To Unite or Not? The
Question of Germany from
1945 to 1955
Jordan Peterson
12/13/2012
What to do with Germany? That was the question on the mind of the leaders of the
United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as the end of World War II was closing in.
As soon as the war ended and the Nazi regime surrendered to the Allied forces, the country was
going to be left ungoverned, and it would be up to the big three powers to determine what to do
with the country. As early as January of 1944, the Allied Powers started talking about what they
would do with the country once the surrender happened. A major question raised was what they
would do about the country’s military and what they would do so that Germany could not cause
another World War; as they had the past two times. Many plans were suggested before the three
countries came up with the original policy for Germany. One suggestion was that the country
should be split up between the three powers. Another was that the country should be
demilitarized and deindustrialized. Many suggestions were thrown around for what to do with
the country, but nothing was really set in stone because the end of the war had not yet happened.
However in September of 1944, an outline of a plan for Germany became more evident.
Representatives from the three countries all came together to work on some plans for Germany
after the war. A major decision made was about the boundaries that were going to be enforced
for Germany once the war ended. It was decided that Germany will once again be within the
boundaries that it was in on December 31st, 1937 and it would be divided into three zones, each
of which will be allotted to each of the three powers.1 At that time the original three zone areas
were set up. The eastern part of Germany would be controlled by the U.S.S.R., the northwestern zone would be controlled by the U.K., and the south-western zone would be controlled
1
"Protocol on Zones of Occupation and the Administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area," German
History in Documents and Images, September 12, 1944, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2959 (accessed October 18, 2012) p.1
Peterson 1
by the U.S.2 More about the future of Germany was decided at a conference attended by the
three leaders in Yalta. They then set in stone the original policy on Germany, although there was
a fourth member country helping to make the decisions. At Yalta, France was invited to take
part in determining what was going to happen to Germany once the war had ended. The original
policy and solution to the German question was agreed upon by the leaders of the four countries.
However, the period of agreement between the four countries would not last long. Although a
policy was agreed upon, there were some major changes to that policy to come, two in particular.
One change came when the U.S., the U.K., and France agreed to an economic fusion of their
zones. The other was when those three zones decided to join together and create the state of
West Germany, which caused the Soviet Union to create the State of East Germany. Both of
these policy changes caused more tension in an already tense situation with the Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
The issues that should be looked at more in-depth are the questions of how and why the
U.S. changed their original policy on Germany, and also looking at the Soviets position on
Germany, if they were consistent or not with the policy. By looking further into those questions
the policy changes will be further explained and understood. Gregory Treverton argues that it
was the Soviet threat that shaped the postwar order in Europe, including the divided Germany;
and the U. S. was an extra-continental balancer, which had to be engaged in order to create a
balance of power within Europe. His thesis implies that the U. S. engagement in Europe,
including its policy toward Germany, was a response to the Soviet threat. According to W. R.
Smyser, recently available evidence makes it clear that Stalin did not want a divided Germany
2
"Protocol on Zones of Occupation and the Administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area," German
History in Documents and Images, September 12, 1944, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2959 (accessed October 18, 2012). p.1
Peterson 2
but did not make the decisions necessary to prevent it; the Communist leaders in East Germany
played a more autonomous role than scholars knew previously; and Ernest Bevin, the foreign
secretary in the post-war Labor government in Great Britain, shaped Cold War Germany more
than he had been credited with doing.
This paper will examine the policies that were changing in Germany between the United
States and Soviet Union from 1945 to 1955. Although both the United States and the U.S.S.R.
are to blame for the continuing problems with the policies on Germany during the time of the
Cold War; it was the U.S. that made the first move towards each policy change that occurred.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States were responsible for the long term division of
Germany, but the US was more aggressive therefore they are more responsible because of the
collapse of the four power cooperation, and inability to reunite Germany as a whole country
again.
The first section of the paper will focus on how to four power cooperation in Germany
collapsed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for this. However the
united states takes on more responsibility because the moved away from the original policy and
did not consult the Soviets on any policy change. The collapse can be explained through the
creation of the Socialist Unity Party in the East Soviet Zone, the merger of the economic zones in
the west to help rebuild the economy, and the disputes between the Western zones and Soviet
zone over reparations and trade. The second section of this paper focuses on the inability to
reunite the country of Germany as a whole. The United States is most responsible for this
because of the rejection of Stalin’s Note, which was written in hopes to reunite the country.
