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Philosophies of Social Science
DTC Essential Module
Handbook
2015-16
Convenors:
Dr Edward Page, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), E2.13 (Social
Sciences), e.a.page@warwick.ac.uk.
Office Hours: Tuesdays 1130-1330 & Thursdays 1100-1200
Dr Milena Kremakova, Institute for Employment Research (IER), C0.13 (Social
Sciences), m.kremakova@warwick.ac.uk
Office Hours: Mondays 3—4 pm or by appointment
Lecturers:
Dr Milena Kremakova, IER, C0.13, m.kremakova@warwick.ac.uk
Dr Edward Page, PAIS, E2.13, E.A.Page@warwick.ac.uk
Professor Michael Saward, PAIS, D1.10 (Social Sciences), M.J.Saward@warwick.ac.uk
Seminar tutors:
Dr Milena Kremakova, IER, C0.13, m.kremakova@warwick.ac.uk
Dr Edward Page, PAIS, E2.13, e.a.page@warwick.ac.uk
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Introduction
This module introduces students to some of the standard methodological and theoretical
problems posed by social inquiry. Many of the issues to be discussed relate to one key
question: are the methods of the social sciences essentially the same or essentially
different from those of the natural sciences? The topics to be addressed include:
introduction to social research; questions in the philosophy of knowledge relating to
science, realism, language and materials; objectivity in the social sciences; challenges to
objectivity via standpoint epistemology; and the feminist and postmodern/postcolonial
challenges to objectivity. Although the issues will be illustrated in specific texts, you are
also encouraged to pursue parallel arguments in different sources from your own
disciplines and across disciplines. The reading list is designed to encourage the
consultation of diverse sources in order to identify common concerns and problems.
There is 'Essential reading' for each session in order to provide a focus to discussion
which all students are required to read in advance of each seminar. The ‘Further reading’
offers an opportunity to locate the topic in a wider context or to pursue more specialised
aspects for essays.
Schedule
The lectures for Philosophies of Social Science will take place in the Humanities building
on Tuesdays, 2—3pm, in room H0.60. Seminars will take place at 3-4 and 4-5pm in
H0.60 (led by Ed Page and Milena Kremakova).
Topics
Lecturer
Week 1 (Tues 6 Oct)
Induction week: No lecture or Induction week: No
seminar
lecture or seminar
Week 2 (Tues 13 Oct)
Introduction: making sense of the Milena
Kremakova
social world
and Ed Page
Week 3 (Tues 20 Oct)
Explanations in Social Science
Week 4 (Tues 27 Oct)
Rational choice theory,
collective action, and
game theoryEd Page
Ed Page
Week 5 (Tues 3
Nov)Interpretation and
understanding in social
scienceMilena
Kremakova
Week 6 (Tues 10 Nov)
Reading Week / Presentation Week Ed Page and Mike
Saward
Week 7 (Tues 17 Nov)
Elements
of
constructivism
performative
Week 8 (Tues 24 Nov)
Social theory from the margins: Milena Kremakova
Social science in crisis?
Week 9 (Tues 3 Dec)
Making sense of bad science, weird Ed Page
science and denial: why do (smart)
Interpretation: Michael Saward
and
the
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people believe weird things?
Week 10 (Tues 10 Dec)
Making sense of suicide terror
Ed Page and Milena
Kremakova
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Background Readings

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


Benton, T. and Craib, I. (2001) Philosophy of Social Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science (Colorado: Westview).
Delanty, G. and Strydom, P. (2003) (eds) Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic
and Contemporary Readings (Maidenhead: Open University Press).
Chalmers, A. F. (2000) What is this Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the
Nature and Status of Science and its Methods. Milton Keynes: Open University Press
(available in several editions with supplementary chapters. Any edition is worth
purchasing and reading as a whole).
Outhwaite, William (1987) New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism,
Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, London: Macmillan.
These very useful and wide-ranging books are available from the bookshop or Amazon
for around £15 and multiple copies are in the library. Benton and Craib is more accessible
and fairly sociological, whereas Hollis’s book has a more philosophical orientation.
Whilst both of these are textbooks, Delanty and Styrdom is essentially an anthology of
short excerpts from classic texts in the philosophy of social science, but with the addition
of a very useful introduction and linking discussions. Outhwaite is an excellent
introduction to alternative approaches to the understanding of social science.
Other useful texts include the following (starred items are particularly useful):
*Chalmers, A. F. (2000) What is this Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the Nature
and Status of Science and its Methods. Milton Keynes: Open University Press (available
in several editions with supplementary chapters. Any edition is worth purchasing and
reading as a whole).
*Elster, J. (1989) Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: CUP).
