No Work for a Theory of Grounding1
Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto
Draft of June 29, 2012
Comments appreciated
Introduction
It has recently been suggested that a distinctive relation---call it (big-'G') "Grounding"--is ultimately at issue in contexts where it is claimed, of some entities (objects, properties,
states of affairs, etc.), propositions, or facts, that these “hold in virtue of” or are
“grounded in”, “less fundamental than”, “constituted by”, “nothing over and above” or
“made true by” some others (notably, in Fine 2001, Schaffer 2009 and Rosen 2010). This
relation of Grounding is supposed to be distinct from other relations, including
modal/correlational relations, causal relations, and---importantly---the metaphysically
specific relations (e.g., type and token identity, functional realization, the part-whole
relation, and the determinable-determinate relation) often in play in the target contexts,
which I'll sometimes refer to as (small-'g') "grounding" relations.
Why posit a distinctive relation (or relations2) of Grounding as holding between entities,
propositions, or facts, or as I will sometimes gloss the relata, “goings-on”?3 Synthesizing
a bit, the stated motivation is as follows. To start, reflecting common use and seeming
intelligibility of the idioms of dependence, metaphysicians have (or should) come to
realize that their concern is not just with what there is, but with how what there is, is
structured---with how the non-fundamental goings-on are grounded in fundamental
goings on:
1
I am grateful to Mark Barber, Stephan Biggs, Brian Embry, Alex Jackson, Jon Litland, Adam Murray,
Michael Raven, and members of the Cornell and OSU Departments of Philosophy, and the LOGOS group
at the University of Barcelona, for very helpful comments. Special thanks are due here to Karen Bennett,
Kit Fine, Benj Hellie, and David Kovacs (my commentator at Cornell).
2
Fine (in progress) allows that there are multiple Grounding relations, and maintains that “we should
understand the generic relation as some kind of ‘disjunction’ of the special relations” (4); moreover, on his
view each special relation “comes in different ‘flavors’” (16). That said, Fine clearly intends that
Grounding relations be understood as distinctive---in particular, distinct from any specific metaphysical
relations (e.g., identity, parthood, the determinable/determinate relation, etc.).
3
There is some disagreement among proponents of Grounding concerning the relata of Grounding, with,
e.g., Schaffer (2009) taking it to hold between entities of any arbitrary category, Fine (2001) taking it to
hold between propositions which are typically but needn’t be true (though he also refers to these as “facts”,
and is recently inclined towards taking the relata to be sentences), and Rosen (2010) taking it be a relation
between facts, understood as “structured entities built up from worldly items [which] might be identified
with true Russellian propositions” (page). Motivations for taking Grounding to be a relation between
representational entities reflect a conception of this relation as entering into explanations, suited to be
understood and reasoned with (as in Fine’s “logic of ground”) by creatures such as ourselves. My own
view is that in specifying the relata relevant to grounding explanations, we metaphysicians should talk
about the goings-on directly, rather than indirectly through the lens of explanation or associated
representations; compare the case of causation and causal explanation, where theorizing typically cuts to
the metaphysical chase; Schaffer (forthcoming, 2) makes the same point. That said, given the worldly
nature of Fine’s and Rosen’s propositional facts, and given that grounding relations between worldly
entities bring states of affairs or facts/Russellian propositions in their wake, there are presumably
translational strategies between the various accounts; again, Schaffer (forthcoming, 2) appears to agree. At
any rate, when called for I will substantiate that my results do not turn on differences in the supposed relata.
1
On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is.
Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties
exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the
revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about
what grounds what. (345) […] It is about the structure of the world. It is about
what is fundamental, and what derives from it. (Schaffer 2009, 379)
(See also Rosen 2010, 109.) As common use of the idioms of dependence suggests,
concern with structure has not been entirely neglected; but as something of an empiricist
hangover, it has frequently been supposed that these idioms should be given
interpretations in semantic, epistemic, or modal terms. Such interpretations are
problematic, however. As Fine (2001) compellingly argues, attempts to characterize
views about structure in semantic or epistemic terms are subject to a number of
difficulties. An appropriate interpretation of the idioms of dependence must advert to a
properly metaphysical relation:
[R]eduction should be construed as a metaphysical rather than as a linguistic or a
semantical relation. […] we need to restore ourselves to a state of metaphysical
innocence in which reduction is seen to concern the subject-matter itself and not
the means by which it might be represented or cognized. (10)
Modal relations, including necessitation, supervenience, and existential counterfactual
dependence, are presumably properly metaphysical, but are too coarse-grained to do the
work of illuminating metaphysical structure. The broader moral of Fine’s classic 1994
paper---what may be the starting point of contemporary attention to grounding as such--is that modality and metaphysical dependence may come apart: Socrates is necessarily
accompanied by his singleton, but Socrates does not at all metaphysically depend on his
singleton. More generally, merely modal relations are too coarse-grained to discriminate
between different views about what depends on what:
[S]upervenience analyses of grounding all fail (c.f. McLaughlin and Bennett
2005: S3.5). […] There have been other attempts to analyze grounding, including
those centered around existential dependence counterfactuals […] I know of none
that succeed. (Schaffer 2009, 364)
One […] reason for regarding the idioms of dependence with suspicion is the
thought that while these idioms cannot quite be defined in straightforward modal
terms, the idioms are always dispensable in practice in favor of the idioms of
modal metaphysics---entailment, supervenience, the apparatus of possible worlds,
and so on---notions for which we have elaborate theories, and which are in any
case more familiar. And yet it seems to me that this is not true at all. Consider
[…] the debate over legal positivism. [The positivist and the antipositivist] will
accept the same supervenience claims. And yet they differ on an important issue,
viz., whether the moral facts play a role in making the law to be as it is. (Rosen
2010, 113)
2
(See also Fine, in progress, 2.) Properly accommodating metaphysical structure requires
a metaphysical relation that is more than merely modal (including counterfactual). Nor
can causal or other diachronic relations do the trick, as Fine here implies:
A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that,
in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive
kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum
are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through
some form of constitutive determination. (in progress, 1).4
So, it is suggested, we should posit a distinctive relation (or relations) of Grounding
underlying the various idioms of dependence and relative fundamentality. Indeed, some
proponents of Grounding go further, claiming not just that Grounding is distinctive---a
characterization compatible with Grounding’s being explicable in, if not reducible to,
other metaphysical terms---but moreover that Grounding is primitive:5
Grounding should rather be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian
approach (c.f. Fine 2001: 1). Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion---it
is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics. (Schaffer 2009, 364)
[T]here is no prospect of a reductive account or definition of the grounding idiom:
We do not know how to say in more basic terms what it is for one fact to obtain in
virtue of another. So if we take the notion on board, we will be accepting it as
primitive […] I begin with the working hypothesis that there is a single salient
form of metaphysical dependence to which the idioms we have been invoking all
refer […]. (Rosen 2010, 113--114)
(Rosen eventually concludes that there are grounds for optimism on this score.) Of
course there is a cost to admitting any distinctive relation, and more of a cost if said
relation is primitive, but proponents take the cost to be well-paid, as allowing for
appropriate illumination of the metaphysics of structure.
Here I will argue that neither this line of thought, nor certain others I will consider on
behalf of proponents of Grounding, provide reason to posit any distinctive relation(s) of
Grounding, and ultimately provide reason to think otherwise. Proponents of Grounding
are right that there is work to do in illuminating how less fundamental entities are
constitutively dependent on more fundamental entities, and they are also right that
semantic, epistemic, modal and diachronic nomic relations are unsuited to do this work.
But, I will argue, Grounding is also unsuited, and moreover not needed, for this work.
4
See also Audi forthcoming, 5.
Here too (see note 2) I understand talk of Grounding’s being ‘primitive’ in metaphysical, not
representational terms. So far as the metaphysics of structure is concerned, indefinability of some
representations in terms of some others is not (idealism and the like aside) to the point.
5
3
I start, in S1, by arguing that the accounts of Grounding under discussion are, like modal
accounts, too coarse-grained to do this work, obscuring or eliding important differences
in the metaphysics of dependence---e.g., between eliminativist, reductionist, nonreductionist, and emergentist accounts of grounded goings-on. There is no getting around
the need for metaphysically specific (small-'g') grounding relations---again, including
type and token identity,6 functional realization, the determinable/determinate relation, and
parthood, among others---capable of preserving these distinctions, since in general we
will not be in position to assess claims “about what is fundamental, and what derives
from it” without having some fairly specific handle on which specific grounding
relation(s) are at issue, and what consequences the holding of a given such relation has
for, among other important questions, the genuine existence, reductive status, and causal
efficacy of the purportedly dependent goings-on. I then consider whether, given that the
holding of the more specific, already accepted metaphysical relations is required in order
to answer various key questions pertaining to metaphysical dependence, the additional
posit of a distinctive relation (or relations) of Grounding is also required in order to
answer such questions; I consider the best reason for thinking this,7 and argue that it
doesn’t support the further posit of Grounding.