They are also to blame because of the creation of the West German State, which was followed by
the East German State and then ultimately the Western zone joining NATO which caused the
Peterson 3
creation of the Warsaw Pact in the East. All of these things had led to the long term division of
Germany.
The first cause of the four power cooperation collapse was the creation of the Socialist
Unity Party in the Soviet East Zone. The new political party in the East was a combination of
the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. When deciding to form the Socialist
Unity Party, the leaders in the East said that they needed to change the politics of Germany so it
would not go back to its old ways. The leaders claimed this:
The working class will unite all democratic and progressive groups of the people. It is the
most consistent democratic force and the most resolute fighter against imperialism. It is
the force which will surmount our national disaster. The working class alone has a great
historical aim: socialism3
With that being said, it was decided that the political parties in the East zone were going to be
merged. It was said that in order to create a new free and indivisible German Republic and to
reform all political, economic, cultural, and intellectual relationships and build socialism is to
learn from the past.4 With that in mind they went ahead and merged the party. The Soviets were
claiming that this party was going to be run democratically. This fighting organization is based
on the democratic rights of decisions of its members, the democratic election of all Party leaders,
and the fact that all members, delegates, deputies, and leaders of the Party are bound by its
decisions which are democratically arrived at.5 However, this merger did not please the other
3
Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany," German History in Documents and
Images, April 21, 1946. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3247
(accessed December 1, 2012).
4
Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany," German History in Documents and
Images, April 21, 1946. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3247
(accessed December 1, 2012).
5
"Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany," German History in Documents and
Images, April 21, 1946. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3247
(accessed December 1, 2012).p.4
Peterson 4
three countries. The merger of the two parties was forced by the Soviet Leaders. The United
States did not support this because the party was still being controlled by mostly the communist
party. Also they did not support this because it was moving away from democracy, since the
people in the zones were supposed to choose their own leaders and parties.
The next cause of the four power cooperation collapse was the merger of the Western
economic zones and the rebuilding of the economy. This new agreement was one of the major
causes of the collapse of the four power cooperation. Representatives of the two countries met in
Washington D.C. to discuss the question of economic fusion of their two zones. The two
countries decided that as of January 1st, 1947, the two zones would become one single economy.6
They also agreed they would enter into talks with either of the other two Powers regarding
extending their agreement to their zones as well.7 Although they were willing to work with the
other two countries to extend their agreement, this was not the original plan for Germany in
which each country was to be solely responsible for their zone and anything that was happening
within it. With the economic fusion of the U.K. and U.S. zones, they were one step away from
the original agreement and one step closer to full zone fusion. However, when they announced
their decision, they stated the merger should be regarded as the first step towards the
achievement of the economic unity of Germany, as a whole in accordance with that agreement
6
"Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic
Fusion of their Respective Zones," German History in Documents and Images, December 2,
1946, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3156 (accessed October 18,
2012).
7
Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic
Fusion of their Respective Zones," German History in Documents and Images, December 2,
1946, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3156 (accessed October 18,
2012). p.1
Peterson 5
reached at Potsdam.8 Instead of consulting this policy change with the other two Powers, they
just went ahead and reached an agreement without them. The representatives stated that the aim
of this fusion was to achieve a self-sustaining economy for the area by the end of 1949.9 This
fusion was going to help create a better standard of living for the people in the zones, and was a
main drive for this policy change, because the two governments are responsible for the welfare
of the people within their zones.