Elster, J. (1989) The Cement of Society (New York: Cambridge University Press).
*Elster, J. (2007) Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Fay, B. (1996) Contemporary
Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
*Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1990) Explaining and Understanding International Relations
(Oxford: Clarendon)
Hollis, M. (1996) Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Kellstedt, P.A. and Whitten, G.D. (2008) The Fundamentals of Political Science Research
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
*Little, D. (1991) Varieties of Social Explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of
social science (Boulder: Westview).
*Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it
can succeed again (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
*Moses, J.W. and Knutsen, T.L. (2010) Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in
Social Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
Popper, K. (1991) The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge).
Pratt, V. (1978) The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: Methuen).Root, M.
(1993) Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
*Rosenberg, A. (1995) Philosophy of Social Science (Boulder: Westview).
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Week 2:
Introduction: Making sense of the social world (Milena Kremakova and
Ed Page)
“What are we doing when we attempt to study human social life in a
systematic way?” (Benton and Craib 2001).
“If even in science there is no a way of judging a theory [but] by assessing
the number, faith and vocal energy of its supporters, then this must be even
more so in the social sciences: truth lies in power” (Lakatos 1978).
The very idea of a ‘social’ science implies two things. First, that it is somehow distinct
from ‘natural’ science; second, that it is some sort of ‘science’. This leads to further
questions. What is science? What is distinctive about social reality? Why is there such
disagreement across the social sciences about how to study social reality? What can we
know about social reality? In this introductory session, we discuss some of the contrasting
approaches to studying the social world and chart the main debates across the social
sciences based on assumptions of the nature of social reality (ontology) and what we can
know about it (epistemology).
Seminar Questions:
1. How, if at all, is ‘social research’ different from other ways we can make sense of the
social world?
2. In attempting to make sense of social phenomena, to what extent should we
distinguish between explanations, understandings and interpretations?
3. What is ‘positivism’ - and what are its limitations? Is all science necessarily
‘positivist’?
4. What is the difference between deduction, induction, and retroduction? Is one of these
superior to the other two?
5. What should the focus of the social sciences be the behaviour of large social groups
and associated institutions (holism) or the behaviour and characteristics of individual
human agents (atomism)?
Essential Reading:
Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science (Colorado: Westview),
Ch.1,Ch.2,Ch.3.
Chalmers, A.F. (1982) ‘The Theory-Dependence of Observation’. Chapter 3 of What is this
Thing Called Science? (2nd edition) Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, ‘Theory and Observation in Science’:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/
Further Reading:
Adorno, T. W. et al 1976. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (Heineman)
Benton, T & Craib, I. 2001. Philosophy of Social Science Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
Ch.1.
Elster, J. (2007) Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch.1,3.
Hammersley, M. (1995). The Politics of Social Research. London: Sage.
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Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave), Ch.2.
Hemple, C. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press), essay 12.
Kemp, Steve 2007. ‘Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Feher,’
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 241-253
Kuhn, T.S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U of Chicago Press)
Lakatos, I. 1978. 'Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes' in
Collected Papers, Volume I (Cambridge UP)
Laudan, L. 1996. ‘“The Sins of the Fathers...”: Positivist Origins of Postpositivist
Relativisms,’ Beyond Positivism and Relativism (Westview Press)
Laudan, L. 1989. ‘If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,’ The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 40 (3): 369-375
Popper, Karl 1963. Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul) Chs 3, 10.
Rosenberg, A. (1998) Philosophy of Social Science. 2nd Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, Ch.1 (pp.1-27).
Winch, P. 1976. The Idea of a Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul).
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Week 3: Explanations in Social Science I (Ed Page and Milena Kremakova)
‘In the long run it is the theory that is supported by the successful explanations
it generates, not the other way around (Elster 2007: 20).
‘To explain a social fact it is not enough to show the cause on which it
depends; we must also, at least in most cases, show its function in the
establishment of social order’ (Durkheim 1950: 97).
In this week, we take a closer look at some prominent theories of social science
explanation. Explanatory approaches make sense of social facts, events, and states-ofaffairs in terms of how they result from other social facts, events, and states-of-affairs.
Such theories can be separated into those that work at the level of the group or society
(holist accounts) and those that work at the level of the individual agent or organism
(artomist accounts). After exploring the concept of explanation, we explore holist
accounts of explanation - such as functionalism and structuralism - make sense of a wide
range of social phenomena including social conflict and social cooperation.
Seminar questions:
1. What is the basic structure of an explanation?
2. What grounds may be used to support an explanation
3. Are all holist explanations causal explanations?
4. What are the core assumptions of functionalist and structuralist explanations of social
phenomena? Are they defensible?