In S2, I consider one last case for there being work for Grounding to do. Though
Grounding is not needed for specific investigations into metaphysical structure, one
might still maintain, as Schaffer (2009) does, that Grounding is needed in order to unify
the metaphysically specific grounding relations under a single general type. But, I argue,
this suggestion fails, for two reasons. First, the model under suggestion here, which Fine
(p.c.) interprets as involving Grounding’s being effectively “multiply realized” by more
specific metaphysical relations, itself involves a grounding relation, whose direction of
priority is unclear (why not see Grounding as a less fundamental abstraction from
specific grounding relations?).8 Second and more importantly, the multiple grounding
relations that are up to the task of characterizing metaphysical structure have different
broadly logical features; e.g., identity is reflexive and symmetric but proper parthood is
not, and some iterated grounding relations are transitive, and some not.9 Here I argue, in
particular, that identity can and should be considered a grounding relation, and I offer
three ways in which the priority of dependence can be accommodated, compatible with
the symmetry and reflexivity of an identity-based grounding relation; I also observe that
attempts to block identity’s being a grounding relation are subject to clear methodological
6
Proponents of Grounding typically suppose that any grounding relation must be asymmetric and
irreflexive, but as I argue in S2 (see upcoming text for prefiguring details), this supposition is incorrect.
7
This is that the specific metaphysical grounding relations (such as, e.g., parthood) do not determine the
direction of grounding without the further assumption of Grounding (as suggested by Fine and developed
by Hellie).
8
The concern here is different from but perhaps related to concerns sometimes expressed by the question:
What Grounds the grounding facts? As I’ll discuss in future, an advantage of sticking with more specific
grounding relations, as opposed to reifying a distinctive relation of Grounding, is that this bothersome
question doesn’t arise for the more specific relations. For now, I point to three interesting attempts to
answer the bothersome question: Bennett (2011), Dasgupta (in progress), and Litland (in progress).
9
On this last Schaffer (forthcoming, 13) now concurs, maintaining that “the assumption of transitivity was
a mistake”. As we’ll see, Schaffer’s cases of intransitive Grounding involve iterations of different specific
grounding relations; but even if every specific grounding relation is transitive, intransitivity in mixed cases
still poses a problem for the claim that Grounding formally unifies all the specific cases.
4
concerns. The upshot is that there is no case to be made that there is a formally unified
notion common to all the specific notions. And if formal unity is gained by multiplying
notions of Grounding, as per Fine’s more ecumenical view, one is pushed back towards
the many metaphysically specific relations---so far, I suggest, that the costs of positing
the distinctive relation(s) of Grounding are no longer worth paying.
I conclude that there is no work for the posit (or associated theory) of Grounding to do:
by itself, Grounding does almost no work; appropriately supplemented by specific
"small-g" grounding relations already on the scene, there is nothing left for it to do.10
1 The uselessness of Grounding for specific investigations into metaphysical structure
Proponents of Grounding claim that its posit can do good philosophical work. As above,
the notion, properly interpreted, is supposed to enable the tracking of metaphysical
dependence relations holding generally between entities (on Schaffer’s account) or
propositional facts (on Fine’s and Rosen’s accounts) associated with certain domains,
with an eye ultimately to elucidating the structure of reality in general. So, as Schaffer
says, Grounding is supposed to enable employment of the “Aristotelian method” of doing
metaphysics, which is “to deploy diagnostics for what is fundamental, together with
diagnostics for grounding”; it is supposed to allow us to “limn”---that is, illuminate--metaphysical structure, in a way that respects concern not just with whether an entity
exists, but with “how it exists” (351-2). Relatedly, it is suggested that Grounding can
assist in determining comparative “naturalness” (which notion, in turn, is supposed to do
good work, following Lewis 1983), on the assumption that comparative naturalness and
comparative fundamentality go together. Fine also sees Grounding as playing a
methodological role; it is supposed to provide resources for “ascertaining what is or is not
factual or what does or does not reduce to what” (13), with a special eye to determining
“the viability of a realist or anti-realist stand on any given issue” (in progress, 7).11
Of course, nothing prevents metaphysicians from taking advantage of Fine’s logic(s) of ground, as
modeling inference involving (claims expressing the holding of) various specific metaphysical relations, or
more generally from speaking of "ground" or "grounding" as a placeholder for one or more specific
grounding relations.
11
There are tricky interpretive questions about Fine’s (2001) use of “realist” and “anti-realist” (understood
as characterizing metaphysical views). On the standard understanding of these terms (see Alexander 2010),
if one is anti-realist about the Xs one (at least) denies the (real) existence of the Xs. This does not entirely
comport with Fine’s stated aim of making sense of metaphysical anti-realism, associated with conceptions
of the real as the factual and the (ontologically) irreducible, respectively; for while non-factualist positions
(expressivism, eliminativism) are anti-realist in the standard sense, reductionists are realists in the standard
sense (the reducible being as real as that to which it is reduced). Fine admits that “Many philosophers do
not take reduction to have antirealist import” (4, note 2), but since ontological reduction involves some or
other identity claim (forcing the existence of the reducible) it is unclear, on the standard understanding,
whether there are any anti-realist reductionists. (A related difficulty shows up in Rosen’s (2001) discussion
of naturalism; see note 12.) On what appears to be Fine’s alternative understanding, if one is anti-realist
about the Xs, then one (at least) denies that the Xs are fundamental. Hence it is that, though difficulties
with analyzing realism/anti-realism in terms of factuality or irreducibility lead him to characterize the real
as primitive, nonetheless attention to Grounding (“nothing more than”) claims can, Fine maintains,
illuminate and help legislate realist/anti-realist disputes, in assisting in the determination of what is and is
not fundamental. This understanding makes (terminologically confusing and overly broad) room for
reductive anti-realism (according to which the Xs exist, but are not fundamental---a claim also endorsed by
non-reductive anti-fundamentalists about Xs, as in the physicalism debates); it also makes sense of a non10
5
Moreover, as Rosen emphasizes, Grounding is supposed to make sense of the idioms of
metaphysical dependence; it is the distinctive (e.g., complete, non-causal) sense of
dependence operative in these idioms that is at issue in investigations into structure.
Hence Rosen suggests, after giving some case studies in which grounding notions appear
to be intelligibly employed, that “it would be very good if these notions were intelligible,
for we would then be in a position to frame a range of hypotheses and analyses that might
otherwise be unavailable, and which may turn out to be discussing”, and he offers a
formulation of naturalism in terms of Grounding (to which we will shortly return) as a
case in point.
But Grounding cannot do the work it is supposed to do. To start, it falls prey to the same
concern that proponents of this relation take to show that merely modal notions are not
suited for purposes of illuminating metaphysical structure---namely, it is too coarsegrained to do this job on its own. Doing the job requires appeal to the specific
metaphysical relations that have been traditionally appealed to in investigations into
metaphysical dependence---but then, I will argue, we have no need for Grounding, at
least so far as specific investigations into metaphysical dependence are concerned.
1.1 Grounding and metaphysical underdetermination
Rosen’s Grounding, or “in virtue of”, formulation of naturalism is a salient case in point.
Rosen says:
Some philosophers espouse a naturalistic metaphysics. What could this
mean? The naturalist’s fundamental thought is that certain peculiar
aspects of our world---the human world---are not among the fundamental
features of reality. Human beings think; most of nature doesn’t. Human
beings are governed by norms; most of nature isn’t. These (more or less)
distinctively human aspects of reality may be genuine; but according to
the naturalist, they are not fundamental. As a first pass, then, we might
identify metaphysical naturalism with the thesis that there are no brute
normative or intentional facts, i.e., with the view that every such fact
ultimately obtains in virtue of other facts. But of course this is compatible
with each normative fact’s obtaining in virtue of some other normative
fact, and so on ad infinitum; and this is obviously incompatible with the
naturalist’s vision. Better to say that for the naturalist, every normative
fact and every intentional fact is grounded in some constellation of nonnormative, non-intentional facts, and if we take the “in virtue of” idiom for
granted, we can say this exactly. Every fact p, we may say, is associated
with a tree that specifies the facts in virtue of which p obtains, the facts in
virtue of which these facts obtain, and so on. A path in such a tree is
naturalistic when there is a point beyond which every fact in the path is
factualist form of anti-realism, as the view that the Xs are neither fundamental nor Grounded in the
fundamental. One question about the target application of Fine’s alternative conception reflects that
reductionist ontological views are identity-based; hence if Grounding is to play a role in illuminating
reductive anti-fundamentalism, then Grounding must be compatible with identity. I’m fine with that but
proponents of Grounding typically aren’t, about which more anon.
6
non-normative and non-intentional. A tree is naturalistic when every path
in it is naturalistic. Metaphysical naturalism is then the thesis that every
fact tops a naturalistic tree. (2010, 111-2)
This is a pretty picture. What work is the appeal to Grounding doing? One might think
that it is potentially doing some work: it is distinguishing those who think that intentional
or normative goings-on are “nothing over and above” naturalistic goings-on from those
who do not think this (most saliently: robust emergentists). To this extent Grounding
initially does better than attempts to formulate theses like naturalism by appeal to mere
modality, since again, mere modal correlations between two varieties of entities, no
matter how strong, are compatible with entities of the one variety being “over and above”
entities of the other (see Wilson 2005 for reasons, old and new, to reject superveniencebased formulations of physicalism, naturalism’s cousin).
