More than Material
In discussing the question, “Are we more than DNA?” I will explore the presuppositions
of those who answer in the negative and show how they lead to absurdities, and will therefore
prove the Christian position on the subject (that we are more than DNA) by the impossibility of
the opposite. In addition, I will show that those who answer in the negative must be inconsistent
and borrow from the Christian position in order to make their argument.
At the heart of all philosophical arguments are presuppositions—assumptions (justified or
not) that the participants hold. Because of this, no one approaches such a discussion from a
completely neutral position. As a Christian, I have my Christian convictions as my
presuppositions, and in obedience I “take every thought captive to obey Christ” (2 Corinthians
10:15). Many naturalists claim to be neutral, however. Yet, if they are “neutral” toward the God
of the Bible, they are, in fact, against Him, since, if the Christian is correct, they do not
acknowledge their Creator. This is not an argument or an attempt to prove that the naturalist is
wrong, but an important observation to make: no one is neutral; everyone has presuppositions.
The Question
The strict question, “Are we more than DNA?” is not, I believe, the subject of this paper.
Even an avowed naturalist would agree with the Christian that there is far more to Homo sapiens
than DNA, whether or not there is some immaterial part of man. For example, there are red
blood cells, which contain no DNA, and these are obviously part of our bodies and therefore part
of us. In addition, if all of our DNA were removed or destroyed, we would still survive and exist
at least for a short time (something like this happens in the “Walking Ghost phase” of severe
radiation poisoning). Answering the question in its strict sense is too easy to be a legitimate
topic for a paper of this length. The question then is, “Are we more than material?” or perhaps
more generally, “Is naturalism a correct interpretation of man?” By naturalism, I mean the
worldview that teaches that there is nothing beyond the natural (or material) world. Only if
naturalism is wrong can there be a soul, a spirit, a free will, etc. An example of a naturalist who
believes, as much as anyone does, that we are not more than DNA (in the loose, rather than strict
sense) is Dr. Richard Dawkins. In the strict sense, Dawkins believes that humans are no more
than the carriers of genes: “These genes are the immortals, or rather, they are defined as genetic
entities which come close to deserving the title. We, the individual survival machines in the
world, can expect to live a few more decades” (p. 133) (emphasis added). This view has two
glaring problems with it: it fails to give an acceptable epistemology and it leads to a catastrophe
of morality.
The Epistemological Problem with Naturalism
In order to hold that we are simply the carriers of genes, and that we are not also spiritual
beings, naturalists today (including Dawkins) seek to explain our origins naturally. Changes to
our DNA due to natural forces (e.g., mutation) and the law of the “survival of the stable”
(Dawkins 124) are, according to Dawkins, the reason for our higher order actions: “The genes
too control the behavior of their survival machines, not directly with their fingers on puppet
strings, but indirectly like the computer programmer” (Dawkins 137).
To hold that this view is both objectively true (i.e., that it is true universally) and that
one’s own actions (including the act of believing) are controlled (albeit indirectly) by genes
which have arisen due to natural forces and the law of the “survival of the stable,” is absurd.
What could Dawkins do to show that his views were true across time and for everyone (i.e.,
universal) and that he didn’t simply hold them because they were stable in the present? Under
circumstances that made people antagonistic to Dawkins’s current view, wouldn’t his genes have
indirectly caused him to hold a different (less dangerous to his genes’ longevity) view? What
gives Dawkins the right to assert that his views are true and not that they are just useful to his
genes’ survival?
Naturalists assert that they are correct, not just that they are correct now that their views
are useful to hold (and won’t get them killed by religious fanatics). Yet in a naturalist’s
universe, what does it mean to be correct? What is objective truth? Is a belief true if and only if
it is judged to be practical (in other words, that it is evolutionarily stable)? This assumes we
know what the true results of a belief would be, and is therefore circular (since it assumes to
know what truth is before defining it) (Bahnsen 162).
In order to defend naturalism, the naturalist must hold (to be consistent) that his views are
the result of the same processes that he holds to govern the universe and biological beings in
specific (since he believes that he himself is the result of those processes). Since this belief does
not lead to a defensible view of truth, this is clearly an untenable position to defend objectively,
which is exactly what naturalists try to do when they argue for their position (i.e., defend it
objectively).
In contrast to the naturalist’s position, the Christian holds that God is truth. The truth or
falsity of a statement, while it may be difficult to ascertain in many particular situations, can be
easily understood as whether God is the source of that statement (i.e., it is true) or not (i.e., it is
false). When the naturalist argues his position, he must borrow the Christian’s view of truth,
namely that there is one objective reality, and ignore the fact that his own view of the world
cannot account for such a state of affairs.
The Moral Problem with Naturalism
Does man have a free will? If DNA is the source of our actions, even if it acts indirectly
through electro-chemical interactions, what more could be said than that our actions are the
result of our DNA and our particular situations? If this is the case, man does not have a free will.
Without a free will, could man be held morally accountable for his actions? Could we say a
particular man was evil? No, not unless we define evil as something that has its source in some
gene. This is not a moral judgment, but merely a biological observation. Are such evil actions
objectively wrong? According to what standard? The naturalist cannot answer here.
Many naturalists will hold that they can believe in morality, and seek to build moral
systems on their own authority (such as utilitarianism). In the course of their lives, all naturalists
demonstrate that they must be inconsistent with what they claim to believe. If it was a provable
economic advantage to sacrifice the elderly to rid a society of their drain of resources, even
naturalists would recoil in horror. I grant that, on observing this, those who believe that we are
not more than DNA will not automatically take my side, but they face a dilemma: either they
claim that they recoil in horror because their DNA directs them to do so (and that DNA which
would be more evolutionarily stable would precede with the sacrifice—unencumbered by such
base scruples), or that there really is an objective moral code to which they can appeal. The
former position assumes—but cannot prove—that the inward evidence that man experiences
(that there is objective morality and that man has a free will) must be subordinate to the naturalist
doctrine that DNA is the end of the story when it comes to human action. As Hodge presses the
naturalist, “If [consciousness] is to be believed when it says that there is something visible and
tangible without us, why should it not be believed when it says there is something which thinks
and wills within us?” (Hodge 277). The latter position assumes—but cannot account for—a
moral code which applies to entities directed by an inherited molecule.
Thus in the field of morality also, the naturalist is forced to use parts of the Christian
worldview to make his argument. The naturalist, for example, assumes the validity of external
observations without being able to explain why these observations are valid (for example, he
cannot answer, from within his worldview, Hume’s charge that scientific induction is
unjustified).
Suppressing the Truth
What accounts for the assumptions of those who believe man is DNA? As Christians, we
know that “the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and
unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth.” (Romans 1:18)
Beginning with the fall wherein Eve took the position of judging Satan’s word against God’s,
natural man has sought to set himself up as judge (Bahnsen 152). Dawkins and other naturalists
promote a worldview wherein all evidence is available to man (since all is material) and man can
therefore be the ultimate judge. In doing so, they deny the authority of God’s revelation
regarding the nature of man: man is a moral being with an immaterial soul and a free will. When
the naturalist’s argument is evaluated, we are not left with two alternative worldviews, each
internally consistent, each with members standing on solid philosophical ground with no way to
resolve the dispute. Only Christian theism is consistent and philosophically defensible, so
unbelievers “are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were
darkened” (Romans 1:19b-21) . Those who hold that man is DNA cannot present a valid case,
and instead continually fall back on the Christian worldview in their vain attempts to set
themselves above God.
References
Bahnsen, Greg. Van Til's Apologetic. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing, 1998. Print.
Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. N.p.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003. 3 vols.
Print.
By Justin Spratt