Essential Reading:
Elster, J. (2007) Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts of the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: CUP), Ch.1 (pp.9-31).
Little, Ch.5, ‘Functional and Structural Explanation’, pp.90-113.
Hollis, M. (1994) 'Systems and Functions', in The Philosophy of Social Science
(Cambridge: CUP), 94-114.
Further reading:
Dore, R.P. (1973) ‘Function and Cause’, in A. Ryan (ed) The Philosophy of Social
Explanation (Oxford: OUP), pp.65-81.
Durkheim, (1950[1895]) The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated by S. A. Solovay
and J. H. Mueller. New York: The Free Press.
Gould, S.J. and Lewontin, R.C. (1979) ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme’, Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London 205 (1161): 581-598.
Kellstadt and Whitten (2008), ‘Evaluating causal relationships’, in The Fundamentals of
Political Science Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.45-66.
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Marx, K. (1977) Preface to The Critique of Political Economy, in D. McLellan (ed) Karl
Marx’s Selected Writings (Oxford: OUP), pp.388-90, available electronically here
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society (New York:
Free Press), pp.133-211.
Root (1993) Ch.4, ‘Functional theories in sociology and biology’, 78-99.
Rosenberg (1995) Ch. 5, ‘Functionalism and Macrosocial science’, pp.124-152.
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Week 4:
Explanations in Social Science II: rational choice, collective action and
game theory (Ed Page)
‘A rational agent’s gotta do what a rational agent’s gotta do!’ (Hollis 1996:60).
This week, we take a closer look at a prominent set of ‘atomistic’ theories of social
science explanation. Such approaches make sense of social facts, events, and states-ofaffairs in terms of how they result from the aggregated effects of individual agents. After
further exploring the concept of explanation in terms of different forms of inference, we
explore atomist accounts of explanation - such as rational choice, collective action and
game theory - make sense of a wide range of social phenomena including social conflict,
social cooperation, and environmental degradation.
Seminar questions:
1. Sometimes people fail to satisfy the conditions of ‘rational action’. Is this a problem
for the theory or a problem for the people?
2. What is a ‘tragedy of the commons’? To what extent can such tragedies be avoided?
3. What are the implications of game theory for our understanding of global climate
change and other environmental problems?
Essential Reading:
Hollis, M. (1994) 'Games with rational agents', The Philosophy of Social Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.115-41.
Little, D. (1991) 'Rational Choice Theory', Varieties of Social Explanation (Colorado:
Westview), pp.39-67.
Hardin, G. (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162, 3859, pp.1243-48.
Further reading:
Axelrod, R. (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: agent-based models of competition
and collaboration (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 3-29.
Benton and Craib, Ch. 4.
Binmore, K. (2007) Game Theory: A very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP).
Brams, S. (2000) ‘Game theory: pitfalls and opportunities in applying it to international
relations’, International Studies Perspectives, 1(3), pp.221-232.
Dawkins, R. (1989) The Selfish Gene (2nd edition) (Oxford: OUP).
Elster J. (1990) ‘When Rationality Fails’ in Karen S. Cook and M. Levi, The Limits of
Rationality (Chicago: Chicago University Press), pp. 19-59.
Gardiner, S. (2001) The Real Tragedy of the Commons, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
30(4), pp.387-41.
Hardin, G. (1998) ‘Extensions of "The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 280(5364):
682-83, 1 May.
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Hargreaves, S. Hollis, M., Lyons, B., Sugden, R. Weale, A. (1992) The Theory of Choice:
A Critical Guide (Oxford: Blackwell), Ch. 1, 3.
Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y (1995) Game Theory: A Critical Introduction
(electronic) (London: Routledge), pp.1-40.
Hindmoor, A. (2006) Rational Choice (New York: Palgrave).
Hollis and Smith, ‘The Games Nations Play (2)’, Explaining and Understanding
International Relations, pp.171-95.
Hollis, M. (1996) ‘The Ant and the Grasshopper’ and ‘A rational agent’s gotta do what a
rational agent’s gotta do!’, in Reason in Action (Cambridge: CUP), pp.60-1; 80-87.
Hollis, Reason in Action, Ch.2, 3 and 5.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 3-20.
Little, Ch.3, ‘Rational Choice Theory’, pp. 39-67.
Olson, C. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press).
Osbourne, M.J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: OUP).
Oström, E. (1992) ‘Covenants with and without the sword: Self-governance is possible’,
The American Political Science Review, 86(2), pp.404-17.
Oström, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., and Policansky, ‘Revisiting the
commons: local lessons, global challenges’, Science, 284, 9 April 1999, pp.278-82.
