1
Sivan
3250784
Utrecht University
12 August 2011
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Supervisor: Dr Chris van der Borgh
Date of Submission: 12 August 2011
Programme Trajectory: Research and Thesis Writing only (30 ECTS)
Word Count: 25,014
Chapter Outline
Preface..................................................................................................................................................... 5
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 6
Chapter One: The Introduction ............................................................................................................... 7
The Land of a Thousand Hills ............................................................................................................... 7
Hidden Tensions .................................................................................................................................. 8
Research Focus .................................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter Two: Politics and Ethnicity in Rwanda ..................................................................................... 12
Ethnicity in Post-genocide Rwanda ................................................................................................... 12
Top-down and Bottom-up perspectives on Rwandan Politics .......................................................... 14
Top down ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Bottom-up ..................................................................................................................................... 15
A Theoretical Approach ..................................................................................................................... 16
Ethnicity and Constructivism ......................................................................................................... 17
Making and Breaking of Ethnic Boundaries .................................................................................. 18
Transcripts of Subordinates........................................................................................................... 20
Research on Hidden Identity in Rwanda ........................................................................................... 21
Chapter Three: Method and Fieldwork ................................................................................................. 24
Students and Higher Education in Rwanda ....................................................................................... 24
Higher Education as Starting Point .................................................................................................... 25
Research Design ............................................................................................................................ 26
Challenges Connected to Censorship ............................................................................................ 27
Challenges Connected to Self-Censorship ......................................................................................... 30
Results ........................................................................................................................................... 31
Chapter Four: The Context .................................................................................................................... 33
National Context................................................................................................................................ 33
University Context and Actors........................................................................................................... 34
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Recent Reforms ............................................................................................................................. 36
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 38
Chapter Five: The Discourse .................................................................................................................. 39
Public talk .......................................................................................................................................... 39
Hidden transcripts ............................................................................................................................. 44
Infrapolitics ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Political Electricity ............................................................................................................................. 50
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 50
Chapter Six: The Struggle ...................................................................................................................... 52
’Intrinsic’ and ’Extrinsic’ Fear ............................................................................................................ 52
Offstage Struggles ............................................................................................................................. 55
Masks................................................................................................................................................. 56
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 58
Chapter Seven: The Conlusion .............................................................................................................. 59
A National Masquerade..................................................................................................................... 59
Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 62
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 64
Primary Sources................................................................................................................................. 64
Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................................ 64
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Preface
Here I am, in Rwanda. A country far away from home, full of hills and dark people. Africa as
you would expect it, but a little bit ’better’: safe and clean streets, nice parks, flourishing
businesses, reasonable houses. And at the same time a little worse. Maybe? Because the
absence of chaos might conceal a fire that is burning in everyone’s inner core,
unobtrusive, but highly inflammable. Explosive like seventeen years ago.. Is that true? You do
not know. You cannot know. Only the future will tell...1
Before going to Rwanda to conduct this research I had read a lot about the country and its history. I
came with a rather skeptical view on the developments that are taking place in Rwanda. Underneath
the economic developments, and the efficiency and unity the Government was promoting, there
would lay a hidden agenda aiming at maintaining the power in the hands of a small elite. Between
international interns and researchers I met once I got to Rwanda, stories about political oppression
and inequality at the job market were shared in low voices. However, as my research progressed, my
opinion about the country and the developments that take place became more nuanced. In the
critical assessment of the role of ethnic identity in the daily life of students in Rwanda today, it is very
important to include these positive developments of a country recovering from a horrendous history.
Gerard Prunier, a leading Africa scholar who wrote a book about the history of the genocide,
acknowledges this complexity of Rwanda’s society. He states that “the situation of many people visà-vis the genocide is extraordinarily complex” and that politics of Rwanda should be seen against a
background of tragic confusion: “Rwanda is not a ’normal’ country anymore, and the actors of its
political life are not in a ’normal’ situation” (Prunier 1997, 358-9).
Society is a complex place full of interactions between groups of people with unpredictable behavior
that differs from moment to moment, depending on the context, emotions and maybe even the
weather. Nevertheless, in order to retell and analyze the story of the students in Rwanda, I have to
capture this complex society in words in black and white. And even though I strive to give a
comprehensive view on this fragment of society, I do realize that he reductionist character of words
will strongly derogate the realities on the campus in contemporary Rwanda where I conducted my
field-research.
I am very happy to have taken this opportunity to travel to Rwanda: to see the situation with my own
eyes. I recall speaking to a Canadian lecturer at the National University of Rwanda about the difficulty
1
Fragment from my weblog written during my stay in Rwanda, www.impressivan.blogspot.com.
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of understanding why people fight when they can do so much more productive things with their
energy and time, on which he replied that we are lucky to be growing up in countries where you
don’t have to worry about your first necessities. Being in Rwanda really opened my eyes to the harsh
realities and taught me more than I could have ever learned in any classroom.
Acknowledgements
Before introducing my research I would like to express my gratitude to the Staff of Conflict Studies
and Human Rights for enabling me to do field research and in particular my supervisor Chris van der
Borgh for his insightful and helpful support throughout the whole process. Furthermore I would like
to thank the Dutch Embassy in Rwanda, the personnel of the hostel where I lived during my stay,
David Kattenburg, Kars Gerrits, Yannick, Didier and Isabelle for their support during my research and
their pleasant company that helped me to make the most of my stay in Rwanda. Finally I want to
thank my interviewees, that shared their stories with me and helped me to better understand their
living-situation in contemporary Rwanda.
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Chapter One: The Introduction
The Land of a Thousand Hills
In 1994 the population of a small African country was decimated in less than a hundred days. People
were killed by their neighbors according to their ethnic identity, often slaughtered brutally with the
use of machetes. Today this genocide is present in every part of society in Rwanda. Everywhere you
go, you are confronted with this chapter of the country’s history: ’1994’ is regularly mentioned in the
many conversations I had with locals, and everywhere throughout the country there are memorial
sites. This confrontation with the past is ever more evident in the month April, when the mourning
period takes place; people wear brooches on their clothes in the colors purple and white to show
their compassion, and all companies and institutions hang banners on their buildings demonstrating
their sympathy for the victims of the genocide.
The ’1994’ people refer to, stands for the dreadful events that took place from April to July that year.
In a hundred days approximately 800.000 people were slaughtered because of their ethnic identity or
their political conviction. Tensions along ethnic lines were fed for a long time through hate media,
mobilization and sensibilization, resulting in a horrendous genocide with the highest number of civil
participants (Gourevitch 1998). The socioeconomic context and political culture that built up to this
outburst of mass violence was one of inequality, discrimination and hate-propaganda. In April 1994
these circumstances, together with political instability and the threat of an invasion by the Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda, led to the large scale civil war and genocide against the Tutsi. Now
seventeen years later, these horrific events continue to play an essential role in the everyday life of
all Rwandans.
Today however, Rwanda seems the complete opposite of this scenario. The country is strongly
developing and very well organized, the people seem quiet and friendly: “Stability and security have
been restored and the process of recovery has been underway for several years now” (Lassibille and
Tan 2005).The genocide certainly plays a visible role in society, but the chaos and atrocities of
seventeen years ago are nowhere to be found. Rather than separatism, the government now
promotes unity by banning the use of former ethnicities: Everyone is Rwandan; Hutu, Tutsi and Twa –
the original tribes – do no longer exist in contemporary Rwanda.
Based on these observations it would not come as a surprise that many international development
organizations and journalists are very positive about the changes that Rwanda has gone through
since the genocide was ended by the RPF in July 1994. The average annual growth of the country’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been seven to eight per cent since 2003 (CIA World Factbook).
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The government strongly promotes education and the streets are safe and clean (Economist 2010b).
Furthermore Rwanda is recently nominated as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa by
Transparency International (Economist 2010a). And the international community is impressed by the
local initiated Gacaca reconciliation processes, that are constructed according to traditional
Rwandese justice systems to reconcile neighbors after the violence and atrocities that took place
between them. ’Never Again’ seems to be the national motto, and everybody is aiming at building up
their nation. All these developments are clearly notable when walking around in Rwanda.
Hidden Tensions
Nevertheless there are also less optimistic accounts about the developments that take place in
Rwanda. Various scholars in the field of social studies stress that many of the former problems are
still prevailing in the country, and that these problems are still forming an important part in the
division of political power. The grim view on the developments in Rwanda is captured in accounts
written by scholars as Filip Reyntjens (2010), Johan Pottier (2002), Bert Ingelaere (2007; 2010a) and
others, and their concerns are particularly focused on the way ethnicity is handled in politics. It is
outlawed in the constitution (Article 19 2009) to speak about the former ethnicities, and those who
do so in a way that is dangerous according to the government, risk being thrown into jail or even
being killed (Reyntjens 2010).
This process of identity transformation towards a united Rwandan nationality, raises questions on
whether such measures are successful or maybe rather counterproductive in the process towards
reconciliation, peace and stability. Reyntjens, in his rather cynical analysis of the contemporary
political situation, is very critical towards these developments. He criticizes the dictatorial character
of President Kagame’s regime, stating that his policies that claim to combat genocide ideology and
recurrence of violence (for example through the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
(NURC) policies) are in fact mainly aiming at maintenance of his power. He states that “there is a
general consensus in the international scholarly community that Rwanda is a dictatorship with little
respect for human rights, little attention to the fate of the vast majority of its population made up of
ever-poorer peasants, and little awareness of the structural violence its ambitious engineering
project engenders” (Reyntjens 2011, 2).
Ingelaere in his research focusing on the grassroots situation of peasants reveals a similar negative
future perspective of developments related to the promoted national identity. In his, and others’,
accounts of peasants perception on the reconciliation policies, it is emphasized that the policies of
the government of Rwanda are engraving the divisions along ethnic lines that are prevailing in the
country in the last 100 years, rather than minimizing them (Ingelaere 2010; Mclean Hilker 2009;
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Thomson 2009). According to these scholars ethnicity thus still remains a dangerous issue in Rwanda,
despite or maybe even because of the ethnic policies of the government of Rwanda, and many warn
for the danger of recurrence of violence in the future.
Research Focus
These two sides of Rwanda’s society clearly demonstrate the ’paradox’ that Reyntjens writes about
(2010). On the one hand the country seems to be strongly developing – something that is cherished
by many scholars in the field of international relations (for example see Snyder 2000) – and on the
other hand the underlying tensions suggest that the stability that is created by those developments,
will prove unsustainable on the long term. If the scholars mentioned above are right, this suggests a
problematic situation in Rwandese society that is invisible at the first sight. How could it be explained
then, that numerous scholars that write on Rwanda warn for the danger of recurrence of violence?
Would it be possible that although nothing is observable on the surface, underneath completely
different sentiments and opinions are gaining ground? I argue that it does. In order to research this
issue I have formulated the following research question:
To what extend is there a hidden identity formed by Rwandese students of higher education, what
relation does this hidden identity bear to the newly imposed public identity, and under which
conditions does this hidden identity find public expression?
This question is based on the theory of Scott on domination and hidden transcripts. Through his
framework it is possible to study the invisible discourse of a population under an oppressive regime.
Scott rejects the theory of hegemony stating that in only very limited cases subordinate groups will
“accept (...) the arrangements that justify their subordination” and suggests that in all the other
cases subordinates form a hidden transcript that “consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and
practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript” (Scott 1990, 4-5).
In other words, in almost all societies where powerholders strongly control society, subordinates
have a divergent perception of the situation, even though it might seem that there is a certain
consensus about the status quo. It is important to look well underneath the surface in order to get a
more complete view on the hidden political discourse that is taking place: “by assessing the
discrepancy between the hidden transcript and the public transcript we may begin to judge the
impact of domination on public discourse” (Scott 1990, 5). In the case of Rwanda this is interesting as
scholars show that such a discourse is present – although hidden – and most likely even dangerous
for the stability of peace in the country. In answering the research question, I will draw on recent
literature and my own qualitative research carried out between March and May 2011.
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This paper proceeds as follows: In the next chapter (two) I will elaborate more on the relevance of
this research and the theoretical framework it is based on. In order to be able to answer my research
question, I have been in Rwanda for three months to conduct field research. I have dedicated one
chapter (three) to an in-depth discussion about the developments and challenges of doing field
research in Rwanda, in order to give an insight to my work method, and for the transparency of my
obtained results.
In chapters four, five and six, I will present my argument based on the data I collected during my field
research. In order to answer the research question I have formulated three subquestions based on
the framework provided by Scott. First I will focus on the question: “What is the context in which the
hidden identity is formed and who are the actors?” To get an insight in this issue, I will present the
actors that are the focus of my research and the context they live in, in chapter four. In order to
narrow down this research I will focus on students and their perception of their identity. Most
importantly because their position in society as the future elite, and because they have an informed
view on their ethnicity and the political situation in the country, because of their education, the
setting they live in at the campus, and their stage in life. I have collected their stories and opinions by
conducting interviews at two institutions for higher education in order to understand how these
students deal with their identity, which has played a vital role in the history and is now being
controlled by the government. This discourse of the students will be discussed in chapter five,
investigating the way they have spoken about identity, trust and other issues. In this chapter also
students’ behavior in their everyday life will be examined in order to find out more about the
underlying perception on their identity in relation to the government promoted nationality. This
analysis will help me to answer the next question: “What different forms does the discourse of
students on ethnicity take?” Finally, in chapter six, I will analyze the struggles that take place
between the promoted new identity and the private perception of students on their own identity,
reviewing how they relate to each other and if there are certain tensions between how students
identify themselves and how they should according to the government. The subquestion that is being
answered in this chapter reads: “Which struggles are taking place between the dominant and the
subordinate group concerning the hidden identity and what form does the frontier take?”
In the concluding chapter (seven) I will provide a short summery of the argument made and give an
answer to the research question presented above, reflecting on the findings provided in this thesis.
Based on the findings, it is argued that in order to establish ethnic boundaries, consensus has to be
reached between the actors in the field, Rwanda in this case. This consensus seems not present in
Rwandan society based on the literature, however, a certain involuntary consensus is in place, based
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on fear instead of interests as its main inspiration. Nevertheless, this boundary proves increasingly
unstable due to the oppressive character of the government.
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Chapter Two: Politics and Ethnicity in Rwanda
Before I start with my actual argument, here I will discuss my theoretical approach to the specific
case of students’ perceived identity in contemporary Rwanda. In this chapter I will first introduce this
specific context in which the students I interviewed live and explain the relevance of this research
focus. I will do so by providing an overview on the literature on Rwanda that is relevant to my
research. Based on the findings of various academics, I will focus both on the elite perspective as well
as on the civilian perspective. Next I will discuss the most fruitful theoretical approaches for analyzing
this context, introducing essential concepts and definitions to be used in the further analysis.
Following this I will put these discussed case-studies in the theoretical framework that I will use in
this thesis to structure my findings. Finally I will introduce my own approach based on the theoretical
framework of Scott on hidden transcripts.
