Annual Review - Summary Sheet
This Summary Sheet captures the headlines on programme performance, agreed actions and learning over the
course of the review period. It should be attached to all subsequent reviews to build a complete picture of actions
and learning throughout the life of the programme.
Title: Hunger Safety Net Programme
Programme Value: £81,580,641
Programme Code: 204258
Review Date: July 2014
Start Date: 23/08/2013 End Date: 31/03/2017
Summary of Programme Performance
2013/2014
Year
B
Programme Score
High
Risk Rating
Summary of progress and lessons learnt
The programme faced a number of challenges during this transition this year. Payments to beneficiaries
began in March 2014 but has not reached the full intended caseload. By mid-July 2014, 61% of those
currently eligible (46,777 out of 76,363 with valid IDs) had received payments against a planned 100,000
beneficiary householdsi. Some components have advanced in line with plans. The design of procedures
for scaling-up HSNP in response to drought has made good progress with active engagement of
stakeholders in the design. Rights Committees are in place in the majority of sub-locations and regularly
receive complaints. Those which can be resolved at sub-national level are largely addressed (but
concerns remain about those forwarded to national level for resolution). The increased Government of
Kenya (GoK) ownership and financing of HSNP represents a key step towards sustainability of the
programme. The National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), established towards the end of
2012/2013, has championed HSNP as one of its flagship programmes with increased operational
commitment. GoK allocated KSH 249.6 million provided for transfers and administrative costs in 2013/14
(80% of the medium term plan figure).
However, the full implications of changes in programme design between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the
programme were not fully appreciated in the business case. Key challenges are outlined below.
 Phase 2 is a scale out, not really a scale up: The programme scale-up from 69,000 to 100,000
regular beneficiary households, is in fact a scale-out. The number of sub-locations covered has
increased from 164 to 454 with the average number of beneficiary households per sub-location
decreasing from approximately 419 to 209.
 The registration and targeting processes took longer than expected and significantly impacted
operations. Technical changes in the targeting methodology resulted in over 50,000 of the original
Phase 1 beneficiaries exiting the programme. Phase 2 demands opening bank accounts and carding
100,000 beneficiaries (approximately 81,000 new beneficiaries, plus 19,000 who transitioned from
Phase 1 but still needed bank cards) and 274,806 new beneficiaries for an emergency response.
 This increased the operational complexity of programme delivery. This was particularly the case
under the payments component which necessitates clear coordination of all partners in the field
during the account opening process.
 This has contributed to delays in payments to beneficiaries: A final approved beneficiary list was
only released by HSNP/ GoK/ NDMA in February 2014 and payments to eligible Group 1 beneficiaries
began in March 2014, with the number receiving payments increasing with each cycle.
 Lack of IDs limits those eligible for regular or emergency payments: The change in payment
mechanism, moving to a fully functioning bank account has meant that all beneficiary households
need a National ID card but the four northern counties are underserved in this regard (24% of regular
(Group 1) beneficiaries and 37% of those to whom the programme may scale up in an emergency
(Group 2) lack an adult with a valid ID card or complete ID information
 The population to be reached is mobile and conflicts are impacting on all the counties
covered. The registered population moves in search of pasture and there have been new conflicts in
Wajir and Mandera, with Turkana and Marsabit also affected.
 Politics and Ministerial restructuring impacted on the programme: This phase was launched at a
politically complex time, there was a general election and devolution. The new parliament has taken a
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
more active interest in cash transfer programmes contributing to delays affecting in the completion of
the targeting process. Beneficiary lists were politically contested in all counties, particularly Marsabit
where payments were blocked, pending political objections to the geographic distribution of
beneficiaries in Moyale sub-county and the number of beneficiaries in Saku sub-countyii. Ministerial
restructuring following the 2013 general election resulted in a change in Ministerial responsibility for
the HSNP (from the Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands to the Ministry of Devolution and
Planning) and the NDMA, formed in 2012/13, took over as lead Government agency for the HSNP.