Root (1993) Ch5, ‘Rational choice theories in positive and normative economics’,
pp.100-23.
Rosenberg (1995) Ch. 6, ‘Individualism’s Invisible Hands’, pp. 153-87.
Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press), Ch.1 (pp.3-20) and Ch. 10 (pp.230-54).
Sen, A. (1982) ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic
Theory’ in his Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell).
Stone, R.W. (2001) ‘The use and abuse of game theory in international relations’, Journal
of Conflict Resolution 45(2), pp.216-44.
Ward, H. (2005) ‘Rational Choice’ in D.Marsh and G.Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods in
Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan), Ch.3.
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Week 5
Interpretation and understanding in social science (Milena Kremakova)
‘Is the meaning of others’ behaviour what they mean by it? (Fay 1996: 136)
In this session, we discuss alternatives to positivist social science: interpretative
approaches which distinguish it from natural science, and critical realism which seeks the
middle ground between rationalism and interpretativism. Interpre(ta)tive sociologies
have their origins in the neo-Kantian critique of sociological positivism and economic
deretminism in the social sciences. The umbrella term ‘interpretivism’ (German:
verstehende Soziologie, from ‘verstehen’: understand, comprehend) includes a range of
very different approaches which are unified by the argument that, unlike natural science
which studies a domain of objects lacking intrinsic meaning, the meanings and
understandings of actors play a central part for social science. Interpretative social
scientists see social science as intertwined with the reality which it studies. They see the
social and cultural world as a milieu of meaning, are especially interested in those
elements of reality which are conflicting or contested by different societal agents.
Examples of authors in the interpretative tradition include Max Weber, Georg Simmel,
Alfred Schütz, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Peter Winch, Howard Becker,
Claude Levi-Strauss and others. In turn, Realism, notably a strand of it known as Critical
Realism, seeks a middle ground between positivism and interpretivism. Critical Realism
seeks to provide a theoretical underpinning for social science that has stressed its
affinities with the natural sciences without losing the grasp on interpretation of meanings.
Critical realists acknowledge that the existence of human agency and the limited
possibilities for experiment in social science make it difficult to locate and identify these
structures. In this session, we discuss realist arguments, on the example to a debate
between Andrew Sayer and John Holmwood about the relationship between capitalist and
bureaucratic structures, on the one hand, and gender structures, on the other.
Seminar questions
1. Are there aspects of social life which are not socially constructed? What are they?
2. Is it possible to incorporate a concern with actors’ meanings while still allowing that
there are causes operating in the social world?
3. Can social action be explained as rule following?
4. Is ‘Verstehen’ a form of ‘empathetic’ understanding, or something else?
4. Are realists correct that experiments cannot be a key tool for social science? Are there
alternatives to experiment that social science can employ?
5. How persuasive is Holmwood’s critique of Sayer?
Essential Reading:
[good all-round summary] Benton, T & Craib, I. 2001. Philosophy of Social Science.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Ch.5.
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[Interpretivism] Berger, P. and T Luckmann, 1966. The Social Construction of Reality
(Anchor), ch. 1 (a PDF of the whole book is available online here:
http://perflensburg.se/Berger%20social-construction-of-reality.pdf)
[Critical Realism] Sayer, Andrew 2000. ‘System, Lifeworld and Gender: Associational
versus Counterfactual Thinking,’ Sociology 34 (4): 705-725.
Further Reading:
Good general treatments of 'hermeneutics' or 'interpretative' social inquiry are:
Benton and Craib, ‘Rationality as rule-following’, Chapter 6, pp.93-106.Berger, P. L.
(1963) Invitation To Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. (chapter 1 is available
online here http://www.sociosite.net/topics/texts/berger.pdf)
Outhwaite, W. 1975. Understanding Social Life: the Method Called Verstehen (Allen and
Unwin) Chs 2, 5, 6
David, M. (2010) Methods of Interpretive Sociology (SAGE Benchmarks in Social
Research Methods), SAGE (ch.1 which has a historical timeline of interpretative
approaches is available online here http://uk.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upmbinaries/35377_Davidvolume_1.pdf
Delanty, G. and Strydom, P. (2003) (eds) Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and
Contemporary Readings, texts from Dilthey, Simmel, Winch, Gadamer and Ricoeur
(pp.99-181).
Fay, B. (1996) Ch.7, ‘Is the meaning of others’ behaviour what they mean by it?
Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell).
Gadamer, H-G 1986. ‘The Historicity of Understanding’ in K. Mueller-Vollmer (ed) The
Hermeneutics Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp.216-250.
Hollis, ‘Understanding Social Action’ (pp.142-162) and ‘Self and Roles’ (163-182).