Ethnicity in Post-genocide Rwanda
Since the genocide broke out in Rwanda in April 1994, a new wave of literature has been produced
on the country, its history, the genocide itself and its aftermath under the regime of President Paul
Kagame. Over the years academics and journalist have written many accounts on the subject, as well
as numerous NGOs. These articles and reports cover a wide range of subjects within the (rather
contemporary) history of the country. Especially concerning the post-conflict situation, ”[o]ne can
find the most divergent claims and conclusions (...), notably on issues of justice, security, and
development, with governance in general as the underlying factor” (Ingelaere 2010a).
Nevertheless, the literature on the small African country is very diverse: “Rwanda is a country full of
paradoxes” as Reyntjens stated (2010). This is reflected in the strong ambiguous viewpoints that can
be identified within the accumulating pile of literature, ranging from pro-Kagame to anti-Kagame
accounts, from studies focusing on international influence to ones that write about national policies,
from pre-genocide literature to aftermath accounts, and from top-down to bottom-up studies of the
political transition.
The core matter for this paradox in Rwanda, and in the literature on Rwanda, is the matter of ethnic
identity. Prunier acknowledges this, stating that there are two main genres in the literature about
Rwanda: the “Tutsi reading of events,” and the “Hutu reading of events” (Prunier 1997, 357). For as
far as the literature on the history of Rwanda and the Genocide of 1994 is concerned, scholars agree
that ethnicity has played a very important role: The history of the genocide is “a long story with
complex roots, many contradictions, brutal twists of fate, sudden celebrations and periods of
spiritual collapse” (Prunier 1997, xii). Although portrayed by the international media as a conflict
rooted in tribalism, the war and genocide that took place in 1994 is “not centuries-old tribal warfare
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but a distinctly modern tragedy, a degenerated class conflict minutely prepared and callously
executed” (Pottier 2002, 9). But, however complex the social processes leading up to the genocide,
the modern ideology that enabled the genocide was “based on a racial construct” (Prunier 1997,
347). And this racial construct, built on the portrayal of Hutu and Tutsi as enemies, became a matter
of life and death for many in April 1994.
Today ethnicity remains “a central factor for Rwandan social identity” and an extraordinary complex
aspect of society (Longman 2004, 176). The genocide plays an essential role and even though it is
“often seen by outsiders as a clear-cut affair, (...) it is in fact an abominably complicated and
interwoven social phenomenon whose actors are psychologically deeply traumatized” (Prunier 1997,
358). The majority of the students I interviewed for my research lost one or both parents and
another family members, and apart from these extremely traumatic cases, also experiences of
betrayal, persecution and violence affect personal issues of trust and anxiety.
However, it is not merely the historical value these ethnicities have in society today or had in the
past, but rather the combination with the political value that Prunier addresses when speaking about
two ’readings of events.’ Since the genocide ended many things have changed, but most
fundamental is the fact that the ethnic groups that were so vital seventeen years ago, are now
completely forbidden by the Rwandese government to speak about. Ethnicity has become one of
“Rwanda’s taboo social constructs par excellence” according to Ingelaere (2010a, 2). He states that
“although Rwanda continues to be ethnically bi-polar, with Hutu and Tutsi as the main ethnic groups,
it is no longer permitted to identify people trough these ethnic markers” (Ingelaere 2010a, 8). The
government radically promotes a unified Rwandese nationality and prohibits the use of former
identities completely (except for when dealing with the past before 1994).
This raises questions about the possibility to change the identity of a whole society through political
measures, and whether this transformation contributes to stability and reconciliation as is claimed by
the powerholders. Furthermore, the situation raises questions concerning the ability and willingness
of the population to cope with the political measures on such sensitive issues. As is pointed out
above, there are many different views on politics in Rwanda and the scholars that look at Rwanda in
a critical way, provide us with various attempts to answer these questions. As this core matter is also
the foundation of my research, I will discuss some of these attempts now, both looking at the elite
point of view as well as at the grassroots perception.
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Top-down and Bottom-up perspectives on Rwandan Politics
Top down
Many of the published articles and books on Rwanda focus on the politics of the Rwandan
Government (most notably: Prunier 1997; Reyntjens 2010; Lemarchand 1994). As stated in the
introduction, publications on the regime practices and other top-down subjects range from critics to
advocates of the policies of Kagame and his RPF party, especially in these top-down analyses.
The political situation in Rwanda is thus rather doubtful. First and foremost this dubiety is due to the
complexity of Rwandan society, acknowledged by Pottier who warns states that: “Anyone interested
in the social and political dynamics of Rwanda and the Great Lakes region must move away from
simplicity and become better prepared to face outbreaks of violence (...), with adequate knowledge
of context and complexity ” (Pottier 2002, 203). On the one hand the African country has had a
dreadful past to deal with and considering the developments and safety that have been generated
since the genocide, one could only speak euphorically about the accomplishments of the RPF regime.
On the other hand however, the government of Rwanda has been accused of being authoritarian
with very limited political freedom. Reyntjens is rather cynical about this ambiguity, denouncing the
positive developments by stating that: “Rwanda has become a ’donor darling’, despite being a
dictatorship with a dismal human rights record and a source of regional instability” (2010, 1).
In explaining this context, ethnicity is pointed out as the major tool to keep all the parties involved
under control and to conceal the minority rule that is in place in Rwanda. To start with, the main
danger according to the regime is ethnic tension and therefore both Hutu and Tutsi identities are
forbidden. Reyntjens argues that this fundamental rule enables the regime to efficiently eliminate
everyone who is perceived as a threat to this new identity, whether because of critical reports by
international organizations, suspicious national NGO activities, or opposing political statements.
Kagame uses the genocide excuse to get rid of all opposition whether internally or externally, by
structurally accusing them of ’divisionism’ (officially outlawed in 2001: Reyntjens 2010, 15) or using
its ’genocide credit’ and politics of ’National Unity’ (2010, 5; 16). Through tightened control over the
whole community, the regime can hold on to their official story of unity. Secondly, “the ethnic
amnesia preached by the regime only served to veil the fact that rule by a minority of the majority
ethnic group was replaced by rule by a minority of the minority ethnic group.” Through claiming that
“there are no Hutu and Tutsi, but only Banyarwanda,” the concealment of domination by Tutsi is
allowed (Reyntjens 2010, 30).
Identity thus plays a fundamental role in Rwandan politics. It is an important tool for controlling the
population and retaining stability, despite the unequal power divisions and the turbulent past. This is
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done rather successfully so far, as no open critical voices are heard in Rwanda, even though there
certainly is dissatisfaction and disagreement from the grassroots level according to various scholars
as we will see below.
Bottom-up
The popular perception of the controversial newly-implemented national identity is equally essential
for the stability of the country. In the last years it became ever more recognized that there is a lack of
research on the grassroots situation in Rwanda (Ingelaere 2007; 2010a; 2010b; Newbury & Newbury
2000). This focus proves important because although ”Rwanda has (...) experienced a gigantic leap
forward since the total destruction experienced in 1994 (...), more discouraging trends often remain
hidden and can be discerned only by looking beyond surface appearances, as difficult such an
exercise may be”(Ingelaere 2010b, 42). These discouraging trends are strongly connected to the
ethnic realities on the ground, as is demonstrated by scholars whose research focus lies beyond the
first sight.
In his research on peasants’ perspectives, Ingelaere concludes that ethnicity remains a central factor
for Rwandan social identity. Even though “ethnicity has officially been banned from public life [and
thus] has become an unobservable variable in most (empirical) studies of post-genocide Rwanda”
(2010a, 3), Ingelaere states that, “there has not been a complete detachment of rural Rwandans
from their ethnic identities” (2010a, 19). This discrepancy could be explained by what Ingelaere calls
“rehearsed consensus” (2010b, 53). 2 The construction of ethnic boundaries through this rehearsed
consensus is “intended not only to eradicate ‘genocide ideology‘ but also to promote a specific image
of Rwandanness” (2010b, 53). This image is adapted by the population at large but is nevertheless
very superficial as ethnic identities still have meaning and force in daily life. The instrumental use of
ethnic identity adopted by the post-genocide regime is not only denied by peasants, but also
counter-productive (2010a, 1).
These strong statements are also acknowledged by other scholars. Lindsay Mclean Hilker argues
similarly in her article on everyday ethnicities that ethnicity still persists in stereotyping of ’the other’
(2009). In 2004-2005 she interviewed forty-six young citizens of Kigali for her research on identity
and reconciliation among Rwandan youth. In her article she emphasizes that ethnicity is prevailing in
relationships between Rwandans today in Kigali “despite current state policies that seek to deemphasize ’ethnic’ identities” (2009, 81). She states that “although many young Rwandans continue
to forge inter-ethnic ties, there is a persistent desire to know the ethnic identity of significant others
2
Using the concept of ’rehearsed consensus,’ Ingelaere assembles sensitization campaigns, commemoration
ceremony, speeches by dignitaries, and reeducation programs. (Ingelaere 2010b, 53).
15
and to categorize them on an ongoing basis” (2009, 81). This evidence suggests, according to Mclean
Hilker, that the risk for recurrence of violence along ethnic lines in Rwanda is increasing.
Susan Thomson (2009) also focuses on this matter and emphasizes the everyday resistance of
peasants to the structure of power. In her PhD research, interviewing thirty-seven Rwandans from
rural areas in 2006, she discovered the ways in which ordinary people resist the national unity and
reconciliation program as its policies conflict with their own experiences and realities. “[F]or many
ordinary Rwandans, the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the product of an
illegitimate regime, an opinion that contrasts considerably with élite claims of Rwanda as a ’nation
rehabilitated’ and one that has ’put the legacy of the genocide behind it’” (Thomson 2009, 269-270).
She points out the similarities between the current regime and previous regimes, alluding to the
danger of such policies for the recurrence of violence.
Hence, ethnic identification is being restricted from within the government and a new national
identity is imposed, while the old identities are prevailing in Rwanda at the local level of society.
Ethnicity seems to have disappeared from the view but according to various scholars, both
researching on elite and grassroots level, it is still relevant for politics and daily realities. The gap
between top-down implementation of new ethnic boundaries and policies in general, and the
bottom-up perception of ethnicity, is very deep according to the literature on the contemporary
Rwandan situation. The articles under review here all emphasize the danger of future outburst of
violence if the current political situation will not be changed. The evidence presented by these
authors suggests that “current approaches to reconciliation do not sufficiently address the ’ethnic’
logic that persists in Rwanda and may instead be entrenching it, increasing the risk that any
recurrence of violence would once again have ’ethnic’ targets and be as extensive and brutal as in
1994” (Mclean Hilker 2009, 81).
A Theoretical Approach
To understand this context in which identity plays a central but very controversial role, I will now
discuss the theoretical framework which will be used to make academic sense of this matter. The
process of ethnic boundary changing that takes place in Rwanda can be best understood through the
multilevel process theory of Wimmer on the making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries (2008). First
however, I will start here by giving a brief overview of the concept of ethnicity, introducing
definitions and frames that are necessary in researching this specific subject. This will bring me
eventually to applying the theory of Wimmer on ethnic boundary struggles on the case of Rwanda.
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Ethnicity and Constructivism
First of all, ethnicity itself is a very controversial concept that lacks a stable definition. Nevertheless,
my aim here is to explain how the concept of ethnicity, with the salient but limited value it has for
people, and the ambiguous use of the term in social science, will be used in this research. By
exploring the concept of ethnicity, I intend to establish a connection primarily between the value
ethnicity has for students in Rwanda and the struggles that are taking place in the name of ethnicity.
In order to understand this link, it is essential to follow the developments that the concept of
ethnicity has gone through in the academic discourse.
Until Frederic Barth published his work on ethnic groups and boundaries in 1969, ethnicity was
conceived as a rather solid identity that constructed social life as a matter of relations between predefined, fixed groups. This primordialist view was opposed by constructivists like Barth, who claimed
that ethnic identity is an imagined, constructed concept, created through social action rather than
given by nature, and thus is changeable over time. This constructivist’s view came into existence in
the 1950s and since predominates in the academic world. In that year Barth published his book
arguing that the differences between two ethnicities are often just as big as the differences within
these ethnicities. The rather structuralist understanding of constructivism is clearly captured in the
words of Hall, who states that “[t]he term ethnicity acknowledges this place of history, language, and
culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity” (Hall 1992, 257).
The rather agency-based understanding of constructivism on the other hand, asserts that it are
rather the boundaries between the ethnic groups that are selected and deepened for political means
that give ethnic groups their significance. For the case of Rwanda this latter understanding is clearly
put forth by Thomson:
[H]istory shows that the political élites have strategically manipulated ethnic identity to
justify resorting to violence. (...) For most ordinary Rwandans, (...) everyday realities are
shaped by their socio-economic position. The tactics of ethnic control found in the programme
of national unity and reconciliation differs from those of previous regimes in that they deemphasize rather than emphasize individual ethnic identities to justify the programme’s
policies of exclusion (Thomson 2009, 266).
“Despite the lack of a stable definition for ethnicity, the construct is salient for people who believe
themselves to be members of one group and not another” (Samuelson and Freedman 2010, 197). As
ethnicity creates a strong sense of belonging, connecting the concept to the many ’ethnic conflicts’
taking place around the world results in the assumption that ethnicity is a rather strong mobilizer for
conflict (and sometimes even seen as its main cause).
17
Further research in this field is focused on this doubtful link between ethnicity and violence (see
Fearon and Laitin 2000; Brubaker 2004; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Wimmer 2002; 2008). The
problem, as Eder et al. state, is that “’ethnic conflict’ is often seen in a normative way” (Eder et al.
2002, 12). Scholars warn for this generalization of ’ethnic conflict’. While “[t]he paradigmatic
instances of ethnic and nationalist violence are large events, (...) they are composite and causally
heterogeneous, consisting not of an assemblage of causally identical unit instances of ethnic violence
but of a number of different types of actions, processes, occurrences, and events” (Brubaker and
Laitin 1998, 446).
Thus, as is pointed out by these scholars, it is rather the discourse around ethnicity and the way it is
used in politics that can create conflict. As stated by Newbury and Newbury, “[i]t is politics that
makes ethnicity significant (or, indeed, insignificant), not ethnicity which invariably defines politics”
(Newbury and Newbury 1999, 313 in Ingelaere 2010a, 20). Therefore, ethnicity could be best
understood as “a specific manifestation of the more general category of collective identity, which we
see as an inevitable, necessary aspect of any collective action” (Eder et al. 2002, 12). In addition
Wimmer states that today, ethnicity is rather conceived as “a process of constituting and reconfiguring groups by defining the boundaries between them” (2010, 1027).
Following this discourse, ethnicity is a man-made thing that feels to be god-given and can be used by
elite as a tool to influence the masses. The focus in the theories discussed is thus especially on
(agent-)activities of elite who promote boundaries in order to gain power. Continuing in this
academic debate, ”[m]any have argued that, in order to advance this constructivist tradition, a
further exploration of how ethnicity is made and unmade in the everyday interaction between
individuals is in place” (Wimmer 2010, 1027). In order to do so, Wimmer combines this whole history
of academic thought discussed above, within his theory on struggles over ethnic boundaries,
including the context (following structuralism) as well as individual actions and interests (following
agency-based theories).
