The expressive dimension of corporal coordination: the case of remembering.
Himmbler Olivares
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile- Interaction and Phenomenology Lab (LiF).
Europa-Universität Viadrina.
Introduction
The study of corporal phenomena is today an important area in the psychological
sciences. The focus on the body opens a path for theoretically comprehending the role it plays
in the configuration of the human mind and how its functioning operates in ways which
endow human experience with its particular sense of being in the world. From the multiplicity
of bodily phenomena that are studied in contemporary research, we are interested in bodily
movements: the changes in some part, or the whole of the body, during the course of time.
Bodily movements reflect, at the beginning, the continuous flux of human life in which we
participate at every moment of our experience, an expression of the natural order in which
human life has an organismic connection with the environment (Bergson, 1911; SheetsJohnstone, 2011.
Bodily movements are also present in communicative situations. When two or more
persons interact, they perform bodily movements spontaneously. At several points of the 20th
century, scholars from different intellectual traditions have been inquiring about the nature of
these movements. In psychological science, an important area of research was emerging in the
seventies under the label of interpersonal coordination. Interpersonal coordinations are usually
defined as the phenomena in which persons organize their behavior, with an emphasis on their
movements, in the temporal course of interaction (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991). The first
studies that reported the phenomenon were conducted in the sixties and seventies, with a clear
focus on body coordination. Researchers recorded interactions in natural settings, in an either
dyadic (Condon & Ogston, 1966; Condon & Sander, 1974) or group condition (Kendon, 1970;
McDowall, 1978). These first studies typically were conducted with microkinesic analysis, a
rigorous system of transcription for recording each body micro-movement frame by frame in
the course of a sentence. Using this method, researchers demonstrated specific differences in
body coordination in persons with psychological disorders like schizophrenia (Condon &
Ogston, 1966). In the same way, scholars probed the existence of body coordination between
the caregiver´s verbal content and neonate movements during natural interactions (Condon &
Sander, 1974). In the case of group interaction, Kendon (1970) demonstrated that the
movements of the listener are also coordinated with the movement of the speaker. Specifically,
Kendon describes with precision coordination between speaker and hearer, with inclusion
about corporal movements in participants non-directly involved in the interaction. This kind of
group coordination also appears in terms of sharing similar or complementary body postures
between participants in an interaction (LaFrance, 1979; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976).
In the seventies and eighties researchers discovered more evidence about body
coordination in communicative settings. Particularly, some evidence about the relation
between coordination and rapport: sharing posture or performing some complementary
posture in group interaction also expresses a relation between several degrees of rapport or
involvement (LaFrance, 1979). In the same way, the observation of behavioral patterns in
interactions between caregivers and children also provides evidence of affective involvement
between each part: attentional gaze directed to the caregiver, mutual gaze, corporal movements
and mutually oriented face expression were synchronized in the course of interaction (see for
example Tronick, Als & Brazelton, 1977). On the other hand, during this period appeared the
first objections to the frame by frame method. To conduct this analysis with a precision at the
level of single frames in a sentence could be a difficult enterprise not only in terms of
reliability, but also in terms of the effort and time needed on the part of researchers (Bernieri,
1988; Capella, 1997; Paxton & Dale, 2013).
These observations led to stressing an alternative measure for establishing body
coordination; the rating method (Bernieri, 1988). The main feature of this method is the
perception of several coordination qualities in the totality of interaction. This perception is a
subjective evaluation of global movements unfolding in the course of interaction. Researchers
created several body coordination dimensions: Simultaneous movement, Tempo similarity and
smoothness (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri, Reznick & Rosenthal, 1988). Using the rating method
researchers demonstrated relationships between corporal coordination and rapport measures
perceived by the interactants. When more levels of synchrony were observed during coding,
participants perceived high levels of cooperation, humor, friendship, enthusiasm, among other
characteristics.
