Statutory Interpretation
Introduction and Presumptions
The main body of the law is to be found in statues, together with the
relevant statutory instruments, and in a case of law as enunciated by
judges in the courts. But the judges not only have the duty of
declaring the common law, they are also frequently called upon to
settle disputes as to the meaning of words or clauses in a statute.
Parliament is the supreme law-maker, and the judges must follow
statutes. Nevertheless there is a considerable amount of case law
which gathers round Acts of Parliament and delegated legislation
since the wording sometimes turns out to be obscure. However, the
rules relating to the interpretation of statutes are so numerous, have
so many exceptions, and several are so flatly contradictory, that
some writers hold view that there are in effect no rules at all.
Statutes are extremely complex legal documents and no
parliamentary draughtsman can anticipate future contingencies;
neither can they always accommodate the natural ambiguities of our
language. As a result, judges are often called upon to interpret a
word or phrase which can be crucial to the outcome of a case.
Presumptions
To aid interpretation there are several presumption which guide the
judiciary in interpreting Acts.
 There are presumptions that the Act applies to the whole of the
United Kingdom but no further, that the Crown is not bound,
that the statute is not retrospective and that the common law is
not altered.
 A statute is resumed not to alter the existing law unless it
expressly states that it does.
 When a statute deprives a person of property, there is a
presumption that compensation will be paid. Unless so stated it is
presumed that an Act does not interfere with rights over private
property.
Canons of Construction
The rules, also known as canons of construction, are used to
interpret statutes. Examples include:
 Literal Rule
 Golden Rule
 Mischief Rule
Literal Rule
This rule gives all the words in a statute their ordinary and natural
meaning. Under this rule the literal meaning must be followed, even
if the result is absurd.
See: London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman 1946
Fisher v Bell 1961
Commentary
 The Literal rule has been the dominant rule, whereby the
ordinary, plain, literal meaning of the word is adopted. Lord
Esher stated in 1892 that “… if the words of an act are clear,
you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest
absurdity…”
 There are, however, a number of disadvantages in using this rule.
It is often called the ‘dictionary rule’, but dictionary definitions
can attribute several meanings to one word. It also restricts
judicial creativity and holds back development of the law in
keeping with changing social conditions.
 With the literal rule- it must be remembered that in extreme
cases the statute may be carelessly drafted where certain words
in isolation can have several meanings. The Law Commission 1969
was very critical of the literal rule as it assumed that Acts of
Parliament were perfectly worded.
 The Law Commission in an instructive and provocative report on
the subject of statutory interpretation said of this rule that ‘to
place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words of a
provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in
draftsmanship’.
 The rule, when in operation, does not always achieve the obvious
object and purpose of the statue. A classic example is Whiteley
v Chappell (1868-9). In that case a statute concerned with
electoral malpractices made it an offence to personate ‘any
person entitled to vote’ at an election. The defendant was
accused of personating a deceased voter and the court, using the
literal rule, found that there was no offence. A dead person was
not entitled to vote or do anything else for that matter. A
deceased person did not exist and could therefore have no
rights. It will be seen, however, that the literal rule produced in
that case a result which was clearly contrary to the object of
Parliament.
Golden Rule
 The Golden Rule is an improvement on the above, as some
attempt is made to put a word into its proper context. It is
basically reverting to the literal rule but if a manifest absurdity
results, judges can consider contextual alternatives, i.e. it is an
extension or ‘offshoot’ of the literal rule.
 It is used by the courts where a statutory provision is capable of
more than one literal meaning and leads the judge to select the
one which avoids absurdity, or where a study of the statute as a
whole reveals that the conclusion reached by applying the literal
rule is contrary to the intensions of Parliament.
Example:
 In Sigsworth (1935) the court decided that the Administration
of Estates Act 1925, which provides for the distribution of the
property of an intestate amongst his next of kin, did not confer
a benefit upon the person (a son) who had murdered the
intestate (his mother), even though the murderer was the
intestate’s next of kin, for it is a general principle of law that no
one profit from his own wrong.
 Lord Wensleydale commented on the use of the Golden rule in
the following way:
“The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to unless that would lead to an absurdity or
repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument,
in which case the grammatical or ordinary sense of the words
may be modified so as to avoid such absurdity, repugnancy or
inconsistency and no further’ - Lord Wensleydale in Grey v
Pearson (1875).
