Game Theory and the Humanities
Freshman Seminar: FRSEM-UA.506
S. J. Brams, 19 West 4th St., Rm. 309
New York University
Phone: (212) 998-8510
Fall 2015
E-mail: steven.brams@nyu.edu
Class: Wed., 4:55 – 7:25 PM
Office Hrs.: Mon., 3:30 – 6 PM; Wed. 3:30 – 4:30 PM
Description
Game theory is a mathematical theory of strategy that has been applied to the
analysis of conflict and cooperation in such fields as economics, political science, and
biology. In this seminar, we discuss more unusual applications—to the humanities,
including history, literature, philosophy, the Bible, theology, and law—as well as some of
the usual ones. No mathematical background beyond high school mathematics is
assumed, but a willingness to learn and apply sophisticated reasoning to analyze the
interactions of players in games is essential.
Among the applications to be discussed are Abraham’s decision in the Bible to
offer his son, Isaac, for sacrifice; choices made by accused witches and their persecutors
in medieval witch trials; Lady Macbeth’s incitement of Macbeth to murder King Duncan
in Shakespeare’s play; several strategic games played by presidents and their adversaries
in domestic crises (the Civil War, the Great Depression, Watergate) and international
crises (the Cuban missile crisis, the Iran hostage crisis); and coping mechanisms used by
characters in catch-22 games (including those in Joseph Heller’s novel, Catch-22).
Why the humanities? A key aspect of our humanity is our ability to think
rationally about alternative choices and to select the one that best satisfies our goals.
Game theory provides a calculus for making this selection when we face other players,
often with conflicting goals, in strategic situations. Complicating these calculations may
be emotions, such as anger, that cannot easily be tamed and—some would claim—are
inconsistent with the allegedly cold-blooded calculations of game theory (I dispute this
claim).
Much of the analysis in my book, Game Theory and the Humanities (one of five
that are required), uses the “theory of moves” (TOM), a theory rooted in game theory that
I develop gradually, and apply systematically, throughout the book. Coupled with
standard game theory, TOM helps to unify and render coherent the diverse contents of the
book, especially insofar as players make farsighted calculations.
The four other required books do not make explicit use of game theory but do
assume that players are rational, at least to a degree. Certain Trumpets: The Nature of
Leadership argues that leaders make a difference in business, politics, military affairs,
and other arenas through the strategies they choose and their relationships with followers.
The Art of Political Manipulation focuses on historical cases in American politics to
demonstrate how leaders sought to manipulate outcomes to their advantage through
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bargaining, persuasion, and occasionally deception. Constitutional Calculus: The Math
of Justice and the Myth of Common Sense shows how mathematics, including game
theory, can be used to formalize ideas and principles in the U.S. Constitution, making
them more precise. The Win-Win Solution describes fair-division procedures and their
properties (some game-theoretic) and illustrates their application to settling different
kinds of disputes. Other readings will be recommended throughout the semester.
Requirements
There will be reading assignments from each of the five books over the course of
the semester. I will discuss the more technical aspects of game theory, but much of the
class will be devoted to a class discussion. This discussion will be guided by short
written comments that students are required to submit about each week’s readings.
After the first few weeks of the seminar, students will be asked to submit short
essays, and make brief oral presentations, on topics they wish to explore in greater depth.
A longer term paper, developed in consultation with the instructor, will be due at the end
of the semester.
Students will be graded on the basis of their written work, their oral participation,
and possible quizzes or exams.
Required Books
All the required books, except Constitutional Calculus, are available in paperback.
Brams, Steven J. (2011). Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor (1999). The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair
Shares to Everybody. New York: W. W. Norton.
Riker, William H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Suzuki, Jeff (2015). Constitutional Calculus: The Math of Justices and the Myth of
Common Sense. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Wills, Garry (1994). Certain Trumpets: The Nature of Leadership. New York: Simon
and Schuster.
Assignments Due
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Sept 2:
Sept. 9:
Sept 16:
Sept. 23:
Sept. 30:
Oct. 7:
Oct. 14:
Oct. 21:
Oct. 28:
Nov. 4:
Nov. 11:
Nov. 18:
Nov. 25:
Dec. 2:
Dec. 9:
Brams, ch. 1; Brams and Taylor, chs. 1-4
Brams, ch. 2; Brams and Taylor, chs. 5-9
Brams, ch. 3; Riker, ch. 1; Suzuki, ch. 1.21; Wills, Introduction & ch. 1
Brams, ch. 4; Riker, ch. 2; Suzuki, ch. 1.22; Wills, ch. 2
Brams, ch. 5; Riker, ch. 3; Suzuki, ch. 1.23; Wills, ch. 3
Brams, ch. 6; Riker, ch. 4; Suzuki, p. 1.24; Wills, ch. 4
Brams, ch. 7; Riker, ch. 5; Suzuki, ch. 1.4; Wills, ch. 5
Preliminary Presentations
Brams, ch. 8; Riker, ch. 6; Suzuki, chs. A4.1-A4.2; Wills, chs. 6-7
Brams, ch. 9; Riker, ch. 7; Suzuki, chs. A5-6.1; Wills, chs. 8-9
Brams, ch. 10; Riker, ch. 8; Suzuki, chs. A6.2-A6.3; Wills, chs. 10-11
Brams, ch. 11; Riker, chs. 9-10; Suzuki, chs. A8.1-8.3; Wills, chs. 12-13
Office hours instead of class
Riker, chs. 11-12; Wills, chs. 14-16 & Conclusion
Paper presentations
Selective Bibliography (Books Not Cited in Game Theory and the Humanities)
Abramson, Paul R. (2012). Politics in the Bible. Transaction Publishers.
Alulis, Joseph, and Vickie Sullivan (eds.) (1996). Shakespeare’s Political Pageant:
Essays in Politics & Literature. Rowman and Littlefield.
Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker (1994). Game Theory and
the Law. Harvard University Press.
Bloom, Allan, with Harry V. Jaffa (1981). Shakespeare’s Politics. University of
Chicago Press.
Bokina, John (1997). Opera and Politics: From Monteverdi to Henze. Yale University
Press.
Boorman, Scott A. (1969). The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch’i Interpretation of Maoist
Revolutionary Strategy. Oxford University Press.
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young (2013). Jane Austen, Game Theorist. Princeton University
Press.
Cohen, Raymond (1987). Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signaling. Longman
House.
Cowley, Robert (ed.) (1999). What If? The World’s Foremost Military Historians
Imagine What Might Have Been. G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
Cowley, Robert (ed.) ((2001). What If 2? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have
Been. G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
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Cronin, Thomas E., and Michael A. Genovese (2012). Leadership Matters: Unleashing
the Power of Paradox. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Ellickson, Robert C. (1991). Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes.
Harvard University Press.
Freedman, Lawrence (2013). Strategy: A History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Katz, Leo (2011). Why the Law Is So Perverse. University of Chicago Press.
Luttwak, Edward N. (1987). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University
Press.
Seymour, William (1982). Yours to Reason Why: Decisions in Battle. De Capo Press.
Whitebrook, Maureeen (ed.) (1992). Reading Political Stories: Representations of
Politics in Novels and Pictures. Rowman and Littlefield.