In more recent years, new assumptions and findings have contributed to interpersonal
coordination. Current research in this field has stressed that body coordination pertains to a
broader phenomenon that includes several linguistic and bodily aspects. To the linguistics
aspects belong findings about dialogical alignment, which have demonstrated the adoption of
similar lexical terms or syntactic structures into the dialogue (Fusaroli & Tylen, 2013; Garrod &
Pickering, 2004). In the first case, lexical alignment appears in the use of the same verbal
expressions by both participants into the dialogue in a systematic way (Garrod & Anderson,
1987). In the second case, throughout the conversation participants adopt active and passive
voices in coordination with their counterpart (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). Other linguistics
phenomena like the changes and adoption of the same vocal tone during the conversation also
take part in the interaction (see for example, the work of Keller & Tschacher, 2008). More
recent discussions deal with the phenomena of linguistic alignment from a dynamic systems
theory perspective (Fusaroli & Tylen, 2013; Paxton & Dale, 2013). With these approaches
researchers intend to change the focus of research language from intra-individual cognitive
processes to an interpersonal, interactive and dialogical approach (Fusaroli & Tylen, 2013;
Garrod & Pickering, 2004). Using the terminology of dynamical systems theory and
cybernetics, researchers argue in favor of a language as a process, with multiple levels in
permanent unfolding, in which coordination plays a key role. “Language is first and foremost a
matter of coordination […] between different scales of linguistic processes” (Fusaroli & Tylen,
2013, p.1).
Research under the dynamic systems paradigm has found a good complement in
automatic video frame-differencing method analysis. With this method it is possible to
establish the change of movements recorded for each pixel in the frames (Paxton & Dale,
2013). Results have demonstrated that there exists a strong correlation between time,
simultaneous movement between participants and speech. This coordination finding occurs
systematically with a complementary pattern when is compared with the pattern of speech. For
one hand, corporal coordination appears regularly in the time frame in which speaker perform
speech and hearer listen. For another hand, the speech coordination is regular in the time
frame of turn-taking, when the speaker and hearer roles change (Paxton & Dale, 2013;
Tollefsen, Dale & Paxton, 2013).
Contemporary research suggests a gap between automatic frame analysis and the
qualitative aspects of the coordination phenomena. First, we know that the pattern of
movements is different from the linguistic pattern, because linguistic pattern is always
regulated by turn-taking. However, the nature of movement performed during interactional
synchrony recorded with automatic-frame analysis remains unclear. It is not clear how it is
displayed in simultaneous movement and neither is it clear how the movements of both
participants unfold in the course of interaction when there are only brief delays in their offsets.
This point is important because even though automatic analysis is useful, its precision exceeds
time frames in which persons behave in a pre-reflective way in the interaction, independently
from whether their movements are simultaneous or slightly delayed. Second, it seems that
bodily movements recorded and analyzed in synchrony studies do not have relation with
psychological aspects of lived experience. The most usual way in which they are considered is
with measures conducted outside the interaction, previously or subsequently. A good example
of this corresponds to considerations about affective aspects into the interaction. Previous
research in the field of interpersonal coordination demonstrated relevant aspects of this
affective connection by means of rapport measures conducted post-interaction. Until now, we
know few aspects about the unfolding of affective aspects in the interaction. Furthermore, the
relation of affective aspects, corporal movements and interpersonal coordination at the level of
bodily experience or at the level of verbal-linguistic aspects still remains unclear.
In this vein, concerning the movements performed in the moment of synchrony, we
can ask, what kind of characteristic or qualities do these movements possess? Are these
movements performed in a fast or a slow way? Are they strong, or soft? The movements
performed are no mechanical movements; they have their own expressive qualities, a fast
movement could be conveying fear, or a communicative emphasis, or some degree of concern
for going faster in the interaction. There are several possibilities. Thus, it is important to
explore the vast variety of movements performed by a person in all moments of the
interaction. When we pay attention to the entire body and its movements, we can see that in
every moment of human experience the movement is present. Thus, considering the
movements inside interaction in this sense will allow us to see the role of bodily movements in
a more comprehensive light. Accordingly, we pay attention to all manifestations of experience
present in bodily movements, and also to the change of rhythm between different moments
inside interaction.
This research attempts to explore several qualitative aspects of interpersonal
coordination using frame by frame analysis. First and foremost, it is important to determine
the role of expressive aspects in interpersonal coordination. In order to advance toward this
purpose, we will perform a first exploration of data putting the focus on representational and
expressive aspects of the interaction, as stressed by the German psychologist Karl Bühler
(1879-1963). In addition, we explore whether movements performed during interaction are
simultaneous or successive. This distinction allows us to comprehend in a complementary
sense expressive or representational aspects of coordination. In addition, our exploration about
interpersonal coordination also intends to determine some relations with another psychological
phenomenon: memory. Specifically, this research seeks to explore connections between
expressive or representational aspects of interpersonal coordination and the organization of
immediate experience in remembering.
