Johnson Chap. 4
1. Introduction (pg. 76)
This essay : (i) challenges the conception of logic and argument at work in FDL; (ii) speculates as
to how our conceptions of logic, inference, and argumentation underwent such a radical
transformation; and (iii) argues that logic must be naturalized.
It puts forward two theses:
Inference is not argument
Logic is not equivalent to deductive logic.
2. Argument is not Inference (pp. 77-78)
IN FDL an argument is either defined as a set of reasons leading to a conclusion or is identified
with inference (implication).
3. Logic is not equivalent to Formal, Deductive Logic (FDL) (pp. 78-79)
4. Where did we go Wrong: Lessons from the Past? (pp.79-82)
5. The Concept of Argument in New Wave Texts (pp. 82-83)
6. What We Can Learn from Others: The View from Afar (pp. 83-84)
7. Conclusion (pp. 84-85)
Why?
(a) Important to get it right
(b) Reviving practice of argument requires a full-bodied conception of argument.
(c) Argument construed merely as reasons to a conclusion without clear reference to
the demands of dialectical interchange ceases to be the powerful instrument it might
otherwise be.