Making and Breaking of Ethnic Boundaries
According to Wimmer, “ethnic boundaries are the outcome of the classificatory struggles and
negotiations between actors situated in the social field” (Wimmer 2008, 970). Following his theory
there are five sorts of strategies that can be used by agents to change the collective identity. The
process that is taking place in Rwanda is an ’emphasis shift’ promoted by the elite aiming at national
unity. In this process of nation-building, “a higher layer of ethnic differentiation that corresponds to
the population of a state and thus superposes existing ethnic (...) divisions” is emphasized (Wimmer
2010, 1032). The new Rwandan identity is imposed with an iron fist and in a very narrow form. To fit
18
into the framework of Wimmer, the strategy of ’blurring’ can be detected within the special case
towards a national identity in Rwanda. ”Boundary blurring reduces the importance of ethnicity as a
principle of categorization and social organization” (Wimmer 2010, 1041). The emphasis shift that is
envisioned in Rwanda is a rather drastic one is explained above. Wimmer adds that not all nationbuilding attempts were successful in the past, stating that ”in all these cases, the nation-building
strategies were not supported by the population at large, who refused to identify with the imagined
community of the nation” (Wimmer 2010, 1033).
Hence, to claim that ethnic identities are constructed exclusively by elites is too short sighted. Next
to the many aspects in society that play a role in this process, another addition to the constructivist
theory concerns the influence of the population. The masses that follow the elite should not be seen
as programmed computers. People do not follow self-evidently every leader that claims to represent
their ethnic group and identity. According to the theory of Wimmer a certain degree of consensus
has to be in place for new ethnic boundaries to be accepted (2002). Wimmer claims that through
political struggle and classification, new boundaries come into place, and that consensus over a new
boundary, is based mainly on economic, political, and symbolic resources and priorities of both the
elite and the population. As a consequent, new boundaries come into place, according to power
balance and overlapping interests. The degree to which power and interests are balanced is different
in every case, and when there is little overlap in interests between elite and the ethnic group, more
power is needed to get a new ethnic boundary in place (Wimmer 2002; 2008). Wimmer thus
provides a theory of cultural compromise, focusing more on the struggle between the powerholders
and the civilians over those boundaries.
Consequently, Wimmer argues that the success of elite boundary changing strategies depends on the
outcome of struggles and negotiations between actors in the field. “Different actors will pursue
different strategies of boundary making” and “[c]onsensus (...) is more likely to emerge if interests
partly overlap and strategies of classification can therefore concur on a shared view” (Wimmer 2008,
997-8). That the construction of ethnic antagonism or cooperation is “the result of individual
strategic action,” is also acknowledged by Fearon and Laitin (2000, 874). As an example of such
strategic action, Wimmer points out that for individuals of various ethnic backgrounds it might be
interesting to “cross the boundary ’into the nation’ because this allows them to claim equal
treatment before the law” (2008, 999).
Following this theory, the open boundary struggles of 1994 in Rwanda seem to have calmed down
under the new regime after the genocide. From the literature discussed above however, it becomes
clear that the strongly imposed new identity does not correspond with the personal experience of
19
identity of the population. Because the kind of consensus as pointed out by Wimmer does not fit the
academic literature on Rwanda, it seems legitimate to assume that in Rwanda there is a ’hidden’
identity that is not publicly visible, but certainly prevailing, even though restricted by the
government. This suggests that there is no consensus and consequently that struggles prevail in
Rwanda. It is because of the power with which the government implements and controls the new
identity that it is difficult to ’get behind the official story’ and to retrieve the private sense of identity.
It follows from this assumption that, being a rather comprehensive theory, Wimmer’s framework
provides insufficient depth for the case of Rwanda. Superficial analysis of the Rwandan context
would, as we have seen, indicate an overall consensus over the new national boundary. In order to
reach this lower, invisible level where consensus might not (yet) be reached, the theory of Scott turns
out to be very useful as we will see now.
Transcripts of Subordinates
In order to find out more about this underlying identity and the struggles that are taking place
underneath the superficial level, I will use the concept of hidden transcripts developed by James
Scott (1990). The term ’hidden transcript’ is used to address the invisible dynamics that take place,
and particularly in societies under strong political control. Scott, in his book Domination and the Arts
of Resistance defines hidden transcripts as the “discourse that takes place ’offstage,’ beyond the
direct observation by power holders,” as opposed to the public transcript which is the “open
interaction between subordinates and those who dominate” (1990, 2-4). Publically, Rwandans –
’subordinates’ in the terms of Scott – might not criticize politics or ethnicity as is shown by authors as
Hilker Mclean (2009) and Thomson (2009). However in the discourse that takes place ’offstage,’
underneath the public identity as propagated by the government, old identities continue to structure
social life. Scott claims that “[b]y assessing the discrepancy between the hidden transcript and the
public transcript we may begin to judge the impact of domination on public discourse” (1990, 15) and
thus on the consensus over ethnic boundaries. By focusing on the case of Rwanda, applying the
concept of hidden transcripts on the sense of identity enables us to look “beneath the placid surface”
that is constructed by the official discourse on public identity (1990, 15). This is relevant, especially in
a highly politicized society as Rwanda where the public identity appears to be very far apart from the
personal hidden identity, however not observable so. Thus the theory on consensus that is provided
by Wimmer in order to analyze processes of ethnic boundary making and breaking, has to be taken
to a more profound level in the case of Rwanda by the use of Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts.
Although in many cases open resistance or complaints are not apparent, existing power relations
should not be naturalized blindly according to Scott. He states that hegemonic ideology seems like a
20
consensus, but is in fact only a temporary situation of submission until the subordinates have a
chance to change. In his analysis of domination he argues that both the powerful and the
subordinates have reasons to uphold a certain common (public) discourse. The elite have vital
reasons to uphold a certain discourse to affirm their power and “conceal or euphemize the dirty linen
of their rule” (Scott, 18). And individuals might be too divided among themselves to successfully
rebel against the powerful (Scott, 17). Scott warns however that this public discourse might
(probably) not be the only evidence to support the interpretation of ideological hegemony (Scott,
70).
From this can be understood that even in case there is no consensus on identity to such a degree,
Scott claims a certain image can be uphold. Along his lines of argumentation this consensus can be
seen as the public version of the transcripts. On the other side of the spectrum one can find the
hidden transcript. Between the hidden and the public transcript two other forms of discourse may be
used by subordinates (which will be introduced later). Scott states that the comparison between the
hidden and the public transcripts, the sense of identity in this case, “will reveal the effect of
domination on political communication” (Scott, 15).
The theory of Scott is thus very fruitful for the case of Rwanda. Despite the fact that the country is
going through strong development and nothing remotely close to a clash is detectible, it is very
important to research what is taking place under the surface. As we have seen, the academic articles
state something opposite to the tranquility one perceives when visiting Rwanda. The strong political
control enables this fake tranquility as the population is suppressed. The reason why ethnicity lies at
the core of the struggles in Rwanda, is because it is instrumentalized by the government through
which interests as freedom of expression or equality of opportunities are unmentionable.
In such a case, hidden transcripts constitute precursors for open violent conflict. Scott even claims
that political analysis can be advanced by research on hidden transcripts as it will “reveal the effect
of domination on political communication” and might move beyond apparent consent and grasp
potential acts. (Scott, 15-16). In addition to these advantages of such analysis of hidden transcripts, I
believe this kind of profound research is necessary in Rwanda as people are very closed and will not
share private information without trusting the other.
Research on Hidden Identity in Rwanda
Based on this information I have formulated the following research question (also stated above): To
what extend is there a hidden identity formed by Rwandese students of higher education, what
relation does this hidden identity bear to the newly imposed public identity and under which
21
conditions does this hidden identity find public expression? To find an answer to the main question,
Scott points out three characteristics that are crucial to understand how hidden transcripts are
formed (1990, 14). He states that first, “hidden transcripts are specific to a given social site and a
particular set of actors.” Secondly he points out that the hidden transcript does contain speech acts
as well as performances. And finally he stresses that the ”frontier between the public and hidden
transcript is a zone of constant struggle between dominant and subordinate – not a solid wall”.
Based on these characteristics, I have structured my research and in each chapter I will discuss in
more detail Scott his theory and place my findings within the framework, in order to finally find an
answer to the research question. Here it should be noted that the second characteristic of the hidden
transcript, which focuses on the discourse, is where the majority of my qualitative research findings
is centered. As the discourse analysis is central in this thesis, stronger emphasis will be put on this
fifth chapter, making this chapter more extensive without necessarily unbalancing the argument.
The notion of hidden transcripts that is introduced by Scott is defined as offstage discourse that
would not be accepted by the powerholders. A significant difference with my research is that I
changed the concept of ’transcripts’ into ’identity’ in my research question. The explanation for this
change is first of all to narrow down the focus of this research and secondly, as is argued above,
because identity is a very essential issue in Rwanda. However, in answering the subquestions, an
extended version of the hidden identity, slightly beyond the strict identity focus, will be examined.
Political discourse will be included in order to provide a more comprehensive approach to the issue
of hidden identity in Rwanda. This is relevant, first of all because politics and ethnicity are very
interrelated in Rwanda, as will be extensively emphasized throughout this thesis. And second of all
because the inclusion of political discourse clearly shows the difference between strict identity issues
and broader political issues, and the different struggles these issues bring along. Nevertheless, as
identity remains the main focus of my research question, only the related political discourse will be
included in the research.
Next to the interesting focus on identity, the focus on education also provides a relevant angle for
research. In Rwanda, no study has explicitly examined the perception of (higher education) students
on (ethnic) identity. We know however that education has a strong and interesting link to national
identity building, based on the growing literature on the relationship between education and violent
conflict (Collier 2006; Mclean Hilker 2011; Bush and Saltarelli 2000). Collier found that conflict has a
strong connection to countries with low level education (2006). In addition, education can have two
faces according to Bush and Saltarelli: a ’negative face,’ suggesting that factors like uneven access to
education along ethnic or religious groups, or manipulation of the thought curriculum by politics, can
increase the likelihood of the outburst of violent conflict. However, a ’positive face’ of education can
22
contribute to peace building projects and conflict prevention, for example through teaching critical
thinking skills and create a culture of tolerance and unity in classrooms.
However before I start my argument on education and identity, first I will discuss the used research
methodology and the realities of fieldwork in Rwanda in the next chapter.
23
Chapter Three: Method and Fieldwork
Doing research on the local level in Rwanda is a rather challenging exercise. First of all due to the
censorship that the authoritarian setting induces, as information is strongly being “construed,
managed and controlled” (Ingelaere 2010b, 41; See also Pottier 2002), and especially because it is
forbidden to speak about issues of ethnicity. The second major challenge is the issue of the selfcensorship among Rwanda’s population. Many people I met in Rwanda told me Rwandans are
“people who like to keep things for themselves,” when describing their own cultural traits (Field
notes 2011). This main obstacle in collecting information from the bottom-up is called Kwibwizira, a
Kinyarwandan word signifying auto-censorship. Ingelaere in his article on the practicalities of
conducting research on the grassroots level in such an environment, acknowledges this difficulty in
Rwanda, stating in addition that “an active interference in the scientific construction of knowledge,
the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and a culturally specific ethics of communication all lie at
the heart of difficulties in understanding life after genocide” (2010b, 42). These two main issues have
strongly influenced the course of my research as will become clear below.
In this chapter I will first briefly discuss the focus group in this research and my preconceived
research strategies. After this I will elaborate on the difficulties I encountered while doing research
connected to censorship and self-censorship and explain how these challenges influenced my
research process and findings. Finally I will give a short review on my research method and the
results.
Students and Higher Education in Rwanda
Students are interesting as a focus for this research for many reasons concerning their position in
society as well as their characteristics that are specific to students. First of all students as a specific
group differ very much from other citizens of Rwanda. When they go to university, most students
move away from home and live together with other students in dorms. In this totally new setting
students get exposure to other perspectives from roommates and co-students, even though speaking
about issues of ethnicity is often avoided. Also lecturers of course also have much influence on the
developing perspectives of students through the classes they follow. Furthermore, the university is
pre-eminently an institution where the national identity is created (Bush and Saltarelli 2000). Living
in the city, away from family and traditional context, students are open for new information and
ideas and in an age where the question ’who am I?’ is regularly asked. Finally, typically for students is
that they have agency: more than others groups in society students have the ability to express and
organize themselves according to their new perspectives, possibly critical of the developments that
take place in Rwanda. Students thus have very specific and interesting characteristics.
24
Next, students are an interesting group as they have a specific position in society. First of all,
students are the future elite. Therefore students are the designated group to carry out the new
Rwandese identity in the coming generations. Moreover they are the generation who lived through
the genocide: even though they were still very young at the time, it took place during their lifetime. A
research by Akresh and de Walque assessing the impact of the genocide on children’s schooling,
conclude that the students who were affected by the genocide, lost half-year of education and were
fifteen per cent less likely to finish the third or fourth grade (2008). Furthermore, the position of
students in society is rather strong and will even strengthen more in the future as the trends in
students graduating have strongly risen since the end of the genocide: “The number of students [in
higer education] increased from an estimated 10,000 in 2002 to 27,787 in 2005” (Mclean Hilker 2011,
273). These students are thus almost a ’product’ of the developments that take place in Rwanda
today, and that is another reason for them to be interesting.
From an academic perspective, students are interesting as they are a previously unheard group. As
Ingelaere and others stress, there has been little research on the bottom-up perception of the ethnic
realities. The recent reforms in education and the tensions these reforms bring along make the case
of students even more interesting. What is also important to mention, making the case of students,
or maybe Rwandan youth in general, is the strong desire for development. Youth, seen as the future
of the country, show a strong motivation to build up their country after the events of 1994. Finally, I
find it interesting to interview students on their perceptions towards the reforms and the matter of
ethnicity as I am also a student and I believe I can identify with them to a certain extend.
Higher Education as Starting Point
My focus on students in higher education turned out to be a good starting point for one other
practical reason. The difficulties one encounters in field research in Rwanda make it for an outside
observer difficult to understand and comprehend the problematic issues, relationships and behavior
in society. Hammersley and Atkinson acknowledge this and comment that “[p]olitical crises (...)
reveal what happens when the limiting factors that normally constrain a particular element of social
life are breached. At such times social phenomena that are otherwise taken-for-granted become
visibly problematic for the participants themselves, and thus for the observer” (1983, 32). Such a
political crisis took place right before I arrived in Rwanda: the majority of students bursaries were
cut, making many students desperate for money for food and housing. The inducement for the
specific focus on students in this research, was a letter that was brought to my attention (by
diplomats of the Dutch Embassy) written by students from the Kigali Institute of Education. In the
letter, four students described the problems with the recently imposed reforms for education, like
25
the abrupt change of the language of the lectures from French into English (2009) and the sudden
announcement that the bursaries would be cut suddenly for many in 2011. Besides their practical
concerns, these students pointed out the issue of ethnicity and ethnic inequality as a problem.
Before coming to Rwanda I was already interested in this perception of ethnicity, and the fact that
these students emphasized their sense of ethnic inequality openly in a letter addressed to the
Minister of Education – even though not under their real names as I was to find out – made their
case even more fascinating. Their letter was a strong starting point and a useful tool for my further
research, revealing the normally constrained elements of social life I wanted to discuss. We will now
turn to the envisioned research method.