In order to build up the economy, the United States and the United Kingdom will have to
share the financial responsibility for the costs of approved imports that are brought into the
country which are required to prevent disease, unrest and other raw materials that are brought
in.10 With this fusion came the need for more industry to be added into the zones. In 1947, the
United States and Great Britain agreed to substantially increase the production capacity of heavy
industry and other previously restricted economic sectors in their “economic bi-zone”11 By
doing this, they moved further away from the original plan to deindustrialize the country. Their
argument for increasing industry again was their bi-zone and Germany could not regain
economic health under the plan as it was and it would help overcome the economic crisis at the
8
Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic
Fusion of their Respective Zones," German History in Documents and Images, December 2,
1946, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3156 (accessed October 18,
2012). p.1
9
Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic
Fusion of their Respective Zones," German History in Documents and Images, December 2,
1946, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3156 (accessed October 18,
2012). p.2
10
Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic
Fusion of their Respective Zones," German History in Documents and Images, December 2,
1946, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=3156 (accessed October 18,
2012). p.2
11
"Revised Plan for Level of Industry in the Anglo-American Zones (August 29, 1947)," In Germany
1947-1948: The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 358, (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).
Peterson 6
time.12 They also make the case that increasing industry will help with foreign trade. “Since
world food and raw material prices have increased more rapidly than the prices of manufactured
goods, the bi-zonal area must be prepared to exchange in foreign trade proportionately larger
quantities of industrial products in return for necessary food and raw materials.”13 The case they
were making was them saying in order to keep up with the rest of the world; they would have to
increase their industrial capability. They made this adjustment again without consulting France
and the U.S.S.R. and they were covering up the policy change, stating that it was going to be
beneficial to achieving the original plan. By doing this without consulting the other countries,
they were creating more distrust between the United States and Soviet Union. The tension in
Germany among the four countries would only raise more with the new adjustment to the
original policy.
Eventually, France did decide to join into the bi-zone economic policy. France was
becoming a trend follower when it came to policy changes, because they just seemed to follow
with what the U.S. and U.K. were doing in Germany. France was able to join into the economic
fusion, only after they were able to figure out how to support French forces on their own and
keep that out of the tri-zonal budget.14 With the tri-zonal fusion, the aid from the U.S. and U.K.
would be spread out thinner, but there would not really be an increase in cost to the two
12
Revised Plan for Level of Industry in the Anglo-American Zones (August 29, 1947)," In Germany
1947-1948: The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 358, (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). p.1
13
Revised Plan for Level of Industry in the Anglo-American Zones (August 29, 1947)," In Germany
1947-1948: The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 358, (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). p.2
14
Ambassador Murphy, "The United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of
State (July 31, 1948)," In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 670, (Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1973).
Peterson 7
countries.15 However, to get the French zone up to the level that the bi-zone is on, more food
and raw materials will have to be brought to the country to equal them out.16 One reason France
decided to join the U.S. and the U.K. in their economic combination was because of the Marshall
plan. They were told if they joined the two countries, they would receive economic aid to their
zone from the United States. The Marshall Plan was a U.S. economic aid program to help fix the
European economy after World War II. Germany was included in this plan because of the zone
the U.S. controlled, however, it was only available to the zones controlled by the United States,
United Kingdom, and France. The aid from the Marshall Plan included shipments of food,
staples, fuel and machinery from the United States and later resulted in investment in industrial
capacity in Europe.17 The plan, however, was intended to rebuild the economies and spirits of
Western Europe primarily and political stability in the West was also seen as a key to blunting
the advances of communism in the region as well.18 With this plan in place, the U.S., U.K. and
French zones of Germany were able to focus more on rebuilding the industrial economy of the
country. Since the three occupation zones were now joined together as an economic zone, the
Soviet Union was left out. The Soviet Union leaders were not even involved in talks that
occurred about the change in policy in the new tri-zonal economy in the west, so they were not
aware of the changes until they had already happened. The Marshall Plan was also not part of
15
Ambassador Murphy, "The United States Political Advisorfor Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of
State (August 24, 1948)," In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 671, (Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1973).
16
Ambassador Murphy, "The United States Political Advisorfor Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of
State (August 24, 1948)," In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 671, (Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1973). p.671
17
George C. Marshall Foundation, The Marshall Plan, 2009,
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/TheMarshallPlan.htm (accessed October 19, 2012).
18
George C. Marshall Foundation, The Marshall Plan, 2009,
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/TheMarshallPlan.htm (accessed October 19, 2012). p.1
Peterson 8
the original plan for Germany because the zones were supposed to trade with one another to
provide aid for their zones.