That’s some potential work done (“potential” since, as above, I’ll later argue that
Grounding isn’t needed to do this work). But it’s not enough for purposes of tracking
naturalistic metaphysical structure, as I’ll now argue.
We can start by noting that a Grounding characterization of naturalism leaves open a
great many questions. Such a characterization tells us almost nothing about how, exactly,
intentional and normative goings-on stand to naturalistic goings-on. It does not tell us,
for example, whether the former are reducible to the latter (as per reductive varieties of
naturalism), or whether the former are rather irreducible to, though still nothing over and
above, the latter (as per non-reductive varieties of naturalism). Moreover, as Rosen
implies in saying that “These (more or less) distinctively human aspects of reality may be
genuine; but according to the naturalist, they are not fundamental” (italics inserted)---it
does not even tell us whether intentional or normative facts exist.12 Fine is also explicit
that Grounding leaves open various ontological questions:
[I]n saying that the fact that P & Q is grounded in, or consists in, the fact that P
and the fact that Q […] we are adopting a metaphysically neutral stand on
whether there really are conjunctive facts (or truths). Thus our view is that there
is a sense in which even a realist about conjunctive facts may be willing to
concede that the fact that P & Q consists in the fact that P and the fact that Q;
there is a position here that may be adopted by realist and antirealist alike. (2001,
15)
And later: “application [of the notion of Ground] carries no realist or antirealist import”
(2001, 21). Bearing in mind the interpretive options concerning Fine’s use of “realism”
and “antirealism” (see note 11), Fine’s claim might be that Grounding is compatible with
either existence or non-existence of the Grounded, or it might be that Grounding is
It seems that we must here interpret “genuine” in terms of existence: unlike Fine’s use of “real”, Rosen’s
use of “genuine” cannot mean “fundamental”, since then the quoted passage will not make sense. As such,
Rosen’s characterization of naturalism as compatible with the normative’s being both Grounded in the
natural and not existing doesn’t track any existing naturalist position.
12
7
compatible with either the fundamentality or non-fundamentality of the Grounded.13
Either way, much is left open.14
Given that Grounding is supposed to illuminate metaphysical dependence, such neutrality
is profoundly puzzling. After all, naturalists care not just about whether (among other
things) normative goings-on are non-fundamental, but about whether normative goingson exist; about whether, if they exist, they are reducible or rather irreducible (though still
nothing over and above) to naturalistic goings-on; about how exactly normative goingson are related to naturalistic goings-on; about whether these are efficacious; and so on.
Hence it is that naturalists never rest with the bare grounding claim, typically
schematically expressed using the ‘nothing over and above’ locution, but rather go on to
stake out different positions concerning how, exactly, the normative goings-on
metaphysically depend on the naturalistic ones.
So, to cite just a few contenders (here I apply categories familiar from the physicalism
debates): a naturalist might be a type identity theorist, maintaining that every type of
normative state is identical with some ontologically lightweight (i.e., lower-level
relational, Boolean or mereological) combination of naturalistic state types (see, e.g.,
Place 1956, Smart 1959). Or a naturalist might be a token identity theorist, maintaining
that it suffices for naturalistic “nothing over and aboveness” that normative state tokens
are identical with naturalistic state tokens, even if type-identities are not available (see,
e.g., Ehring 2003, the Macdonalds 1995).15 Or a naturalist might be a non-reductive
naturalism, according to which normative state types and tokens are, though not identical
to (even complex combinations of) naturalistic state types and tokens, nonetheless stand
Either interpretation of Fine’s claim may seem at odds with his intended use of grounding, as enabling us
to “determine the viability of a realist or anti-realist stand” on the entities as issue; we’ll see how he
resolves this shortly.
14
One might wonder (as Karen Bennett and Jon Litland did) how the holding of a Grounding relation can
leave open the existence of the Grounded: doesn’t the holding of a relation require that all the relata exist?
It would seem so, whether metaphysical entities, facts, or Russellian propositions are at issue; but such
factivity is hard to square with the explicit pronouncements of ontological neutrality. Since Fine’s
propositions are not explicitly Russellian (notwithstanding that he sometimes refers to them as “facts”) he
is perhaps in a somewhat better position to maintain that the truth (or counterfactual truth) of a Grounded
proposition leaves open the existence (or counterfactual existence) of the worldly entities whose
dependence is at issue in the proposition (which he presumably wants to do in order to make sense of
standard anti-realist accounts). Alternatively (as Litland suggested) one might preserve the stated neutrality
by conceiving of Grounding in operator-based rather than relational terms. I can’t read between all the
relevant lines here, but am just going to proceed by taking at face value the several explicit remarks about
the ontological neutrality and relational nature of Grounding.
15
In saying that normative states might be grounded in naturalistic states by way of type or token identity, I
am assuming, contra some proponents of Grounding, that identity may be a grounding relation. As noted,
in S2 I’ll argue that proponents of Grounding are wrong to deny this. For now I make two observations.
First, insofar as proponents of Grounding typically link this posit to the standard (‘nothing over and above’,
‘in virtue of’) locutions of dependence, as they enter into naturalist and physicalist theses in particular, and
insofar as standard versions of these theses explicitly interpret the schematic locutions in terms of identity,
and insofar as proponents of Grounding provide no reason for thinking that their concern is only with nonreductive versions of these theses, the default position would appear to be that grounding, and moreover
Grounding, should be compatible with identity, whatever its proponents have maintained. Second, in any
case it’s bad enough that the Grounding of mental in physical goings-on is compatible with both anti-realist
eliminativist and realist non-reductive physicalist views about the mental.
13
8
in some other intimate relation(s) sufficient for naturalist purposes. So, for example, a
non-reductive naturalist might be a functionalist, maintaining that normative state types
are characterized by functional or causal roles played by naturalistic state types (see, e.g.,
Putnam 1960, Shoemaker 1975). Or they might maintain that normative state types
and/or tokens stand in something like the determinable/determinate relation (see, e.g.,
Yablo 1992, Wilson 2009). Or they might maintain that normative state types and/or
tokens are appropriately seen as proper parts of naturalistic state types and/or tokens (see,
e.g., Clapp 2001, Shoemaker 2001, Paul 2002). Finally, and granting---what could be
denied---that grounding is compatible with eliminativism, a naturalist might be a
pragmatic eliminativist, maintaining that normative goings-on don’t really exist, but that
it is convenient for various purposes to speak as if they do (see, e.g., Churchland 1981
and Churchland 1986).
Each of these views conforms to Rosen’s “in virtue of” characterization of naturalism,
but each advances a seemingly different conception of how the non-fundamental goingson stand to the fundamental goings-on---that is, of metaphysical structure.
I will shortly argue that the proponent of Grounding cannot rest with this degree of
metaphysical underdetermination. First, however, I want to note that other suggested
applications of Grounding also underdetermine the interpretation of the associated idioms
of dependence, since those using such idioms do not rest with bare claims of dependence,
but rather go on to provide specific metaphysical accounts of the dependence at issue.
Consider, for example, the passage that Schaffer cites by way of motivating the
Aristotelian method:
In the categories the main criterion [for selecting the primary substances] is
ontological priority. An entity is ontologically primary if other things depend for
its existence on it, while it does not depend in a comparable way on them. The
primary substances of the Categories, such as particular men and horses, are
subjects that ground the existence of other things; some of the nonprimary things,
such as qualities and quantities, exist because they modify the primary substances,
and others, such as substantial species and genera, exist because they classify the
primary entities. (Gill 1989, 3)
These remarks don’t, however, motivate taking Aristotle to have had Grounding in mind,
as opposed to some more specific metaphysical "small-g" grounding relations. On the
contrary, here Gill reports that Aristotle was concerned, not just with ontological priority,
but moreover with giving specific accounts of how entities of different varieties were
understood to metaphysically depend on the primary substances: qualities and quantities
modify the primary substances, substantial species and genera classify the primary
entities. No appeal to a distinctive notion of Grounding, common to all cases of
metaphysical dependence, is at issue here.
Or consider one of the views Rosen cites as motivating the intelligibility of Grounding:
9
The dispositions of a thing are always grounded in its categorical features (Prior,
Pargetter, and Jackson 1982). A glass is fragile in virtue of the arrangement of
the molecules that make it up, perhaps together with the laws of chemistry and
physics. (110)
Here again, proponents of such a view do not stop with a bare Grounding claim, but
rather go on to propose specific accounts of the grounding relation at issue:
The different views about the relation between dispositions and their causal bases
that have been defended in the literature mirror views about the relation between
mental properties and physical properties. David Armstrong defends a "typeidentity theory" according to which any disposition is identical with its causal basis.