Research Design
Before starting my qualitative research in Rwanda I designed a rather fluid research method. First of
all I decided to interview approximately twenty students from two different universities. I chose to
interview ten students from the National university of Rwanda (NUR) situated in Butare, because it is
the biggest and the oldest university of Rwanda, founded in 1963. The other ten students were from
the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE), chosen because this was the university the ’letter writers’ came
from, also one of the bigger institutions for higher education in Rwanda. Both universities are public
institutions, meaning that the government supports the large majority studying at these universities,
who are selected to come to the universities based on their final high school marks.
The ten students I decided to interview at each university had to be selected to create a certain
diverse sample. As the number of respondents and my research itself are relatively small, I did not
aim at creating a representative sample. With this rather exploratory research I did however try to
interview a diverse group of students, corresponding for as far as possible with the composition of
students at the university. Because I am interested in ethnicities and perception, it would be
preferable to select students with different backgrounds and ethnicities. However, as it is impossible
to speak about such issues in Rwanda, especially when superficially searching for a diverse sample of
interviewees, I decided to compose the group of interviewees mainly based on their socio-economic
background. According to the government there are six different socio-economic classes, ranking
from ’umutindi nyakujya’ (most vulnerable) as the poorest and ’umukire’ as the richest of society.3 A
similar way of classifying is also used by Ingelaere and Thomson in their researches, as they focus on
3
“Rwandan society is stratified across six socio-economic categories. From the bottom up they are: umutindi
nyakujya (abatindi nyakujya , pl.) most vulnerable, umutindi (abatindi, pl.) vulnerable, umukene (abakene, pl.)
poor, umukene wifashije (abakene wifashije, pl.) poor with means or salaried poor, umukungu (abakungu, pl.)
rich without money, umukire (abakire, pl.) rich.” (Thomson 2009, 329)
26
the lowest classes (peasants) of Rwandan society. Following these lines I envisioned to select
students based on their socio-economic situation.
I hired a local research assistant to help me set up the interviews, to ensure the diversity of students
as envisioned, and if necessary translate interviews for me. He was a fourth year student in
Journalism at the National University, originally from a small town south of Butare, working as a
freelance journalist next to studying in his final year. With him I discussed my plan to do in-depth
interviews. This was preferable as people in Rwanda seemed very anxious to talk to people in general
but especially concerning ethnicity. I expected that finding interviewees through his network would
provide me with extra confidence from respondents. The interviews would be held with the help of
my research assistant and an interview guide that we would discuss beforehand, preferably taking
place in a private place, using a recorder and taking half an hour to an hour.
During my interviews, above all the doing no harm principle was important, especially in such a
controlled environment as Rwanda is. Throughout the field research, meeting participants on their
own terms as well as safeguarding their anonymity remained my first priority (See also Thomson
2010, 32). For the same security reason, all respondents that are mentioned in this thesis are given
fake names. In the next section I will discuss how the research in the field proceeded.
Challenges Connected to Censorship
However, “[W]hen one is carrying out research in settings in which one has little power, and of which
one has little previous knowledge, the research cannot be fully designed in the pre-fieldwork phase”.
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, 28). Therefore, the challenges and opportunities I encountered
resulted in various adjustments to the original research design, as will be discussed below. In this
section challenges connected to censorship like obtaining a research permit, selecting a sample and
the influence of my Research assistant are discussed.
Doing research in Rwanda, one particular difficulty is getting access to the field. Before I could start
my research as I set it up, I had to apply for a research permit through the government of education
as the government tries to control the construction of knowledge: “The RPF deals harshly, and
without haste, with any Rwandan or foreigner who questions its commitment to ethnic unity as the
basis of peace and security” (Thomson 2010, 22). As the objective of my research would most likely
not please the officers at the Ministry of Education, I applied with a vaguer version of my research
design, explaining that I would focus on the (progressive) developments in Rwandese education. It
took almost a month to acquire the research permit. This restricted me in my research plan but
people advised me not to start without the permit as the government had been very strict with
27
researchers working in the field without permit in the past. Finally I could start my (legitimized) field
research towards the end of April.
My next obstacle was reaching students that were willing to be interviewed by me for my research.
As I did not have the means to know their class-status beforehand either, I was advised to work with
a research assistant. He would have more insight in the backgrounds of the people I would be
interviewing and thus would be able to inform me and eventually warn me for problematic
situations. This was important as the topic of my research or some questions were controversial and
some interviewees might have had ties with the RPF that could put me and my interviewees in
danger. Together with my research assistant, I decided to interview the following composition of
students at both universities, aiming at diversity: At each university, first of all I wanted to interview
two genocide survivors. Genocide survivors are the only citizens in Rwanda of who you can be certain
of their ethnic background based on their status according to the government. All genocide survivors
are Tutsi who lost family members in the genocide and are sponsored by the Fonds national pour
l’assistance aux rescape´s du Genocide (FARG), the genocide survivors organization. When a large
percentage of the bursaries of students were cut, the students that were supported by FARG still
received the same amount of money (see also Mclean Hilker 2011, 275). This was also emphasized in
the letter of the KIE students, stating that the bursary cuts were a way of excluding some students as
only FARG still paid the genocide survivors. Second of all I wanted to interview one student who was
not affected by the bursary cut at all, as this student did not receive money from the government to
study before. For both universities this student turned out to be a returnee from Uganda with a Tutsi
background, who migrated to Rwanda after the genocide ended.4 Thirdly, I have chosen to interview
two students who were strongly opposing the reforms and the policies of the government. For KIE I
envisioned that these would be the ’letter writers,’ and my research assistant informed me about a
group of students at NUR that were planning a demonstration against the reforms through the social
media device Facebook, who could be the counterpart of the ’letter writers’ in Kigali. Finally I was
planning to interview five students that were affected in greater or lesser extent by the bursary cuts,
either because they have no more money to buy food or to pay for a room close to the campus, or
students who dropped out because they had to start working or had to go back to live with their
families.
My research assistant had a very influential role during the course of my research, especially
concerning the composition of my sample. First of all, he picked the interviewees at the National
28
University in Butare and these were for a significant part his own classmates. Being a fourth year
Bachelor student in Journalism, four of my interviewees were also journalism students towards the
end of their university career. This strongly influenced my research, on the one hand because, as I
was introduced to the interviewees through an acquaintance, I was trusted more which made the
interviews were qualitatively better. On the other hand, interviewing these (rather ambitious)
journalism students, very well informed on the national developments, also biased my research in a
certain way. Furthermore it was impossible for my research assistant to get contact with those
students at KIE that sent the letter or with those at NUR who planned a ’Facebook-revolt’. In order to
find the students that were mostly disadvantaged due to the bursary cuts my assistant contacted
three students that had to move away from campus. Three other students that were heavily affected
we found during lunchtime eating in a restaurant where meals cost 250 Rwandese Franks (converted
approximately 30 euro cent) and were nicknamed ’Kill-me-quick Restaurants’ for their bad hygiene
and malnutrition. Although strictly classified in the research design, during the interviews these
divisions all became more nuanced and overlapping: some genocide survivors also turned out to be
victim of the bursary cuts, and students in the category of ’rich’ returnees often ate once a day, just
like the other students, due to money problems. Nevertheless, as I did not have many options to
select my interviewees more objectively, this small scale snowball method for selecting respondents
through social ties, was successful to find a rather diverse and well-willing group of interviewees.
At KIE, my sample was formed in a complete different way. Due to complications with my research
assistant, I started my interviews in Kigali only after I finished almost all interviews in Butare. As he
could not arrange the interviews for me after all, I arranged the interviews at KIE myself with the
help of the Student Union president. I supplied him with the same list of interviewees following the
original plan (excluding the ’letter writers’) and he arranged a meeting for me with seven students.
The first round of interviews went rather chaotic as I was sitting with all interviewees in the small
office of the president, asking them slightly personal questions in English (which was not the first
language for most). I kept this first round very short, getting a rough picture of the students
background and met each of them a week later for a second round of interviews individually. These
interviews differ strongly from the interviews I did in Butare. The interviews in Butare where
qualitatively better and went deeper into the issues I wanted to discuss. Furthermore, as I found out
during the interviews in Kigali, most students picked by the president of the Student Union had a
Tutsi background, according to their own saying or according to their background stories, and thus
not matching with the sample at the National University in Butare or with the composition of
students at the university. Finally the interviews differed because the living situation of students in
Kigali differed slightly from those in Butare, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
29
Challenges Connected to Self-Censorship
After having discussed the challenges connected to censorship, I will now turn to the challenges
connected to self-censorship. These confrontations strongly had to do with the confidence from
students in me as the researcher. Namely issues of gaining trust, securing privacy and staying neutral
will be discussed here.
In order to gain more trust from the interviewees, I decided to interview each student three different
times, in three rounds of meetings. The first round I would keep very introductory and superficial,
asking about the background of the student; the living situation and their friends and family; the
study he or she chose and why; their general opinion about the university. In the second round of
interviews, planned approximately a week later, I would elaborate on the previous interview;
discussing the changes that take place at the university; what kind of consequences the student
thought it would have, both in general and personally; and why they thought these reforms were
taking place. Only in the third round of interviews I would get to the core of the issue, discussing the
letter of the students and asking for their opinion on the ethnic issue raised in the letter; issues of
trust in relationships; and how they envisioned ’Never Again’, the national motto propagating the
rebuilding of a peaceful Rwanda.
To my surprise, issues that I had planned to discuss in the second round of interviews were already
discussed with almost all interviewees in Butare in the first round. On the other hand, students were
more hesitant to speak about their background than I expected. Issues I planned to discuss in the
third round turned out to be very difficult to touch upon in the interviews and only with a few I could
really discuss issues of trust and the matter of ethnicity in Rwanda.
Practical issues I encountered while doing research concerned the matter of privacy. Choosing a good
setting was a difficult task as it was important for my in-depth interviews to be in a safe and quiet
place. As I interviewed most students at or around the campus, these discrete places where
sometimes hard to find, especially because you stand out as a white person everywhere you go in
Rwanda. Also my use of the recorder was a problem for some interviewees and therefore I decided
not to use the recorder anymore after the first round of interviews in Butare as my time to gain
confidence was limited and I thus had no time to lose by ensuring confidence of respondents in my
electronic equipment. The final issue concerning trust was the presence of my research assistant.
Following the advice of one lecturer at NUR that I interviewed, I decided not to bring along my
assistant as the interviewees would be more tight-lipped if another local would be listening. This was
also acknowledged by some interviewees and proved to be a valuable suggestion. These adjustments
and my three-round method helped to build up trust and from several interviewees I gained enough
30
trust to get less superficial answers. However, the confidence most students had in me after two or
three rounds was still limited. Many times it thus was not clear whether or not the respondents
shared with me their whole opinion. Therefore observation was necessary to get a complete picture
of the respondent and their behavior (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983).
In order to gain trust and stay neutral, especially in the beginning, I would not start to explain the
objectives of my research, but by introducing my research as a social science research on higher
education development in Rwanda. Here the letter served as a kind of cover for the research I
wanted to conduct in Rwanda. The complaints expressed in the letter (apart from the issue of
ethnicity), and the recent reforms in the education sector in general were very controversial under
students, and to a certain degree debatable. Thus, in interviews both with students as well as with
government officials and university staff, I introduced my research as on that was focusing on the
developments in education. Furthermore, I never asked about their ethnicity, first of all because it is
illegal to speak about in Rwanda and I did not want to shock the interviewees or put them in any
danger. And secondly because in this way I would be able to find out more about the discourse
around ethnicity, whether or not they would mention it themselves or how it would become clear in
the course of the conversation.
Results
The findings of my fieldwork have given me interesting insights to the current situation that students
live in and their perception of ethnic identity and politics in general. With my research some
respondents provided me with qualitatively more valuable answers, which influenced my argument
more than other interviewees. First of all my research assistant strongly influenced the course of my
field work, as is discussed in detail above. And secondly, one communication student shared many of
his thoughts with me in the various interviews we had.5 Next to the rather strong statements he
dared to reveal to me, he also gave me advice on related topics and provided me with his well
informed opinion on internal and international developments. These two key-informants therefore
have a larger impact on my findings than many other students that I interviewed.
In addition to my interviews with students, I found it important to triangulate my findings with other
sources. In order to get a better insight in the situation where the students in Rwandan both from KIE
and NUR were living, I consult some other sources and interviewed some other relevant persons to
the context I conducted my research in. At both universities I interviewed the Public relations
officers, the dean and some teachers. I also interviewed the president of the Student Union in order
to get a more general (and more official) view on the situation on the campus. Finally I spoke to
5
This student will be nicknamed ’Samuel’ hereafter.
31
several government officials, both at the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) and at the Student
Financing Agency of Rwanda (SFAR). The sources I consulted were policy documents and Rwandan
newspapers, especially The New Times, the daily government newspaper in English.
Taken into account the challenges one faces in doing field research in Rwanda, I do believe these indepth interviews have given me sufficient sight into the situation of contemporary Rwanda.
Nevertheless the sample is rather small and in order to increase the value of my research, I used
other academic researches to validate my findings and a strong theoretical foundation to base them
on. This framework, the lens through which I will analyze all my findings, will be present throughout
the whole argumentation. The measures taken to get around the censorship and self-censorship
have certainly influenced my research but not the quality or validity of my findings. The rather
interesting turns during the course of my field research, gave me extra insights to include in the
outcomes of my interviews. Together these findings brought me to fascinating and objective answers
to my research question. We will now turn to this part of the thesis.
32
Chapter Four: The Context
When searching for hidden identity in Rwandan society, first of all it is important to look at the
society itself: to explore the context in which the hidden identity is formed and the actors that are
part of it. Scott points out the context as one of the three characteristics of the hidden transcript that
merit clarification, as the transcript is “specific to a given social site and to a particular set of actors”
(Scott 1990, 14). Exploring the context is relevant for several reasons. First, as I focus on a fragment
of Rwandan society in this research, namely students’ everyday life, demarcating this specific setting
is essential in the field of social sciences. Furthermore, the term ’ethnicity’ itself, which forms a
central issue in this research, “acknowledges the place of history, language, and culture in the
construction of subjectivity and identity” (Hall 1992, 257). And finally, as education systems
traditionally have played a key role in “maintaining [the] fictive image of cultural homogeneity” (Bush
and Saltarelli 2008, 6), closely examining the context of universities in Rwanda will give interesting
insights connected to the formation of identity through education.
In this chapter I will first give a concise view on the Rwandan national context, emphasizing especially
those aspects that are among the most influential for the formation of identity today. Next I will give
an outline of the specific setting of this research: the university campuses; and introduce the specific
actors: the students. Finally I will shortly review this setting using Scott’s theory, claiming that even in
one specific context as is described here, there can be a world of difference between what is visible
and what is hidden under the surface.