Another reason for the four power cooperation collapse was disputes about reparations
and trade between the Western Zone and the Soviet Zone. The zones had planned to trade with
one another in the original agreement; the west was going to provide the industry and the east
zone was going to provide the agricultural goods. However that did not happen, because the
Soviets did not trade their agricultural goods. That is something that pushed the U.S. to come up
with another plan to provide for the people in their zone, hence the Marshall Plan. Although
with the Marshall Plan, it cost the U.S. more money to fund the program than originally planned,
because the original plan only had them trading for goods, so that saved them money to use
elsewhere in their zone. With the trade of industry and agriculture no longer occurring between
the zones in Germany, the Soviet zone was left to rebuild their zones economy on their own.
This would be difficult for them because they had deindustrialized their zone and relied on the
reparations they were getting from the western zones regarding industry.
With the combination of the three economic zones in the west, they were on their way to
creating a separate state. When they combined their zones economically, they had no other
choice because they had to take care of the people. Although they did not consult all the powers
before they did it, they made the right choice, because they were thinking of what would be best
to achieve the goals that had been set for the country from the Potsdam agreement. However,
when it came to what they were doing about the industry in the tri-zone, they were doing
everything in secrecy. In a telegram from the Civil Affairs Department of the Army to the
United States Military Governor for Germany, it is stated:
Peterson 9
“Meantime you should continue practice of making no deliveries to Soviet Union except
for any tag end of deliveries which were never suspended and are now being completed
pursuant advance deliveries and war plants equip programs. There should be no public
statement or statement to the Soviets on this practice pending the adoption definitive U.S.
policy. Reasons for secrecy are delicate negotiations with British and desire if possible to
avoid any Soviet reprisals pending definitive policy.”19
With that being said, they were cutting off the Soviets without even giving them an explanation
on why policies were being changes. The Soviets had expected they would receive their
reparations in their zone for as long as it was occupied, but as soon as the U.S. changed the
policy they were cut off and had to find their own way of getting industrial goods. This was the
opinion of the U.S. and they had hoped it would have been adopted by the other members of the
tri-zone, however, that was not the case. With this policy change happening, the United States
was becoming more aggressive towards the Soviet Union. The British had indicated that they do
not wish to join with the U.S. in cessation of deliveries to Soviets, and they regard themselves as
obligated to continue such dismantling and deliveries.20 The British were very cautious about
their decisions when it came to the Soviets. In communications with the U.S. state department,
the ambassador stated the British lay great stress on argument to cut off reparations to the Soviets
would give them excuse for launching further attacks on allied positions in Berlin.21 However,
the U.S. still pushed on with wanting to cut off deliveries to the Soviet zone. The U.S. claimed
stopping of reparations would not really affect the relationships between the zones by stating
this:
19
"The Civil Affairs Division of the Army to the United States Military Governor for Germany (Clay),"
In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 703-705, (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1973).
20
"The Civil Affairs Division of the Army to the United States Military Governor for Germany (Clay),"
In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 703-705, (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1973). p.704
21
"The Civil Affairs Division of the Army to the United States Military Governor for Germany (Clay),"
In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, 703-705, (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1973). p.705
Peterson 10
“There is no assurance, however, that the Soviet Union would continue any reciprocal
deliveries under the above proposal, and it is possible that refusal by the Soviet Union
would mean a net loss for Western Europe in the recovery period. A study prepared by a
member of the U.S. delegation to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency indicates that the
value of capital reparations remaining to be delivered to the Soviet Union from the
Western zones is approximately the same as the value of all reciprocal deliveries. Thus if
deliveries from the West stopped, the U.S.S.R. could very well make no reciprocal
deliveries and justify its action.”22
Even though the U.S. wanted to cut off the Soviet Union, they did not expect for them to still
make deliveries to the Western zone, and they were fine with that, but since deliveries had not
been coming for a while from the Soviets, they saw it in the best interest for their zones, if they
stopped sending their reparations. However, they were still not going about this the right way,
and they seemed to be going into this policy change alone. The British were unsure about
cutting off the Soviets, however, they were sharing an economic zone with the United States, and
they did lessen their deliveries to the Soviets, even though they still kept up with the
reparations.23 Although the U.S. was attempting to make the right decisions, they were not going
about it the correct way which caused more tension between them and the Soviet Union. With
these changes in policy and the economic fusion between the United States zone, the United
Kingdom zone and the French zone, they were well on their way to creating what will become
the state of West Germany.