The expressive and representational function of language: theoretical and historical
antecedents.
The expressive dimension of movements supposes crucial differences with mechanistic
and rationalistic approaches to human movement and body coordination. The main idea
involved in these differences concerns the nature of movement. In a mechanistic approach,
movement is, precisely, mechanical; it can be studied with physical-geometrical parameters.
When movements are viewed from an expressive point of view, they are connected with
psychological aspects in a broad sense. Accordingly, the psychologist Karl Bühler stressed an
important idea concerning this point: It is possible to see, in the history of physiognomic,
pathognomic and characterological studies from antiquity until modern times, a theoretical
system about human expression, with an important degree of development. He proves this
point by doing a historical and theoretical review in his book Ausdrücktheorie (Theory of
Expression), published in 1933. In his revision, he demonstrates that the study of expressive
aspects in physiognomic and pathognomic studies conducted during the 19th and the
beginnings of the 20th century, usually took for granted the idea in which psychological
aspects of human life are visible across the body. Thus, there is a sense of unity between
affective and corporal aspects in human beings. A good example of this point is evident in the
ideas of Johann Jakob Engel, published in 1875 in his Ideen zu einer mimic, translated under the
title “Practical illustrations of rhetorical gesture and action”:
If the gestures are the exterior and visible signs of our bodies, by which the interior
modifications of the soul are manifested and made known, it follows that we may
consider them under a double point of view; In the first place, as visible changes of
themselves; secondly, as the means indicative of the interior operations of the soul
(1822, p.27).
This sense of continuity between the life of the soul and its bodily manifestations was a
permanent topic of discussion between scholars of the epoch as well as physiognomic or
pathonogmic approaches. Although the connection between soul forces and bodily
expressions was broadly accepted, it was discussed whether all personal characteristics, the
physiognomic aspects, left some trace in personal expression. Accordingly, Bühler wrote that
“not all things “endured” –as strong and durable as they may have been- imprint in human
beings traces such that they remain, fully defined by them” (1968/1980, p.47, our translation).
We know that some of our personal traits give form to body characteristics, and, despite the
difficulties present in the studies of the epoch, this conviction never was completely missed.
One of most important distinctions stressed by Bühler during the thirties appears in his
organon model of language (1934/2011) which appeared for the first time in his Sprachtheorie
(Theory of Language) in 1934. For Bühler, human communication is a holistic-semiotic
process, in which persons are deeply involved in the ways in which constructive meaning
unfolds duringthe interaction. The speaker, the addressee and the concrete acoustic
phenomenon between them give form to the basic aspects of the model. Together with these
components, Bühler also develops semantic functions for conducting relations between each
part of the model. These functions are the representational function, the expressive function and the
appeal function. With the first function, Bühler makes reference to symbolic aspects that are
concurrent with the interaction. These include, in linguistic terms, lexical and syntactic aspects.
The semantic function of representation is, therefore, a symbolic process in which things and
states of affairs take sense and meaning into the interaction. In the case of the expressive and
appealing functions, Bühler is stressing specific semantic relations for the speaker and the
addressee. The expressive function represents in the organon model some indicium or symptom
of the speaker, whereas in the appeal function the communication is a signal that produces
some reverberation in the experience of the hearer. It is important to note that no aspect
aspects of the organon model works in an isolated way. In the same sense, the holistic feature of
the model suggests an interrelatedness between each part in which each one of them presents
an organization that goes farther beyond the semantic frontier that what they suggest in a
separate way. In other words, each semantic function does not catch in an isolated way the
experience of the speaker (in the case of the expressive function), the hearer (in the case of the
appeal function) or some state of affairs (in the case of the representational function).
Bühler recognizes in the work of Engel an important legacy for the study of expressive
phenomena. In his Ideen zu einer mimik, the scholar attempts a systematic work in the field of
theater, thinking considering the comprehension of human expression in order to understand
its unfolding in the context of dramatic work. Following the tradition of his time, Engel sees
the phenomena of expression as a manifestation of the human soul and, by extension, as an
expression of the forces of nature. An actress must develop, if she wants to perform an
appropriate work, a deep understanding of the work in which she participates. This not only
entails a detailed study of all manifestations presents in the human body and its movements,
but also includes aesthetic aspects, i.e. expressive aspects such as those present in sculptures
and imaginative resources –for giving life in an appropriate way to determinate character,
among other aspects.
