Synopsis of Dr. Austin Long’s Presentation: Counterterrorism and Containment- Security
Challenges in Afghanistan After 2014
Dr. Long started his presentation by noting that in some ways the security
situation in Afghanistan is much better than it was two to three years ago but in some
ways is much worse. On the positive side, the Afghan security forces are capable of
conducting operations that they were not able to accomplish previously. For example,
when the Taliban cut off the town of Lobar, government forces were able to reopen the
town with out extensive assistance from the United States. Dr. Long also stated that the
elite Afghan units are now quite good. On the other hand, the United State’s ability to
keep the relevant government actors on the same page is growing smaller. Additionally,
Afghans are already competing over who will gain primacy after next year when Karzai
leaves office and the U.S. further reduces its role. Last, patronage s still incredibly
important in Afghan politics and the political actors that the U.S. favors still have very
little ability to distribute such patronage and so may be the first to be eliminated from
political competition; some are even choosing to leave Afghanistan altogether. One
example of this is that the leader of an elite SWAT unit cleaned out his bank account and
then sought asylum in Europe.
Dr. Long then drew an analogy between Afghan security at the end of the Soviet
occupation in the 1980s and the situation today. As the Soviet Union was leaving
Afghanistan, commentators largely believed that the Afghan communists would not
survive for very long at all. Still, they performed well initially even defeating antigovernment forces in an important battle at Jalalabad. They continued to govern until
their benefactor, the Soviet Union, collapsed and their funding dried up. The Afghan
security forces are in a similar situation now. Many commentators believe the current
government, and with the security forces, will fracture along ethnic lines and quickly
cease to function after the American withdrawal. Dr. Long argued that this is unlikely to
happen and that the Afghan government can continue to maintain a modicum of stability
as long as the United States continues to pay the bills.
Dr. Long was much more pessimistic about the prospects for a negotiated
settlement that satisfies all of the contending interests of the relevant parties. The United
States primary interest is in counterterrorism and ensuring that Afghanistan remains
inhospitable for al-Qaeda. The Afghan government is less interested in counterterrorism
but is still interested in fending off threats to itself. The Taliban is divided. Some of them
are extraordinarily tired of fighting and might welcome a settlement that allows them to
return to their homeland. Others within the Taliban believe that they see the light at the
end of the tunnel; they think that without the U.S., Afghan security forces will fall apart,
which will allow them to win. Still others might be willing to accept an arrangement like
that enjoyed by Hezbollah in Lebanon whereby they can have some role in government
while maintaining an armed wing. Pakistan remains central to Afghan politics. Pakistan
wants to maintain influence in Afghanistan and the Taliban is their chosen lever for doing
so. Despite their denials, Pakistani connections to the Taliban remain clear because they
seem to always know where members of the Taliban are at almost all times. Pakistan’s
overriding concern in Afghanistan is keeping India out. The Indians meanwhile have
longstanding cultural and economic ties to Afghanistan and do not want to see a repeat of
the 1990s when Pakistan had a decisive role of Afghan politics. The Iranians have
previously supported the Taliban to undercut the United States but given historical
animosities between the Taliban and Iran, Iran does not want to see the Taliban return to
power. The Russians have a major interest in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan
given that they have a significant drug problem- Afghan heroine. China has some
business interests in Afghanistan especially with regards to mining but is very reluctant to
put its own skin in the game as far as bolstering the government. There is also significant
internal tension as well. Hamid Karzai is working to keep everyone working together for
now and sometimes- to the chagrin of Washington politicians, rhetorically attacks the US
to placate domestic constituencies. Furthermore, currently Afghan politics is in a
reshuffling period as people figure out who the patrons are going to be in post-Karzai
Afghanistan.
Dr. Long ended by repeating his assertion that the Afghan security forces will
hold together. He also stated that he believes that there will be a Status of Forces
Agreement that allows the United States to leave some troops in Afghanistan; the real
question is whether the Afghans can accept extra-territorial right for American soldiers as
an issue of jurisdiction. He contended that U.S.-led international forces can make a very
big difference in stabilizing Afghanistan with a total force of eight to twelve thousand
troops, of which roughly two-thirds will be Americans. Still, he said that there are a
number of ways in which this could all go off the rails. He warned against the United
States assuming that the Afghan government could be just as effective with no U.S.
troops as with the eight to twelve thousand and pulling out all o its soldiers. If the U.S.
does that, al-Qaeda may be able to branch and it will be much more difficult for the
United States to implement an effective counterterrorism strategy. The U.S. totally
leaving would also increase the likelihood of the worst-case scenario, an overt civil war.
In sum, Dr. Long argued that the United States should accept that it will likely be
involved in Afghanistan for a long time to come, but that managing Afghanistan is a
better path than ether making some large push to permanently solve the country’s
problems or abandoning the country and hoping for the best.