One reason why Germany was unable to reunite as a whole country was because of the
creation of the West German state. When the United States, United Kingdom, and France
combined their zones economically, they were setting the stage for creating their own German
state. In May of 1949, the three zones were merged to create the state of West Germany, which
22
"Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State," In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948,
715, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1973).
23
"Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State," In Foreign Relations of the United States 1948,
715, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1973).
Peterson 11
was to be a democratic state. This was once again a policy change made by the United States
and their allies. In doing this, they were making a statement to the Soviet Union in the East. The
statement was they were no longer allies and they no longer intended on working together.
When this happened, the Soviet Union was completely cut off politically and economically.
However, this was not part of their original plan. The division of Germany was never supposed
to get this far, it was only supposed to be short term. This was not the case any longer since
division was now to be long term. Although West Germany was not declared its own state until
1949, plans for the new state began in February of 1948. Starting then, the Western Allies
started meeting in London to deliberate on the future of Germany both politically and
economically.24 Once again the western allies were having these meetings in secret and not
informing the Soviets of their decisions. This was how they were going to decide what to do
with their zones of Germany. The constituent assembly will draft a democratic constitution
which will establish for the participating states a governmental structure of federal type which is
best adapted to the eventual re-establishment of German unity at present.25 This will help move
the future Germany state to becoming a democracy, keeping it away from turning to
communism.
This democratic constitution will establish for the participating states a governmental
structure of federal type which is best adapted to the eventual re-establishment of German
24
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950).
25
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950).
Peterson 12
unity and present disrupted and which will protect the rights of the participating states,
provide adequate authority, and contain guarantees of individual rights and freedoms.26
This constitution seemed to be based off of the constitutions of the countries that were writing
them. After the new constitution was written it needed to be approved by the military leaders in
the allied zones so it could be put into effect. The establishment of a constitutional German
government will necessitate careful definition of the relationship between this government and
the Allied Authorities.27 With this occurring, it will be established that the Allied Authorities
will still have a part in the government of the West German State. One clause that was put into
the constitution regarding the Allied Authorities is in the event of an emergency threatening
security, the military governors will resume the right to exercise their full powers.28 This would
be helpful to the State in the occurrence of a conflict with the Soviet Union. This is also a way
for the Allied Authorities to keep some control in the West German State. The relationship
between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had worsened and led to the collapse of the
Allied Control Council in Berlin in March 1948.29 From there the relationship only seemed to
worsen as more changes occurred in the Western Zone.
The next reason for the inability to reunite Germany was the formation of the East
German State and how the Western State was being run. As for the Soviets in the East, they
needed to come back with a response to the Western State. Their decision was to create an
26
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950).
27
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950), p. 2
28
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950), p. 2
29
United States Department of State, "The London Documents (July 1, 1948)," In Germany 1947-1949:
The Story in Documents, by United States Department of State, 275, (Washington D.C. : U.S.
Government Print Office, 1950), p. 1
Peterson 13
Eastern State of Germany. With this, more tension was created between the two sides during the
Cold War. When the Western State was created, it was established that the Allies would retain
their power in important political areas for the time being.30 When the decision on West
Germany was officially made, the Allies made sure they had come to an agreement on all
questions related to Germany. The new state was going to be called the German Federal
Republic. With that establishment of the state, there will be many changes. One main change is
the military government will be terminated and the functions of the Allied Authorities will
become mainly supervisors, and each of the Allied establishments will come under the direction
of a High Commissioner, aside from the occupation forces which will remain headed by military
commanders.31 This will give the German Federal Republic a chance to take responsibility for
domestic affairs in the country. However, anything they take action on, both administratively
and legislatively, could lose its validity if it is disapproved by the Allied Authorities.32 The
Allies did still want the German people to feel like they were governing themselves.
