The metaphorical links between ecology, ethics, and society
Brendon M. H. Larson
Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
ON N2L 3G1 Canada
Email: blarson@uwaterloo.ca
Phone: 519-888-4567 ext. 38140
Abstract
It is now widely understood that metaphors are not simply rhetorical embellishment in
science, but serve a critical epistemic role for the creation and exploration of theories.
Three prevalent ecological metaphors—competition, invasion, and resilience—serve as
examples and touchstones of the role of metaphors in ecology, and how their origin and
operation as “feedback metaphors” interweaves ecology with its social context. In each
case, the social origin of these metaphors implies that they are value-laden at the level of
interpretation (i.e., due to their resonance with everyday language) and/or at the level of
worldview (i.e., due to the way they highlight some aspects of a comparison while hiding
others). Thus, metaphoric choices in ecology should be subject to ethical scrutiny. In
effect, this necessitates paying attention to the “evolutionary ecology” of metaphors in
ecology itself—that is, attention to factors such as their context, diversity, history, and
scale. These normative elements in metaphors bear directly on perennial discussions
about objectivity and advocacy in ecology, and how ecologists should use metaphors in
science while being cognizant of and sensitive to their social context.
Keywords: advocacy, science, society, values, worldview
Over the past several decades, the role of metaphors in scientific inquiry has become
much more widely appreciated. A metaphor is a figure of speech by which we
understand one thing in terms of another, and most of us learned about them in the
context of English courses in high school—or perhaps during our undergraduate
education. We learned that “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” in Hamlet’s
famous “to-be-or-not-to-be” soliloquy were not actual slings and arrows, but unpleasant
things in his life (which he considered ending, by suicide). Hamlet could have just
referred to them as the “problems of life.” Instead, Shakespeare employed a poetic
metaphor as rhetorical embellishment to ‘dress up’ his narrative. If this is all metaphors
do—put the bare facts poetically—then it is not surprising that metaphors were widely
disparaged in scientific writing until quite recently (Ortony 1993), despite their continual
use. However, it is now increasingly recognized that metaphors are not simply
embellishments, but cognitive instruments in science that have an “epistemic”1 function
in helping us to understand complex relationships and/or what was formerly unknown
(e.g., Keller 1995; Brown 2003).
Here, I don’t have space to discuss the origin and function of scientific metaphors
in detail. Instead, I focus on how metaphors operate as links between ecology and its
social context, demonstrating that (i) ecological metaphors originate from the everyday
social world; (ii) they are thus value-laden; and (iii) their use in ecology thus requires
Epistemic means “of or pertaining to knowledge.” In this sentence, notice several
instrumental metaphors (“instrument” and “function”) for metaphors.
1
2
ethical reflection, particularly in the context of advocacy for conservation outcomes. (For
further discussion of these ideas, see Larson 2011a).
Metaphors permeate ecology (Worster 1985; Larson 2011a), so a few concrete
examples—competition, invasion, and resilience—may help to indicate their epistemic
function. Each of these terms was adopted as a central metaphor in ecology at a particular
point in time: competition a little after the time of Charles Darwin, invasion with Charles
Elton in the mid-twentieth century, and resilience with C. S. Holling a few decades ago
(see, respectively, McIntosh 1992; Elton 1958; Holling 1973). They were not simply
embellishment, but central concepts adopted by ecologists to better understand natural
phenomena by reference to everyday phenomena that were already known. In this sense,
then, they were “constitutive” metaphors that directed ensuing empirical inquiry down
particular paths rather than others. As time passed, one might say that they were
increasingly interpreted as part of the foundation of ecology, that is “factual,” because
they were (arguably) subject to empirical test, and more or less empirically supported.
Ecologists chose these metaphors because they helped to understand phenomena;
and they did so because of an apt comparison with something everyday and better known.
