Constructivism, Truth and Reality
Hugh Gash
St Patrick’s College
A College of Dublin City University
Dublin, Ireland.
Abstract
This commentary to Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech’s article (2013) links ideas in their paper
to radical constructivism and raises two questions. (1) Would it be helpful to substitute the
constructivist notion of viability for the traditional notion of truth with its connotations of relating
language and reality? (2) Is the link made to issues in ontological philosophy important since the
implicit constructivist epistemology of the paper considers mathematical ideas are just as real as
ideas about objects.
Keywords Constructivism, truth, ontology
The paper by Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, formalising semiotic theory in the language of
mathematics contains elements of a constructivist epistemology. The Semantic Incompleteness
Principle, the Systemic Conception of Reality, and the limited notion of truth in Hypothesis 8 as
presented here are all features of a radical constructivist epistemology (RC) that I think holds
promise for understanding cultural difference and promoting mutual understanding. My comments
come from this RC perspective and specifically concern issues relating to the process of knowing and
objects of knowledge.
In the 20th Century scientists sought ways to understand and model mental processes in psychology,
linguistics, artificial intelligence and computer science. From the time of the Macy Conferences
initiated by Warren McCulloch in 1946, the usefulness of a systems approach to understanding the
human mind has been apparent. Today the study of complex systems plays an important role in all
of these domains. However, both meaning and systems thinking are clearly central to psychology in
Overton’s review of emerging scientific paradigms (2012).
In 1710 the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1988) distinguished between knowledge and
awareness arguing that we can only really know the truth when we have made it (verum ipsum
factum) (Gash & Glasersfeld, 1978). Glasersfeld described Vico’s epistemology as an early example of
RC that emphasises both the role of cognitive processes and their limits in our understanding of
reality. One feature Vico emphasised was that mathematics could be true as it was wholly
dependent on mental processes, whereas our knowledge of what God had made, nature, was not
certain as it depended on interpretation of perceptions of reality. The uncertainty about our
knowledge of Absolute Reality in this article (Section 4) by Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech
mirrors this key feature of RC. Further as in Vico’s mathematics, there is a certainty for abstract
systems that is missing in impure systems.
Uncertainty about truth and the dependence of knowledge on cognitive process invites discussion
when there are differences in perspective between individuals. Perhaps because certainty is so
important biologically, cultural differences in interpreting undecidable phenomena lead to
potentially powerful and threatening conflict. Many cultural problems arise because of differences in
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what is accepted as true. Given this uncertainty about meaning and truth, I wonder if Glasersfeld’s
suggestion that “viability” avoids the epistemological connotations suggested by the concept “truth”
may be helpful?
Reality and the ontological dimension are an important part of this paper. Also, the authors assume
the existence of an unfragmented but unknowable Absolute Reality. RC has avoided ontology
because what we know of reality we base on a comparison of the result of a prior cognitive process
with the result of a present process (Glasersfeld, 1995). So, direct comparison between what we
know and phenomena is impossible. Accepting this way of thinking involves accepting the Semantic
Incompleteness Principle and recognising the importance of the role of culture in our interpretations
of experience. It seems that RC and the authors agree about this aspect of epistemology.
A substantial domain of scholarship exists, mentioned by the authors with reference to the work of
Penelope Maddy, Willard Quine and Hartry Field, bearing on whether sets exist in reality and
whether their existence is warranted because as mathematical entities they are indispensable to
science. While these arguments are an essential part of the philosophical work concerning the
relation between existence and thought, it seems to me that these considerations on Platonism and
existence belong to a different domain and are not germane to the thrust of this paper. The authors’
position that knowledge is a semiotic construction means that both mathematical knowledge and
our knowledge of reality are each on a similar footing. Both the existence of mathematical entities
and other objects of knowledge depend on the processes used to specify them (Schmidt, 2011).
References
Gash, H., & Glasersfeld, E. von. (1978). Vico (1668-1744): An early anticipator of radical
constructivism. Irish Journal of Psychology, 4, 22-32.
Glasersfeld, E. von. (1995). Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning. New York:
Routledge Falmer .
Nescolarde-Selva, J. and Usó-Doménech, J.L. (2013). Reality, System and Impure Systems.
Foundations of Science. DOI: 10.1007/s10699-013-9337-8.
Overton, W. F. (2012). Evolving scientific paradigms: Retrospective and prospective. In L. L’Abate
(Ed.), The role of paradigms in theory construction. (pp. 31-65). New York: Springer
Schmidt, S. (2011). From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism.
Constructivist Foundations, 7, 1. 1-9 & 37-47.
Vico, G. (1988) On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. (L. Palmer., Trans.) Cornell: Cornell
University Press. (Original work published 1710).
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