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“PEACEFUL RISE”: A DISCOURSE IN CHINA
(TALKING POINTS)
Wang Jisi
Peking University
I.
THE FORMATION OF THE DISCOURSE
In 1998, Yan Xuetong and three other researchers in the Institute of
Contemporary International Relations published a book entitled
International Environment for China’s Rise, which probably was the first
analytical work that discusses the concept of China’s rise in the PRC.
Zheng Bijian, a veteran theoretician in the Communist Party of China, is the
most enthusiastic promoter of the idea that the Chinese leadership should
explain the rise of China to the outside world. Zheng paid a visit to
Washington in December 2002 when he was struck by the strong American
interest in debating China’s newly gained power and influence. The Chinese,
he suggested later in Beijing, should rebut both the “China threat theory”
and the “China collapse theory” by promulgating the concept that China has
embarked on the road of rising peacefully since the beginning of reform and
opening in the late 1970s. With the support of the government, Zheng has
been leading a research project on how China will keep developing along
this path until the mid-21st century while diluting suspicions and fending off
hostilities toward China’s emergence. His main thoughts and arguments
were published widely in Chinese media and in Foreign Affairs
(September/October 2005).
Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao adopted the wording
“Peaceful Rise” (heping jueqi) in their public speeches in late 2003 and early
2004. Since this brief period, however, Chinese official documents and
statements have rarely referred to this concept. Instead, the road of China’s
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“Peaceful Development” (heping fazhan) has been introduced, as is
systematically expounded in the official white paper released by the
Information Office of the State Council in December 2005.
The meanings and connotations of “Peaceful Rise” have been carefully
considered within policy circles and widely consulted with international
observers. Alternative English words to replace “rise,” such as “emergence,”
“resurrection,” “reemergence,” and “revival,” were discussed.
Indeed, to quite a few Chinese officials, policy analysts, and scholars, heping
jueqi is not an appealing idea, but the reasons for their objection vary. One
grouping of thinkers points out that the Chinese word “jueqi” could carry the
meaning of “suddenly appear (or rise) on the horizon.” To them, the
emphasis on China’s rising power in international affairs, even being
modified by the adjective of “peaceful,” would echo or reinforce the
expressive concerns in the outside world about China’s present or potential
threat. They make references to Deng Xiaoping’s repeated advice in the
early 1990s for Chinese leaders to lie low and remain sober-minded when
some other governments and international forces called for Beijing’s
leadership role in forming a united front against U.S. hegemony. China’s
best international strategy, they argue, should be based on a modest
assessment and a cautious projection of its own power in order to
concentrate on economic growth and social development within China. Most
of them would prefer Peaceful Development to Peaceful Rise, as the former
would be “bloodless,” less aggressive, and much less controversial.
In making such points, these observers appear to concede the appreciation of
China as a fast growing power. However, they call for resisting the
temptation to boast of China’s achievements in the outside world as such a
boast would be tactically inadvisable. Some of them have gone even further
to blame the promotion of heping jueqi for giving ammunition to the new
surges the “China threat theory” in the United States and elsewhere.
Another line of argument challenges the very judgment of China’s actual
“rise.” Some Chinese observers point to the fact that despite the
demonstrated economic progress the country is still faced with many
difficulties, bottlenecks, and pitfalls in its development path. They tend to
underscore the large gap between China and postindustrial nations,
especially the United States, in social, cultural, educational, and
technological dimensions, casting doubts about the sustainability of the
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current economic growth rate and fearing that China’s development might
be disrupted by a combination of certain unpredictable problems. In other
words, they caution against overconfidence in seeing China’s growth of
strength as irreversible. The exacerbating imbalance in China’s development
and redistribution of wealth is another factor they are worried about.
The third line of thinking in response to heping jueqi is critical of the
anticipation that China will be able to rise up to a great power status in peace.
People holding this notion contend that no great power in history ever rose
up in peace, and China would be no exception. They would not advise, of
course, that China should resort to war to become an economic and
geopolitical giant. Rather, these people present an increasingly ominous
security situation in the world in which China would eventually be engage in
military conflicts with major powers or drawn into inadvertent wars.