Returning to our examples, ecologists inhabited a world where humans themselves
competed and invaded territories, and where the meaning of “resilient” was clear in the
context of everyday experiences with things that recover their shape after stress or
expansion (e.g., an elastic band). By applying this everyday understanding to something
new (that is, by using it metaphorically), ecologists obtained an ability to better
conceptualize and therefore to investigate phenomena in nature.
3
But the choice of these metaphors was also an interpretive and definitive act. The
choice of these metaphors was not inevitable because ecologists could have adopted other
ways of understanding by choosing other metaphors. Other metaphors, however, may
not have resonated as well with the cultural contexts in which ecologists introduced them.
The chosen metaphors reflected prominent aspects of the prevailing zeitgeist. The role
that symbiosis plays in contemporary evolutionary biology demonstrates that early
ecologists might have chosen some other metaphor than competition (Larson 2011), and
it also demonstrates that scientists are more likely to choose metaphors and follow the
lines of inquiry to which such metaphors point because they resonate with the prevailing
cultural assumptions about the world.
According to Keddy (1989), the competitive and masculine culture in ecology
prioritized study of competitive interactions (and associated empirical exploration) over
cooperative ones (also see Boucher 1986). Further, some scholars question whether
competition is an appropriate metaphor for passive interactions, such as the shade of one
plant preventing the growth of another, that are transformed by the metaphor into
combative ones (e.g., Keller 1988). Davis et al. (2001) claim that the Nazi threat to midtwentieth century Britain incited Elton to adopt the metaphor of “invasion” (as opposed
to viewing highly mobile species as simply spreading or expanding demographically).
I’m not familiar with published explanations for the recent rise of the resilience metaphor
in ecological thought, though this would be an interesting topic for an historian of
ecology to pursue.
Moreover, there is synergistic feedback between the metaphors adopted within
ecology (and other sciences) and the cultural context in which they originate (e.g., Stepan
4
1986; Bono 1990; Maasen et al. 1995). Elsewhere (Larson 2011a), I have made the case
for calling these “feedback metaphors.”2 The metaphors originate in everyday language;
they are applied within science, where their use shapes scientific inquiry; and, their use in
science in turn feeds back into culture. If this were not the case, the metaphoric referent
would have been too obscure to be useful and to communicate to other scientists as well
as to lay people (including funders and the broader public). If scientific metaphors did
not reflect and resonate with their cultural context, they would not endure—and indeed
many have not. For example, as space exploration has been given a lower and lower
public policy priority, the “spaceship-Earth” metaphor, ubiquitous around the time of the
spectacular Apollo moon missions, has all but dropped out of environmental discourse.
The referents of feedback metaphors occur at various scales. Often the referent is
bodily experience—e.g., so-called cognitive metaphors sensu Lakoff and Johnson (1980),
such as “balance,” which is the referent of mathematical equilibrium according to
Cuddington (2001). In other cases, the referent of a metaphor is cultural. The cultural
context of some metaphors may be somewhat obscure (e.g., a “keystone” species, drawn
from Medieval architecture), or they may sometimes reflect the discourse of the day—
called discourse metaphors by Zinken et al. (2008)—e.g., “meltdown,” drawn from
nuclear-power-plant accidents, which, in turn, is drawn from metallurgy. Sometimes a
metaphor may be much more deeply embedded in the cognitive structure of the society—
called root metaphors by Pepper (1942)—e.g., “mechanistic” explanations.
Given that these core metaphors in ecology reflect the society in which they
occur, they are implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) value-laden. This occurs not least
2
Note that this choice of a metaphor is steeped in a cybernetic view of the world (see
Larson 2011).
5
because metaphors can have different meanings (“polysemy”), which occurs at various
levels as well. At an interpretive and psychological level, many of these metaphors have
a popular “resonance” that is quite strongly value-laden, for example “invasive” species
are, by that token, bad things. The value resonance of some metaphors (and their
alternatives) is extremely context-dependent. Partisans of free-market economics might
view competition as a good thing, while partisans of Keynesian economics might view
cooperation more favorably. Sometimes even invasion can be a good thing (e.g., when
we want to introduce a species to control another that’s deemed a “pest”). At their worst,
ecological metaphors can have racist, sexist, or misogynistic overtones (e.g., Haraway
1989; Zuk 1993; Herbers 2007).