Procurement delays for the PILU: The Project Implementation and Learning Unit (PILU), conceived
as the main managing agent in the original design, was only finally in place mid-June 2014 after a 7
month procurement delay. This increased the management burden on DFID Kenya and further
slowed down operations.
Consequently, a number of key lessons should be taken into account:
It would have been useful for the HSNP 2 business case to formally plan for a transition phase
between HSNP 1 and HSNP 2.
The change in payment mechanism to a full bank account demands an ID. The lack of IDs should
have been better anticipated an prepared for, even if the scale was not known until final beneficiary
lists were ready.
The logframe was over optimistic for year 1.
Independent scrutiny of the transition has been useful to inform future delivery.
GoK’s funding commitments have increased overall interest in and oversight of the programme.
Summary of recommendations for the next year (see full list in key actions table p.5-6)
1. The launch of PILU provides an opportunity to clarify and tighten programme accountability
and management for all components. In order to fulfil its role, it will be necessary to ensure that via
revised governance structures, the implementers of the various components of the programme are
operationally accountable (if not contractually accountable) to the NDMA through the PILU, and that
DFID should play a less active role in the day-to-day management of the programme and focuses on
assurance of delivery through the PILU.
2. The GoK/ NDMA and other relevant Government departments need to better define their
vision of how the programme will be managed post 2017. A strategy for ensuring adequate core
staffing and recurrent budget within the GoK/ NDMA to allow effective capacity building by the PILU
must be in place to facilitate delivery at national, county and sub-county level in the long term.
3. In order to build GoK/ NDMA management and oversight abilities in the short term, all
implementing partners need to ensure that they are providing the GoK/ NDMA (via the PILU)
with timely and salient information they need to make informed decisions, particularly
operational decisions. These include annual work-plans, budgets, progress reports and financial
information. This is particularly critical for all field operations which rely on coordination with the
payments component.
4. There is an urgent need to address the issues causing underperformance against indicators
1.2 and Output 2. Actions required include: (i) resolving any household ID issues that require only
information correction or change of recipient; (ii) releasing an update to Equity Bank regarding those
households which do now have complete ID information and for whom bank account opening can
start; (iii) exploring options on how to complete card distribution in conflict affected Mandera and
Wajir; and (iv) rolling out the proposed accelerated ID registration joint programme with National
Registration Board (NRB) and Help Age International (HAI).
5. The Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSD) needs to strengthen its management and
monitoring of the payments component. This includes the reporting to GoK/ PILU, against key
performance indicators and standards as laid out in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) with Equity
Bank, and demonstrating its ability to ensure Equity Bank’s adherence to these. As part of this, there
is an urgent need to operationalize a planned payment management information system (MIS) within
FSD.
6. There is a need to improve responsiveness to complaints. This should be achieved by: (i)
devolving a number of change management functions to county or sub-county level including the
ability to verify and correct key identifying information (beneficiary names and ID numbers) and (ii)
improving the downward flow of information on not only whether complaints have been closed, but
how such complaints have been resolved and regarding any further actions required.
7. In light of this annual review, a full logframe review should be undertaken by December 2014.
8. The impact of changes in beneficiary targeting on the cost effectiveness of the programme
should be assessed. This is in order to check that the VfM of the programme is still sufficiently high.
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A. Introduction and Context
DevTracker Link to Business Case:
DevTracker Link to Log frame:
QUEST: 3922230
QUEST: 3915054
Outline of the programme
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) are routinely food insecure and rates of acute malnutrition
regularly rise above emergency thresholds, becoming particularly severe when there are environmental,
market or security shocks. Historically, the principal means of addressing this has been costly and often
poorly targeted food aid, with limited attention being given to non-food interventions. HSNP Phase 1
(HSNP 1) was piloted as one component of DFID Kenya’s larger Social Protection Programme Phase 1
(2007-13). HSNP1 provided predictable electronic cash transfers worth approximately £13 per
household per month to 69,000 households in the poorest and most vulnerable households of Northern
Kenya: in the four Counties of Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Turkana.