In the eyes of those who doubt China’s ability to rise peacefully, a more
aggressive United States may turn its spearhead to China when it no longer
sees Islamic radicalism as the primary security threat. The United States
could go to war with China when the mainland is forced to use military
means to stop Taiwan from declare de jure independence. To them, a war
with Taiwan is probably inevitable unless Beijing carried out a
capitulationist policy or gave up the goal of reunification. If China remains
politically divided, its national security will be increasingly vulnerable, and
China will never become a full-fledged, respected great power without
having solved the Taiwan issue. They further argue that no reunification will
be possible until the Mainland is ready to take Taiwan by force. As Taiwan
is determined to separate itself peacefully from the rest of China with
American military backup, to disseminate unfounded optimism like heping
jueqi would only serve the purpose of encouraging secessionists in Taiwan
and disarming the Chinese people.
The suspicions of China rising in peace have been reinforced recently by the
discovery of a more assertive and unrepentant Japan, with which China has
territorial disputes. Japanese denials of their WWII atrocities in Asia have
given rise to the popular notion is that a military confrontation between
China and Japan is unavoidable. Beside the United States and Japan, there
could be other problems ahead, such as the shortage of energy supplies and
ethnic tensions along Chinese borders, which might disrupt China’s peaceful
development.
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This alarmist thinking is striking but inherently logical, at least to the extent
that such reasoning is echoed by some hard realist theories in the United
States, as reflected in the works of John Mearsheimer and Robert Kagan,
among others. However, the alarmists certainly do not represent mainstream
policy thinking in the PRC.
Similar to other internal controversies in China since the end of the Cold
War concerning policy-relevant concepts like “multipolarity” and “peace
and development as main trends of the time,” the polemics centered on
Peaceful Rise is neither open to the general public nor directly appearing in
media or scholarly journals. Rather, the debate is confined to a limited circle
of concerned analysts and officials. Also similarly, the differences of
opinion are across institutions rather than compartmentalized, reflecting the
extent of diversity and complexity of Chinese politics today.
What makes the discourse of heping jueqi interestingly distinguishable from
earlier discourses is that it is more pertinent to China’s own interests,
intentions, and domestic as well as foreign policies than to how Chinese
should perceive their surroundings and the rest of the world. What is also
interestingly unprecedented is the fact that the concept was first adopted by
political leaders and then dropped in officially statements following
unfavorable domestic repercussions, while its initiators are still able to use
the term in public.
II. THE SUBSTANCE
In substance, both Peaceful Rise and Peaceful Development carry the same
message that China’s growing power will not be threatening to the outside
world and therefore the many variations of the “China threat theory” are to
be rejected. The following are the major points:
 China is faced with a strategic opportunity of at least 20 years in the
beginning of the 21st century. The main themes in today’s world
affairs are peace and development.
 China has been taking the right path of peaceful development since
the beginning of reform and opening, and will not change course as its
top priority remains building the nation into a well-off and
harmonious society by the middle of the century. The continuously
rapid development China has enjoyed over the past 27 years has
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proved to be such a success story that no alternative path is
imaginable.
Although China has made great progress, it is still generally an
underdeveloped country. Its per capita income ranks beyond 100th in
the world. All China's efforts to resolve problems of development are
mainly devoted to creating better lives for its large population. This
goal alone will keep several generations of Chinese people quite busy
and leave them no energy to engage in military expansion.
As an emerging power, China will acquire capital, technology and
resources in the world market through competition on an equal footing
and through peaceful means. Meanwhile, it must make further efforts
to rely on its domestic resources and must not depend too much on the
international market.
The country also should be depending on institutional innovations,
industrial restructuring, exploring the growing domestic market,
transferring huge personal savings into investment, and developing
human resources in greater depth and magnitude.
The Taiwan issue poses a big challenge for the country's development.
Peaceful reunification between the Mainland and the island should be
achieved. However, the use of force will by no means be ruled out in
case Taiwan takes outrageous steps toward de jure independence.
In world affairs, China does not seek hegemony and predominance. It
advocates a new international political and economic order through
reforming and democratizing international relations. China is turning
its back on old practices characterized by the model that emerging
powers broke up existing international systems through war and
sought hegemony through bloc confrontation.
The Chinese have transcended the Cold War mentality, which rejects
peaceful development and cooperation merely because of differences
in social systems and ideologies. In other words, Beijing is not
interested in waging ideological warfare with the Western world.
Beijing has been carrying out good neighborly policies toward other
Asian countries, and has improved relations with all countries in the
world (with the conspicuous exception of Japan, which is the only
party to blame for the lack of friendly relations).