At the level of worldview, scientific metaphors are also implicitly and subtly
value-laden. This largely originates from the manner in which all metaphors both
highlight and hide. As I said, a metaphor is chosen because it is apt. If new species did
not colonize (also a metaphor) in a manner that we could compare with “invasion,” then
we would not utilize the metaphor at all—we might say “colonize” rather than “invade.”
So by using that metaphor, we highlight the ways in which widely spreading species are
like invaders conquering a country. But there is also an “is not” with every metaphor;
that is, there are ways in which the phenomenon is not like the metaphorical referent and
the metaphor hides this “is not” from view. Further, in contrast to a stated simile—X is
like Y—the very act of comparison is itself obscured. The “invasion” metaphor, for
example, implicitly vilifies a species that shows up in a new place. But species do not
have agency or intent to harm (even if they often do cause harm) and they are not
crossing borders bounding countries that are geopolitically demarcated (Larson 2005,
6
2011b). The value-laden element of this metaphor leads to a strong bias towards
interpreting the phenomenon of spreading species in terms of what is highlighted by the
metaphor, while ignoring what is hidden. This can lead to epistemic limitations and to
inappropriate social responses—for example, a response to these species as if they are
“bad” and “vicious” rather than just species doing what species do.
From a philosophical point of view, these feedback metaphors implicitly blur the
bright line scientists typically would like to draw between fact and value. Such melding
of fact and value occurs in science all the time. Many ecologists and conservation
biologists, for example, naturally interpret “invasive species” as something against which
we should, without question, defend the homeland (Larson 2008). While this
interpretation may be appropriate if “invasive species” are defined in terms of their
harmfulness, the metaphor is misleading in ecology, where they are defined simply in
terms of their tendency to spread (Lodge et al. 2006). To shift metaphors, as it were,
most laypersons would wish to cultivate ecological “stability” and to restrict ecological
“disturbance,” even though contemporary ecology now recognizes the importance of
disturbance for ecological renewal and the maintenance of biological diversity (Worster
1990; Lodge and Hamlin 2006).
Not only in science itself do metaphors meld fact and value (as “invasion” so
obviously demonstrates), but also when a metaphor from science, interpreted as an “is,”
is used to justify how things “ought” to be in the cultural context from which it is drawn
(see Fleming 2006; Elliott 2009; Larson 2011). The classic example is the “survival-ofthe-fittest” metaphor drawn from Darwinian evolutionary biology and then used as a
justification for competitiveness within society, as in Social Darwinism, and even as
7
justification for eugenics and for genocide (Keller 1992; Taylor 1998; and see Larson
2011a for further nuance).
Accordingly, the choice of which metaphor to use is an ethical and value-laden
one, not just epistemological, even though scientists have often restricted discussion to a
metaphor’s epistemic dimensions—as if science were indeed “objective ” and occurring
in a social vacuum. Although the attempt to be objective is a laudable ideal, it is
ultimately not possible to actually achieve (Putnam 2002; Kincaid et al. 2007; Douglas
2009), despite the determination by the early 20th-century Logical Positivists to draw a
sharp distinction between objective facts and subjective values. This is not to suggest
that the selection of a metaphor can be deliberately managed because no scientist can
operate as a perfect “social engineer.” Metaphoric choices are often quite unconscious,
even though one goal of this chapter is to make their choice more conscious or at least
more transparent. On the other hand, there are now some very good examples of
biologists who have consciously used metaphors, such as “invasional meltdown” and
“DNA barcoding” (Larson 2009, 2011), to promote a particular worldview and its
associated values.