Stephen Mumford defends a "token-identity theory" according to which any
instance of a disposition is identical with an instance of one of its potential causal
bases. Elizabeth Prior (together with Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson) defends
a "functionalist theory" according to which a disposition is a second-order property
of having some causal basis or other. […] There are other views too, for example
those of Place and Martin given in (Armstrong, Martin & Place 1996) […] . (Fara
2006)
The fairly obvious point is that philosophers almost never make general grounding claims
without having some specific grounding relation(s) in mind.16
Before considering how the proponent of Grounding might respond to such metaphysical
underdetermination, it is worth observing, both to keep the historical record and the
dialectical burden straight, that such case studies undermine the stated motivations for
Grounding. Pace Schaffer, Quine’s view of metaphysics is not the dominant view of
what metaphysics is, judging from what metaphysicians actually do, nor is it true that
only “vestiges” of the Aristotelian concern with dependence and metaphysical priority
presently remain. Pace Rosen (109-110), it is not the case that the idioms of dependence
have been widely dismissed as unintelligible or obscure, except as suppressed in favor of
modal notions. Pace Fine, it is misleading to say that “A number of philosophers have
recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation,
there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation” (in progress, 1). Attention
to grounding relations is not new: many, perhaps most, contemporary metaphysicians
have spent their careers articulating and/or applying various specific metaphysical
dependence relations in service of giving constitutive accounts of various phenomena.
Of course, the suggestion that there is a distinctive relation or relations of Grounding is
new. My side point here is that these stated motivations for Grounding make no sense: it
is a myth that contemporary metaphysicians ignore dependence and priority, and given
the plethora of specific dependence relations on offer, there is not even a prima facie
route from the failure of modal or diachronic relations to serve as grounding relations to
I say “almost never”, since conditions of epistemic duress or studied metaphysical neutrality might
motivate sticking with a general grounding claim; here the exceptions prove the rule.
16
10
the posit of any distinctive Grounding relation(s).17 Some better reason(s) to posit
Grounding is required, of the sort that I will consider on behalf of proponents of
Grounding in the remainder of this and in the next section.
To return to our thread: what does the metaphysical underdetermination associated with
Grounding, illustrated by the case of naturalism and many other metaphysical debates,
mean for the posit of this relation? There appear to be three available lines of response,
which I’ll address in order of increasing potential value. Since proponents of Grounding
do not explicitly treat this concern, their preferred response(s) are themselves somewhat
underdetermined.18 This won’t matter, however, since as I’ll now argue, none of these
responses succeeds in motivating the posit of Grounding, either instead of or in addition
to the more specific metaphysical relations already in philosophical play.
1.2 The “coarse-graining” response
Here one takes at face value Rosen’s and Fine’s claims that grounding is neutral as
regards the specific status (as existing or not, as reduced or not, as involving functional
realization or not, etc.) of Grounded entities or facts, and maintains that, whatever
previous investigators may have been up to, in any case the proper level of grain for
purposes of elucidating metaphysical dependence pertains merely to the distinction
between more and less fundamental entities---the only clear distinction Grounding is in
itself capable of tracking. (This view is not especially plausible, and it’s not likely that
either Fine or Rosen would endorse it, but it’s worth considering to get a feel for what’s
at stake here.)
Philosophers are, of course, free to choose the level of grain of their target projects, but
four points tell against taking the fundamental/non-fundamental distinction to be an
appropriate investigative stopping-point.
First, I cannot think of any very interesting metaphysical projects whose aim is limited to
saying which entities are or are not (relatively) fundamental, leaving open such basic
questions as how (in some detail, and not just “non-fundamentally”) the less fundamental
entities stand to the more fundamental entities, whether the non-fundamental entities
exist, whether the non-fundamental entities are distinct from the fundamental entities, and
so on. Indeed, as is illustrated by the several versions of naturalism, the claim that some
entities are “nothing over and above” some others is typically just the starting point of
metaphysical investigation into (determinative, constitutive) dependence relations in a
given domain. On the coarse-graining response, Grounding stops where most
investigations into metaphysical dependence begin.
Second, there is a tu quoque point to be made against this response. As above, one of the
main stated motivations for the posit of Grounding is that merely modal relations are too
coarse-grained to do the job of illuminating metaphysical structure, since the holding of
such modal relations is compatible with views that, as Rosen put it, “differ on an
This is easily verified by searching under “metaphysical dependence”, “physicalism”, “realization”,
“causal overdetermination”, etc. in PhilPapers; there are thousands of publications on these topics.
18
Though here I am especially indebted to Fine (p.c.).
17
11
important issue, viz., whether the moral facts play a role in making the law to be as it is”.
The case of “in virtue of” naturalism shows that Grounding similarly fails to discriminate
between views differing on important issues clearly relevant to metaphysical dependence.
If such a failure is reason to reject giving a modal interpretation to the idioms of
metaphysical dependence, then we also have reason to reject giving a Grounding
interpretation to these idioms. Conversely, having dispensed with Quine’s project, and
rejected merely modal conceptions of dependence, why should metaphysicians resist
being as articulate as their metaphysical means allow as regards what grounds what?
Third, mere claims of relative fundamentality cannot be all that's at stake, since x can be
more fundamental than y despite not grounding y: an electron in Spain is more
fundamental than my table, but has nothing whatsoever to do with my table.19
Fourth and most importantly, investigation into metaphysical structure, understood as
tracking only what is or is not (relatively) fundamental, and with no reference to specific
metaphysical details, cannot be carried out. Consider the perversely uninterested
metaphysician who aims only to figure out which entities are fundamental and which are
not. Such a metaphysician will find themselves hopelessly stymied, for in the usual case
we cannot assess a given claim about what is or is not fundamental, either relative to a
domain or in general, until we know which grounding relations are at issue. Does it make
sense to be a physicalist---to take the physical entities as fundamental? Well, it depends.
Everyone has their commitments. In my book, it is of the first importance to preserve the
(existential) reality, ontological distinctness and distinctive causal efficacy of the mental,
and I will give up one of these commitments only if no option accommodating all three is
available. More specifically, I would rather be either a non-reductive physicalist or a
robust emergentist, since these views accommodate all my commitments, than a
reductive physicalist, since this view fails (or so I and many others think) to preserve the
distinctness and the distinctive efficacy of the mental. Now, if someone claims that the
mental is Grounded in the physical, am I in position to know whether I should agree with
them? Not at all. As with naturalism, the bare assertion of Grounding is compatible with
both reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism---indeed, perhaps even with
eliminativism about (in particular) the mental (see notes 11 and 12). Absent further
information about the specific grounding relation(s) supposed to be at issue, I’m stuck: I
am not in position to assess, much less endorse, the claim that the physical is
fundamental.
A similar problem pertains to the proper interpretation of failures of Grounding. Suppose
someone tells me that the mental goings-on are not Grounded in the physical goings-on.
Does such a result support taking an anti-realist eliminativist stance concerning the
mental, or rather a realist emergentist stance, according to which mental goings-on are
themselves fundamental? Again, it depends: one must look to the specific reasons for the
supposed failure of grounding before one can pin a metaphysical interpretation onto such
a result. So, for example, if the failure of grounding is due to the mental's having powers
not had by the physical, then an emergentist rather than an eliminativist stance is in order.
If the failure rather reflects some sort of epistemic incapacity or merely pragmatic
19
Thanks to Karen Bennett for this observation; see her (2011) for further discussion.
12
leanings on our part, then perhaps an eliminativist stance is to be preferred. Here too, the
bare facts concerning the holding or failing to hold of Grounding offer no metaphysical
insight, even concerning which goings-on are, all things considered, fundamental.
That Grounding, in itself, is so coarse-grained as to be practically useless for purposes of
illuminating metaphysical structure undermines another motivation for such a posit,
according to which this relation is admirably explanatory. Fine says:
We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in
other truths, then they account for its truth; P’s being the case holds in virtue of
the other truths’ being the case. (2001, 15)
Indeed, Fine takes Grounding to be “the ultimate form of explanation”. But, as above,
from the bare fact that some goings-on are Grounded in some others it hardly follows that
the latter metaphysically explain the former in any interesting sense; nor does a bare
Grounding claim itself constitute an explanation in either a metaphysical or epistemic
sense. If an appeal to Grounding is to be explanatorily “ultimate”, some further
specification of this relation is required.20
1.3 The conciliatory response
Here the proponent of Grounding grants that the proper elucidation of metaphysical
dependence requires more than just a bare appeal to Grounding, but maintains that what
is moreover needed is not appeal to specific metaphysical relations, but rather to certain
general theses or presumptions concerning the ontological status of Grounded entities.
This appears to be one way in which Grounding ontologists have tried to accommodate
the clear need for further illumination about the nature of metaphysical dependence.
