Integrating the non-rational soul
Jonathan Lear
1. “there seems to be some other nature of the soul (αλλη τιs φυσις τηs ψυχηs) that
is irrational, but which in a way participates in reason”. (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics I.13, 1102b13-14) Oxford and Loeb: “element”, Rowe: “kind”
2. “Now even this seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the
continent man it obeys reason – and presumably in the temperate and brave man it
is still more obedient (ευηκοωτερον); For in them it speaks, on all matters with the
same voice as reason.’’ (EN, I.13, 1102b25-28; Oxford trans.)
‘’But this part too seems to participate in reason, as we have said: at any rate, in the
self-controlled person it is obedient to reason – and in the moderate and courageous
person it is presumably still readier to listen; for in him it always chimes in with
reason. (ομοφωνει) (Rowe trans.)
3. “Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative
element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring
element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense
in which we speak of paying heed to one’s father or one’s friends… That the
irrational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the
giving of advice and buy all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must
be said to have reason, that which has reason will also be two-fold, one subdivision
having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as
one does one’s father.
Excellence too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference;
for we say that some excellences are intellectual and others moral, philosophic
wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and
temperance moral. For speaking about a man’s character we do not say that he is
wise or has understanding, but that he is good-tempered or temperate...” (EN I.13,
1102b28-1103a8; Oxford trans.)
4. “We won’t allow anyone to say it in his own city, if it is to be well governed or
anyone to hear it either…. For these stories are impious, disadvantageous to us, and
not in concord with one another.” (Plato, Republic II. 380b-c; Reeve trans.
‘‘neither do they speak with the same voice / nor are they in agreement with each
other’’ (...ουτε συμφωνα αυτα αυτοις, 380c3-4)
5. ‘’Then isn’t it appropriate for the rationally calculating element to rule since it is
really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited
kind to obey it and be its ally?... isn’t it a mixture of musicaland physical training that
makes these elements concordant, tightening and nurturing the first with fine words
and learning, while relaxing, soothing and making genlte the second by means of
harmony and rhythm? (Republic IV, 441e3-8; Reeve trans.)
‘’... ‘speak with the same voice’ (...συμφωνα αυτα ποιησει)
The Aristotelian Society: November 18, 2013
Integrating the non-rational soul
Jonathan Lear
2
6. “Imagine someone – call him Harry – who says: ‘My therapist tells me that I
unconsciously believe no one could ever fall in love with me, and she’s generally
right about such things, so I suppose I must have that belief.’ Let’s imagine Harry’s
therapist is right about him and that Harry is justified in believing that she’s right
about him. Harry is, then, aware of his belief that no one could ever fall in love with
him; he knows about it…. But we can imagine that Harry holds no such conscious
belief. (David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, p.115.)
“we speak with first-person authority not about all our mental states, but only our
conscious ones. I might learn in therapy that I harbor unconscious anger toward my
sister, and having learned this, I might say to a friend, “I’ve discovered that I’m
unconsciously angry with my sister.” In such a circumstance I would not speak with
first-person authority. If a friend were to ask me why I take myself to harbor
unconscious anger toward my sister, it wouldn’t make sense for me to reply, ‘What
do you mean? I’m just really angry with her.’ …. the claims I make about my
unconscious states of mind are only as good as the evidence that backs them up.” (Ibid.
p. 119, my emphasis)
7. “In various familiar therapeutic contexts, for instance, the manner in which the
analysand becomes aware of various of her beliefs and other attitudes does not
necessarily conform to the Transparency Condition. The person who feels anger at
the dead parent for having abandoned her, or who feels betrayed or deprived of
something by another child, may only know of this attitude through the eliciting and
interpreting of evidence of various kinds. She might become thoroughly convinced,
both from the constructions of the analyst, as well as from her own appreciation of
the evidence, that the attitude must indeed be attributed to her. And yet, at the
same time, when she reflects on the world-directed question itself, whether she has
indeed been betrayed by this person, she may find that the answer is no or can’t be
settled one way or the other. So transparency fails because she cannot learn of this
attitude of hers by reflection on the object of that attitude. She can only learn of it in
a fully theoretical manner, taking an empirical stance toward herself as a particular
psychological subject.” (Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement, p. 85, my
emphasis)
8. “Finally, there was evolved the consistent technique used today, in which the
analyst gives up the attempt to bring a particular moment or problem into focus. He
contents himself with studying whatever is present for the time being on the surface
of the patient’s mind, and he employs the art of interpretation mainly for the
purpose of recognizing the resistances which appear there, and making them
conscious to the patient. From this there results a new sort of division of labor: the
doctor uncovers the resistances which are unknown to the patient; when these have
been got the better of, the patient often relates the forgotten situations and
connections without any difficulty.” (Freud, Remembering, “Repeating and Working
Through”, SE XII: pp. 147-148)
The Aristotelian Society: November 18, 2013
Integrating the non-rational soul
Jonathan Lear
3
9. "The technique [of dream-interpretation] which I describe in the pages that
follow differs in one essential respect from the ancient method: it imposes the task of
interpretation upon the dreamer himself. It is not concerned with what occurs to the
interpreter in connection with a particular element of the dream but with what
occurs to the dreamer." (Freud Interpretation of Dreams, SE IV.98n, my emphasis)
10. “What the material is with which one starts treatment is on the whole a matter
of indifference – whether it is the patient’s life history or the history of his illness or
his recollections of childhood. But in any case the patient must be left to do the
talking and must be free to choose at what point he shall begin… The only exception
to this is in regard to the fundamental rule of psycho-analytic technique which the
patient has to observe….”1 Footnote 1: “….there comes a time in every analysis when
the patient disregards it. (S. Freud (1913), “On beginning the treatment”, SE XII: 134135; my emphasis)
11. “To sum up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of
cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality – these are
the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the
system Ucs.”(Freud, “The Unconscious” SE XIV: 187)
12. “… we find ourselves in an unforeseen situation. We have come upon something
in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which behaves exactly like the repressed
– that is, which produces powerful effects without itself being conscious and which
requires special work before it can be made conscious…. we must admit that the
characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance for us. It becomes a
quality which can have many meanings…” (Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 17, 18)
13. “A non-moralized, or less moralized, psychology uses the categories of meaning,
reasons and value, but leaves it open, or even problematical, in what way moral
reasons and ethical values fit with other motives and desires, how far they express
those other motives, and how far they are in conflict with them. Thucydides and (I
believe) the tragedians, among the ancient writers had such a psychology; and so in
the modern world, did Freud.” (Bernard Williams, “Naturalism and morality”, in
World, mind and ethics, p. 202; my emphasis).
14 "The human mind is self-conscious.... in the sense that it is essentially reflective....
we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves,
on to our own mental activities, and were conscious of them. That is why we can
think about them. And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem
of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental
activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into
question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back
up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the
impulse doesn't dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this
perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful
impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a
The Aristotelian Society: November 18, 2013
Integrating the non-rational soul
Jonathan Lear
4
certain distance. No the impulse doesn't dominate me and now I have a problem.
Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act. The reflective mind cannot settle for
perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason." (C. Korsgaard, Sources of
Normativity, pp. 92-93, my emphasis)
The Aristotelian Society: November 18, 2013