Not only is the choice of metaphor an ethical choice, it is also performative,
which enlarges its significance even more. By performative, I mean that the metaphors
we choose are not merely cognitive: they lead to actions in the world that have
consequences. The naturalistic fallacy—inferring an “ought” from an “is”—provides one
example of such consequences (see Wilson et al. 2003; Fleming 2006). That is, while a
metaphor may seem like a scientifically validated “is,” it in fact implies “oughts” that
contribute to social decisions, actions, and outcomes that may sometimes be undesirable.
8
Even if we do not consciously transpose a metaphor from one domain to another (e.g.,
“competition occurs in nature, so it ought to occur in human society”), in the case of
some metaphors the “is” is strongly tied to an “ought” and associated actions (e.g., “those
species are invading a forest”, so we are led inexorably to think, “therefore, we ought to
stop them”).
Over time, metaphors have their greatest power in the performativity of an entire
worldview, as evidenced by some subfields and schools of thought in ecology. In the
history of ecology, as already pointed out, there has been a decided emphasis on studies
of competition as opposed to cooperation. The “invasive species” has been so powerfully
performative as to give rise to an entire field of “invasion biology.” Resilience is a fairly
new metaphor in ecological science, but one that has become an increasingly common
metric of the state of an ecosystem and its ability to tolerate anthropogenic change.
Interestingly, though, one might say that the increasing prevalence of this metaphor in
ecological discourse actually reflects a narrowing of options, thus in effect reducing our
cognitive resilience for understanding ecological change in diverse ways. As ecologists,
we should always be sensitive to whether our metaphoric lenses have become too narrow
or whether a greater plurality of metaphors would be helpful for maintaining diverse
options for responding to change.
As a consequence of the way they operate, ecological metaphors create a
significant tension between neutrality and advocacy. Some would argue that we can
dispense with the problem of metaphors by simply abandoning them, but that is hopeless
because of their cognitive function—and even the attempt to be neutral is value-laden
(Weber and Word 2001). More to the point, many ecologists, philosophers, and social
9
scientists argue that ecology would be more effective in terms of conservation outcomes
if it became more explicitly and consciously value-laden (e.g., Westoby 1997; Norton
1998; Bradshaw and Bekoff 2001; Robertson and Hull 2003; Foote et al. 2009).
Conservation is, after all, motivated by values. That the contemporary zeitgeist is
broadly inconsistent with sustainability values poses a significant problem for
conservation because the metaphoric referents available for use by conservationists may
not be consistent with desired sustainability outcomes (see Larson 2011a). There is an
ongoing challenge here to find metaphors that speak positively to people about
conservation and sustainability and that do not simply reinforce the largely incompatible,
contemporary worldview (which puts a premium on consumption and economic growth).
Concluding thoughts and recommendations
Bringing to light the operation of metaphors in ecology exposes several tensions that lie
at the heart of claims of scientific objectivity and the role of science in conservation and
sustainability initiatives. Conservation problems are not simple ones, where facts lead to
clear decisions (Sarewitz 2004), but instead they are complex, uncertain, and contested
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). As a result, diverse values come into play that drive the
direction society will take. Therefore ethical decisions are inescapable because the
choice among diverse values is by definition an ethical choice. Science must thus
respond in moving in a more democratic direction (Kitcher 2001), despite fears that this
will devalue science to the lowest common denominator of public opinion, subject to
extra-scientific manipulation, such as we see with the success of climate-change denial
(which is a particular sort of manipulation that must be acknowledged and prevented
10
where possible). Gone is the previous, implicit model of the relationship between science
and society/citizens (top-down, science-first), to be replaced by a more bottom-up model
where society is more involved in decisions formerly thought to be determined by science
alone (Dietz and Stern 1998; Pielke 2007). This is uncomfortable for some ecologists,
but many increasingly recognize that advocacy and public engagement as a necessary
path for ecology (Lubchenco 1998; Balmford and Bond 2005; Palmer et al. 2005; Foote
et al. 2009; Nelson and Vucetich 2009).