Hence, for example, Fine comes down against reality:
I would like to suggest that there is a general presumption in favor of the
grounded not being real. […] The presumption may be justified by reference to
the general aims of realist metaphysics. For the distinction between what is and is
not real represents a general strategy for making sense of the factual world. For,
of all the structure that the world exhibits, some may be taken to be real, to belong
to the world itself, and some to be only apparent and to be understood by
reference to what is real. (27)
Again, given the interpretive options, Fine’s claim here is either that there is a
presumption against the existence of the Grounded, or (more likely) that there is a
presumption against the fundamentality of the Grounded. Schaffer comes down for
reality, endorsing ontological “permissiveness” as regards Grounded entities:21
Fine recognizes this, and accordingly is presently inclined towards a view on which “just as an inference
will hold in virtue of a rule of inference so a relationship of ground will hold in virtue of a ground-theoretic
connection” (p.c.); see S1.4 and S2 for discussion of this strategy, as a way of accommodating the need
(metaphysical as well as explanatory) for more specific grounding relations.
21
It’s likely here that Schaffer and Fine do not have the same sense of “reality” in mind, even if the
presumption at issue in Fine’s claim involves existence, since Schaffer’s claim likely pertains to “ordinary”
existence, whereas Fine’s pertains to “metaphysical” existence. One might question the wisdom of
20
13
[W]hile the Quinean will show great concern with questions such as whether
numbers exist, the neo-Aristotelian will answer such questions with a dismissive
yes, of course. [As regards such existence questions] there is no longer anything
directly at stake. For there is no longer any harm in positing an abundant roster of
existents, provided it is grounded on a sparse basis. (This is why the neoAristotelian can be so permissive about what exists. She need only be stingy
when it comes to what is fundamental.) (353)
Schaffer’s motivates his permissivism by arguing that “contemporary existence debates
[e.g., about numbers] are trivial, in that the entities in question obviously do exist” (357).
There are three concerns with this sort of strategy. First, general endorsement of either
dismissiveness or permissiveness about Grounded goings-on seems not to properly
conform to the diversity of uses of the idioms of dependence (in linking the proper
understanding of grounding to such idioms I think Rosen has it right). Second, the
reasons given for taking either attitude toward the ontological status of grounded entities
depend on independent and controversial assumptions concerning either the deflationary
aims of “realist” metaphysics or the triviality of existence claims. It is these further
assumptions, which do not themselves follow from the posit of Grounding, that are doing
the work of illuminating basic facts about metaphysical dependence. Third,
implementations of this strategy go at best partway towards overcoming the metaphysical
underdetermination associated with bare appeals to Grounding. Supposing Grounded
goings-on aren’t (really) real: are they reducible to (that is: identical with some
ontologically lightweight combination of) Grounding goings-on or rather eliminable? If
Grounded goings-on are (really) real, are they reducible to or rather distinct from (but
still “nothing over and above”) the Grounding goings-on? Are Grounded broadly
scientific goings-on efficacious or not? Why or why not? Even putting aside the
controversial nature of the presuppositions, most of the important questions about
dependence remain unanswered. But again: we cannot assess, much less endorse, claims
about what is or is not fundamental in the absence of answers to these and other crucial
questions. Individually and together, these three concerns indicate that the conciliatory
response is no real advance over the coarse-graining response.
1.4 The “crucial appeal” response
The upshot of the previous subsections is that investigations into metaphysical
dependence cannot proceed by attention to Grounding alone, nor by attention to
Grounding coupled with some or other (controversial) general assumption concerning the
ontological status of grounded entities. On the "crucial appeal" response to the
underdetermination concern, the proponent of Grounding accepts that investigations into
bifurcating notions of existence this way (see Wilson 2011), but in any case nothing hangs on this
exegetical issue for purposes of evaluating the conciliatory strategy (a proponent of Grounding could
understand Schaffer’s view as pertaining to metaphysical as opposed to “ordinary” reality). In particular, if
Schaffer and Fine agree that Grounded goings-on are “real” by ordinary but not metaphysical lights, it
remains that this stance fails to accommodate the diversity of uses of the idioms of dependence, relies on
(now, two) controversial assumptions, and goes only partway to addressing the metaphysical
underdetermination associated with a bare Grounding claim.
14
the metaphysical dependence must advert to specific metaphysical relations. They
maintain, however, that there is still reason to posit Grounding, for as Fine put it (p.c.),
“the mere holding of these other relationships may not in general be sufficient to establish
a relationship of ground”. So, for example, given that every X is a proper part of some Y,
nothing follows about whether it is the parts or the wholes that are more fundamental (see
Schaffer 2010). The same is even more clearly true for other of the specific relations---in
particular, type or token identity---that are frequently appealed to in investigations of
metaphysical dependence. Moreover, as Fine suggested, “there is a real question, it
seems to me, whether talk of more specific relations will be adequate to convey what we
want to convey unless it is also coupled with a claim of ground”. On the “crucial appeal”
response, then, the proponent of Grounding maintains, first, that further (worldly) facts or
associated assumptions must be in place in order for specific metaphysical relations to
serve as grounding relations, and second, that these further facts/assumptions crucially
involve an appeal to Grounding.
This response to the underdetermination concern is the most promising (especially as
developed by Hellie, below), but as I’ll now argue, it does not succeed. My basic
strategy will be to grant that additional facts/assumptions are needed for a specific
metaphysical relation to serve as a grounding relation, but to deny that these crucially
involve an appeal to Grounding.
The first thing to observe is that the additionally required facts/assumptions concern
which goings-on are fundamental (or relatively fundamental22). So, for example, given
that the Ys are fundamental, and that every X is a proper part of some Y, then it follows
that the Xs are grounded in the Ys, rather than vice versa. Given that the powers of
physical complexes are fundamental, and that the powers of mental states are a proper
subset of the powers of physical complexes, then it follows that the powers of mental
states are grounded in physical states, rather than vice versa. And so on.23 That this is
the correct story about which facts/assumptions are additionally required is encoded in
the standard methodology in existing debates over metaphysical dependence. So, for
example, debates over the status of naturalism or physicalism start by identifying the
naturalistic or physicalistic goings-on as (assumed, as a working, speculative, or
antagonistic hypothesis to be) fundamental; participants then proceed to consider whether
other goings-on not clearly part of the fundamental base might stand in various specific
relations to (ontologically lightweight combinations of) goings-on in the base, sufficient
unto the former’s being “nothing over and above” the latter. It appears, then, that what
implications the holding of a specific metaphysical relation has for what grounds what
crucially depend on which goings-on are fundamental---or, if metaphysical explanations
are specifically at issue, on which goings-on are assumed (either as a working,
speculative, or antagonistic hypothesis) to be fundamental.
22
The considerations to follow apply, mutatis mutandis, to cases where one of the relata of the specific
relation is assumed to be (just) relatively fundamental---that is, to be part of a relatively fundamental base
of entities (see note 25 for my preferred levels-based characterization of the notion of a relatively
fundamental base). I won't carry this qualification through.
23
Since the response I want to make here can be formulated without discussing the supposedly
controversial question of whether identity can serve as a grounding relation (to which I return in S2), I
focus here on specific relations besides type or token identity.
15
Interestingly, it is not the need for facts or assumptions about what is fundamental (as
needed in order to determine the direction of priority among relata standing in a specific
metaphysical relation) that bothers Fine. He is rather concerned with cases where the
fundamental base contains mixed types, but where a specific grounding claim
appropriately attaches to just one of the types. For example, suppose that the
fundamental base consists of both physical and mathematical facts, and suppose as well
that every token mental state is a proper part of a token physical state. In such a case it
seems correct to say that the mental is grounded in the physical, but incorrect to say that
the mental is grounded in both the physical and the mathematical. Such cases indicate
that, in general, not every fundamental going-on may be at issue in a given grounding
relation. But, I respond, we knew that already, quite apart from consideration of mixedtype fundamental bases: for example, some physical states have nothing to do with
mentality. It suffices to accommodate Fine’s observation to note that specific grounding
claims presuppose a minimal base among the fundamentalia. Whether non-minimal
bases for some grounded goings-on should be considered additional grounds, in some
looser sense, for these goings-on is a matter of decision (or further metaphysics). In any
case just as---all parties are now assuming---it is a matter for independent investigation
whether some goings-on are specifically grounded in the assumed fundamental base, it is
also---we should now assume---a matter for independent investigation what minimal base
of fundamentalia might serve as such a ground.
Still, there remains a case to be made, along lines of Fine’s original concern, that if
specific metaphysical relations serve as grounding relations only against the backdrop of
facts/assumptions about what is fundamental, then Grounding is required for the specific
relations to do this work (in the debates over naturalism, physicalism, dispositions, etc.).
This case, suggested to me by Hellie, proceeds by reference to a characterization of the
fundamental as not grounded in any other distinct goings-on. Supposing that this is the
right way to characterize the fundamental, then since the specific metaphysical relations
only operate as grounding relations given a specification of the fundamental, appeal to
Grounding would be crucially required. The suggestion, in other words, is that the posit
of Grounding is needed in order to characterize the fundamental as the UnGrounded.