 In Sweet v Parsley (1970), a schoolteacher was convicted for a
strict liability offence because she had permitted her house to
be used for cannabis smoking, even though she herself was
abroad at the time and had no knowledge of the activity. The
House of Lords held that the mens rea element should be read
into the case, as Parliament would never have intended that an
innocent person should ever be convicted. This illustrates how
flexible the law can be by putting the alleged commission of an
offence into its proper context.
 The Law Commission submitted a report in 1979, entitled ‘The
Interpretation of Statutes’ , and supported the use of the
Golden Rule, although it also recommended the use of an
explanatory memorandum to clarify parliamentary intention.
Mischief Rule
 Here the judge should interpret the statute in such a way as to
put a stop to the problem that Parliament was addressing. This
rule was laid down in Heydon’s Case in the 16th century and
provides that judges should consider three factors:
1. What the law was before the statute was passed
2. What problem/ mischief the statute was trying to remedy
3. What remedy parliament was trying to provide.
 See Smith v Hughes (1960), Elliot v Grey (1960) and Royal
College of Nursing v DHSS (1981).
 The mischief rule/mischief approach implies an ability and
willingness on the part of the judge to look beyond the words of
the statute itself.
 The Laws Commission in 1969 suggested that the ‘rules’ be
relaxed and that greater focus should be placed on the Mischief
Rule approach
The European/Purposive approach
 EC law takes precedence over UK domestic law.
 If there is a conflict between EC and UK law, then EC law
prevails; see Factortame (1990), Tachographs (1979) and
Van Duyn v Home Office 1974.
 During his judicial career, Lord Denning was in the forefront of
moves to establish a more purposive approach, aiming to produce
decisions that put into practice the ‘spirit of the law’ even if
that meant paying less that usual regard to the ‘letter of the
law’.
 Denning stated his view in Factortame (1990):
“We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament apart to
pieces and make nonsense of it ………… We sit here to find out
the intention of Parliament and carry it out, and we do this
better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis”
 Denning’s view contributed to the growth of a more purposive
approach which gained ground in the last 20 years.
Commentary:
 Blackstone also believed that the mischief/purposive approaches
should prevail as, in his opinion, the ‘fairest and most rational
method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his
intention at the time the law was made...’
 Possibly the way forward is to again draw on the experience of
continental law, where the judiciary are given much more freedom
to interpret the law and often have training in the Parliamentary
field to call upon. Denning and Lord Simon long campaigned for a
more ‘open’ approach and favour the European model of statutory
interpretation.
Intrinsic Aids:
 The literacy rule and the golden rule both direct the judge to
internal aids,
 Acts passed since the beginning of 1999 are provided with
explanatory notes, published at the same time as the act
 Headings and subheadings used in an act can be a useful intrinsic
aid
External Aids:
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Dictionaries
Law reports
EU directives
Treaties
Since Pepper v Hart 1993 Hansard, which is a daily report of
parliamentary debates.
Using Hansard:
 Lord Denning’s argument, advanced in Davis V Johnson (1978), was
that to ignore it was to “grope in the dark for the meaning of an
act without switching on the light”. When such an obvious source
of enlightenment was available, it was ridiculous to ignore it – in
fact Lord Denning said after the case that he intended to continue
to consult Hansard, but simply not say he was doing so!
 Using Hansard can be time consuming, because lawyers may spend
too much time and attention to ministerial statements and so on at
the expense of considering the language used in the act itself.
 Parliamentary intention is difficult if not impossible to pin down.
 Parliamentary debates usually reveal the views of only a few
Members of Parliament and even then those words may need
interpretation too.
Rules of Language:
Rules of language developed by lawyers are really little more than
common sense although they are not always precisely applied.
Examples include:
 Ejusdem generis: general words which follow specific ones are
taken to include only things of the same kind. For example ‘dogs,
cats and other animals’ the other animals would probably include
other domestic animals.
 Noscitur a socis: a word draws meaning/ context from the other
words around it. For example, if a statute included ‘cats, toys and
food’ it would be reasonable to assume that the food is cat food.