“You sacrificed me” : An inter-disciplinary approach to Liverpool’s business culture
in the eighteenth-century Atlantic
Using ‘networks’ as an analytical tool in economic and business history is very popular at present. However,
there is very rarely a real attempt to use the social-science theory from which the term is derived. Other
terms being used with equally little care are ‘trust’, ‘risk’, ‘obligation’ and ‘reputation’. This is not to say that
borrowing from the ‘neo-institutional economics’ is not useful, but that paying it more than merely lip service
could be even more so. Preliminary research has shown that these concepts have relevance for the analysis
of eighteenth-century trade. The word concept rather than term is used, because contemporaries thought
about ‘networks’ but were more likely to call them ‘associations’ or ‘friends’. They were equally concerned
about their reputation, but called it their ‘credit’. It is argued that these concepts are useful for historical
analysis, but more attention paid to the theory from which they come would produce a more nuanced
analysis and facilitate a more particularised language. Furthermore, they will help to demonstrate how, in a
period of minimum regulation, the ‘Atlantic system’ worked so efficiently.
This paper will be based on interdisciplinary research funded by an ESRC grant. Using Liverpool’s
eighteenth-century Atlantic trade as a case study, it will investigate the concepts of networks, trust, risk,
obligation and reputation with two main objectives: to assess how far or often these concepts were
considered by contemporaries (even if other terms were used); and how far social-science theory can
enlighten these concepts when applied directly to the primary sources. For example, the theory of ‘relational
cohesion’ demonstrates how actors in a network often stay in a trading relationship due to past successes,
even when more profitable opportunities were presented. 1 Repeated business transactions could lead to the
relationship having an affective bond in itself. The notion of ‘impersonal trust’ could help us understand why
eighteenth-century merchants took the risk of doing business at extremely long distances with contacts that
they only knew by name and/or reputation. 2 Certainly merchants dealt with many people at long distances
whom they had never met. Ideas on ‘technological’ versus ‘natural’ risk may enlighten whether merchants
thought differently about risk regarding shipping, as opposed to with whom they dealt. 3 For example, a slave
ship owner wrote to his Captain to guard against bad decision making for “Misfortunes may to be sure
happen that human prudence cannot forsee or guard against, but many there are that might be prevented by
prudence and a proper attention”.4 ‘Mutual obligation’ may explain why some merchants extended their
networks further and further; whilst others chose to keep potential future calls for help to a minimum. 5 Finally,
but by no means least, reputation, or ‘credit’ was the lynchpin of a successful merchant. For example, having
trusted in an Irish trader, McDowell, and the system of bills of exchange in general, Liverpool merchant
Thomas Leyland was horrified to find that a bill drawn by him had been dishonoured. He wrote to McDowell
that “surely you dont consider the consequences of such amatter and how much it injures my credit”. 6
Edward J. Lawler & Jeongkoo Yoon, “Commitment in Exchange Relations: Test of a Theory of Relational Cohesion”,
American Sociological Review, 61, 1 (1996), 89-108.
2
Susan P. Shapiro, “The Social Control of Impersonal Trust”, American Journal of Sociology”, 93, 3 (1987), 623-658.
3
Lee Clarke & James F. Short Jr., “Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies”, Annual Review of
Sociology, 19 (1993), 375-399.
4
Clemens & Co. to Capt Speers, 3 Jun 1767, Tuohy Papers, Liverpool Record Office (hereafter LivRO).
5
D. E. Muir & E. A. Weinstein, “The Social Debt: An Investigation of Lower-Class and Middle-Class Norms of Social
Obligation”, American Sociological Review, 27, 4 (1962), 532-539.
6
Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, American Journal of
Sociology, 91, 3 (1985), 481-510; Leyland to McDowell, 29 May 1786, Thomas Leyland Letterbook, LivRO.
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This paper will investigate these themes in order to study the nature of business culture in the eighteenthcentury Atlantic. It will argue that there was a common business culture held together by a mentalité
understood by all traders. Following a brief overview of some of the concepts being investigated by this
project, this paper will take a closer look at networks and trust. Social-exchange theory and notions of trust
are often ‘modelled’ in the social-science literature, and comparing these to the reality of eighteenth-century
sources highlights both the problems and potential of using such theories in historical context. 7 In particular
they allow a nuanced analysis of how business culture functioned on a day-to-day basis. For example, trust
was central to the commercial code of conduct at the personal, institutional and general level. 8 Breaking this
code of conduct was considered extremely bad practise and those who suffered by such actions felt very
personally insulted. Thomas Leyland found out that two supposedly unconnected trading associates in
Ireland had colluded against him. He wrote to one of them that “I have since discovered you were a Partner
with him in all these transactions, and to remove your distresses, at the time, you sacrificed me”.9 It will be
argued that this inter-disciplinary approach will help us to understand better the mind and business attitudes
of the eighteenth-century merchant, and their success in binding the Atlantic economy together.
Sheryllynne Haggerty
University of Liverpool
Abstract for the Economic History Society Conference 2005
sheryllynne.haggerty@liv.ac.uk
word count: 956 inclusive of all titles and footnotes.
Shane R, Thye, Michael J. Lovaglia & Barry Markovsky, “Responses to Social Exchange and Social Exclusion in
Networks”, Social Forces, 75, 3 (1997), 1031-1047.
8
Oliver E. Williamson, “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization”, Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 2
(1993), 453-486.
9
Leyland to Tallon, 24 Jun 1786, Thomas Leyland Letterbook.
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