Here we have arrived at the best version of the best case for positing Grounding as
needed in addition to the specific metaphysical relations, so far as investigations into
metaphysical dependence are concerned.24 The case can be resisted, however, for two
reasons. First, it would be metaphysically suspect if the characterization of the
fundamental base as such proceeded by way of a negative (worldly) fact, to the effect that
these goings-on were not grounded in any other distinct goings-on. Indeed, many are
inclined to reject the existence of negative facts; and to the extent that they are accepted,
their holding is usually supposed to be determined, somehow or other, by the holding of
positive facts. Second, the suggestion under consideration presupposes that the
fundamental goings-on are not themselves grounded. But why think this? Why couldn’t
the fundamental goings-on mutually ground each other, as on a holist pluralist view of
24
As prefigured, in S2 I will consider a remaining motivation for the posit of Grounding, according to
which this relation serves to terminologically and/or formally unify the specific relations.
16
the sort associated with, e.g., Leibniz? And why couldn’t the fundamental goings-on
ground themselves, as some have supposed God capable of doing, or as a metaphysical
correlate of foundational self-justified beliefs? These alternative understandings of the
fundamental---as mutually or self-grounding---are live possibilities, so it is inadvisable to
rule them out of court in characterizing the fundamental. More generally, when
characterizing categories suited to the mapping of metaphysical structure, we should
reject characterizations that import antecedent assumptions about what that structure is
like. Hence we have two reasons to resist a characterization of the fundamental as the
un-Grounded: first, such a characterization is inappropriately negative; second, such a
characterization is inappropriately theoretically loaded.
In place of a negative, theoretically loaded characterization, we should rather characterize
the fundamental in positive, metaphysically neutral terms. Here I am inclined to follow
Fine (2001, 25) and “reject the idea that the absolute notion of fundamental reality is in
need of a relational underpinning”, rather taking “reality and its intrinsic structure” to be
primitive: “it is this positive idea of the intrinsic structure of reality, rather than the
comparative idea of reduction, that should be taken to inform the relevant conception of
what is fundamental or real”. Though I endorse Fine's view that the fundamental is
primitive, I think we can say more to characterize this notion; namely, that it follows
from some entities' being fundamental at a world that these entities, individually or
together, provide a ground---nota bene: in one or other specific "small-g" fashion, not by
reference to a distinctive relation of Grounding---for all the other goings-on at the world.
Which entities are in the fundamental base is primitive; this primitive specification then
fixes the direction of priority (assuming there is one, as there may not be in cases of selfor mutual grounding) associated with a given specific small-g grounding relation as
applied to entities in the base. For example, if the One is primitively fundamental, then
proper parts of the One will be non-fundamental; if the Many are primitively
fundamental, then fusions of the Many will be non-fundamental.25
Let me say this again. On the positive, theoretically neutral approach, which entities are
fundamental is ultimately a primitive matter. That seems right (or at least acceptable):
entities in a fundamental base play a role analogous to axioms in a theory. On my
preferred interpretation of the approach, the direction of priority operative in applications
of the specific metaphysical relations is fixed by this primitive specification. That also
seems right (or at least acceptable): applications of the specific metaphysical relations
(e.g., proper part, fusion) will thus be appropriately (in particular: non-circularly)
sensitive to which relata are prior.26
That applications of the specific relations are informed by what is fundamental also
conforms to the methodology that metaphysicians usually employ in investigations into
25
How should we characterize relative fundamentality? We can do this by assuming something like a
hierarchy of levels, and taking the relatively fundamental goings-on at a level L to be those that, either as a
primitive matter of fact or as following from the primitive fundamentality of some deeper level, serve as a
fundamental base for all the other goings-on at or above L.
26
Thanks to Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (and also Lisa Downing and David Sanson) for convincing me that a
primitive notion of fundamentality was needed here in order to avoid circularity.
17
fundamentality and grounding. Again: such investigation proceeds by assuming, as a
working, speculative, or antagonistic hypothesis, some candidate fundamental base;
investigation then proceeds by considering whether some goings-on not obviously in the
base can be appropriately seen as grounded, in one or other metaphysically specific
fashion, in goings-on inside the base. Supposing so, one checks off the seemingly
grounded goings-on and moves to the next goings-on outside of the base. Supposing not,
one has various options---most saliently, to take the seemingly ungroundable goings-on
to be either fundamental or eliminable. Hence it was, for example, that prior to the
advent of quantum mechanical explanations of chemical phenomena, the seeming
irreducibility of the latter to lower-level physical goings-on was offered as evidence of
their emergence---a status that was revoked when a reduction became available,
indicating that the chemical was, after all, grounded in the physical. And hence it is that
the status of various aspects of the mental as grounded, or not, in the physical continues
to be a focus of metaphysical investigation, with those convinced that such grounding is
not in the offing differing as regards whether this indicates that the mental is to be
eliminated or taken to be as fundamental as the physical goings-on.
But I somewhat digress. Summing up: a Grounding relation is too coarse-grained on its
own to do even basic work in illuminating metaphysical dependence relations. The
specific metaphysical relations that have traditionally served as grounding relations are
needed to do the work, in particular, of specifying whether grounded entities do or do not
exist, are or are not reducible, are or are not distinctively efficacious, etc. To be sure, the
specific relations only serve as grounding relations relative to facts or assumptions
concerning which goings-on are fundamental (or relatively fundamental). But that this is
so does not motivate the posit of Grounding in addition to the specific metaphysical
relations, for the fundamental can be characterized in positive, neutral terms that do not
involve any appeal to Grounding. So far as specific investigations into metaphysical
dependence are concerned, then, there is no work for Grounding to do.
Before continuing, it is worth making explicit that in arguing that cases where Grounding
are supposedly operative are in fact cases where one or other more specific notion of
grounding is operative, I am not advancing the sort of anti-metaphysical thesis advanced
in Hofweber 2009. Like me, Hofweber is inclined to reject the claim that there is a single
primitive notion of ground, but unlike me, he supposes that the more specific notions are
not properly “metaphysical”, but are rather logical, mathematical, scientific, or what-have
you. Hence in discussing the case of a supposed primitive grounding relation between a
true disjunction and its disjuncts, he says:
There are a number of examples Fine gives in [Fine, 2001] that suggest that we
have a grasp on the notion of metaphysical priority. But is seems to me that these
are really examples of various other kinds of priority. For example, consider the
case of a true disjunction and its true disjunct. One might hold that the true
disjunct is metaphysically more basic than the true disjunction. But is seems to be
rather a simple case of an asymmetrical logical relationship between them: the
disjunction implies the disjunct, but not the other way around. That the disjunct is
in some sense more basic than the disjunction can be accepted by all. What is
18
controversial is whether this is in a metaphysical sense, or in some other sense. I
think it is simply a logical sense. Or take the case of mass, volume and density.
Any two of them determine the third, but intuitively one pair, mass and volume, is
more basic than density. And this seems right, but this is priority in a conceptual
sense, not a metaphysical one.
Hofweber’s discussion here presupposes that metaphysics, if it is to be viable, must have
its own subject matter; it is for this reason that he considers whether it makes sense to
posit Grounding as a properly metaphysical phenomenon. The presupposition is
mistaken, for among other things metaphysics is in the business of integrating and
rendering consistent (among other virtues) the subject matters of first-order disciplines.
But even granting the presupposition, and also granting that grounding claims typically
have correct first-order answers, and also granting that there is no reason to posit
Grounding, it remains that the relations referenced in first-order answers may be
associated with specific properly metaphysical relations. Sometimes the specific
metaphysical grounding relation will be a general or relevantly abstract version of the
“non-metaphysical” relation, as in the case of entailment or identity. Other times the
metaphysical grounding relation at issue will advert to some “deeper” state of affairs, as
in cases where causal or metaphysical facts are taken to underlie appeals to “conceptual”
priority. Coupled with the fact that there may be local as well as global reasons for
revision of first-order claims, there is plenty of work for metaphysicians of dependence to
do, even in the absence of a distinctive Grounding relation.
2. The uselessness of Grounding as a general unifier of the specific grounding relations
Though Grounding is not needed for specific investigations into metaphysical structure,
one might wonder whether we should nonetheless posit Grounding in addition to the
specific metaphysical grounding relations, as terminologically and formally unifying the
specific notions. Schaffer offers just such a motivation:
I digress to consider a possible objection, according to which there are many
distinct notions of grounding, united only in name. […] By way of reply, I see no
more reason to consider this a case of mere homonymy, than to consider various
cases of identity as merely homonymous. In both cases, there is a common term,
and the same formal structure. This is some evidence of real unity. At the very
least, I would think it incumbent on the objector to provide further reason for
thinking that the general term ‘grounding’ denotes no unified notion. (Schaffer
2009, 377)
There are two problems with Schaffer's suggestion. The first is that it tacitly involves a
relation between Grounding and the specific grounding relations whose direction of
priority and existential implications are unclear. There are various models of how one
relation might unify some others; without loss of generality we may follow Fine (p.c.) in
thinking of Grounding’s being effectively multiply realized (or implemented) by more
specific metaphysical relations. Now, in cases of multiple realizability, is it the realized
or the realizing goings-on that are more fundamental? This is the sort of question that
receives considerable attention in various debates in the metaphysics of dependence
19
(involving broadly scientific properties, the determinable/relation, and so on), with
candidate answers heavily relying on specific metaphysical details of the case. Hence
even granting that the specific grounding relations have something terminologically or
formally in common that might be associated with a relation of Grounding, why not see
Grounding as a less fundamental abstraction from the specific relations? And in that
case, why not see Grounding as reducible to, e.g., a mere disjunction of the specific
relations, rather than as a distinctive, much less primitive, relation? Here it is useful to
recall that, notwithstanding that determinables clearly terminologically and formally
unify their determinates, philosophers very commonly assume that determinables are
non-fundamental relative to and reducible to disjunctions of determinates. I don't think
that's the right view of determinables (see Wilson 2012), but the moral remains: no
support for the posit of Grounding follows just from the supposition that the specific
grounding relations have certain terminological or formal features in common.