National Context
The social context is a very basic foundation for the formation of collective identities. Hall argues that
ethnicity, which is a specific form of collective identities, is not given but is “constructed historically,
culturally [and] politically” (1992, 257). Most obvious and predominant for the formation of the
perception of ethnicity in Rwanda is the historical stability of the collective identities in place. As
explained by Prunier,
Rwanda was built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century into a complex, unique
and quasi-mythological land. With time this cultural mythology became reality. [Halfway into
the twentieth century] the red seal of blood put a final label of historical unavoidability on this
mythological construction, which from then on became a new real historical framework
(Prunier 1997, xiii).
Through the genocide and its aftermath these ’mythological’ identities became evermore
strengthened and meaningful, traumatized and distrustful as the population had become.
33
Culturally, as is shown by Hilker Mclean, ethnicity still plays a certain part in everyday life, especially
concerning stereotypes about appearances and characters of others (2009). Nevertheless, most
academic descriptions of Rwandan context both before and after the genocide point out the minor
role of ethnicity and ethnic divisions played for relations at the lower levels of society. Power was
often in the hands of one ethnic group, but the population is rather equally treated. Long before
ethnic divisions got their current meaning, the main split in the Rwandan Kingdoms in the nineteenth
century was a “center versus periphery affair and not one of Tutsi versus Hutu” according to Prunier,
stating that while the King and his chiefly agents were mostly (but not all) Tutsi, their ’victims’ were
both Tutsi and Hutu (Prunier, 21). Also today “[f]or most ordinary Rwandans, ethnicity actually plays
only a minor role in their daily lives; instead, their everyday realities are shaped by their
socioeconomic position” (Thomson 2009, 266).
Throughout the years it was especially politics that made ethnicity come to matter: “it is not the
complexities per se that demand our attention, but the fact that they are easily reinterpreted for
political gain” (Pottier 2002, 11). In Rwanda, looking at political aspects of identity formation, one
can find very ambiguous views. On the one hand the national unity and reconciliation is promoted to
ensure social cohesion, but on the other hand implementation of policies is seen by some as a
continuation of ethnic discrimination and the powerholders are claimed to be mainly Tutsi from
Uganda. Thus the national context underlying the identity in Rwanda is very complex and influenced
by history and culture, but most strikingly made to matter through political discourse and actions.
University Context and Actors
Within this context, the university campus is an interesting setting in itself. In this section I will
describe the larger context of universities in Rwanda. As I did research at two different universities,
namely the National University of Rwanda in Butare and the Kigali Institute of Education in Kigali, I
will then discuss both institutions and their students separately in more detail. However, as the
National University was founded half a century ago and during the genocide, the campus and the
prefecture of Butare experienced horrendous events that cannot be left out in the discussion of the
university context related to identity. Therefore I will first elaborate on its relevant history.
Historical Context
Before 1994, the National University was the country`s only university. Situated in Butare in the
Southern Province of Rwanda, the university produced almost 2,000 graduated students between
1963 and 1993, making the area more progressive than the rest of the country (NUR 2010; 2011).
During the first two weeks of the genocide, Butare was the only prefecture where “nothing
happened” (Prunier 1997, 244). Nevertheless this changed when the prefect of Butare was replaced
34
and the killing started immediately. After the 21st of April 1994, “almost everybody who lived on
campus, both students and teachers, the vast majority of them Hutu, were massacred” (Prunier, 249250). Prunier gives special attention to the role of educated elites, stating:
In the hysteria of Rwanda in April 1994, almost anybody might turn into a killer. But the
responsibility lies with the educated people – with those in positions of authority, however
small, who did not have the strength to question the poisonous effluents carried by their
cultural stream. (Prunier, 248)
Rwanda’s education system was thoroughly damaged as a result of the civil war and genocide in
1994: “A significant amount of infrastructure was destroyed, an estimated 75% of teachers were
killed or jailed for alleged participation in the genocide, and 70% of children reported having
witnessed violent injury or death” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 272). Before the genocide, education long
has been favoring one ethnic group. During the Belgian rule (1916 to 1961), places in higher
education were almost exclusively for Tutsi. After independence, the level of education strongly
deteriorated and under Hutu Power domination, inequality continued on the basis of wealth, region
and ethnicity, this time favoring Hutu students (Enry 2003 in Mclean Hilker 2011, 268-9).
The contemporary setting and actors have to be placed in a slightly different light. The recent
developments in education, based on the governments ’Vision 2020’ program, have broaden the
access to education, resulting in strongly growing enrollment and completion rates (Mclean Hilker
2011, 272): “In signing up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the Government of Rwanda
committed to creating ‘Universal Education for All’ and Pillar One of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 document
emphasizes the importance of quality education” (MINEDUC 2010). In Rwanda today there are
sixteen universities, seven public and nine private universities, which together enroll more than
57.000 students per year (MINEDUC 2010). Education in Rwanda is thus strongly promoted and
students are being supported by the Students Funding Association of Rwanda (SFAR), created in 2003
(MINEDUC 2011). Given the destructive legacy of the genocide, Rwanda has made remarkable
progress in reconstructing the education sector. Within this reconstruction the government envisions
education to play a key role in the national reconciliation strategy, through eliminating discrimination
and creating a culture of peace (Obura and Bird 2009, 8-9). However, “the current approach is largely
technocratic and focused on institutional reforms and meeting the MDG targets” and thus challenges
remain (Mclean Hilker 2011, 279). Mclean Hilker states that most importantly unequal opportunities
in education, the ’official’ history teaching, and critical thinking skills have to be addressed as these
issues may “continue to exacerbate tensions” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 267). Furthermore, the recent
35
reforms – like the change to English and the cut of the student loans provided by SFAR– were rather
controversial, making the university as a focus of research even more interesting, as we will see now.
Recent Reforms
Apart from the progress made in education, there have also been some controversial reforms
concerning the higher education sector. In the mid-1990s, “the Rwandan Government instituted a trilanguage (Kinyarwanda, French, and English) policy in education,” in order to foster unity with
returning Rwandan refugees from Anglophone countries (Mclean Hilker 2011, 276).Towards the end
of 2008 however, the government suddenly stated that French would no longer be an official
language, and “[t]he Ministry of Education (...) announced a move to English as the sole medium of
instruction” (Samuelson and Freedman 2009, 195). It was argued that this was important as Rwanda
was now member of the East African Community and the Commonwealth, but simultaneously this
measure raised a lot of problems as teachers were used to teach in French and did not have
sufficient knowledge of English (Mclean Hilker 2011, 276). According to many students I spoke with,
the new policy was reasonable but it made the lectures and thus the level of education qualitatively
worse. This issue of language is an acknowledged tool for nation building, especially within the
setting of education (Bush and Saltarelli 2008; Samuelson and Freedman 2010).
Language is a laden issue in Rwanda as “French and English are primarily spoken by elites, and
language overlaps with ethnic and place-based identity” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 276). English is mainly
the language used by Tutsi returnees from Uganda and French is spoken mainly by Hutu and Tutsi
who grew up in Rwanda or Tutsi returnees from other francophone countries. “[T]he new language
policy is likely to give an advantage to the children of Tutsi Anglophone returnees—potentially
exacerbating ethnic divisions and divisions between different returnee populations” (Obura and Bird
2009, 10). Students acknowledged that the new language policy is an advantage for those classmates
who are fluent in English, hence especially for Ugandan Tutsi returnees (Field notes 2011).
Another reform that was very controversial, already mentioned above, is the radical cut in the
bursary loans. In November 2010 the government announced that for those students who were able
to be self-reliant, the loan of 25.000 RwF (approximately 30 euro when converted to euro’s) would
no longer be provided from the first of January onwards (The New Times 2011).
Apart from the fact that this measure put many students in financial problems, an additional
complication arose from this bursary cut, namely the fact that some Tutsi survivors still were
receiving another fund from FARG. The FARG is a fund that “was set up in 1998 to aid victims of the
genocide, including children who lost at least one parent in the genocide” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 275).
In theory, this fund “can be allocated to both the (tens of thousands of) Tutsi genocide survivors and
36
the (thousands of) Hutu survivors whose families were killed due to their political allegiances or
opposition to the genocide” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 275). However, in practice it is solely provided to
Tutsi, which raised some tensions between students.
The National University of Rwanda
As is stated above, the National University of Rwanda as it is the oldest and largest university in the
country, situated in Butare, in the Southern Province. The best students from throughout the country
come to NUR on scholarships, based on their grades, and every year more than 1,500 students
graduate (NUR 2011). Students I interviewed generally believed they have good chances in the future
as they are graduating from one of the leading universities in the country. The large majority of the
students were supported by the government in 2010 and the student population in Butare contains
mainly students with a peasant background.6
Notable during my interviews in Butare was that most students I spoke to had a clear opinion about
the deterioration of the university. Comparing the university to how it used to be before the
genocide, they asserted that, as more students were accepted to go to university, many were less
ambitious and rather aiming at getting ’the paper’ than the desire to study. The deterioration was
also due to the capacity of the University, students stated that the level of education was too low
and that there was a lack of equipment (Field notes 2011).
The Kigali Institute of Education
The second university I focus on here is a rather new one, the Kigali Institute of Education.
Established in 1999, this university can be seen as a product of the new regime (KIE 2006). The large
majority of the students was supported by the government and it is the fifth largest university in
Rwanda with more than 1200 graduates in 2010.7 With the institution’s focus on education, the
students – teachers to be – were generally optimistic about their future chances.
The students at both universities I interviewed had rather poor living conditions. Almost all students I
interviewed told me they ate once a day, sometimes not even reaching that average. Except for one
student all had to share their mattress with another student, living in one room with three to eight
others. The bursary cut was perceived as a big problem for all students, influencing grades and even
future perspectives. Even those who did not face financial difficulties personally, had difficulties
6
7
Author’s interview with Public Relations officer at NUR, 22 March 2011.
Author’s interview with Public Relations officer at KIE, 21 April 2011.
37
seeing their classmates suffer(Field notes 2011). At both universities the Student Union set up
programs to help the poorest students.8
Conclusion
As we have seen, the context is the foundation for ethnicity and influences the collective identity
both on the national and the local level. Within this process, the role of education itself is
indispensible. In chapter two, the ’positive’ face and the ’negative’ face of education are briefly
discussed. Mclean Hilker concludes in her research on education in Rwanda that the negative face of
education is prevailing. She states that “[d]ispite the government’s stated ambition, educational
policy and reforms in Rwanda appear to have been largely divorced from the wider peace building
project” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 279). This suggests that the recent reforms and the way they are
experienced create a rather unstable context for students.
Simultaneously the context is an important characteristic for the hidden identity according to Scott.
The context that is described in this chapter and the discourse that takes place within this public
domain, “is where the effects of power relations are most manifest” (Scott 1990, 4). However,
according to Scott, “this public transcript is an indifferent guide to the opinion of subordinates”
(Scott, 3). Within the same context there is a hidden context, “beyond the direct observation of
powerholders,” where a hidden identity “is produced for a different audience and under different
constraints of power” (Scott, 4-5). In the following chapter we will see that the reactions of students
are ambiguous according to these hidden and public domains, as we will take a closer look at these
different forms of discourse.
8
Author’s interview with Student Union President at NUR, 15 April 2011, and author’s interview with Sudent
Union President at KIE, 21 April 2011.
38
Chapter Five: The Discourse
In this chapter I will discuss the various forms discourse of students in Rwanda on identity takes.
Discourse is important according to the theory of Scott, most clearly explained in the following
quote: “Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a hidden transcript that represents a
critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant.” Analysis of this discourse “offers a
substantially new way of understanding resistance to domination” (Scott 1990, xii). Scott states that
especially in cases of domination, the public discourse of the subordinates is “not the whole story”
(Scott 1990, 3): behind the public talk which is “a decidedly lopsided discussion,” there is a hidden
discourse revealing more information on political dynamics (Scott 1990, 18). In Rwanda, this is
certainly the case. Mclean Hilker concludes that stereotypes persist in Rwandan discourse,
demonstrating “the ongoing pervasiveness of the categories ’Hutu,’ ’Tutsi’ and ’Twa’ in
contemporary Rwanda, despite the Government’s efforts to diminish the importance of ’ethnic’
identity” (Mclean Hilker 2009, 92).
In this chapter I will discuss the discourse on ethnicity and politics among Rwandan students
according to the theoretical framework of Scott. In the discourse of subordinate groups, Scott would
distinguish four varieties. These different forms of discourse vary according to “how closely they
conform to the official discourse” and “according to who comprises the audience” (Scott 1990, 18).
First I will introduce the four sorts of discourse, after which I will discuss each form in more detail.
Finally I will provide a short conclusion on the discrepancy between the four.
First of all there is the most public form of discourse of subordinates, closely conforming to the elite
and their public self-portrait. The second realm is the hidden transcript itself, offstage and far from
anything the elite would tolerate. The third form of discourse “lies strategically between the two”
(Scott 1990, 19); including all prohibited discourse of subordinates that takes place in the public
space but under a certain kind of disguise. This form of discourse is designated ’infrapolitics’ by Scott.
Finally there is the rupture between the public and the hidden discourse: ’the most explosive realm,’
namely the moment of political electricity when the hidden discourse is no longer concealed. In this
chapter I will discuss these four realms of discourse on identity, projecting each of them on the case
of Rwanda. In this way it is possible to structure the different forms that discourse of students on
ethnicity take and to compare them empirically (Scott 1990, 20).
Public talk
As stated above, first of all there is the public talk, which has as its basis the “flattering self-image of
elite” (Scott 1990, 18). This public talk on identity in Rwanda exists in different forms and varies from
the “self-portrait of dominant elite as they would have themselves seen,” for example in the
39
Government controlled media, to the public political discourse of the students based on this same
image. Here I will discuss these two forms of public discourse of subordinates, after having
introduced the ’flattering self-image’ of the elite on which this discourse is based.
In Rwanda, the discourse on politics and in particular the discourse on identity that is closest to the
self-image that the elite wants uphold in the public domain, can be found in official policies and
ceremonies. It is common that the construction of truth is in the hands of the powerholders, and
after one party wins a conflict their version of the truth will often predominate. In Rwanda, the
’victors history’ and the consequential vision on collective identity is strongly promoted by the RPF
and no other version is accepted. The regime controls the monopoly of truth and history in general,
legitimizing only one official history. This history claims essentially that Rwanda had been a unified,
harmonious, and peaceful society, where ethnicity was introduced by the Belgian administration in
the context of a divide and rule policy. This resulted in the genocide in 1994 to which the RPF put an
end, restoring peace and harmony (Reyntjens 2010, 28-29). There is a general consensus that these
“attempts to impose a singular official narrative of history and close off alternative interpretations
are detrimental to the reconciliation process” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 278). Reyntjens states that this
official history imposed as the only truth, served a very concrete project in Rwanda: Denying
vigorously the reality of ethnicity is an “essential element of the hegemonic strategies of a small Tutsi
elite,” that claims that Hutus and Tutsis do not exist, allowing the concealment of domination by
Tutsi. This also shows that the elite has an hidden transcript of its own, as the official history as
preached by the government simultaneously serves to veil the fact that Rwanda is ruled by a minority
(Reyntjens 2010, 30).