China’ defense budget is modest, being only a fraction of that of the
United States and smaller than that of Japan. Its military machine is
designed to defend its long land borders and coastal lines.
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 The Chinese culture is of a peaceful and harmonious nature and
tradition (explicitly or implicitly in contrast with Western cultures).
China advocates mutual understanding and fusion, instead of clashes,
between civilizations. Chinese cultural traits also emphasize harmony
between the human being and the natural environment, in contrast
with the cultural tradition in the West of conquering the nature.
In summary, according to Chinese official pronouncements and authoritative
publications, China’s Peaceful Rise is assured because of (1) a generally
favorable international environment, (2) China’s good intentions and
policies to maintain peace, (3) its cultural characteristics, (4) the limitations
to its capabilities of expansion, and (5) the development strategy that will
insure peaceful means to procure resources.
III. WHAT IS ABSENT?
As China’s power and influence will probably continue to grow in the
foreseeable future, the discourse in China with regard to Peaceful Rise is
likely to keep its momentum for some time.
In response to doubts, suspicions, and criticisms in the international
community concerning China’s Peaceful Development or Peaceful Rise,
Chinese commentators tend to attribute them to either misunderstanding and
ignorance or deliberate misinterpretation and ill-intended efforts to keep
China down.
What is obviously missing in the current discourse is any discussion of
China’s domestic political agenda. In the last two years, a number of
political campaigns went on in the Communist Party, including the study of
the “Three Represents” and the education to “maintain the advanced nature
of the Party members.” At the same time, Chinese people are reassured that
their country will never embrace Western-type democracy to allow a
multiparty system but will enhance socialist democracy and socialist rule of
law with Chinese characteristics. Both the advocates and the critics of Peace
Rise avoid touching on the sensitivities of political reform at home as if it
bore no importance to China’s path of development ahead.
Also absent is any deliberation of global governance beyond government-togovernment cooperation. There are vague recognitions of the importance of
international organizations and the assurances that China does not seek to
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overturn the existing international order. Nonetheless, few works on
Peaceful Rise expound China’s attitudes toward existing international
mechanisms and regimes it has been critical of, such as NATO.
The lack of publicized discussions or debates of Peaceful Rise reminds
people of the tradition for the Chinese leadership to look for a unified
official language. Too much effort has been concentrated on the correct
definition of the same policy orientation, and too little has been done to
substantiate the research on China’s growing power and influence in the
world and their implications for other countries.
From the very beginning of the Peaceful Rise initiative, people have been
asking the question as to who are the audiences supposedly to be addressed
to. Are they mainly international audiences whose opinions about China’s
increased capabilities and enhanced status should be “corrected” or reshaped?
Alternatively, is the initiative directed at domestic audiences in China who
are expected to find the right ways to achieve their national goals along a
peaceful path? If the former is true, it should be the domain of those
institutions which are responsible for improving China’s international image
and external public relations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Information Office of the State Council. To this extent, no real policy
adjustments are needed, and the initiative to present China as a benevolent,
peace-loving country and culture will be essentially defensive and reactive.
Instead, if the initiative is aimed also at influencing domestic audiences and
high-level agenda-setting, then serious attempts will have to be made to
coordinate various policies, include those related to national security,
defense, Taiwan, energy, trade, etc. Furthermore, attention should be paid to
curbing what is viewed as excessive nationalistic sentiments commonly seen
in the media, Internet chat-rooms, and street demonstrations against Japan.
In this case, the traditional demarcation between “external propaganda” and
“internal propaganda” will be less discernable and less effective, because
what is presented to the outside world has domestic consequences, and what
is done domestically will incur international responses. Thus far the Peaceful
Rise discourse has been relevant only to a relatively small number of
scholars, journalists, and officials, but it bodes well for the transformation to
a more transparent body politic of China.
Finally, while nontraditional security problems are increasingly acute, the
concerns about China’s future will not be limited to whether China will be
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bringing peace or threatening to use force. Rather, the “China threat theory”
will likely become less focused on. Concerns about China’s future will be
dispersed, as more observers will be caring about how the country is
governed internally and how cooperative, responsive, and accountable its
government will become in the international arena. In this sense, the
Peaceful Rise/Peaceful Development theory may be gradually eclipsed by
upcoming events, and new discourses may likely emerge.
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