During the period in which it is necessary that the occupation continue, the Governments
of France, the United States and the United Kingdom desire and intend that the German
people shall enjoy self-government to the maximum possible degree consistent with such
occupation. The Federal State and the participating Länder shall have, subject only to the
30
United States Department of State, "Decisions of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Three
Western Powers in Washington, DC (April 8, 1949)," In Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents, by United States Department of State, 88-92, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1
31
United States Department of State, "Decisions of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Three
Western Powers in Washington, DC (April 8, 1949)," In Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents, by United States Department of State, 88-92, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1
32 United States Department of State, "Decisions of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Three
Western Powers in Washington, DC (April 8, 1949)," In Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents, by United States Department of State, 88-92, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1
Peterson 14
limitations in this Instrument, full legislative, executive and judicial powers in
accordance with the Basic Law and with their respective constitutions.33
This new policy is going to give the German people the chance to rule themselves again and
make decisions for their people. With this opportunity given to the Germans, the Allies hope and
expect their authorities will not have reason to take action in fields that are not reserved for them
specifically.34 Although the German people had gained more freedom, the United States and
their Allies were still deeply involved in the country and its decision making. Since the United
States still wanted to keep control of certain aspects of the West German State, they can be seen
as still being aggressive in their policy change.
The United States can be seen as aggressive in this situation because of the major shift in
policy that occurred. When they created the West German state, they threw out the idea of short
term occupation of Germany that was outlined in the original policy on Germany which was
agreed upon by all the Allies when World War II ended. They could have chosen to reunite the
country back to one complete Germany, but they did not, they created the separate state which in
return caused the formation of another German State: East Germany which was in control of the
Soviets.
Another reason why Germany was unable to reunite was that the United States was
thinking Germany would become a communist state. They did not want to unite Germany
because they knew they needed Germany not fall completely into the hands of the Soviet Union.
33
United States Department of State, "Decisions of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Three
Western Powers in Washington, DC (April 8, 1949)," In Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents, by United States Department of State, 88-92, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 2
34
United States Department of State, "Decisions of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Three
Western Powers in Washington, DC (April 8, 1949)," In Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents, by United States Department of State, 88-92, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1950) p. 3
Peterson 15
Since communism was not popular, the U.S. did not want to take the chance of uniting Germany
back to a single country and seeing what type of government the people would choose.
Therefore, West Germany was created to be a democratic state and East Germany followed and
was made a communist state. However, even with this occurring the Soviets were still open to
the idea of uniting the country and letting them have the freedom to choose what government
they wanted to have. The United States still did not want to take that chance and moved forward
in creating their democratic German State. With that occurring, the tension between the United
States and Soviet Union only grew worse causing more problems between them.
The next reason why Germany was unable to be reunited was the refusal of Stalin’s Note
in 1952. The Stalin Note is a document in the form of a peace treaty that was sent to the Western
Allies regarding Germany.
“Almost seven years have passed since the end of the war with Germany but Germany
still does not have a peace treaty, finds itself divided, continues to remain in an unequal
situation as regards other governments. It is necessary to end such an abnormal situation.
This responds to the aspirations of all peace loving peoples. It is impossible to assure a
just status to the legal national interests of the German people without the earliest
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany”35
The Soviet Union leaders were reaching out to the Western Allies, in order to attempt to put the
country back together. The Soviets wanted to reunite the country peacefully and fulfill the
original agreement between the countries at the end of World War II. The Soviets had hopes the
United States, United Kingdom and France would work with them to come up with a peace
treaty. Many provisions were made by the Soviets to try and make reunification happen. One
provision made was, “All armed forces of the occupying powers must be withdrawn from
35
Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty - First "Stalin" Note (March 10,
1952)," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 1944-1959
and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956, 85-87, (Washington
D.C. : General Printing Office, 1959) p.1
Peterson 16
Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty.
Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated.” 36
There was one main provision that the Soviets did want in order to reunite Germany. Their
major provision for the country was this: “Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of
coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in
the war against Germany.”37 This meant it was their wish that the country of Germany would
remain a neutral country once unified. However, the United States and Allies did not trust the
Soviet Union. In their response to the note, they have some requests that must be met in order to
discuss a peace treaty.