MacIntyre, A. ‘The idea of a social science’, in A. Ryan (ed) The Philosophy of Social
Explanation, pp.15-32.
Mottier, Veronique. 2005. The interpretive turn: history, memory and storage in
qualitative research. Forum: Qualitative social research, vol.6, No.2, May 2005.
Available
online
here:
http://www.qualitativeresearch.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/456/972.
Rosenberg, Ch. 4, ‘Interpretation’, pp.90-123.
Warnke, G. 1987. Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Oxford: Polity
Weber, M. 1922. ‘Science as a Vocation’. (Wissenschaft
als Beruf, ‘
from
Gesammlte
Aufsaetze
zur Wissenschaftslehre’ (Tubingen,
1922), pp.
524‐55.
Originally
delivered
as a speech at Munich
University, 1918. English
translation
available
online
here:
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/X/WeberScienceVocation.pdf
Weber, Max The Nature of Social Action in Runciman, W.G. 'Weber: Selections in
Translation' Cambridge University Press, 1991. p7.Winch, P. (1990 [1958]) The Idea
of a Social Science and its relation to philosophy, (electronic) (2nd edition) (London:
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Routledge), Ch.1, pp.1-39 (see also Winch, P. 1974. ‘The idea of a social science’ in
B.R. Wilson (ed) Rationality, Oxford: Blackwell).
In the conservatism of interpretation, and a critique of that position, see:
Habermas, J. 1970. 'On systematically distorted communication' Inquiry 13 (3)
Gadamer, H-G 1976. 'On the scope and function of reflection' in Philosophical
Hermeneutics (U of California Press)
Gadamer, H-G 1986. 'Rhetoric, hermeneutics and the critique of ideology' in K. MuellerVollmer (ed) The Hermeneutics Reader (Blackwell)
Outhwaite, W. 1987. New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and
Critical Theory (Macmillan) Chs 4, 5
On Critical Realism, see:
Archer, M. 1996. ‘Social integration and system integration: developing the distinction,’
Sociology 30 (4): 679-699.
Collier, A. 1994. ‘Experiment and Depth Realism’ in Critical realism: An Introduction to
Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso)
[Critical Realism] Holmwood, John 2001. ‘Gender and Critical Realism: A Critique of
Sayer,’ Sociology 35 (4): 947-965.
For criticisms of ‘Critical Realism’ in social science see:
Kemp, S. 2005. ‘Critical Realism and the Limits of Philosophy,’ European Journal of
Social Theory 8 (2): 171-191
King, A. 1999. ‘The Impossibility of Naturalism: The Antinomies of Bhaskar’s Realism,’
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 29 (3).
‘Critical realism’ has had considerable impact in economics and management. See:
Fleetwood, S. and S Ackroyd 2004. Critical Realist Applications in Organisation and
Management Studies (Routledge)
Lawson, T. 1997. Economics and Reality (Routledge)
Reed, M. 2005. 'Reflections on the ‘Realist Turn’ in Organization and Management
Studies', Journal of Management Studies, 42 (8): 1621-1644.
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Week 6:Reading Week / Presentation Week
In this week, students will be encouraged to give presentations in groups that explore the
ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates raised in the module so far for
the conduct of research in their disciplines and sub-disciplines. Groups will be assigned in
the first two weeks of the module and presentations that bring together a range of
disciplinary accounts of a common methodology or theoretical framework (such as
discourse analysis, game theory, or critical theory) are also encouraged.
The session will run 2-3pm in H0.60 and will be for all students (the 3pm and 4pm
seminars will be replaced by this session).
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Week 7:
Elements of Interpretation: constructivism and the performative
(Michael Saward)
“Do our writings and our utterances reflect or describe the world, or do they
intervene in it? Do they, perhaps, help to make it? (Loxley 2007).
“To say that ‘representation means this’, pointing to a specific instance or
practice, is not the most interesting or important point to make about
representation. It is less about pinning down meaning, more about asking
how meanings are generated and contested; or … how something absent is
rendered as present” (Saward 2010).
A number of approaches in the philosophy of social sciences have stressed the importance
of interpreting meanings from social or cultural contexts, including phenomenology,
ethnomethodology, constructivism and performativity. In this session, we will focus in
particular on the latter two, though many core elements of them derive from the former
two. The concept of representation – a critical notion in politics, culture, and other
domains – will be used as a case study, specifically Saward’s departure from (a)
representation as a social and political feature with a context-independent meaning and
reference to (b) a view of representation as a performatively produced social construction.
Seminar Questions:
1. What does it mean to say that a social phenomenon might be ‘socially constructed’?
2. What conceptions of language, discourse, and culture are at play in constructivist
thinking?