Finally, it is important to reflect on one of the overarching metaphors in this book,
that of “worldview.” A worldview emphasizes the sense of vision, the view of
something. In that sense, it is coincident with the attempt by science to be objective, to
take a “disembodied” gaze at the world. As Heidegger (1977, p. 133-134) put it, “As
soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a world view …
The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.” The
problem here is that vision is one of the more “distancing” senses insofar as it separates
the viewer and the observed (Ingold 2000). This may be inconsistent with the more
embodied linking of ecology, ethics and praxis that we here seek. But sometimes it
seems that the harder we try, the more enmired we become in language, the very
metaphor of a “link” further suggesting two reified entities that must be reconciled.
Awareness of feedback metaphors in ecology demonstrates the extent to which facts and
values, science and society, are less linked (or in need of linking) than intertwined (a
weaving metaphor, I suppose). We can no longer pretend that science exists in splendid
isolation because attention to ecological metaphors demonstrates that ecology and ethics
are already inextricably integrated.
11
To facilitate a better understanding of the metaphorical integration of ecology,
ethics, and society, and to operate in this context with greater awareness:
1. Ecologists (as well as scientists and citizens more generally) should reflect on
the prevalent metaphors that shape their lives. Awareness is the first step to
understanding their influence.
2. When utilizing a metaphor, ecologists should reflect on the broader connections
of the metaphor and whether it is consistent with their values and intentions.
3. When creating a new metaphor, ecologists should seek input from experienced
science communicators and diverse stakeholders to better understand its broader
ethical and social implications.
12
References
Balmford A, Bond W (2005) Trends in the state of nature and their implications for
human well-being. Ecol Lett 8:1218–1234
Bono JJ (1990) Science, discourse, and literature: The role/rule of metaphor in science.
In: Peterfreund S (ed) Literature and science: Theory and practice. Northeastern
University Press, Boston, p 59–89
Boucher DH (1986) The idea of mutualism, past and future. In: Boucher DH (ed) The
biology of mutualism: Ecology and beyond. Croom Helm, London, p 1–28
Bradshaw GA, Bekoff M (2001) Ecology and social responsibility: The re-embodiment
of science. Trends Ecol Evol 16:460–465
Brown TL (2003) Making truth: Metaphor in science. University of Illinois Press,
Chicago
Cuddington K (2001) The 'balance of nature' metaphor and equilibrium in population
ecology. Biol Philos 16:463–479
Davis MA, Thompson K, Grime JP (2001) Charles S. Elton and the dissociation of
invasion ecology from the rest of ecology. Divers Distrib 7:97–102
Dietz T, Stern PC (1998) Science, values, and biodiversity. BioScience 48:441–444
Douglas HE (2009) Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. University of Pittsburgh
Press, Pittsburgh
13
Elliott KC (2009) The ethical significance of language in the environmental sciences:
Case studies from pollution research. Ethics, Place, Environ 12, 157–173
Elton CS (1958) The ecology of invasions by animals and plants. Methuen, London
Fleming PA (ed) (2006) Can nature (legitimately) be our guide? In: Lodge DM, Hamlin
C (eds) Religion and the new ecology: Environmental responsibility in a world in
flux. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, p 199–225
Foote L, Krogman N, Spence J (2009) Should academics advocate on environmental
issues? Soc Natur Resour 22:579–589
Funtowicz SO, Ravetz JR (1993) Science for the post-normal age. Futures 25:739–755
Haraway DJ (1989) Primate visions: Gender, race, and nature in the world of modern
science. Routledge, New York
Heidegger M (1977) The question concerning technology, and other essays. Garland,
New York
Herbers JM (2007) Watch your language! Racially loaded metaphors in scientific
research. BioScience 57:104–105
Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 4:
1–23
Ingold T (2000) The perception of the environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and
skill. Routledge, New York
14
Keddy PA (1989) Competition. Chapman and Hall, New York
Keller EF (1995) Refiguring life: Metaphors of twentieth century biology. Columbia
University Press, New York
Keller EF (1988) Demarcating public from private values in evolutionary discourse. J
Hist Biol 21:195–211
Keller EF (1992) Competition: Current usages. In: Keller EF, Lloyd EA (eds) Keywords
in evolutionary biology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p 68–73
Kincaid H, Dupré J, Wylie A (eds) (2007) Value-free science? Ideals and illusions.
