PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No.: AB5526
Project Name
Region
Sector
Project ID
Borrower(s)
Samoa Post Tsunami Reconstruction
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Roads and highways (100%)
P120594
INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA
Implementing Agency
The Land Transport Authority
Land Transport Authority
P.O.Box 1607
Apia, Samoa
Tel: (+685) 26740
Fax: (+685) 26739
info@lta.gov.ws
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment
Private Bag
Apia, Samoa
Tel: (+685) 23800
Environment Category
Date PID Prepared
Estimated Date of
Appraisal Authorization
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
[ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
May 28, 2010
June 2, 2010
June 23, 2010
Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement
1.
Samoa is highly vulnerable to natural hazards. The World Bank’s Natural Disaster
Hotspots study identifies Samoa as the 30th country in the world’s most exposed states to three
or more hazards. Seventy percent of Samoa’s population lives on the coast facing coastal hazards
such as cyclones, tsunamis, flooding and storm surges. Cyclones Ofa (1990) and Val (1991) have
been the most notable affecting 195,000 and 88,000 people respectively and costing
approximately four times GDP. Geo-hazards such as earthquakes, tsunami and volcanic
eruptions are also threats. The National Tsunami Plan of Samoa identifies a wave of between 7m
and 9m average run up height to occur approximately every 50 – 100 years. With the currently
available analysis, this remains a best design case, equivalent to a once-in-a-lifetime event and
resembles the recent tsunami.
2.
On September 29 2009, a powerful earthquake struck south of Samoa and was followed
by a tsunami that impacted American Samoa, Samoa, and northern Tonga. In Samoa there have
been 143 reported deaths and an estimated 5,274 people homeless. The main affected areas, with
1
about 7 percent of the country’s population, are the southern, eastern and southwestern coast of
Upolu Island.
3.
The response from the Government of Samoa (GOS) and the international humanitarian
community was immediate, swift and efficient. A fully functional National Emergency
Operations Centre (NEOC) was activated near the capital Apia. Access roads to affected areas
were quickly cleared allowing for rapid response efforts by communities, Non Governmental
Organizations (NGO) and the national Disaster Management Office (DMO). With support from
the Australian and New Zealand military and disaster relief teams, the Government provided
medical facilities, tents and clean water. Strong social networks responded effectively, despite
the devastation, and many homeless were accommodated by family and friends.
4.
The Government’s Disaster Advisory Committee requested assistance from the United
Nations (UN) for a multi-cluster needs assessment. Advanced teams arrived in Samoa on Oct 4
and 5. At the same time the Minister of Finance, in a meeting with World Bank’s East Asia–
Pacific Vice President, requested World Bank support for a Post Disaster Needs Assessment
(PDNA) to complement the early recovery assessment and formulate a long term recovery and
reconstruction strategy. A joint World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and United Nations
PDNA team arrived in Samoa on October 7 2009 to assist the GOS for a damage and loss
assessment.
5.
The Post Disaster Needs Assessment estimated the sum of direct damages and economic
losses in Samoa at US$124 million (equivalent to more than 22 percent of Samoa’s GDP). In
economic terms, the infrastructure sectors only accounted for three quarters of the total damages
at US$64.8 million with an additional US$4.3 million in economic losses. The greatest costs
were found in the transport sector, where the coastal road and accompanying sea walls were
severely damaged. Furthermore, about 13 percent of the country’s housing stock was lost.
6.
A significant proportion of the affected population has chosen to relocate inland from the
shore and government decided to support this move with provision of services. This move
inland, as part of the recovery and future disaster risk reduction, raises the total post-tsunami
recovery costs to about US$ 167.4 million. The GOS officially requested Bank support to
address the reconstruction needs of the roads infrastructure in January 2010.
7.
Before the tsunami disaster, Samoa was performing strongly with real per capita income
growing steadily since the mid-nineties. However, the country has been recently affected by the
global financial crisis with real GDP falling by more than 5 percent in FY 2008/9. Many jobs
have been lost in the domestic economy, primarily in the export manufacturing sector, and other
jobs and associated remittances have been lost through the closure of a large tuna canning plant
in neighboring American Samoa. The agriculture sector also suffered in 2008/09 as fish exports
fell. Construction output was reduced due to a decline in activity following the South Pacific
Games in 2007. However, the small, but growing tourism sector used to have a positive impact
on incomes, but mostly in the tsunami affected area. This was reflected in growth in the hotels,
restaurants, and transport and commerce sectors in the affected areas.
8.
Despite the global crisis, Samoa’s current account deficit narrowed, as remittances and
tourism receipts --together accounting for more than 40 percent of GDP-- continued to grow in
2008. Samoan authorities responded to the crisis by lowering interest rates and increasing
development spending. The deficit was budgeted to double to over 10 percent of GDP in FY
2009/10 and would be financed by soft loans and aid grants. Public debt comprises mostly
2
concessional lending from the ADB and World Bank and is expected to reach 41 percent of GDP
in 2009/10, slightly above government’s target of 40 percent of GDP.