”Some events are planned essentially as discursive affirmations of nomination of power relations”
(Scott 1990, 46). That the public discourse of elite serves a certain goal is pointed out by various
other authors. Pottier states that internationally the government “displays exceptional skill at
converting (...) feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the [RPF] deserves to have the
monopoly of knowledge construction” (Pottier 2002, 203). Also on the national scale this is the case:
Claudine Vidal found that the official genocide memorials are used by the Rwandan Government for
strengthening their own power, while taking over the private purposes of these mourning rituals for
the population. She concluded that “at every commemoration, those in power have intrumentalized
the representation of the genocide in the context of the political conflicts at the time” (Vidal 2001,
44). On the local level, concerning university students in particular, the public discourse is strongly
controlled as well. According to a research by Saskia van Hoyweghen, students were urged during the
opening session of a pre-university training camp “to chose their side and work with or against the
government” (Hoyweghen 1999, 366). These findings show that
40
in Rwanda as in some other places, history is a highly political stake of the present and the
future rather than a way of analyzing and understanding the past. Its manipulation
contributes to the structural violence so prevalent, yet apparently so invisible to outsiders
(Reyntjens 2010, 33).
Based on this image and strongly controlled by the Government, is the media. It is commonly known
and also pointed out to me by many students I interviewed that the national daily newspaper, The
New Times, is the most prominent pro-government media outlet. Also other newspapers like the
Rwandan Focus and The Independent are, although stating to be more independent, acknowledged
by students to write only what the government allows them to (Field notes 2011).
Nevertheless, some kind of minor criticism can be detected in the newspapers. Even though the
newspapers are regularly euphoric about the measures the government takes, the media played a
significant role in getting attention of politicians for the case of the students when de bursary loan of
many was cut. The New Times wrote that “[t]he decision to scrap the monthly allowance, taken last
year, drew a lot of debate with most students suggesting that they will not be able to meet their
welfare expenses“ (The New Times 2011). BBC Rwanda made a large news item on the students’
situation, interviewing them and asking for their living situation and comments on the policies,
resulting in slightly critical comments on national radio (Field notes 2011). During my stay in Rwanda
the announced cut for approximately seventy per cent of the students was reduced to approximately
twenty per cent of the students, partly because of all this media attention, and the government
initiated a large-scale research on the financial situation of the duped students. Thus, however
strongly controlled by the government these media outlets are, the minor possibility to critically
address issues is quite remarkable.
Similarly remarkable were the first interviews I conducted in Rwanda. The answers students gave me
were certainly critical towards the government to a certain extend. Nevertheless, the measures
aiming at controlled information management strongly influence the public discourse of students.
When I started the interviews, most students and also the student representatives of both
universities gave me similar answers that were rather critical towards the policies of the government,
in particular concerning the bursary cut. The majority of the students provided me with rather
balanced accounts in which both sides of the story were equally pointed out. The situation and the
frustration connected to the recent changes in education were acknowledged by all students. When
asked about relations among students and the influence of the recent bursary cuts, many answered
in the first round of interviews that it was possible that on the one hand some students would feel
left behind as their monthly loan from the bursary was cut while other students, in particular the
41
genocide survivors supported by FARG, were still getting their money and that this might lead to
tensions. However on the other hand, these students continued, they themselves did not feel this
frustration and stated that the situation resulted in solidarity between students rather than tensions.
They would mention the many initiatives that were set up by students in order to help those very
needy ones (Field notes 2011). Furthermore, when asked about the policies, all students
acknowledged the mistakes that were made, but made clear that these mistakes were rather
mistakes of the local authorities and of implementation. One of the students answered:
We are all unique, the policies [in education] do not harm the reconciliation, they do not favor
genocide survivors and it does not prevent me from having normal, peaceful relations. The
problem lies with the political leaders, who don’t think before implementing them.9
Thus within the public discourse on politics there certainly is some space for discussion. However,
during the interviews, and particularly the first time I spoke to each student, a strong sense of ’Never
Again’ was evident in all the answers given.10 Despite the acknowledged possibility of frustration
between different groups of students, the situation brought rather solidarity than tensions according
to the large majority of respondents, and it would definitely not influence their sense of identity in a
unified Rwanda (Field notes 2011).
Along the same lines of Never Again, the censorship that was acknowledged by a significant number
of students was justified. One student in communication told me in an interview:
You know, it’s because of the climate. You know Rwanda is a country which has had a history
of killings. (...) Because of the role that the media played in the 1994 genocide, [the political
leaders] kind of put in place very restrictive measures, if I might say, which do not enable
journalists to practice their work freely which is on one side justifiable, because if you give
journalists freedom and they can do what they want, I think we would see the same events as
the ones that happened in 1994 where hate media played a very significant role in forcing
people to take part in the genocide, but one also might say, well, 17 years after the genocide,
that is enough time, maybe they would ease or they would chuckle journalists and the
practice they work in.11
9
Author’s (first-round) interview with Yves (23), a third-year Law student at NUR, self-declared Hutu, in Butare
in a ’Kill-me-quick’ restaurant on 15 April 2011.
10
In this research I define the concept of Never Again as a concept strongly promoted by the government that
is similarly accepted by the population, assembling all the efforts to eliminate any possibility to recurrence of
violence similar to the 1994 genocide.
11
Author’s (first-round) interview with Samuel (27), a fourth-year communication student at NUR, a selfdeclared Hutu (despite mixed background), in Butare, 1 April 2011.
42
Discourse on ethnicity is a more difficult subject. Self-censorship on this subject is also acknowledged
by a significant number of students, and again it is justified. This is also stressed by Buckley-Zistel
who states that during the course of her field research, it emerged that “the absence of certain
memory, this chosen amnesia about past divisions, is less a mental failure than a conscious strategy
to cope with living in proximity to ’killers’ or ’traitors’ ” (Buckley-Zistel 2006, 132). On this subject
too, the sense of Never Again strongly came forward in conversations with students. For example
one student said:
I would say that because of the history that Rwanda has gone through, eh, on one side there
is a sort of self-censorship because you know the history Rwandans had gone through or went
through in 1994 (...) has made it that the way Rwandans maybe used to express themselves
back in that era, somehow changed, I would say even significantly changed.12
In addition, when asked about their expectations of the future, many students gave a rather positive
answer, speaking about the good chances to get a good job after university. However, a number of
the interviewees pointed out that may the bursary-cut policy not be revised, this would mean a
negative trend for the future and their perspective of it.
These answers that I obtained especially in the first sessions of interviews, provided me with a rather
clear opinion of the twenty students I interviewed. Their informed, balanced responses with a strong
sense of Never Again, gave me a clear view on the way students perceived their lives and respected
policies and new identity issues, even though this view was still rather limited. The answers
examined here show a rather controlled society, although not entirely so. That such controversial
and critical accounts are possible in Rwanda both in media and among subordinates in public –
however limited these are – is rather notable for Rwanda, with its reputation as a strongly controlled
state. Even though the government promotes its policies as the best solution for the population, it is
argued that the regime is very oppressive. However, Scott states that it is exactly this “rhetorical
concession that this self-image contains, that offers a surprisingly large arena for political conflict
that appeals to these concessions and makes use of the room for interpretation within any ideology”
(Scott 1990, 18).
However, while interviewing in such a setting as Rwanda about issues that are prohibited to talk
about, observation is an important part of conducting research. During the interviews I observed that
when asked about ethnic issues, the respondents became nervous. Also, as can be detected in the
quotes provided above, there is a certain hesitation in students’ answers when speaking about issues
12
Same interview with Samuel on 1 April 2011.
43
that are controversial and possibly prohibited by the Genocide Ideology Law. These observations give
an insight to the level of subordination according to Scott. He states that “[t]he influence that the
powerful exercise on public discourse is apparent in the findings of sociolinguists about language use
and power” (Scott 1990, 30). Marks of subordination include linguistic hedges that weaken a
declarative phrase, such as “kind of,” “somehow” and “if I might say” that were often used when
interviewees revealed their ’forbidden’ opinion (Field notes 2011). Gestures, tones and the usage of
language are an important part of the hidden transcript and reveal a glimpse of what is discussed
offstage.
Beside the public transcript of the powerful, the powerless develop their own hidden transcript:
“This insurgent reading of history and the society in its whole is invisible, yet very present in people’s
minds and private exchanges” (Reyntjens 2010, 31). Also Mclean Hilker states that “in public,
Rwandans will give the official narrative of history, but in private a diverse range of alternative
versions of history circulate” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 278). Here we have seen that even though
subordinates’ discourse is not entirely controlled by the powerholders as they might wish it to be,
still students have very limited in freedom of expression. Scott states that “if we wish to move
beyond apparent consent and to grasp potential acts (...) we have little choice but to explore the
realm of the hidden transcript” (Scott 1990, 16). To this hidden transcript we will turn now.
Hidden transcripts
Thus, the public transcript is not the whole story. As we have seen in the theoretical chapter of this
thesis, Scott suggests that the conditions under which subordinate groups may come to accept the
arrangements that justify their subordination are limited and stringent (Scott 1990, 82). Rather,
subordinates would develop their own understanding of their subordination, often including
ideologies that raise their cause instead of pander to the hegemonic theories of the elite. As such,
Rwanda is a clear example of a country where the structures of domination tend to provoke
responses and forms of resistance, invisible as they might be. This deference can be found in the
hidden discourse on politics and more specifically on identity matters.
After the first round of interviews, and particularly when I interviewed students without a recorder
or assistant around, additions to the answers presented above came sometimes forward. “It is
particularly in [the] realm of relative discursive freedom, outside the earshot of powerholders, where
the hidden transcript is to be sought. (...) The hidden transcript is, for this reason, the privileged site
for nonhegemonic, contrapuntal, dissident, subversive discourse” (Scott, 25). First of all, the selfcensorship that was acknowledged in previous interviews, later no longer was automatically
44
accepted as legitimate or constructive for a peaceful country, but rather as counterproductive as it
enables an unequal society. One student strongly denounced censorship, stating:
The law on genocide ideology creates fear, people are scared to be outspoken. (...) They are
acting. You should not impose things when it comes to the personal level, let people have
their own discussion. Forgiving has more to do with willing than with giving in to a policy.13
In conversations off the record more frustrations were put forward, especially concerning the limited
freedom of expression, the unequal chances in society, and the issue of trust, as I will discuss in more
detail here.
First of all, the students pointed out their unequal positions in society. The situation with the bursary
cut was not pointed out as a case of frustration in particular, as this was seen by many as a simple
failure of implementation. However in further conversations the solidarity as a result of the bursary
crisis that was so proudly put forward earlier was not so relevant anymore:
Only the poorest students in class are supported by co-students. But everyone is poor, how
can they help if no one has money to eat. (...) I help my friends when I can, but I don’t see this
happening [with others] so often in general.14
Also, some students acknowledged that relationships between students were slightly tensed due to
unequal positions in society, although not very obviously so. Most striking was the concern of
students about inequality of future opportunities, stating that: ’I could be one of the best in my year,
but I will never be able to get a scholarship for a Master [program] abroad. Those opportunities are
only available for Tutsi, [and predominantly] Tutsi Returnees from Uganda.’ 15
Another story of unequal chances in society that came back in several interviews and other private
experiences while in Rwanda, concerned job applications. Various students told me a similar story
about this process in which, in order to get a job, one had to do an oral and a written exam. The
students told me that you could do well on the written exam because you are simply better, but on
the oral exam the results would be biased favoring the one who has contacts, in the context of ethnic
lines (Field notes 2011).
Secondly, the restrictions in free expression of opinion proved a problem for students, especially with
regards to the frustrations that could not be expressed openly, concerning the bursary cuts or
13
Author’s (second-round) interview with Richard (24), a fourth-year student in Physics and Education at KIE, a
self-declared Tutsi (returnee from Uganda), in Kigali on 3 May 2011.
14
Same interview with Richard on 3 May 2011.
15
Author’s (second-round) interview with Samuel in Kigali on 15 April 2011.
45
unequal opportunities. In addition, some students pointed out that their suffering as a Hutu was not
recognized while they had gone through horrible situations as well, as they lost their parents and
have had to flee for their life during the genocide. A similar sense of inequality was linked to the
memorial ceremonies of the genocide, where no attention was given to these victims but only to
Tutsi, and nothing could be said against it as this would be depreciated as violation of the Genocide
Ideology Law (Field notes 2011).
Thirdly and most prevailing in Rwanda, trust is an important subject for hidden transcripts
concerning ethnicity in particular. Although many students said that ethnicity did not matter for
them in friendship, some acknowledged that they would only truly trust someone if the other
persons ethnicity was known to him. This is also acknowledged by Ingelaere who found that “53% of
the population replies affirmative on the proposition that ’it is naive to trust others’” (Ingelaere 2007,
18). With a history of social control and betrayal it is difficult for Rwandans to have confidence in
each other, and the situation today only engraves the situation, as people live in a strongly controlled
society with strict rules on discourse where everyone could be an accomplice of the RPF. People will
not easily talk about politics or ethnicity, and even when they do, the expression of their opinion is
limited. Mclean Hilker strongly puts this forward in her analysis as she says that “[t]he limited
knowledge close groups of friends had about each other’s backgrounds constantly surprised me”
(Mclean Hilker 2009, 85).
However it should be noted that the issue of trust is not restricted to ethnicity, although some did
base it on their ethnic identity. One student told me: ’I will not trust a person until I know the
ethnicity, my best friend has to have same identity as me.’16 While another student explained:
’Stereotypes will always be there but I will not use them against someone else (...). At the end of the
day we are all human, I have to see value in someone to be friends.’17 In addition it should be kept in
mind that not all respondents agreed with this discourse and several students even depreciated
those respondents who revealed their frustrations, going as far as to call them outright liars (Field
notes 2011).
Finally, the optimistic way students used to talk about the future was significantly diminished in the
more profound interviews I had with some. This not only concerned the possibility of future jobs but
also the possibility of recurrence of violence. It is interesting to mention here that the reason for this
possible recurrence of violence is seen differently by all students who pointed it out. One student (a
genocide-survivor) expected the recurrence of violence to be caused by people with prevailing
16
Author’s (second-round) interview with Vincent (26), a third-year Law student at NUR, self-declared Hutu, in
Butare on 29 April 2011.
17
Author’s (second-round) interview with Richard in Kigali on 3 May 2011.
46
genocide ideology.18 Another student (a returnee) stressed that when people are not allowed to
speak about Hutu and Tutsi, it will be discussed only at home with the parents. This eventually would
enable relived tensions within a few generations to come.19 A third student claimed that at a certain
point it would be the denial of the basic need for freedom of expression that will be fatal for the
current stability in the country.20
Again, observation is an important research tool in the hidden realm. When gaining more access to
the personal opinion of students, their language became more straight forward, but their voice was
kept lower, especially when using the terms ’Hutu’ and ’Tutsi.’ In public places the students would
check often if no one could listen in.
From this section it becomes clear that the hidden discourse that is pointed out by Scott and
acknowledged by various other scholars who conducted research in Rwanda, is also to be found in
the discourse of the students I interviewed. The findings match the statement that “offstage, where
subordinates may gather out-side the intimidating gaze of power, a sharply dissonant political culture
is possible” (Scott 1990, 18). It is important to stress here that although some of my respondents
clearly discussed with me their frustrations based on their ethnic perceptions, often this was not the
case and it were mainly political matters that raised those frustrations. In the following sections we
will discuss in what ways this dissonant political culture comes out in the open.