Under HSNP 2, the UK is expanding and increasing support in these four counties. HSNP 2 will provide
cash transfers for 100,000 of the poorest households (approximately 53% women headed), worth £17-19
a month over the next 4 years (i.e. reaching approximately 605,000 of the poorest people, with 49%
female beneficiaries). This will help to stop HSNP households sliding into further poverty, and enable
them to increase their expenditure on food, education, health, and wider livelihood opportunities. This will
make a major contribution to the achievement of DFID Kenya’s Operational Plan results. HSNP 2 will
also offer a response to Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) commitments, by building a
scalable emergency cash transfer response to drought for the additional 274,806 households
(approximately 1.65m people) registered in the four northern counties of Kenya. This will enable DFID,
other donors and/or GoK funds to be utilised rapidly to enable a timely response at scale in times of
crisis (e.g. a drought).
UK support to the programme funds the following:
 Electronic cash transfers going directly to beneficiary bank accounts via an internationally
procured private sector payment provider (82% of total funds). This covers (i) cash transfers
(88% of this total); and (ii) delivery costs (12% of this total).
 An internationally procured Project Implementation and Learning Unit (PILU) within the
National Drought Management Authority (12% of total funds). This is responsible for: (i)
Management and monitoring; (ii) Long and short term technical assistance for capacity building
and delivery; and (iii) the international procurement of independent evaluation services.
 A DFID held contingency (6% of total costs). This covers: (i) inflation costs; and (ii) transition
payments for people moving in and out of the programme as a result of better targeting.
For the first time, GoK will also contribute funding, along with the UK and Australia’s Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). By 2017, it is envisaged GoK will account for 49% of the costs of
HSNP II and 54% of its core caseload.
Objectives of HSNP 2: The programme impact is to: Reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability for the
poorest in Kenya’s arid lands. The programme will continue to focus on four of the poorest, drought
prone counties in Northern Kenya (Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Turkana).
The programme outcome is to: Create better and more sustainable safety nets for poor and vulnerable
households, particularly for households in the arid and semi-arid lands.
HSNP 2 has three outputs:
1. HSNP is integrated into the broader National Safety Net Programme (NSNP) Framework.
2. HSNP households receive timely, predictable electronic cash transfers.
3. Improved operation of HSNP 2 for the poorest in the four targeted counties.
On the basis of the approved business case, DFID Kenya will deliver up to 10% of DFID-wide cash
transfer results and HSNP 2 will account in total for 78% of the DFID Kenya OP cash transfer target.
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B: PERFORMANCE AND CONCLUSIONS
Annual outcome assessment
Although there may be slippage on the achievement of individual milestones, the programme should still
achieve its outcomes by 2017, assuming that activities to catch-up on progress are implemented. Three
milestones were expected to be reached during this financial year. The first focused on GoK funding; the
second was regarding programme coverage; and the third concerned gazetting of the National Drought
Contingency Fund (NDCF). The GoK funding milestone was met, reaching 80% of the target set in the
Ending Drought Emergencies Medium Plan (EDE MTP). The coverage milestone has been missed
because not all beneficiaries targeted have valid IDs and account opening delays, which means that
although beneficiaries have been identified (with some modifications to targeting in Marsabit), not all
selected beneficiaries have yet received payments. The NDCF milestone has also been missed,
although there has been progress in moving forward the discussions and supporting documentation
which is now pending cabinet level approval. Both missed milestones should be met next year. The
remaining indicator, concerning impact on beneficiary households, does not have a milestone until
2015/16.
Overall output score and description
The programme faced a number of challenges during this transition year. Delays in the procurement of
the PILU resulted in a gap in the overall management and coordination of the programme. Whilst this
would probably have delayed progress by itself, it also meant that delays caused by other challenges
took longer to resolve. The new targeting approach, combined with heightened political interest in the
programme led to long delays in the finalization of targeting results. These delays led to knock on delays
in the opening of bank accounts which was also hampered by the fact that approximately 24% of core
beneficiary households (estimated at 23,637) and 37% of those to whom the programme may scale up
during an emergency (estimated at 101,182 out of 274,806), currently lack an adult with a valid ID card
or complete ID information. Furthermore, the account opening process has taken longer than expected,
with population, mobility and the outbreak of conflicts in Wajir and Mandera also impeding progess.