3. How can social phenomena, such as gender in the work of Butler, be
understood as performatively produced?
4. What are the main strengths and weaknesses of constructivist and performative
approaches?
Essential Reading:
Hacking, I. 2000. The Social Construction of What? (Harvard University Press), ch.1
Lynch, M. 1998. ‘Towards a Constructivist Genealogy of Social Constructivism’, in I.
Velody and R. Williams (eds), The Politics of Constructionism (Sage)
Loxley, J. 2007. Performativity (Routledge),esp. ch.6.
Saward, M. 2010. The Representative Claim (Oxford University Press), chs. 1 & 2.
Further Reading:
Austin, J.L. 1975. How To Do Things With Words (2nd edn) (Clarendon Press)
Brassett, J. and C. Clarke. 2012. ‘Performing the Sub-Prime Crisis: Trauma and the
Financial Event’. Political Sociology 6 (1): 4-20.
Butler, J. 1990. ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution’, in S. Case (ed) Performing
Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre (Johns Hopkins University Press).
Butler, J. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge)
Butler, J. 2010. ‘Performative Agency’, in Journal of Cultural Economy 3 (2): 147-161.
Callon, M. 2010. ‘Performativity, Misfires and Politics’, in Journal of Cultural Economy 3
(2): 163-169.
Collins, R. 1994. ‘The Microinteractionist Tradition’, in Four Sociological Traditions
(Oxford University Press), final chapter.
Schaap, A., S. Thompson, L. Disch, D. Castiglione and M. Saward. 2012. ‘Critical
Exchange on Michael Saward’s The Representative Claim’, in Contemporary Political
Theory 11: 109–127.
Rosenberg, A. 2012. Philosophy of Social Science (4th edition) (Westview Press), ch.7.
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Week 8: Social theory from the margins: Social science in crisis? (Milena
Kremakova)
This session will examine three main alternative politics of knowledge production which
challenge the status quo: Marxist, feminist and postcolonial. Marx identified the
proletariat as a ‘universal class’ that carried with it the principle for transformation of
capitalist modernity and the realisation of a more just, communist society. The ‘standpoint
of the proletariat’ was argued to be the basis of social criticism and social transformation.
Later on, feminist scholars developed this idea into a ‘feminist standpoint’ position.
Postcolonial theory situated the subject in the margins of history from where the subaltern
subject tried to speak but was often not heard. We shall discuss how dominant discourses
of legitimate knowledge by marginalising ‘other’ sources of knowledge. This lecture will
look at this model of social criticism and assess the implications of these marginalised
theories for ideas of objectivity. It will also explore the claim that the social sciences are
facing an empirical crisis, and if so what might be done in response.
Seminar Questions:
1. How do marginalised figures (the proletariat, the woman, the subaltern) become the
point of view from which criticism can be made? Is it fruitful to rethink academic
disciplines from these alternative standpoints?
2. Can social research be independent of political values and influences? Can the
Marxist, feminist or postcolonial critic avoid replicating that which is being criticised
as imperial or colonial in the first place?
3. Why do Savage and Burrows say that contemporary social science is in crisis? Can
any of the above strands of social science respond to this crisis?
4. Is it true that many of methodological tasks once performed by the social sciences are
now performed better by commercial agencies situated outside of the academy?
Essential Reading:
[Marxism] Lukacs, Georg 1968. ‘The Standpoint of the Proletariat’ in History and Class
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. London: Merlin Press.
[feminism] Harding, Sandra 1991. ‘”Strong objectivity” and socially situated knowledge’
in Whose Science? Whose Knowledge: Thinking from Women’s Lives, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
[postcolonialism] Spivak, Gayatri C. 1998. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson
and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (University
of Illinois Press).
[social science in crisis?] Savage, Mike and Burrows, Roger 2009. ‘Some Further
Reflections on the Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology’. Sociology, 43, 4, pp.762772.
Further Reading:
On Marxism
Althusser, Louis 1969. ‘Contradiction and Over-Determination’ in For Marx translated
by Ben Brewster. London: Penguin Press.
Althusser, Louis 1970. ‘From Capital to Marx’s philosophy’ in L. Althusser, E. Balibar
Reading Capital (New Left Books)
Hammersley, M. 2000. Taking Sides in Social Research: Essays on Partisanship and
Bias (Routledge) Ch 1
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Holmwood, John and Alexander Stewart 1983. ‘The Role of Contradictions in Modern
Theories of Social Stratification’, Sociology 17 (2): 234-54.
Marx, Karl 1987 [1845]. The German Ideology: Introduction to a Critique of Political
Economy. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd.