The second problem with Schaffer's suggestion is that, as a matter of fact, the
terminological and formal features of the specific grounding relations don't serve as
"evidence of real unity". To start, there is not "a common term" operative in contexts
where metaphysical dependence is at issue, but rather several idioms of dependence ('in
virtue of', 'nothing over and above', 'grounded in', 'just', etc.). Moreover, as we saw
previously, users of these idioms uniformly treat these idioms as placeholders, to be filled
in with a specific grounding relation (or relations).27
Nor do the formal features common to the multiple specific grounding relations serve as
evidence of real unity. Proponents of Grounding typically cite irreflexivity, asymmetry,
and transitivity as features shared by all grounding relations. To be sure, some grounding
relations, including proper parthood, proper subsethood, and the determinable/
determinate relation, have these features. But note, to start, that many non-grounding
relations---causation, temporal relations such as 'before-than', and quantitative scalar
relations such as 'taller-than'---also have these features. Hence even if all grounding
relations did have these features, this in itself wouldn't serve as evidence of real unity of
the sort that would motivate posit of Grounding; at best it would serve as evidence for
some other relation, subsuming Grounding, causation, temporal relations, and, e.g., the
taller-than relation.28
Moreover, not all grounding relations have all the supposed features. It is often supposed
that impure sets metaphysically depend on their members, but not vice versa (see Fine
1994); but set membership is not transitive. And Schaffer (forthcoming) has come to
believe, by attention to “mixed” cases of iterated grounding, that "the assumption of
transitivity was a mistake".29 Having given up transitivity, the argument from formal
27
Again, talk of small-g grounding claims, here and throughout, should be understood as made against the
background of an assumed fundamental or relatively fundamental base.
28
It is perhaps in recognition of this fact that Schaffer takes the evidence of real unity to advert to the
conjunction of terminological and formal considerations; but as above what terminological evidence exists
does not support the posit of Grounding.
29
So, for example, Schaffer discusses a case in which a specific dent in a ball’s surface partially grounds
the ball’s specific shape S, and the ball’s specific shape S partially grounds the ball’s being more-or-less
spherical, but the dent doesn’t ground the ball’s being more-or-less spherical. Though Schaffer doesn’t flag
20
unity is on even shakier ground, since now many more non-grounding relations will share
the supposedly unifying features at issue. Indeed, since the asymmetry of a relation
entails its irreflexivity, the claim that grounding relations are formally unified comes
down to the claim that grounding relations are all asymmetric. Even supposing this is
correct, the case for unity here is again not for Grounding per se, but for some some other
relation, subsuming all asymmetric relations.
I could stop here, but I want to press on a bit, since I think the supposition of asymmetry
(hence irreflexivity) can also be denied. For, I maintain, identity is also a grounding
relation, and identity is both reflexive and symmetric.
But wait: isn’t it usually assumed---by proponents of Grounding in particular---that,
unlike identity, any grounding relation must be asymmetric and irreflexive? Indeed, this
is usually assumed:
It seems clear that the binary part of the grounding relation is asymmetric and
hence irreflexive (Rosen 2010, 115).
As to the logical features of grounding, it is best modeled as a two-place
predicate […] Grounding is […] irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. (Schaffer
2009, 376)
(See also Correia 2008, 1023.) We’ll consider the stated reasons for thinking this shortly,
but we already have reason to think that any such assumptions must be mistaken. For in
investigating grounding we aim to make sense of the usual idioms of metaphysical
dependence, and identity claims are paradigmatic of claims taken to establish that certain
goings-on are “nothing over and above” certain other goings-on. Sometimes the
assumption of identity is explicit:
Every mental state type is identical with a physical state type or a disjunction of
physical state types.
Water is identical with H2O.
Sometimes it is tacit but clearly presupposed:
To say that there is a table in the room is just to say that there are some particles
arranged table-wise in a room.
The fact that it is possible that there is a blue kangaroo is reducible to the fact that
there is a concrete possible world containing a blue kangaroo.
Why, then, think that a grounding relation must be asymmetric (hence irreflexive)?
Rosen says:
this, his case is “mixed” in arguably involving distinct specific grounding relations: the dent is partly
mereologically constitutive of the specific shape, and the specific shape is a determinate of which the less
specific shape is a determinable.
21
The case for strong irreflexivity is clear enough. Just as no fact can make itself
obtain, no fact can play a role along with other facts in making itself obtain.
Strong asymmetry (which entails strong irreflexivity) is less evident. The thought
is that when we cite grounds for [p], we cite facts that are strictly prior to [p] in a
certain explanatory order. If [q] plays a role in making it the case that p, then [q]
must be ‘more fundamental’ than [p], in which case [p] cannot play a role in
making it the case that q. (2010, 116)
(On Rosen’s view, Grounding is a relation between many grounding facts, and a single
grounded fact; talk of ‘strong’ irreflexivity and asymmetry reflects that a grounded fact
cannot be one among the several grounding facts.)
These motivations can and should be resisted, however.
To start, even bracketing whether identity is a grounding relation, the case for strong
irreflexivity is weak. Again, why not allow that fundamental goings-on can ground
themselves, along lines of the self-justificatory status of basic beliefs on a foundationalist
epistemology, or the self-sustaining status of God on many theologies? Given such
possibilities, it seems better to suppose that grounding is nonreflexive, with some cases of
grounding being reflexive and others not.30 31 But if grounding can be reflexive, then it
can also be symmetric. Again, why not allow that there can be cases of symmetric
irreflexive grounding---say, as holding between mutually interdependent foundational
entities, along lines of Leibniz's monadology, or as might be the case if, as I argue in
Wilson 2012, determinables as well as determinates can be fundamental? Given such
possibilities, it also seems better to suppose that grounding relations may be
nonsymmetric, with some cases of grounding being symmetric and others not. It is
clearly a serious cost to rule such possibilities out of court, especially given that the stated
project here is to provide resources for investigations into what grounds what.
Still, putting aside the possibility of foundational or mutual self-grounding, something
seems right about the above line of thought motivating asymmetry (hence irreflexivity),
according to which grounding is supposed to reflect a directed order of metaphysical
dependence. Indeed, in typical cases of identity-based claims, the dependence is
supposed to be asymmetric; e.g., mental state types are grounded in physical state types,
30
Fine (forthcoming) and (in progress) distinguishes strong and weak notions of grounding that are
irreflexive and reflexive, respectively; but his admission of reflexive grounding isn’t intended to
accommodate identity claims as grounding claims, since (as the terminology of “weak” grounding implies),
reflexive grounding is supposed only to connect facts at the same “level” of metaphysical priority. As I’ll
shortly argue, a grounding relation may be reflexive even in cases where there is a clear asymmetry of
priority.
31
Relatedly, Jenkins (2011) concludes, after observing that the assumption of irreflexivity, combined with
certain plausible dependence claims (e.g., that statues depend metaphysically on their composing matter),
entails the falsity of certain seemingly live positions (e.g., that every statue is identical with its composing
matter), that “there are considerations of methodological neutrality which speak against assuming
irreflexivity” (270).
22
rather than vice versa. How can the typical asymmetry of dependence be accommodated,
if the specific grounding relation at issue---say, type or token identity---is symmetric?