One of most important remarks Bühler makes regarding the work of Engel deals with
the distinction about the representative and expressive functions of language. For Engel this
distinction allows us to define and comprehend in a systematic way movement modifications
in the body. These modifications include the entire body since “the soul exercises an equal
power over all the muscles” (Engel, 1822, p.41). Even though the inclusion of all of the body
is necessary, Engel gives more importance to the role of the face, fundamentally because of its
sensibility for showing the forces of the soul. One of these modifications concerns the
picturesque gestures, which denote, in the words of Bühler, the representational-semantic aspects.
Picturesque gestures can be defined as bodily representations of an action. This representation
is intended as a process, by means of which the body, with a certain bodily disposition, and in
a pre-reflective way, carries out the action. Concerning picturesque gestures, Engel wrote:
An intuitive and complete representation of an action […] is a predisposition to the
action itself. While representing the idea of any words to ourselves, we pronounce
them interiorly; and, when this internal language becomes forcible, by acquiring a
greater portion of vivacity, we begin to make motions with our lips (Engel, 1822, p.33).
Deploying an important effort in describing the phenomena under research in terms of
their qualities rather than classifying them Engel provides another example of representations
such as the movements performed in characterization, justification or correction. These three
kinds of communicative acts seem to be nearer to the nature of a reflective process. Engel
provides us, then, with a foremost idea about the nature of reflective or thinking phenomena
which is born as an intuitive act with organized interior movements that gradually become
observable manifestations in the person.
In the case of expressive gestures, Engel intends to define a group of different corporal
manifestations. Engel is always trying to provide detailed qualities of the phenomena under
study, and the case of expressive gestures is not an exception. On the one hand, this gestures
include affective phenomena in an broad sense “The Gestures are motive […] Such are the
exterior and voluntary motions by which we know the affections, the desires, the tendencies,
and the passions of the soul” (Engel, 1822, p. 42, emphasis in the original). Although these
distinctions look similar to the most usual definition of expression of emotions in
contemporary research, it is different in the sense that the notion of affect is broader and does
not intend to build a classification. Besides, in his examples Engel also describes these gestures
in a more holistic sense in terms of their visibility in the body including for example extended
arms when a person expresses love or retracting the back as an expression of fear. Thus,
expressive gestures include the whole body in their manifestation. Engel also mentioned in his
description a variation of expressive gestures called physiological gestures. These gestures are
expressions, said Engel, by means of which the soul articulates its will without the possibility to
be held back by the person. This represents, in other words, arbitrariness or involuntary nature,
or in more contemporary terms, a reaction. Tears of grief, paleness due to fear and the blush
of shame are examples of this type of gestures.
Interestingly, Engel includes in his descriptions about expressive gestures a third variety
called analogous gestures. These gestures are defined by Engel as expressions about situational
aspects, with their corresponding modifications in the soul. Analogous gestures deploy the
forces of thinking, the manifestations of our body following a determinate line of thought or
the expression of a tension in which several lines of thought are present in personal
experience:
These are partly founded on the tendency which the soul has to approximate itself to
sensible ideas, and consequently to express itself by the imitative modifications of the
form, until they acquire a due degree of vivacity; as, when one refuses assent to a
position, one scatters it abroad (in idea) and, with a motion of the hand reversed, seems
to put it aside (Engel, 1822, p. 42).
It seems that Engel was making reference to forces of thought when writing about
these gestures. Furthermore, at moments the scholar describes these corporal movements
as a stream of thought “Every situation of the soul, every interior movement, has its
regular progression” (Engel, 1822, p. 43).
On the other hand, it is possible now to find a high degree of continuity in the
ideas of Engel and the developing of semantic aspects in the communicative situation
developed by Bühler. Although some minimal differences appear in their ideas, in both
scholars, a constant effort is recognizable in putting bodily manifestations into the scene is
recognizable. In Engel, the interior movement in which the forces of the soul develop a
determinate expression. In Bühler, on the other hand, the work of exploring the semantic
aspects of these manifestations and creating a comprehensive model of language that
encompasses these aspects for their adequate understanding.