Infrapolitics
The third kind of transcript that Scott mentions lies in the realm of infrapolitics. Infrapolitics can be
seen as the collection of “low profile forms of resistance that dare not speak in their own name”
(Scott 1990, 19). As stated above this discourse takes place in the public view, but, as it is “a politics
of disguise and anonymity,” it is designed not to raise visible tensions even though the discourse
does not conform to that of the elite (Scott 1990, 19). Scott argues that this “coded version of the
hidden transcript is always present in the public discourse of subordinate groups” (Scott 1990, 19).
Here I will direct attention to the various strategies by which students as subordinate group manage
to insinuate their resistance, in disguised forms, into the public realm: by exploiting loopholes or
ambiguities, or by “setting a course at the very perimeter of what the authorities are obliged to
permit or unable to prevent” (Scott 1990, 139). At the most basic level, techniques of disguise can be
divided into “those that disguise the message and those who disguise the messenger” (Scott 1990,
139).
18
Author’s (third-round) interview with Gerard (31), a fourth-year Journalism student at NUR, self-declared
Tutsi (genocide-survivor) in Kigali on 8 May 2011.
19
Author’s (second-round) interview with Richard in Kigali on 3 May 2011.
20
Author’s (third-round) interview with Samuel in Kigali on 3 May 2011.
47
First of all, in those interviews where I was not allowed the offstage level of students discourse, it
was still possible to detect some forms of infrapolitics. One research strategy I used was to
intentionally never ask the interviewees about their identity (see chapter three). In the article of
Mclean Hilker it is also pointed out that her respondents used this information on personal
backgrounds to find out more about each other’s ethnic identity, but also that respondents were
reticent with this kind of information as it might reveal more about their own ethnicity (2009). Also
my research assistant and some interviewees acknowledged that when someone says he is from the
Eastern Province, he or she is most probably a ’Tutsi’ and when someone is from the Northern
Province he or she most probably is ’Hutu.’ This infrapolitical loophole is also acknowledged by
Mclean Hilker: “[a]s talking directly about ethnicity was effectively taboo, questions would often take
a more indirect form, for example asking where a person was born or where they were during the
war and genocide” (2009, 90).
Even though in some interviews an approximation to one of the former identities was mentioned by
the respondents, questions about backgrounds like place of birth or pre-university living situation
were answered with hesitation by many. The fact that some students, especially those who denied
any role of ethnicity or tensions in society, were so hesitant with sharing their background, suggests
that ethnicity also is relevant for them in a certain way.
Another way that was asserted by students to identify the ethnicity of others was the language that
they use. Especially English was a good indicator, but also Luganda, a language that is spoken only by
Tutsi returnees from Uganda, was used to check if the other could understand and thus also would
be from Uganda (Field notes 2011). Samuelson and Freedman state similarly that “[i]n modern-day
Rwanda, language choice of French or English has become a factor in group affiliation
determinations” (2009, 197). Language now serves as an indicator for identity (Hintjens 2008).
Rumor and Gossip are also forms of infrapolitics, as these narrations “almost by definition have no
identifiable author” and are thus guarantying anonymity for the messenger (Scott 1990, 142). One
example of a rumor in Rwanda is the story about the job application which was told to me by two
independent respondents in almost exactly the same manner. A form of gossip I encountered when I
asked one of the students about his classmate’s background. He answered me that it was said that
the other student was a Hutu and that his father was a notorious killer in the genocide, later killed by
the RPF, but that this was just one story he had heard.21
21
Author’s (fourth-round) interview with Samuel in Kigali on 6 May 2011.
48
Another example of infrapolitics in which the messenger is disguised is the letter that was written by
the four students from KIE mentioned above. The letter, addressed to the Minister of Education was
signed with fake names, safeguarding the writers’ anonymity. The ’anonymous letter’ is one of the
prominent techniques to declare the hidden transcript in the open, according to Scott (1990, 140).
Even though the information in the letter was against the government’s law on genocide ideology,
the authors could reveal their opinion unpunished as their identity stayed disguised.
Another way is to disguise the message just enough to skirt retaliation. One clear example of a
disguised message was pointed out to me by one of my respondents. This student told me that one
popular artist, who is also a professor at the National University, wrote and produced songs that had
a very ambiguous message. In an interview with this professor/artist, he told me that the subjects he
sings about can be interpreted in many ways. One of his songs was called ’This was not the reason’
and narrates the story of a couple that was happily in love and wanted to get married, but could not
because the boy was ’brown’ and his family did not accept his girlfriends ’black’ skin color. The artist
explained to me that brown could be understood as a nickname for Tutsi and black as a nickname for
Hutu. He told me that later he decided to change the name of the song to ’Klarisse,’ the name of the
girl, in order to focus more on the romantic aspect and less so on the political message, as ’those
who understand [the underlying message], will understand.’22 By the subtle use of codes for ’Hutu’
and ’Tutsi,’ the artist could insinuate into his songs “meanings that are accessible to one intended
audience and opaque to another audience the actors wish to exclude” (Scott 1990, 158).
Furthermore those who are excluded, especially the powerholders, are unable to prevent these
infrapolitics even if they do understand the message, because the “sedition is clothed in terms that
also can lay claim to a perfectly innocent construction” (Scott 1990, 158).
In Rwanda many forms of infrapolitics are to be discovered when looking between the lines. What
comes forth in all these forms of infrapolitics is that Hutu and Tutsi are prevailing in society, as a
caged identity that cannot be revealed due to the political restrictions, rather than two conflicting
identities. As pointed out above, in any form that the hidden discourse takes when disclosed in the
public realm, the message or the messenger are disguised. When this is not the case, “if both the
messenger and the message (...) are openly disclosed, then we are in the realm of direct
confrontation” (Scott 1990, 139). This will result in a situation of open resistance, or, in the terms of
Scott, moments of political electricity. To this realm we will turn now.
22
Author’s interview with professor/artist in Butare on 10 May 2011.
49
Political Electricity
Political electricity is defined by Scott as that “what happens when the frontier between the hidden
and the public transcript is decisively breached” (Scott 1990, 202). Political electricity takes place
when the hidden transcript is declared in public without any disguise. This would mean a riot, a
rebellion or a complete civil war. As we have seen in Rwanda this is not yet the case: everyone keeps
their frustrations with the government close to him or herself and seems to accept the new united
identity, at least publically. These rare moments of open confrontation is what often is studied by
political analysts, however, most of the political struggle of subordinate groups is conducted in a
much more ambiguous territory as we have seen above. And analyzing these previous, hidden
struggles can give us more insight than any outburst of violence could ever do, according to Scott.
Conclusion
From the interviews with students it seems that it is not identity per se which is the issue in Rwanda
and the authors discussed above equally claim this was never prominently the case (Thomson 2009;
Prunier 1997; Pottier 2002). Rather than the sense of belonging to a different ethnic group, it is the
frustration that cannot be revealed and discussed because of the influence of the regime on identity.
This situation in some cases reinforces the value that students attach to ethnicity, but more than
anything else this situation strengthens the sense of suppression. Hence politics make ethnicity
important while claiming to do the opposite.
As we have seen there is a clear discrepancy between the hidden and the public transcript of
students in Rwanda. The open discourse gives a slightly critical but censored version of students
opinion, while the offstage discourse exceeds previous statements claiming that censorship and selfcensorship enable frustration and inequality. Although in the realm of hidden transcripts ethnicity is
not the main subject, in the realm of infrapolitics clear connections to ethnic identities can be found.
This provides us with the understanding that the hidden identity is not closely conforming to what
the elite would like to hear.
An addition to Scott in this specific case is the sense of Never Again. Whereas Scott writes especially
about subordination that is seen as completely wrong in the eyes of the subordinates themselves, in
the specific case of Rwanda, this subordination lies more nuanced. The strong sense of Never Again
that came forward in all interviews, showed a certain degree of understanding and acceptance of the
current regime as all students had seen what ethnic division had caused in their own lifetime.
However, this understanding is one that slowly is fading out as the genocide is lies further in the past
and the political control continues to be strengthened.
50
This analysis of discourse suggests that the boundary struggles as pointed out by Wimmer (2008;
2010) are still continuing. Also, this suggests that students do not comply entirely with the imposed
new Rwandan identity, even though this might seem the case when looking at public talk. Consensus
is not reached yet and struggles continue as is discussed in the next chapter.
51
Chapter Six: The Struggle
Towards the end of this thesis we now reach the examination of hidden struggles that take place
under the surface in Rwanda. Scott states that “the frontier between the public and the hidden
transcript is a zone of constant struggle between dominant and subordinate – not a solid wall” (Scott
1990, 14). These struggles can be seen as a constant testing of the limits of the capacity of the
powerholders who try “to prevail in constituting what counts as the public transcript and what as
offstage” (Scott 1990, 14). These negotiations of power relations between the dominant and the
subordinates involve discipline and punishment used by the elite, against acts of infrapolitics for the
subordinates. Each form of infrapolitics should therefore be seen as “the silent partner of a loud form
of public resistance” (Scott 1990, 199), and thus connected to political conflict. Following this logic,
Scott states that this “unremitting struggle over such boundaries is perhaps the most vital arena for
ordinary conflict” (Scott 1990, 14). How vital exactly that is in the case Rwanda will be analyzed in
this chapter.
In this chapter I will first take a closer look at Scott’s concept of struggles and slightly adjust this
concept to fit the case of Rwanda. In order to do so I will discuss different sorts of fear I distinguish in
Rwandan society and link these to the struggles that are currently taking place. Next I will examine
two different kinds of struggle, elaborating on the difference between them and the developments
that are taking place in this field of hidden conflict. Finally I will provide a rather theoretical approach
to the possible scenario of political electricity in Rwanda if (hidden) struggles turn into open conflict.
As this is a rather precarious and unpredictable field, and as my small research not competent to
answer questions about possible recurrence of violence, I will restrict myself here to the theoretical
framework of Scott. However, in order to counter the abstract potential of especially this last section,
I will add a concise live story of one of my interviews in order to provide a personal and vivid casestudy to complement the theoretic assumptions.
’Intrinsic’ and ’Extrinsic’ Fear
According to Scott, “political analysis can be advanced by research that compares the hidden
transcript of subordinate groups with the hidden transcript of the powerful and both hidden
transcripts with the public transcript they share” (Scott 1990, 15). Scott states that there is a
“dialectical relationship between the public and the hidden transcript (...) as the hidden transcript
represents discourse (...) that is ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of subordinates by the
exercise of power” (Scott, 27). The practice of domination thus in fact creates the hidden transcript.
Scott compares this “realm of power and interests” with the “realm of masks,” stating that the closer
52
to domination and the more imposed the interests are, the thicker the mask of subordinates (Scott,
28).
The struggle that takes place in Rwanda is essentially linked to political issues. “Although the
government in Kigali has asserted that ethnic differences cannot be applied to the Rwandan context,
the persistent tensions in Rwanda are increasingly viewed as an identity-based conflict” (Samuelson
and Freedman 2010, 197). The core issue within this struggle is not primarily resistance against the
hegemonic domination per se, but rather against the denial of the prevalence and relevance of
private identity in society. The fact that this denial is used by the government as a tool to control the
population reinforces inequality and is counterproductive in the process towards peace and unity in
Rwanda.
Before closely examining this ongoing struggle in Rwanda, it is important to note here that the
inequality is mainly perceived this way by students with a Hutu background. In my field research it
appeared that there is a notable difference in the perception of domination according to students
with a Hutu background, compared to students with a Tutsi background. Both could be just as worse
off due to the bursary cuts or the new language policy. However none of students with a Tutsi
background linked any of these problems to the legitimacy of politics or the inequality based on
ethnicity within these politics, while three of the students with a Hutu background explicitly stressed
the connection between their subordinated situation and their perception of ’ethnic’ domination.
This difference in perception also comes forth when comparing the interviews in Butare with the
interviews in Kigali. At the National University, I interviewed mainly students with a Hutu
background, who also seemed better informed about the situation (because of their study) and with
who the interviews were more in-depth. This in contrast to the Kigali Institute of Education where my
interviews were less profound and furthermore the large majority of the respondents had a Tutsi
background. Minor as this finding may be in my research (according to the small scale of this study
and the incomparable features of the interviews at NUR and KIE), this difference between Hutu and
Tutsi respondents is also acknowledged by other scholars. Mclean Hilker states that “[o]verall,
growing evidence shows that progress towards reconciliation in Rwanda is limited and that the sense
of injustice is developing because many Rwandans – particularly Hutus – feel unable to speak about
their suffering” (Mclean Hilker 2011, 278).
Until today direct confrontation has been evaded, mainly because of fear. This fear among
subordinates can be divided between (1) a fear for punishment by the government when one is
breaking the law, which I label as ’extrinsic’ as the cause of this fear comes from a source exterior to
the person. And, (2) a fear for recurrence of violence, which I label as ’intrinsic’ as it is caused by
53
personal experience and logic. The first sort is acknowledged by Scott as he states that “a
subordinate conceals the hidden transcript from powerholders largely because he fears retaliation”
(Scott, 140). In Rwanda the climate of fear is extremely present in society as many politicians and
journalists are in jail (and even killed) for their proclaimed ’divisionist’ and ’genocide ideology’ ideas
as we have seen above. The second kind of fear for open confrontation is based on the conception of
Never Again that was pointed out in all interviews.
Although fear is used as a strong argument to explain the seemingly peaceful status quo of
domination, this kind of intrinsic fear is not present in the theory of Scott. However this is very
relevant for the situation of Rwanda, with its exceptional history of civil war and genocide. The vision
of building up the country and living in a peaceful society, combined with the fear for recurrence of
violence similar to 1994, is a strong motivation for students (and other civilians) to not openly
complain about their frustrations. In a research on peasants’ memorization of past events, BuckleyZistel shows that a similar fear for recurrence of violence and the inevitable situation where victims
and perpetrators have to live together in the same village, made her interviewees ’deliberately’
forget certain parts of history (2006). Together with extrinsic fear, these two kinds of anxiety are
enabling the ideological domination of elite without a real consensus from subordinates on ethnic
boundaries.
The division between the intrinsic and extrinsic fear is currently prevailing and essential for our
understanding of the struggles that take place under subordinate students in Rwanda. In the theory
of Scott, the extrinsic fear (for punishment by elite) can be connected to the (more or less) open
political measures of the powerholders, and thus their public transcripts (like the bursary cut or the
change in official languages, and more general, their strive for total control of society). The intrinsic
fear in turn, can be linked to the private measures of the powerholders, and thus their hidden
transcripts (like the minority rule and the inequality of opportunities along ethnic lines).