“The United States Government has taken due note of this statement. In its view, it will
not be possible to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have
been created for free elections and until a free all-German Government which could
participate in such discussion has been formed”38
With that being said, the United States did not think everything was in place for free elections in
the Eastern Zone. Therefore, they did not want to get into peace treaty talks just yet. Another
thing that the United States did not support in the peace treaty was this:
“The United States Government also observes that the Soviet Government now considers
that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air, and
sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter
36
Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty - First "Stalin" Note (March 10,
1952)," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 1944-1959
and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956, 85-87. (Washington
D.C. : General Printing Office, 1959) p.2
37
Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Soviet Draft of a German Peace Treaty - First "Stalin" Note (March 10,
1952)," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 1944-1959
and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956, 85-87, (Washington
D.C. : General Printing Office, 1959) p.3
38
"Note from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Regarding Soviet Draft
of German Peace Treaty, March 25, 1952," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background
Documents on Germany, 1944-1959 and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting
Berlin, 1945-1956, 87-88, (Washington D.C.: General Printing Office, 1959) p. 1
Peterson 17
into association with other countries. The United States Government considers that such
provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergency in Europe of a
new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry
and distrust.”39
With those reasons given, the United States government remained convinced that the proposal of
the Soviet Government for the formation of German National forces is inconsistent with the
achievement of this objective as set down by the original plan.40 Through the Stalin Note, it is
clear that the Soviets had wanted to stay consistent with the original policy for Germany;
however, the United States was rejecting their request for a united Germany.
The final reason that the country could not reunite stemmed from the issue of the Western
State not remaining neutral by joining NATO. Not only did the two states develop more
structured political parties, but the Western State was also moving closer to possibly joining the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which would destroy their neutrality all together. The main
requirement for the country of Germany to be reunited and become whole again is that it has to
remain a neutral country. However, if it was to join NATO then it will definitely not be neutral
and it will oppose the ideals of the Soviet Union completely, so it will not be open to having a
relationship with them. The decision to join in with NATO was another aggressive change
because it took away the possibility of joining the country back together and it would extend the
occupation of Germany. Even though the United States and the Allied governments knew in
order to reunite Germany the country would have to remain neutral, they still extended an
invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
39
"Note from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Regarding Soviet Draft
of German Peace Treaty, March 25, 1952," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background
Documents on Germany, 1944-1959 and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting
Berlin, 1945-1956, 87-88, (Washington D.C.: General Printing Office, 1959) p. 2
40
"Note from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Regarding Soviet Draft
of German Peace Treaty, March 25, 1952," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background
Documents on Germany, 1944-1959 and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting
Berlin, 1945-1956, 87-88, (Washington D.C.: General Printing Office, 1959) p. 2
Peterson 18
Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of
America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the
Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it
deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of
America in accordance with Article 10 of that Treaty.41
The United States once again made a policy change for Western Germany, without consulting
the Soviet Union about it. With the occurrence of West Germany joining NATO, the Soviets in
the East created the Warsaw Pact which causes them to no longer be neutral as well.
With the West entering NATO and the East forming the Warsaw pact, reuniting the
country of Germany became impossible. With both countries going in separate directions there
was no way they could come together and agree on anything. The path of both sides moving
away from neutrality started when both sides created their own opposite political parties. In the
East, anti-fascist parties and unions were permitted again, and the revival of the German
Communist Party was shaped in crucial ways by a group of pro-Soviet politicians.42 However,
that party was not getting much done in East Germany. The leaders there were still blaming
Hitler and the Nazi’s for their problems in the east, even though it had been many years since the
war had ended.43 In the West, they were working towards forming their Democratic
government, with a big helping hand from the United States. Both the East and West States were
still under control of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though this is true, the United
41
"Protocol on the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (October
23, 1954)," In Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 19441959, and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956, 142-143.
(Washington D.C.: General Printing Office, 1959).
42
Aufruf des Zentralkomitees vom, "Proclamation by the Central Committee of the German Communist
Party (June 11, 1945)," In Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, by Aufruf des Zentralkomitees vom, 292-299.
(Hamburg: The Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973), P. 1
43
Aufruf des Zentralkomitees vom, "Proclamation by the Central Committee of the German Communist
Party (June 11, 1945)," In Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, by Aufruf des Zentralkomitees vom, 292-299.