Government’s Strategy
9.
With support from the World Bank’s Infrastructure Asset Management program, Samoa
has adopted a modern and comprehensive disaster risk management framework in its 2006
Disaster and Emergency Management Act. The National Disaster Council, chaired by the Prime
Minister and served by the Disaster Management Office (DMO), serves as the national
coordinating mechanism to oversee disaster risk management in the country, including the
tsunami recovery plan. Responsibility for Disaster Management is assigned to the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) which houses the DMO as a Section of the
Meteorology Division with three staff members.
10.
A National Samoa Tsunami Recovery Plan has been established by the GOS based on the
integrated assessment reports prepared jointly by the GOS and development partners. The plan is
coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and a supplementary budget for recovery was approved
by cabinet in December 2009. The recovery plan estimates total needs at US$108 million with
expenditure at approximately US$ 26 million per year in the first three years of recovery. The
Ministry of Finance confirmed that financing for the recovery effort will be comprised of a mix
of resources including multilateral and bilateral grants, loans and restructuring. The plan includes
activities already underway and lists priorities for the medium term from 2010-2012. Longer
term actions beyond 2012 are to be addressed through ongoing multi-year sector programs.
11.
The National Tsunami Recovery Plan calls for US$ 27.9 million investment in the
transport sector in the next three years. Whilst immediate clearance of roads and superficial
repair was conducted in October and November 2009, increased heavy transport combined with
weakened or damaged seawalls have left vulnerabilities from displaced rocks and potential
coastal erosion in exposed sections of the road. The tsunami recovery plan also calls for the
upgrading of roads to resettlement areas and provides for prioritized investments in the following
order: (i) restoration of existing roads; (ii) restoration of bridges and main routes; (iii) a new road
to resettled communities; and (iv) reconstruction of the seawalls.
12.
The GOS approached the Bank to support the recovery program through financing of
transport infrastructure for the resettled communities inland from the coast. The aim is to
establish normal living conditions for these communities through the provision of services that
will: i) provide better transport access to relocated communities; ii) improve access for
agricultural activities in these areas to support income generation; and iii) safeguard the disaster
mitigation benefits of moving exposed populations away from the coastal areas, where they are
at risk from tsunami and cyclones.
Risk factors that affect the Government’s tsunami recovery program include the concatenation of
events, such as additional natural hazards that might affect the vulnerable population. Affected
families have been stretched for resources and find themselves dependent on their community,
the government. and family members abroad as they rebuild. While remittances from abroad
have provided in many cases a life-line, the newly relocated communities are still vulnerable as
they seek to reconstruct at the end of the 2010 cyclone season. The recent passage of cyclone
Rene in February 14 2010, and tsunami warning following the Chile Earthquake of February 27
2010, fortunately did not materialize in significant events in Samoa, but were reminders of the
potential risks Samoan communities must mitigate against.
3
Proposed objective(s)
13.
The project’s Development Objective is to assist the Government of Samoa in its efforts
to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living in the island of Upolu affected
by the tsunami of September 29, 2009, through the provision of improved infrastructure access to
relocation sites; enhanced transport infrastructure, and assistance to local communities to address
future natural disasters.
Preliminary description
14.
The proposed Credit incorporates five project components:
(a) Component 1. Upgrading of existing access tracks and seawalls – US$5.6 million. This
component will provide partial retroactive financing for urgent works by LTA to: provide
improved road access to relocation areas; construct a new link road that will provide an
alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone; and reinstate
damaged seawalls and construct new seawalls to protect the east and south coast roads.
(i) Lepa/Lalomanu link road – US$1.1 million. This sub-component responds to the need to
provide improved road access to relocation areas and for an alternative route along the south
coast above the natural disaster risk zone.
(ii) Upgrading of access tracks – US$2.8 million. This sub-component responds to requests
from village mayors to upgrade existing tracks from the east coast road to areas where
residents are relocating after the tsunami.
(iii) Sea wall repair and reconstruction – US$1.6 million. This sub-component will restore
and upgrade seawalls along critical lengths of the coastal roads.
(iv) Salani Bailey Bridge repair – US$0.04 million. This sub-component will repair damage
caused by the tsunami.
(v) Technical assistance – US$0.06 million. This sub-component will finance specialist
technical assistance for storm-water drainage design along all the upgraded routes.
(b) Component 2. Community Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans– US$0.2 million.
This component will update the mapping of the affected and relocation areas, and revise the
community level Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans for these areas to assist
with infrastructure planning and monitoring, and disaster risk reduction. CIM plans will be
revised through close consultation with communities.