I find that there are two variations, or maybe extremes, of struggles as pointed out by Scott,
prevailing in Rwandan society. First of all, on the one side of the spectrum, there is the struggle
between the public discourse of elite and the public discourse of subordinates. This struggle concerns
essentially the political measures and can be linked to the extrinsic fear that is introduced above,
based on external compulsion to act in a certain way. Second of all, at the other extreme, there is the
struggle between the hidden transcript of elite and the hidden transcript of the subordinates – which
can be linked to the intrinsic fear, based on internal norms. It is exactly the latter struggle that has
the perception of identity at its core. Although the first struggle is rather apparent in Rwandan
society, both are taking place in the hidden realm. I will discuss these two different struggles that
54
take place in Rwanda in more detail now, arguing that it is the second struggle that is the most
dangerous for the stability in Rwanda.
Offstage Struggles
In the previous chapter we have seen various examples of both of the struggles mentioned above.
One of the most public forms of struggles that takes place in Rwanda, is the case of the education
reforms and the bursary cut. Even though still rather restricted in an authoritarian country as
Rwanda is, students and journalists were able to address the problems of the new measures and the
government had to change their policy, even though still very reticent. Another example was
provided to me by one journalism student from Butare. Gerard told me the story of a Hutu man who
was caught and put in jail by the authorities, because he had a picture on his phone of an
acknowledged enemy of the state. The wife of this man then called Gerard and asked him to write a
piece on the matter. Gerard did so and the man was released. According to this student,
as long as you stay within the lines of what is possible here, and write a well-informed and
realistic piece, you can reach a lot and [the powerholders] cannot punish you for it. However,
if this man was a Tutsi, this would have been a bigger threat to the government, and
releasing him like this will be less probable. 23
At this rather confined side of the spectrum, where the struggle over public discourses of the
subordinates and the elite is situated, students have a certain space to maneuver, even though they
are criticizing the actions of authorities and challenging their autocracy. It is in this realm that
students can speak about the issues in society between friends and the ’masks’ they wear in the
presence of powerholders are ’thin.’ The fear for punishment is prevailing in this realm but the
struggle based on this side of the spectrum is rather fluid and testing the limits is often and rather
openly done.
On the other side of the spectrum, the struggle that takes place is a completely different one. This
struggle is completely hidden for outsiders, kept very close to the respondents themselves. In various
interviews with students, when I started to speak about ethnic identity issues, the subject was
declined or quickly done away with. One student reacted in a rather extreme form, stating that he
would not speak about politics after which he put his hands over his ears and his head down.24
Another student told me that even in the closest friendships there were things, concerning ethnicity
23
Author’s (third-round) interview with Gerard (31), a fourth-year Journalism student at NUR, self-declared
Tutsi (genocide-survivor) in Kigali on 8 May 2011.
24
Author’s (third-round) interview with Laurent (24), a third-year Economics student at NUR with Hutu
background in Butare on 26 April 2011.
55
in particular, they would not speak about.25 Also, the professor/artist I interviewed stated that he
certainly had thoughts on politics and ethnicity, but that he would share them with nobody.26 In this
extreme form of struggles concerning identity, based largely on an intrinsic fear, the reactions of the
students show that this is mainly an internal struggle. Hence the ’mask’ that students wear is thick.
Consequently, the frontier between the hidden struggle of elite and this hidden struggle of
subordinates is a rather solid one as it is only challenged through disguised infrapolitics, like the song
of the artist or the letter of the students.
Masks
An interesting but alarming feature of de division between these struggles is that with time the one is
slowly moving towards the other. The two sorts of fear that divide the struggles are increasingly
overlapping as the intrinsic fear of Never Again is slowly being overtaken by the extrinsic fear for
punishment by the government. It is acknowledged by scholars as well as during interviews, that the
government certainly has good reasons for concerns “for the use of the spoken and written word in
Rwanda’s public life to incite violence,” based on past experiences (Samuelson and Freedman 2010,
198). However, as was also acknowledged in the student’s statement in the previous chapter, “today
restrictions on speech have been extended far beyond public figures and opinion makers”
(Samuelson and Freedman 2010, 198).
According to the theory of Scott, this extension of the restrictions, rather than reducing them with
time, make the suppression more obvious for the subordinates and simultaneously less accepted. As
is stated above “[t]here is an important dialectic (...) between the hidden transcript and practical
resistance” (Scott, 191). Based on reactance theory, Scott explains that when compliance is perceived
by subordinates as threatened by the use of force, this leads to reaction of opposition (Scott, 109).
On the other hand “individual believes and attitudes are likely to reinforce compliance with
powerholders’ wishes if, and only if, that compliance is perceived as freely chosen – as voluntary”
(Scott, 109). Thus the “disparity between public action and offstage discourse depends heavily on the
severity of domination” (Scott, 134).
The interaction between subordination an domination is clearly explained in the following fragment,
where Scott states that:
The greater the force majeure compelling the performance, the less the subordinate considers
it representative of his ’true self’ and the more it seems merely a manipulative tactic having
25
Author’s (second-round) interview with Vincent (26), a third-year Law student at NUR, self-declared Hutu, in
Butare on 29 April 2011.
26
Author’s interview with professor/artist in Butare on 10 May 2011.
56
little or no bearing on his self-conception. (...) [T]he face behind the mask will, in reaction,
grow to look less like the mask rather than more like it. (...) [T]he greater the extrinsic reasons
compelling our action (...) the less we have to provide satisfactory reasons to ourselves for our
conduct (Scott, 110).
Scott states that the “frustration, tension, and control necessary in public give way to unbridled
retaliation in a safer setting,” which balances at least symbolically the accounts of reciprocity (Scott,
38). However, these infrapolitics and hidden transcripts should be considered as a preparation for an
eventual outburst rather than a satisfactory substitute (Scott, 187). As the private, most dangerous
form of struggle becomes less an result of intrinsic fear and thus less an internal struggle of
subordinates, while the hidden struggle and discourse of elite (on identity) is not changed, Scott
would suggest that the increasingly thick masks that the subordinates wear in this struggle warn for
the danger of explosion. This also matches the numerous warnings of scholars on the danger of
recurrence of violence.
Only one of my respondents shared aspects of this private struggle with me: With his (Tutsi) mother
and (Hutu) father being killed before the genocide started, Samuel and his brothers had to flee for
their life in April 1994. Now, being one of the brightest students in his class, it is hard for him to feed
himself and his brother without any support from the government. He tried to get support from
FARG but they denied his case. Despite his capacities, he told me he would never be able to get a
scholarship for a Master program abroad or a good job at the government. And even if this would be
the case, he would see it as a miracle. These places are reserved predominantly for Tutsi returnees
from Uganda. Nevertheless, Samuel will most probably be able to find a job after he finished his
university degree in Communication and his extracurricular activities. He will gain enough money to
raise a family and live a peaceful life in Rwanda. However, according to Samuel, at a certain moment
this is not enough anymore: because ’next to food and a place to live, freedom of expression is a
basic need and without it people cannot live.’
’Recently I have been thinking to join the army,’ he told me.
My uncle considered it, some time before the genocide, in order to join the RPF and overthrow
the Hutu Power regime that caused so many victims at the time. Because that is the only
thing that can change anything in Africa: violence. My uncle never joined the army, but
maybe I will. I could train myself and find a group of moderates that would join me. No
57
extreme Hutu or Tutsi, moderates. Violence is the only way things can be influenced. If
nothing changes, something has to change.27
Conclusion
Thus to answer the question, because of intrinsic fear, rather solid frontier is in place between the
identity struggles of the subordinates and the struggles of the dominant. While the elite strongly
protect the defense wall around their national identity with extreme measures, the subordinates
only mildly kick against the wall with their own feet, frustrated rather than trying to take the wall
down. Nevertheless the chance that this will change due to the growing extrinsic reasons compelling
action, becomes bigger with time.
In Rwanda, the hidden power struggle is special case. Following the main argument, the struggle’s
intrinsic character is, however limited and decreasing to be so, the most important reason why no
conflict is bursting out in the public realm. As Samuel stated: If nothing changes something has to
change.
27
Author’s (fourth-round) interview with Samuel in Kigali on 6 May 2011.
58
Chapter Seven: The Conlusion
A National Masquerade
In this research the aim was to find an answer to the question: To what extend is there a hidden
identity formed by Rwandese students of higher education, what relation does this hidden identity
bear to the newly imposed public identity, and under which conditions does this hidden identity find
public expression? In order to find this answer, I first examined the Rwandese context on different
levels and the students of higher education. Next I explored the discourse of these students on
identity in four different realms; namely the public and the hidden realm, and the realms of
infrapolitics and political electricity. Finally I analyzed the struggles that are taking place between
these transcripts, and the struggles between the transcripts of students and those of Rwandese elite.
In this final chapter I will provide a rather simplified summary (in the form of a narrative) of the
findings from the previous chapters, and based on these findings I will present my final statement.
Finally I will situate this central idea in the current academic debate around this subject.
As has been stressed throughout the whole paper, the context in which students in Rwanda live is
very complex. The role that ethnicity plays within this context might be even more complex. On the
one hand ethnicity is extremely meaningful on the personal level due to past events and on the other
hand ethnicity is extremely politicized through the denial of its relevance in Rwanda today. The
context that the education sector provides within this paradoxical structure is similarly unstable.
When going to university, students get exposed to new ideas, new friends, new experiences, but in
contrast, the way education is influenced by powerholders seems to be rather destructive.
Ethnicity can be found in all these aspects of the context: a student, marked by the experience of the
genocide, changes his rural life for a campus room. Here he meets new friends whose past and
identity is unclear to him. Speaking about personal background however is difficult, and trusting
others even more so. In lectures new and interesting ideas are shared, but he can detect the official
narratives throughout the whole curriculum. Reforms in education may appear to be favoring one
ethnic (sub)group, but there is no one with whom he can discuss these ideas. He may fall in love, but
the girl of his dreams does not have the right ’skin color,’ they say. And finally, no matter how hard
he works for his grades, ethnicity will influence his future opportunities anyway.
This situation shows that no matter how open-minded a student may be, envisioning Never Again
like all his other classmates do, ethnicity plays an essential role in his life as it influences discussions,
relationships and possibilities. The student is caged in a new national identity and this is frustrating.
Not so much because he does not feel Rwandan, or because of the connection that the student
59
might feel to a certain ethnic group, but because of the politics that seem to shape the whole society
around these identities while claiming to do nothing of the sort and even prohibit their use.
Frustrations that might partly be based on the sense of being unrepresented, but mainly prevail
because of perceived inequality.
However, in such a society tensions and frustrations seem to have disappeared, as no one openly
speaks about them. However, this only seems so because the Rwandese student uses two separate
languages, one in public and one ’offstage.’ Publically, issues are to a certain extend discussed with
others, depending on the context and the subject. Concerning mere political issues, a rather critical
but superficial discussion among students can take place, slightly across the limits of imposed
censorship. However, concerning deeper frustrations, extended to the level of identity issues,
discussions are restricted to the hidden realm. Only very close friends discuss these issues together,
but even on this level discourse is restricted due to censorship and self-censorship. Only in a
disguised way frustrations and tensions are disclosed. In songs, gossip, rumors and an anonymous
letter the hidden identity finds public expression. Nothing that can profoundly change the status quo
of domination. Nothing yet.
This discrepancy between what he would share with everyone and what he would share only with
the ones that are the closest to him, clearly shows what influence domination has on the student’s
discourse and behavior. It is as if his life is like play, in which he at one moment wears a mask that
covers his whole face so that none of his personal expressions will be detected, and at the other
moment a small mask that only covers the space around his eyes, just enough to hide his deepest
fears.
Because fear is the essence of his political ’stage fright’. Frustrations the student might have, based
on the perceived unfairness and suppression in his society, are not shared because of fear. On the
one hand extrinsic fear for punishment restricts him in openly declaring his frustrations, and on the
other hand intrinsic fear for what might happen to his society retains him from pursuing his interests.
Nevertheless, struggles do continue to exist: Struggles between education reforms and public
opinion in the newspaper, testing the limits of relative freedom of expression and censorship.
Struggles between friendships and the influence of ethnicity on these friendships at the campus,
testing the positions of classmates on their self-censorship and ethnic logic. And struggles in his own
head, testing the limits of his fear for retaliation against the fear for circular history-trends and
reliving that horrific past.
60
But as time passes by, control over the context is further strengthened by the government. The new
identity and the sense of unity feels increasingly imposed and less legitimate. The struggle that until
now only took place in his head because of his intrinsic fear and justified self-censorship, slowly
breaks out of his own boundaries and finds ever more reason to pursue his ambitions.
And he might not be the only one.
This scenario summarizes the application of Scott’s theory on the situation of Rwanda, as I have done
extensively in the previous chapters. Although nuance might be lost here, the simplified story
provides a comprehensive answer to my research question. A hidden identity is certainly formed,
based on the ethnicities that played a role before and during the genocide, particularly by the impact
of politics on this identity. The continued existence of the hidden identity is not a negation of the
public identity itself, but rather a negation of the way the public identity is used and abused by the
powerholders. Because of fear the hidden identity only finds public expression in disguised forms.
However, as with time the abuse of the public identity does not outweigh the use of its uniting
character, this fear is moving from a rather intrinsic sense of anxiety towards a mainly extrinsic fear.
In such a case political electricity becomes more probable than it has been before.
61
Discussion
In Rwanda everybody is frustrated, from the peasant to the president. The peasant is
frustrated because he is suppressed by the government and his excellence is frustrated
because he knows that if for one moment he lowers his guard, people from outside will come
and take power.28
As stated in the beginning, this research cannot comprehend the contemporary situation in Rwanda,
as no research can. Focused on just a fragment of society, it is important to nuance my findings
related to the bigger context of the country. In a country where ’everybody is frustrated,’ everybody
had other interests, fears and motivations, but is however limited to act upon these inspirations. For
this reason it is also important to include the positive developments that are taking place, which are,
despite of all the critique, impressive for a small African country as Rwanda is.
To put this central idea of my research in the larger academic debate, strategic action based on fear
in the case of Rwanda can be seen as an involuntary substitute for the ’interests’ in the theoretical
framework of Wimmer. Thus involuntary consensus can provide a rather stable ethnic boundary, and
from this it can be concluded that, as Wimmer states, the less consensus over the boundaries there
exists, the more power is needed to keep the boundaries in place. Following this, Wimmer warns
that “[t]he more inequality and the less consensus (...) the more politically salient boundaries will be.
If, with the course of time, oppression of the government does not change, but the intrinsic fear of
students has changed into extrinsic fear, the struggles over boundaries that are now taken place in a
rather safe setting, namely the student’s brain, will move slowly to the open. In this realm, the
struggles will be more persistent and damaging, which eventually might lead to open confrontation
and conflict.
Based on this thesis I fear for the possibility of recurrence of violence in Rwanda that is stressed by so
many researchers that write on the current situation in the country. From the perspective used in
this research, based on the notion of hidden transcripts and domination of Scott, it is suggested that
the political control should be lessened or, if that is still perceived as to dangerous according to the
regime, at least start with promoting more equality both at the hidden as well on the public level of
the policies. Such measure aspires a more peaceful and unified society than the National Unity and
Reconciliation policies seem to envision.
28
Fragment from a conversation with Eric, a lecturer at the Kigali Institute for Science and Technology (KIST) at
the Residence of the Dutch Ambassador for the Queensday-party on 28 April 2011.
62
63
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