Payments to beneficiaries began in March 2014 but has not reached the full intended caseload. By midJuly 2014, 61% of those currently eligible (46,777 out of 76,363 with valid IDs) had received payments
against a planned 100,000 beneficiary householdsiii. Some components have advanced in line with
plans. The design of procedures for scaling-up HSNP in response to drought has made good progress
with active engagement of stakeholders in the design. Rights committees are in place in the majority of
sub-locations and regularly receive complaints. Those which can be resolved at sub-national level are
largely addressed (but concerns remain about those forwarded to national level for resolution).
Table 1: A summary of output performance:
Output
number
1
2
3
Output Description
HSNP is integrated into the broader National Safety
Net Programme framework
HSNP beneficiaries receive timely, predictable
electronic cash transfers
Improved operation of HSNP 2 for the poorest in
the 4 targeted counties
Impact
Weight (%)
25%
50%
25%
Output Performance
Outputs moderately did not meet
expectation (B)
Outputs substantially did not
meet expectation (C)
Outputs moderately did not meet
expectation (B)
The overall programme has been scored a B. The independent Annual Review team took into
consideration the following additional factors in determining the final rating:
 The cause for underperformance for two key indicators where performance has been weakest
(1.2 and 2.1) is the same. Delays in targeting led to delays in the opening of bank accounts and
issuing of bank cards which in turn has led to delays in payment.
 Some of the causes of these delays could have been better anticipated by DFID, the HSNP
secretariat and GoK/ NDMA and could have been mitigated with better oversight and
management.
 However, one of the key factors – political interest – was less predictable and has caused similar
delays in the other three cash transfers of the NSNP in which programme scale-up was planned
in 2013-14.
4

Progress in other areas of implementation, particularly the rights component and the scalability
component has been strong.
Key lessons
1. It would have been useful for the HSNP 2 business case to formally plan for a transition
phase. There have been a number of substantial changes in programme design between Phase 1
and Phase 2, the consequences of which were not fully appreciated. The programme scale-up to
100,000 households was actually a scale-out with the number of sub-locations covered by the
programme increasing from 164 to 454 and the average number of beneficiary households per sublocation decreasing from approximately 419 to 209, increasing the operational complexity of
programme delivery for all components.
2. Lack of IDs should have been better anticipated, even if the scale of the issue was not known
before final beneficiary lists were ready. The change in payment mechanism has meant that all
beneficiary households need a National ID card but the four northern counties are underserved in
this regard. This could have been planned for, ready for the final agreed lists.
3. The logframe was over optimistic for year 1. There is a need to adjust the logframe, particularly
vis-à-vis more realistic milestones and new numbers on household sizes (approximately 6 not 7.2).
4. Taking time to reflect and be independently critiqued is useful. DFID undertook an independent
lessons learned review about the transition from Phase 1 to 2 and the targeting process. This gave
many recommendations on lessons learned to inform future deliveryiv.
5. GoK’s funding commitments have increased overall interest in and oversight of the
programme. GoK/ NDMA has increased its involvement in programme management. It was also
facilitated by the unanticipated management gap (due to the delay in recruitment of the PILU),
highlighting the fact that a key incentive for capacity building is having the responsibility to deliver the
programme. At present there is no clear long term vision for how the Government will take over dayto-day management of the programme by 2017, and ensuring adequate core staffing and recurrent
budget within the GoK/ NDMA to allow effective capacity building by the PILU is critical.
Key actions
Action
Timeline to May
2015
Team Members Responsible
1. Revise and clarify programme
accountability and management
procedures to allow PILU to coordinate the
programme on behalf of GoK/ NDMA
Procedures in place
by October 2014
2. GoK/ NDMA to define vision of how
programme will be managed post 2017,
including capacity building plan and strategic
study undertaken
October 2014
PILU to draft revised governance
structures;
DFID should reinforce new procedures
PILU to coordinate. Other implementation
partners to comply.
GoK/ NDMA with facilitation provided by
PILU
PILU to develop capacity building plan to
respond to vision.
