengthened infrastructure network permeate, even
constitute as its raison d’être, strategic programmes and visionary policy plans, like
INTERREG and ESDP. In the example of the Öresund region, focus has been on
infrastructure as well, combined with the above-discussed rather instrumental view on the
regional citizen. Jensen and Richardson further discuss, after Weiler 1999, the infranational
character of EU governance. Increasingly large sectors of European policy making are
carried out at meso-governance level, in committees, commissions, directorates etc. These
19
ways of working have the character of a quite informal network approach that increases the
autonomy being given to the bureaucracy:
…because of its managerial, functional and technocratic bias, [it] operates outside
parliamentary channels, outside party politics. There is nothing sinister or conspiratorial
in infranationalism, but its processes typically lack transparency and may have low
procedural and legal guarantees…In general, the classic instruments of control and
public accountability are ill-suited to the practices of infranationalism (Weiler 1999:
284-285).
Since these policy making network contains a complex web of negotiations between public
and other forms of non-public actors, the decision-making process may be just as opaque
and exclusive as traditional bureaucratic forms (Atkinson 2002: 784). Striving for an
efficient and pragmatic decision-making process, some actors may actually prefer
informality and opaqueness, making European space in ‘obscure policy spaces, away from
the public gaze’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 5).
Again, the cross-border region is at least sometimes a telling example of this. In the EU
rhetoric, cross-border co-operation is often argued to be a step towards a higher ‘degree of
subsidiarity’ and a solution to the ‘democratic deficit’, but since the EU has encouraged a
consensual and negotiated procedure in these matters, ‘border policy continues to be
relatively undemocratic with consequences for the EU as a transnational policy’ (O’Dowd
2001: 96). The Öresund region, at least, fit into this rather bleak characterization, and
following the thereabouts of the continued regional co-operation and integration process, by
living in it, I really cannot see any tendencies that a change should be on its way.
20
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Berlingske Tidende 2004.06.27: Syge københavnere bliver dyre for ny hovedstadsregion.
KvP 2004.10.09: Öppna broarna.
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SDS 2003.06.11: “Bron förenar olikheterna”.
SDS 2003.06.20: Längre till Sverige.
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25
SDS 2003.11.18: Öresundsvisionen var en utopi.
SDS 2003.12.22: Ökad integration över Sundet.
SDS 2004.09.16: Smågnabb om Öresundssamarbetet och visionerna.
SDS 2004.09.30: Skatteförslag retar Reepalu.
SDS 2004.10.02: “Regeringen vill enkelrikta Bron”.
SDS 2004.12.24: Toppmöte om framtiden.
SDS 2005.03.10: Öresundsbron drar ifrån färjorna.
SDS 2005.06.29: “Brotaxa hindrar integration”.
SDS 2005.07.01a: Trafiken över Bron tar fart lagom till jubileet.
SDS 2005.07.01b: “Integration i det tysta”.
SDS 2005.07.02a: Bron ett lyft – för hälften av Skånes företag.
SDS 2005.07.02b: “Integration i det tysta”.
SDS 2006.03.16: Brotrafiken överträffar alla prognoser.
SDS 2006.03.19a: Mannen som lockar danskarna över Bron.
SDS 2006.03.19b: Andra vågen över Sundet.
SDS 2006.03.19c: Danskarna invaderar.
SDS 2006.04.11: 16 000 deklarerar över Sundet
Öresundskonsortiet (1999): Sund och Bro nr 36, juli 1999 (news material).
26