Pels, D. 1998. ‘The Proletarian as Stranger’ History of the Human Sci 11 (1): 49-72.
On Feminism:
Grosz, E. 1986. ‘What is feminist theory?’ in C, Pateman, E Gross (eds) Feminist
Challenges (Allen and Unwin).
Hawkesworth, M. 1989. ‘Knower, knowing, known: feminist theory and claims of
truth’ Signs 14 (3).
Harding, S. 2004. The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political
Controversies. London: Routledge.
Hartsock, N. 1988. ‘The feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically
feminist historical materialism’ in S. Harding (ed) Feminism and Methodology
OUP
Spivak, G. C. 1996. ‘Subaltern Studies Deconstructing Historiography’ in D. Landry &
G. MacLean (eds) The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak (Routledge).
Stanley, L. and S. Wise 1993 Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and
Epistemology (Routledge).
On Postcolonialism:
Harding, S. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Ch 5
Du Bois, WEB 1903. The Souls of Black Folk. Various imprints
Lemert, C. 1994. 'Dark thoughts about the self' in C. Calhoun (ed) Social Theory and
the Politics of Identity (Blackwell)
Collins, Patricia Hill 1990. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and
the Politics of Empowerment. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Holmwood, John 1995. ‘Feminism and Epistemology: What Kind of Successor
Science?’, Sociology 29(3): 411-428.
Phillips, A. 1992. 'Universal pretensions in political thought' in M. Barrett, A. Philips
(eds) Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Polity)
Mohanty, Chandra T. 1988. ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial
Discourses’ Feminist Review Autumn 30: 61-88
On the debate about the crisis in sociology
Holmwood, John 2010. ‘Sociology’s Misfortune: Disciplinarity, Interdisciplinarity and
the Impact of Audit Culture’. The British Journal of Sociology. 61, 4, pp.639-658.
Holmwood, John and Scott, Scott 2007. ‘Editorial Foreword: Sociology and its Public
Face(s)’. Sociology, 41, 5, pp.779-783.
Crompton, Rosemary 2008. ’Forty Years of Sociology’. Sociology, 42, 6, pp.1218-27.
Webber, Richard 2009. ‘Response to “The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology”: An
Outline of the Research Potential of Administrative and Transactional Data’.
Sociology, 43, 1,
pp.169–78.
Gane, Nicholas 2011. ‘Measure, Value and the Current Crises of Sociology’,
Sociological Review, 58, s2, December, pp.151-73.
Burrows, Roger and Gane, Nicholas 2006. ‘Geodemographics, Software and Class’,
Sociology, 40, 5, pp.793-812.
Thrift, Nigel 2005. Knowing Capitalism. London: Sage.
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Week 9:
Weird science, bad science, and denial (Ed Page)
‘Smart people believe weird things because they are skilled at defending
beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons’ (Shermer 2007: 283).
Here we explore the limits of science and the phenomenon of denial. ‘Conspiracies of
silence’, ‘political spin’, ‘being economical with the truth’, ‘turning a blind eye’, ‘seeing
what you want to see’, ‘selective memory’: scholars across the social sciences have been
exercised by how and why individuals, firms, and governments frequently assert that
something didn’t happen, does not exist, or is not true despite being aware that these
things happened, did exist, and are known about (Cohen 2001). Is the explanation for
such denial a matter of psychology, pathology, culture, or political science?
Seminar Questions
1. What is the difference between contesting a social fact, interpretation, or implication?
2. What are the arguments of those who deny evolution or the Holocaust? To what extent
do they presuppose the rejection of ‘sound-science’?
3. Why do (smart) people believe weird things?
4. Should all ideas and points of view, even those that are demonstrably false, be
tolerated in a free society?
Essential Reading
Shermer,
M.
(2014)
‘Why
people
believe
weird
(http://www.michaelshermer.com/weird-things/excerpt/).
things:
excerpt’:
Cohen, S. (2001) States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge:
Polity), Ch.1,2,3.
Oreskes, N. and Conway, E. (2010) ‘What’s Bad Science? Who Decides?’, in Merchants
of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury), pp.136-68.
Further Reading
Brockman, J. (ed) (2006) Intelligent Thought: Science Versus the Intelligent Design
Movement (New York: Vintage Books) (see especially articles by Coyne, Dennett,
Attran and Kauffman; and the Appendix on the judgment in the Kitzmiller vs. Dover
Area School District case (223-56).