Oxford University Press, New York
Kitcher P (2001) Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford University Press, New York
Lakoff G, Johnson M (1980) Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago
Larson BMH (2005) The war of the roses: Demilitarizing invasion biology. Front Ecol
Environ 3:495–500
Larson BMH (2008) Entangled biological, cultural and linguistic origins of the war on
invasive species. In: Frank R, Dirven R, Ziemke T, Bernárdez E (eds) Body,
language and mind. Volume 2: Sociocultural situatedness. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin,
p 169–195
15
Larson B (2009) Should scientists advocate? The case of promotional metaphors in
environmental science. In: Nerlich B, Elliot R, Larson BMH (eds) Communicating
biological sciences: Ethical and metaphorical dimensions. Ashgate, Burlington, VT,
p 169–183
Larson B (2011a) Metaphors for environmental sustainability: Redefining our
relationship with nature. Yale University Press, New Haven
Larson BMH (2011b) Embodied realism and invasive species. In: de Laplante K,
Peacock K (eds) Philosophy of ecology and conservation biology. Elsevier, London,
p 133–150
Lodge DM, Hamlin C (eds) (2006) Religion and the new ecology: Environmental
responsibility in a world in flux. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
Lodge DM, Williams S, MacIsaac HJ et al (2006) Biological invasions:
Recommendations for US policy and management. Ecol Appl 16:2035–2054
Lubchenco J (1998) Entering the century of the environment: A new social contract for
science. Science 279:491–497
Maasen S, Mendelsohn E, Weingart P (eds) (1995) Biology as society, society as
biology: Metaphors. Kluwer, Dordrecht
McIntosh R (1992) Competition: Historical perspectives. In: Keller EF, Lloyd EA (eds)
Keywords in evolutionary biology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p 61–67
16
Nelson MP, Vucetich JA (2009) On advocacy by environmental scientists: What,
whether, why, and how. Cons Biol 23:1090–1101
Norton BG (1998) Improving ecological communication: The role of ecologists in
environmental policy formation. Ecol Appl 8:350–364
Ortony A (ed) (1993) Metaphor and thought, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Palmer MA, Bernhardt ES, Chornesky EA et al (2005) Ecological science and
sustainability for the 21st century. Front. Ecol. Environ. 3:4–11
Pepper S (1942) World hypotheses. University of California Press, Berkeley
Pielke RA Jr (2007) The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics.
Cambridge University Press, New York
Putnam H (2002) The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge
Robertson DP, Hull RB (2003) Public ecology: An environmental science and policy for
global society. Environ Sci Policy 6:399–410
Sarewitz D (2004) How science makes environmental controversies worse. Environ Sci
Policy 7:385–403
Stepan NL (1986) Race and gender: The role of analogy in science. Isis 77:261–277
17
Taylor P (1998) Natural selection: A heavy hand in biological and social thought. Science
as Culture 7:5–32
Weber JR, Word CS (2001) The communication process as evaluative context: What do
nonscientists hear when scientists speak? BioScience 51:487–495
Westoby M (1997) What does 'ecology' mean? Trends Ecol Environ 12:166
Wilson DS, Deitrich E, Clark AB (2003) On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic
fallacy in evolutionary psychology. Biol Philos 18:669–682
Worster D (1985) Nature's economy: A history of ecological ideas. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Worster D (1990) The ecology of order and chaos. Environ Hist Rev 14:1–18
Zinken J, Hellsten I, Nerlich B (eds) (2008) Discourse metaphors. In: Frank R, Dirven R,
Ziemke T, Bernárdez E (eds) Body, language and mind. Volume 2: Sociocultural
situatedness. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, p 363–385
Zuk M (1993) Feminism and the study of animal behavior. BioScience 43:774–778.
18