Bodily movements in remembering experience: subjective and objective aspects
The involvement observed in the interaction does not ensue only in the domain of
intersubjective experience. It is also subjective experience for both participants. If the
involvement observed in the stream of interaction provokes subjective impressions, could it be
possible to see this lived experience in the memories of participants. Two assumptions are
relevant for arguing this. First, the relation between intersubjetive and subjective experience is
an embodied relation; this is equivalent to saying that mutual understanding occurs, first of all, in
the bodily experience of participants: body synchrony movements show the key role of the
body in interpersonal understanding. Thus, the subjective remembering experience of the
other could be observed in bodily expressions where the person remembers the experience, for
example, some experience lived in a previous conversation In the same way, a second point
concerning remembering is the holistic quality of human experience and, by extension, the
psychological phenomena. When I perceive the other in the course of my subjective
experience, I´m going to prefigure certain aspects of my remembering of the other. In other
words, the experience lived about the other remains, in some degree, in me. This prefiguration
is a psychological process of formation. Potentially, it can be able to transform the previous
experience with the other in remembered experience –if a pertinent situation in my immediate
experience leads to remembering part of the previous interaction. Thus, it is possible to
establish the existence of a holistic relation between perception and remembering. Also it is
possible to stress the idea that we remember across our bodies and their movements in specific
ways and relations with the immediate experience.
These ideas about remembering are not new. In fact, it is possible to find some of
them in phenomenology and Ganzheitpsychologie or psychology of totality mainly during the 20th
century. This relation was reported for the first time in modern psychology by the French
philosopher Henri Bergson (1912/1988). For Bergson, immediate experience is, in a
predominant way, action, i.e. movements with some degree of organization. The body is in
movement always, and, the past experience, have loosed the bodily movements in which lived
experience did occur in the immediate-present time. Nonetheless, all past experience is able to
return to the present, as a result of a personal disposition that enables such past experience to
find bodily experience movements in the present that guide a person to bringing a determinate
experience at the scale of present time. This is the mechanism whereby it gives rise to
remembering. The experience lived in the past comes into the present-immediate experience
because exist a dynamic coupling between movements present in the immediate-present
experience with the movements performed in the past experience. Regarding this process
Bergson wrote:
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history,
we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the
present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain
region of the past - a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera. But
our recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by
adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing
cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its outlines become more
distinct and its surface takes on color, it tends to imitate perception (1912/1988, p.
133, emphasis in the original).
As a result of Bergson’s ideas about remembering as a bodily activity, we can ask if the
immediate experience of remembering has specific movements and if these movements
inform, in different ways, about the organization of immediate experience. Previous ideas
about human interaction stressed by Bühler demonstrated that the lived experience of a
speaker can be closer to expressive aspects or representational aspects. Consequently, it is
possible to assume the idea that immediate experience changes its organization in specific
ways, depending on whether it is more close to a representational activity or an expressive
activity. From the point of view of immediate experience, Bergson proposed to distinguish its
organization in terms of its closeness to the subjective or objective aspects in the person. For
Bergson, when the immediate experience is subjective, it is characterized by a deep fusion or
interpenetration of all the psychological states. To this respect Bergson mentioned:
We can thus conceive of a succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual
penetration, an interconnection and organization of elements, each one of which
represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract
thought (1888/1910, p. 101).
These holistic features of subjective experience stressed by Bergson, also include bodily
movements. For the French thinker, the totality movements involved in the subjective
organization are organized across affective experience. In this sense, there exists a sense of
continuity between the experiential aspects stressed by Bergson and their expressive unfolding
from the interior to the visible expression previously indicated by Engel in his expressive
gestures and Bühler in his expressive-sematic dimension of language. Subjective organization
of experience corresponds to expressive movements, because there is an organismic relation
between subjective aspects of experience and bodily manifestations.
Nevertheless, not all experience is organized across affective aspects. At some moment,
symbolic aspects are also required. For Bergson, symbolic aspects also pertain to the stream of
immediate experience. In this sense, the symbolization process represents a radical change in
subjectivity for Bergson, because it transform the interrelatedness of experience into a
sequence, in which every aspect of experience is ordered one next to the other. This order
represents two opposed aspects. On the one hand the sequential organization of experience is
indispensable for social communication, since it allows us to put different aspects of lived
experience in the scenario of interpersonal understanding in a comprehensible order. By
contrast, experience ordered in a sequence leads to an inevitable rupture in the totality of lived
experience, and by extension, in its intrinsically subjective qualities.
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