(Hamburg: The Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973), P. 1
Peterson 19
States still tried to act like they were allowing the Germans to run their own government, yet the
United States and their Allies were still in charge of all major decision making in the State. In
the West it was still made clear that they needed to present an anti-communist stance. It was also
decided in the West they needed to shift from having a private capitalistic economy to a socialist
economy.44 The Social Democracy was seeking a socialist economy based on planned direction
and collective decision making because the state needed to be able to meet the needs of its
people.45 Still they were trying to do what was best for the people in West Germany. This can
still be seen as aggressive, however, because the United States was still helping in the decision
making of the new German officials. Some say the United States needed to stay, however,
because they played a big role in keep Germany democratic. Some authors argue that the United
States was a balancer in Cold War Germany, and without them Germany would have fallen into
the hands of the Soviet Union, because Europe was not stable enough to keep the Soviets out
after World War II. Even though communism opposed by those countries in the West, the
United States was still over stepping its boundaries because it stayed in power in Germany too
long. The original plan called for a temporary occupation of Germany for a couple months up to
about a year max, however, with all the policy changes, the United States and its Allies ended up
staying much longer than expected. As a result of that the Soviets stayed in East Germany
longer as well. From the time World War II ended, the policy regarding what to do with
Germany has changed in many ways.
44
"Political Principles of the Social Democratic Party (May 1946)," In Unity and Law and Freedom: West
German Domestic Politics 1945-1955, by Theo Stammen, 120-126, (Munich, 1965), p.1
45
"Political Principles of the Social Democratic Party (May 1946)," In Unity and Law and Freedom: West
German Domestic Politics 1945-1955, by Theo Stammen, 120-126, (Munich, 1965), p. 1
Peterson 20
In conclusion, the United States was more responsible for the long term division of
Germany because of the collapse of the four power cooperation, and the failure and inability to
reunite Germany as a whole again. Germany was a troubled country that had been the cause of
two World Wars, so at the end of the second, major decisions needed to be made. To make those
decisions, the Soviet Union, United States, France and the United Kingdom all stepped in to help
decided what to do with the country. The plan they came up with was a good solution to the
German problem, they had thought. However they were wrong, by splitting Germany into zones,
they were just setting the stage for more tension.
By not keeping Germany united to begin with, they opened the door for unwanted policy
changes. The reasons for the four power cooperation collapse was because of the creation of the
Socialist Unity Party, the merger of the Western economic zones in order to rebuild the
economy, and the disputes on reparations and trade between the Western and Soviet zones. The
creation of the Socialist Unity party was a cause because it was not allowing the people in the
Eastern zone to choose their own political parties and it was forced by the Soviets. The United
States became the aggressor in the situation because they made the major changes to the policy.
The three zones in the West joined together to create an economic fusion. With that in place
they decided to industrialize their zones again and they also decided that they were going to
bring back some militarization. Along with that the United States decided to start completely
cutting the Soviet Union out of everything having to do with the West. The major reasons for
the inability to reunite Germany as a whole were attributed to the formation of Western and
Eastern German states, the rejection of Stalin’s Note, the Western State joining NATO and the
East creating the Warsaw Pact. A couple years after that the West decided to join their zones
completely and make a Western State. The Soviets were still willing to work with the West and
Peterson 21
reunite Germany to a whole country, but the West did not go along with that. In return, an
Eastern State was formed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union attempted to end the division
by sending Stalin’s Note, to create a peace treaty to reunite Germany, but the United States
rejected it. Things only worsened more when the West joined NATO and the East created the
Warsaw Pact. After that reconciliation and reunification was out of the question. The United
States was the major aggressor when it came to Germany, even though both the United States
and Soviet Union caused problems regarding the policies in Germany. The United States is
much more responsible for the long term division of Germany. The U.S. had plenty of
opportunities to reunite the country, but they did not because they were fearful it would not go
their way. So instead of working with the Soviet Union and other Allies to create an agreement
to reunite Germany and hand the government back over to the German people, they made their
own policy changes and created more tension and distrust with the Soviet Union. Both countries
are at fault for the long term division of Germany which lasted from 1945 to 1990, but the
United States holds more responsibility because of the action they took and decisions they made
regarding the policies in Germany pertaining to long term division and the collapse of the four
power cooperation.
Peterson 22
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