(c) Component 3. East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) – US$4.6 million. This
component will provide a new road link along the east coast above the natural disaster risk
zone to improve access to and for communities relocating inland from the east coast, and
provide a secure transport link between Samusu and Lalomanu.
(i) Route alignment study, design & supervision – US$0.5 million
(ii) Environmental Impact Assessment – US$0.1 million
(iii) Compensation cost – To be determined following route alignment study
4
(iv) Road construction – US$4.0 million
(d) Component 4. Dual-purpose pedestrian access routes – US$0.6 million. This component
will provide new and improved pedestrian access routes to relocation areas above the south
east escarpment area, both to facilitate access for resettled families between their new homes
and the coast, and to serve as evacuation routes in the event of a tsunami or cyclone.
(i) Feasibility study, design and supervision – US$0.1 million
(ii) Construction of pedestrian access routes – US$0.5 million
(e) Component 5. Project Management and Support – US$0.3 million. This component will
support contracted consultant services, and staffing plus operating costs for in-house project
management, administration, and monitoring and evaluation activities by LTA and MNRE.
(i) Project Management – US$0.23 million. Support for in-house project management,
administration, training, and monitoring activities by MoF, LTA and MNRE.
(ii) Monitoring & Evaluation – US$0.07 million. This sub-component will support TA to
establish the project evaluation framework and conduct before-and-after analysis to
evaluate the impact of the project.
15.
Given the emergency preparation of the above activities, there are uncertainties regarding
the final design and costs of the above components. The project will therefore include an
amount of unallocated funds of US$0.50 million to cover contingencies and currently unforeseen
needs.
Safeguard policies that might apply
16.
The project triggers OP 4.01. Because of the works taking place where roads already
exist and/or the size of the activities is limited, the project is characterized as category B. Samoa
has well-developed environmental assessment and monitoring procedures for road works.
Relevant Codes of Environmental Practice (COEP) were developed with the assistance of
international consultants to modern standards, have been adopted by Samoa, and are used for the
SIAM-2. Appropriate environmental and social frameworks have been developed to be
implemented under this emergency operation.
17.
Social Issues. The project will restore and improve access to communities and relocation
areas. Overall, the impacts are expected to be positive, as access to critical infrastructure (e.g.
schools, hospitals, markets) will be restored and improved bringing better development outcomes
to affected communities.
18.
A Social Assessment will be conducted early in the implementation period in an effort to
(i) increase awareness of the project, (ii) identify relevant social issues that may arise from the
project, (iii) discuss potential impacts of the project with the community (and mitigation
measures), (iv) (identify and recommend actions that will mitigate negative impacts and/or
maximize positive impacts either on the general population or on specific groups, and (v) solicit
input from community members into the project design, in particular the alignments of the
Samusu-Lalomanu road and the dual-purpose pedestrian access routes.
19.
The preparation of the social assessment and the consultations will be broad based and
representative, paying particular attention to the input and experiences of women, the youth, and
5
other potential vulnerable groups. Any relevant actionable inputs will strengthen the project
design, including the LARAPs, and the ESSAF.
20.
Component 1 is providing retroactive financing for activities. Due diligence will be
undertaken to determine whether the activities were implemented in compliance with national
law. The ESSAF provides guidance on the information that is required from the due diligence
including summaries of relevant legislation, summaries of the activities’ location and scope,
description of the scope and magnitude of adverse impacts, and details on measures put in place
to mitigate those impacts. If the due diligence reveals that national law was not complied with
actions to remedy adverse impacts will be developed and discussed with Government.
21.
OP 4.12 is triggered as Components 3 and 4 may require involuntary land acquisitions
and/or resettlement. The project aims to minimize involuntary land acquisition and/or
resettlement, in part by involving communities in the design of the route alignments. In addition,
a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework has been prepared. The project has adopted a
framework approach because the alignment of the relevant sub-projects under Component 3 and
4 will not be known prior to project approval.
22.
The LARF provides guidelines for temporary and permanent land acquisition,
resettlement (if necessary), and compensation for loss of crops and economic trees. The LARF
provides principles for land use which include the avoidance and minimization of involuntary
resettlement, land acquisition, and damage to physical assets. It also details procedures on
institutional roles and financial responsibilities. The LARF provides guidelines for the
preparation of Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plans once the specific route
alignments of sub-projects are known.
23.
Component 2 is financing the updating of Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans.
The Component will include close consultation with affected communities as an integral part of
the process of updating the district Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans.
Tentative financing
($m.)
Source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
International Development Association (IDA)
Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility Trust Fund
Total
Contact point
Contact: Demetrios Papathanasiou
Title: Senior Infrastructure Specialist
Tel: + 61-2-9235-6522
Fax:
Email: dpapathanasiou@worldbank.org
Location: Sydney, Australia (IBRD)
6
TBD
10
1.8
11.8