Fine, R. and C. Turner (eds) (2000) Social Theory after the Holocaust, Liverpool
University Press, esp. ch.2, Hannah Arendt: Politics And Understanding After The
Holocaust,
by
Robert
Fine
(chapter
2
available
online
here:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/emeritus/robertfine/home/teaching
material/sociologyofholocaust/ch2_fine_in_fine_and_turner_holocaust.pdf)
Gilbert, D.T., Tafarodi, R.W. and Malone, P.S. (1993) ‘You Can’t Not Believe Everything
You Read’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(2), pp.221-33.
Goldacre, B. (2009) ‘Why clever people believe stupid things’, Bad Science (London:
Harper Perennial), pp.242-55.
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Halbwachs, M. (1992[1925]) The Social Frameworks of Memory, in Lewis A. Coser
(ed.), Halbwachs on Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp.
37-40, 74-83.
Lipstadt, D. (1993) ‘The Antecedents’, in Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault
on Truth and Memory (London: Penguin), pp.31-47.
Lipstadt, D. (2005) History on Trial (New York: Harper Perennial).
McGrath, A. (2005) ‘Proof and Faith’, in Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning
of Life (Oxford: Blackwell), pp.82-118.
Monbiot, G. (2008) ‘A Crusade Against Science’, Guardian (G2), 22 July 2008, pp7-11.
Monbiot, G. (2006) ‘The Denial Industry’, in Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning
(London: Penguin), pp.20-42.
Neisser, U. and Fivush, Robyn (1994) The Remembering Self: Construction and
Accuracy in the Self-Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Available as
e-book at http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2524232~S1
Oreskes, N. and Conway, E. (2010) ‘The Denial of Global Warming’, in Merchants of
Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury), pp.169-215.
Oreskes, N. and Conway, E. (2010) ‘What’s Bad Science? Who Decides?’, in Merchants
of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury), pp.136-68.
Shermer, M. (2007) Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and
Other Confusions of Our Time (New York: Souvenir Press).
Shermer, M. and Grobman, A. (2002) Denying History: Who says the holocaust never
happened and why do they say it? (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Shermer, M. (2006) ’Science Under Attack’, in Why Darwin Matters: The Case Against
Intelligent Design (New York: Henry Holt & Company), pp.89-105.
Zerubavel, E. (2004) Time maps: collective memory and the social shape of the past.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
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Week 10: Making sense of suicide terror (Ed Page and Milena Kremakova)
‘Imagine a situation in which choosing to blow yourself up along with dozens
of other people seems like a great idea. How bad must your life be if you
think that it is better to be a sacrifice than to live, have a family, and be a
productive member of society. Imagine what goes through the minds of
people right before they become suicide bombers. Are they scared, are they
angry, do they fully understand what they are about to do?’ (Bloom 2005: 1).
This week, we take a closer look at a social phenomenon that raises profound questions
for theories of explanation and interpretation: suicide terror. Researchers from a range of
social science disciplines have attempted to explain, understand, and interpret suicide
missions. Brainwashing, poverty, kin selection, pathology, organisation theory, coercion,
cultural and game theory have all been used in this context and yet a sophisticated theory
of suicide terror has yet to emerge. Here we explore a closer look at the nature, scope and
historical antecedents of suicide terror in order to test the explanatory and interpretive
power of alternative theories of social life.
Seminar Questions
1. Do suicide bombers fully understand what they are about to do?Is ‘dying to kill’ ever
be reasonable or rational?
2. What is the role of terrorist organizations in the execution of suicide missions?
3. To what extent can evolutionary psychology explain the behaviour of suicide bombers
and the organisations to which they belong?
Essential Reading
Atran, S. (2003) ‘The Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, Science 299, pp.1534-39.
Elster, J. (2005) ‘Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions’, in D. Gambetta (ed)
Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.233-58.
Moghadam, A. (2006) ‘The Roots of Suicide Terrorism’, in A. Pedahzur (ed) (2006) Root
Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (London:
Routledge), pp.81-107.
Further reading
Bjorgo, T. (ed) (2005) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward
(London: Routledge) (especially chapters by Ahmed and Merari).
Bloom, Mia (2005) Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia
University Press), Ch.4 (pp.76-105).
Elster, J. (2005) ‘Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions’, in D. Gambetta (ed)
Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: OUP), pp.233-58.
Gambetta, D. (ed) (2005) Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), pp.259-99.
Hafez, M.M. (2006) Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide
Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press).
Margalit, A. (2003) ‘The Suicide Bombers’, The New York Review of Books 50(1), pp.18. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15979.
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Moghadam, A. (2006) ‘Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and Globalization of Martyrdom’,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, pp.707-29.
Moghadam, A. (2006) ‘The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A multi-causal approach’, in
A.Pedahzur (ed) (2006) Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of
Martyrdom (London: Routledge), pp.81-107.
Pape, R.A. (2006) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York:
Random House).