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Egyptian Concerns on the P5+1/Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Nabil Fahmy
The P5+1 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus
Germany) have framed the joint comprehensive plan of action with
Iran as a necessary measure to curtail Iran’s ability to build a
nuclear arsenal or quickly reach nuclear weapons breakout
capacity. Arab states, all members of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), support nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament. Consequently, in principle, they
should have been able to whole heartedly support any technically
sound plan. Yet, there is profound concern palpitating the region
and for good reason.
Egypt was a signatory to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons the first day it was open for signature. It
however refrained from ratifying the treaty until 1981 because of
its strong belief that regional neighbors should all have the same
commitment; Israel had declined to join the NPT. Even before
1981, Egypt and Iran proposed in 1974 that the Middle East be
declared a nuclear weapon free zone. And after refraining from
adhering to the chemical weapons prohibition agreement, Egypt in
1990 proposed the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of all
weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological. In
doing so it was driven by a strong belief in the principle of “equal
security for all” and by a concern that weapons’ asymmetries will
ultimately be a source of anxiety and a catalyst for an arms race in
the region.
The comprehensive plan of action is far from sufficient in
dealing with the Middle East’s nuclear issues. It delays, but does
not close the door on, potential Iranian breakout. The joint plan
completely ignores the nuclear program in Israel, the only nonNPT party in the Middle East. Equally disconcerting is that the
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“let’s be realistic” approach adopted in justifying the joint plan is
testimony to a continuing and dangerous policy of “nuclear nonproliferation procrastination and exceptionalism” in the Middle
East, which exacerbates and perpetuates security asymmetries.
This procrastination in the short run may respond to some extraregional, but not Arab, security concerns and is ultimately
detrimental to all.
If fully implemented and enforced, the specific
measures outlined in the plan of action—such as major reductions
in the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its stockpile of nuclear
materials— would substantially curtail Iran’s nuclear capacity to
weaponize for the stipulated fifteen-year period. However, there
are justifiable concerns about what Iran may do at the conclusion
of this period, when its nuclear program is no longer bound by the
terms of comprehensive joint plan of action. The joint
comprehensive plan of action’s enforcement period does provide
time for hoped for policy change in Iran, where changing political
dynamics and cleavages have been so clearly displayed in the 2009
election protests and the differing approaches of former president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the incumbent Hassan Rowhani.
Nonetheless, the complexities of Middle East dynamics augur
against any consensus among analysts in projecting where the
region or Iran will be in the future.
Consequently, there is no basis upon which to assume that the
risk of nuclear proliferation in the region will have subsided at the
conclusion of the joint plan with Iran. In fact, it is more likely that
the asymmetries between the capacities of Arab versus nonArab states in the region will have increased. This is a point of
particular concern for Egypt. Given its historic leading role in the
Arab world as well as its defense commitment to a number of Arab
countries, the present asymmetries are problematic and further
exacerbation could have intolerable national security results.
Israel, a non-NPT party presumed to have nuclear weapons and
with confirmed nuclear technology and capacity, would remain
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completely beyond any regional or international nonproliferation
effort. Iran, albeit an NPT party, would then once again in the
future have the right to enrich and reprocess nuclear material,
pursuant to the NPT itself (Article 4, Paragraph 1), thus shrinking
Iranian breakout time if it were to decide to weaponize. And, these
two asymmetries between capacities and obligations in the Arab
world versus those of Israel and Iran generate a strong sense of
insecurity in the Arab world.
A third point of concern, particularly for the majority of the
Arab Gulf states, is how Iran will use the removal of sanctions, be
that in terms of the influx of resources or more relaxedinternational
interaction. Many Arab states wonder whether Iran will embark on
an even more aggressive, assertive regional foreign policy,
emboldened by its reacceptance into the international community.
Iran’s evident and openly pronounced influence in Lebanon, Syria,
Iraq, and Yemen is already worrisome for a number of Arab
countries including Egypt.
In addition to these intra-regional concerns, the Arab states are
also today questioning the resilience of U.S. policies in the Middle
East, particularly regarding present and future security policies in
the Arab Gulf region. Consequently, offering a U.S. nuclear
umbrella or sophisticated hardware and defense systems alone in
the long run will not suffice nor adequately respond to Arab
anxiety. Tactical responses—such as a more assertive United
States in Syria or more U.S. support in Yemen would not be
commensurate with Arab concerns. Arabs accepting them as
enough would be a major mistake. More useful would be a
substantive Arab regional discussion of a changing Arab region,
particularly Arab Gulf, security paradigm with greater emphasis on
domestic and regional components to bring in the Egyptian
component. These potential scenarios and its responsibilities
thereof are factored in by Egypt as it looks to and assesses the
P5+1 comprehensive plan of action.
I am not suggesting that the P5+1 drop the plan of action or that
Iran should be held to a higher standard than other countries.
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However, dealing with nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East
should not be a choice between “realism” and “nothing at all.” It
requires a principled determination and the courage of conviction
to deal with nuclear nonproliferation comprehensively, not as stop
gap measures, applying them to all throughout the region without
prejudice or exception and the maturity and wisdom to accept
concrete steps in an incremental process, provided they are within
a serious, transparent, and publicly announced strategy and
timeframe.
I believe this can be done by engaging simultaneously on the
following tracks:
1. The international community, particularly the United States,
must engage Israel in a more rigorous effort to have it revisit the
logic of its nuclear program. One wonders how George Shultz,
William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn can initiate the
debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for the United States,
yet the issue cannot be raised with Israel.
2. Arab countries need to be more forceful in efforts to create a
nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East before the fifteenyear termination of the joint comprehensive plan of action with
Iran. This should include a submission of a United Nations
Security Council resolution reaffirming support for a nuclear
weapon free zone in the Middle East and establishing a maximum
15 year date for its realization. This resolution should task the
United Nations to establish a small technical expert group to draw
up a model agreement, and later host a regional,
intergovernmental negotiating process on that basis. These efforts
would provide not only for a continuous Iranian commitment in
this regard, but would also include the Israeli program and resolve
the problem of deepening security asymmetries.
3.Arab countries- all members to the NPT-should preserve their
right to enrich and reprocess nuclear material under International
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Atomic Energy Agency safe- guards, even if they do not all have
the intention to exercise that right in the near future.
4. Arab countries should also agree on the establishment of a
regional nuclear fuel bank under international safeguards.
The joint comprehensive plan of action with Iran has the
potential to become a major diplomatic accomplishment or an
historic strategic miscalculation, exacerbating an already
tumultuous security paradigm. How we complement this plan of
action will be the determining factor.