There are three ways. First, the asymmetry of dependence can be located, not in the
specific grounding relation itself, but in extrinsic considerations involving the relata. So,
for example, a type-identity theorist about the mental can locate this asymmetry in the
broadly extrinsic fact that every mental state type is identical with a physical state type,
but not vice versa. Second, the asymmetry of dependence can be located, not in the
specific grounding relation itself, but in intrinsic considerations involving the relata. So,
for example, a type-identity theorist can locate this asymmetry in the broadly intrinsic
fact that the physical state type to which the mental state type is identical is an
ontologically lightweight (e.g., lower-level relational, Boolean, or mereological)
combination of other physical state types rather than other mental state types. This sort
of strategy will also work to secure the asymmetry of priority in cases of a posteriori
necessity, involving, e.g., water’s being identical with H2O (here, a higher-level type is
taken to be identical with a lower-level relational type). Even granting that the
dependence at issue in (many cases of) grounding is directed and so in some sense
asymmetric and irreflexive, then, there is no problem with taking identity-based
grounding claims at metaphysical face value. Third, even if such extrinsic or intrinsic
asymmetries are not in place, one may always fall back on the facts, or the assumed facts,
about which goings-on are fundamental. Relative to the fact/assumption that the physical
is fundamental (which does not, as argued above, require crucial appeal to Grounding),
then given that the mental is token or type identical to the physical, the former is
grounded in the latter, rather than vice versa.32
One final concern remains about taking identity to be a grounding relation. Supposing it
is, then one of the relata will (by one or other means, above) be more fundamental than
the other. But then how can the relata be identical? Since they have different properties,
by Leibniz's law they must in fact be different.33 The concern here is familiar to identity
theorists; my preferred response adverts to considerations similar to those discussed in
the previous paragraph. According to the reductionist, a state token or type may be
shared by different systems. In such cases, the qualification of the state as fundamental
or not reflects the status of the state as part of a system of states that is or is not
appropriately taken to be fundamental, either on intrinsic or extrinsic grounds; as a
working, speculative, or antagonistic hypothesis; or as primitive. Qua physical a belief is
fundamental, according to the reductive physicalist; qua mental that same belief is not
fundamental. As Jenkins (2011) notes, one way of making out this sort of view is to take
talk of relative dependence as hyperintensional:
To say that 'depends on' is hyperintensional is to say that it creates
contexts into which one cannot always substitute necessarily co-extensive
32
These strategies for accommodating the directedness of metaphysical priority will also serve to
accommodate the related idea that (as per Fine 2001 and in progress) grounding is or is associated with an
explanatory relation, and explanatory relations must be irreflexive in order to be informative.
33
Thanks to Karen Bennett for raising this concern.
23
terms salva veritate. The verb 'believes' is often thought to be like this.
We can have all-true triads of the following form:
i. The Sherriff of Nottingham believes that Robin Hood is wicked.
ii. The Sherriff of Nottingham does not believe that Robin of
Locksley is wicked.
iii. Robin Hood is identical with to Robin of Locksley.
Similarly, I suggest, one might think that there can be all-true triads of the
following form:
a. S's pain depends on S's brain state B.
b. S's pain does not depend on S's pain.
c. S's brain state B is identical with S's pain state P.
This option is, importantly, compatible with ontologies that identify brain
states with pain states. We are free to identify S's pain with the brain state
that grounds it, should we wish (for reasons of parsimony, say), to do so.
(270-1)
It is moreover worth noting the lengths that proponents of Grounding must go in order to
treat, one way or another, seemingly clear cases of grounding relations not having the
assumed features of irreflexivity and asymmetry. So, for example, in regards to the case
of logical analysis, Fine says:
The notion of ground […] is also to be distinguished from logical analysis.
Indeed, the paradigm of logical analysis (“the average American”) is not
for us a case of ground, since the propositions expressed on both sides of
the analysis are presumably the same and yet no proposition can properly
be taken to ground itself. For us, the potentially misleading surface
appearance of grammar is entirely irrelevant to questions of ground, since
we are looking to the propositions expressed by the sentences rather than
to the sentences themselves.34 (2001, 15)
But cases of logical analysis are paradigmatic cases of grounding, and it is implausible to
deny that they are such. Rosen agrees that a “Grounding-Reduction Link” is highly
plausible, not just in cases of logical analysis but also in cases of metaphysical analysis
and a posteriori necessity; but again the commitment to grounding’s being irreflexive
poses a difficulty:
34
Fine reports that he is presently inclined towards taking the relata of Grounding to advert to more
specifically representational entities (sentences, rather than the propositions that sentences express), which
move strikes me as either at odds with his desired “return to metaphysical innocence” or else to be subject
to concerns similar to those of Rosen’s view, to be next discussed.
24
To be a square just is to be an equilateral rectangle. This means that if
ABCD is a square, then it is a square in virtue of being an equilateral
rectangle. To be an acid just is to be a proton donor. So HCl is an acid in
virtue of the fact that HCl is a proton donor. Suppose Lewis is right;
suppose that for a proposition to be necessary just is for it to hold in all
possible worlds. Then it is a necessary truth that whatever is green is
green, and if we ask what makes this proposition necessary, the answer
will be: It is necessary in virtue of the fact that it is true in every world.
These instances of the Grounding-Reduction Link have a certain ring of
plausibility […] but the Link presents us with a real puzzle. After all, if
our definition of square is correct, then surely the fact that ABCD is a
square and the fact that ABCD is an equilateral rectangle are not different
facts: they are one and the same. But then [...] every instance of [the Link]
will amount to a violation of irreflexivity. (2010, 124)
Rosen’s basic strategy for avoiding this difficulty is to take reduction to be a relation
between distinct propositions. But not just any propositions will do the trick; in
particular, Russellian propositions, individuated just by their worldly constituents and
their manner of combination, won’t do, since on such an account reduced and reducing
propositions fail to be distinct, leading, via the Grounding-Reduction link, to another
violation of irreflexivity. Rosen’s second pass strategy then involves…
[…] insisting that the operation of replacing a worldly item in a fact with its real
definition never yields the same fact again. It yields a new fact that ‘unpacks’ or
‘analyzes’ the original. (2010, 124)
Rosen spends some time motivating this new means of individuating facts and associated
propositions, which effectively imports modes of presentation characteristic of
representational entities into the world. Suffice to say that there is a much more
straightforward strategy for preserving the Grounding-Reduction Link: namely, to allow
that grounding can be reflexive (again, locating the asymmetry of priority elsewhere than
the grounding relation), and more generally, allowing that identity can be a grounding
One might respond to the seeming diversity of formal properties of specific grounding
relations by multiplying distinctive grounding relations, a la Fine. So, for example, in his
(in progress) Fine distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” notions of Ground which
are and are not reflexive, respectively. Such diversification, in manifesting sensitivity to
the variety of ways in which some goings-on may be grounded in some others, is clearly
on the right track. But a strategy of diversification leads back towards a disunified array
of the more specific relations, undermining the remaining reason to posit any Grounding
relation or relations distinct from the usual metaphysical suspects, and moreover---since
we must clearly remain committed to the specific relations---violating the usual strictures
of parsimony and Ockham’s razor.
Summing up: there is neither terminological nor formal reason to posit a Grounding
relation, as needed to unify the multiplicity of specific grounding relations: the objection
25
“according to which there are many distinct notions of grounding, united only in name”
stands.
Concluding remarks
Proponents of Grounding are correct that metaphysics is or should be concerned with the
question of what depends on what; and they are correct that the idioms of metaphysical
dependence are not properly interpreted in semantic, epistemic, causal, or merely modal
terms---necessitation and supervenience, in particular, are simply too coarse-grained to
trace patterns of intimate dependence. But this much leaves open whether these idioms
are to receive, wholly or in part, a metaphysical interpretation in terms of a distinctive
relation or relations of Grounding, or whether such idioms should rather be taken to
advert only or simply to one or other of the specific metaphysical grounding relations
already on the scene.
I have argued against the former interpretation, on grounds that Grounding cannot do,
and is moreover not needed to do, the work it is posited as doing.
First, Grounding fails to do the work of illuminating metaphysical structure, for like the
modal notions it is supposed to replace it is too coarse-grained to discriminate between
importantly different features of metaphysical dependence. The proponent of Grounding
cannot respond by restricting their understanding of “structure” to a bare specification of
which entities are fundamental and which aren’t, for we cannot assess such bare
structural claims antecedent to having some specific idea of what grounding relations are
supposed to be at issue, and what consequences the holding of such relations has for such
basic questions as whether grounded entities do or do not exist, are or are not distinct
from grounding entities, are or are not efficacious, and so on. Attention to the specific
metaphysical relations is required in order for investigations into metaphysical
dependence to proceed. Moreover, Grounding is not needed for the specific relations to
do their work. To be sure, the holding of the specific relations has implications for what
grounds what only in combination with facts or assumptions about what is fundamental;
but assuming we reject (as we should) a negative, non-neutral characterization of the
fundamental as the UnGrounded in favor of a positive, neutral such characterization, the
need for such further facts/assumptions does not motivate the posit of Grounding.
Second, Grounding is not needed to do the work of unifying the more specific grounding
relations, for there is no such work to be done. There is no reason to posit Grounding as
terminologically unifying the idioms of dependence, for appeals to these idioms are
uniformly filled in by appeal to specific grounding relations (or candidate such relations);
metaphysicians of dependence do not rest, unless operating under evidential duress or
studied metaphysical neutrality, with bare grounding claims. Nor is there reason to posit
Grounding as unifying the common formal structure of the diverse specific grounding
relations, for these relations have no interesting formal structure in common: some are
asymmetric, some not; some are irreflexive, some not; some are transitive, some not.
One might respond to this formal diversity by multiplying notions of Grounding; but in
that case the parsimonious thing to do is to stick with the specific metaphysical relations
we already accept.
26
I conclude that ontologists interested in metaphysical structure should abandon the
halfway house of Grounding, as no better and in certain respects worse than the
inadequate notions it was invoked to replace, and rather join forces with the
metaphysicians of dependence already on the scene in exploring the diversity of specific
ways in which some entities may be grounded in some others.
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