DFID should draft TOR for a study in
consultation with GoK/ NDMA and NSNP
3. Provide GoK/ NDMA with key information
they need to make informed decisions.
4. ID resolution: Address issues causing
under-performance against indicators 1.2
and output 2
December 2014
November 2014 TOR
drafted
Study complete by
May 2015
From August 2014
August - November
2014
August - November
2014
5. Update and revise the logframe
6. FSD to strengthen management and
monitoring of payments component and
August – January
2015
August – December
2014
Immediately
5
PILU, HAI and FSD to provide annual
plans and budgets for FY 2014/15. DFID
to increasingly handover coordination to
GoK/ PILU.
HAI, CDCs and PILU to resolve
household ID issues requiring only
information correction
PILU, HAI and Equity Bank to identify and
implement options for how to complete
card distribution in conflict affected areas
PILU, HAI and NRB to roll-out accelerated
ID registration programme
Snr PHV Adviser and Snr Prog Manager,
DFID with GoK/ NDMA and PILU
FSD
ensure regular reporting to DFID and PILU
for timely operational decision making. This
includes (i) timely delivery against agreed
actions from PILU operational meetings; (ii)
finalizing payment MIS within FSD; (iii)
ensuring Equity Bank and FSD are
represented in HSNP meetings required by
the PILU; and (iv) monitoring, managing and
reporting on Equity Bank’s adherence to
performance standards.
7. Improving responsiveness to complaints.
August – September
2014
August 2014
8. Review value for money calculations
9. Finalise scalability design, triggers and
costing.
10. Payments in the new FY should follow the
transfer cycle laid out in the Operations
Manual. Consider delinking first from regular
subsequent payments.
11. Targeting: Impose a cut-off after which
potential beneficiary households (households
who have been targeted for the programme
but who do not yet have a payment card) are
removed from the targeted list
12. Marsabit targeting methodology
documented and agreed at the HSNP
Steering Committee level. Additional spot
checks included
13. Sharing lessons learned study
December 2014
December 2014
From September
2014
PILU to devolve key change management
functions to county or sub-county level
PILU to enhance downward flow of
information regarding complaint
resolution.
DFID Economic Advisor
DFID PHV Adviser with PILU Consultant
reporting to GoK/ NDMA.
GoK/ NDMA, FSD and Equity Bank with
facilitation provided by PILU
By March 2015
PILU presenting to HSNP Steering
Committee for agreement
By September 2014
PILU and GoK/ NDMA with agreement of
HSNP Steering Committee
By September 2014
PILU and presentation made to DFID
14. Official launch of HSNP database for public
access following NSNP data sharing
protocols
15. NSNP compliant recertification strategy for
HSNP to be agreed and consider a
presentation to MPs
By August 2014
PILU and GoK/ NDMA with agreement of
HSNP Steering Committee
By October 2014
16.
By March 2015
PILU and GoK/ NDMA with agreement of
HSNP Steering Committee and NSNP
Joint Sector and Implementation Review
Mission
(i)
GoK/ NDMA with PILU
(ii)
All partners and DFID Snr
Programme Manager
Financial Management: (i) GoK to
maintain an up-to-date overview of
programme financing and expenditure and to
play a more active role in overall financial
management; (ii) better cash-flow forecasting
by all implementing partners
17. Risk (i) Levels of GoK funding to HSNP
should be captured in the overall office risk
register; (ii) Programme level risk matrix
should be updated and regularly reviewed,
including regular spot checks on assets; (iii)
FSD to following up on FRA
recommendations
18. Coherent HSNP M&E framework in place
By December 2014
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
By December 2014
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Snr PHV Adviser
As above plus ART roving
auditor with Snr Programme
Manager
FSD
PILU and GoK/ NDMA with agreement of
HSNP Steering Committee
Has the logframe been updated since the last review?
No, however the team recognised that there was a need to update the logframe, but agreed that the
Annual Review findings should be a key input into this update. Therefore the logframe was not updated
prior to the review, but where appropriate the review has reported against potential revised targets.
Targets were revised on the basis of new information from the MIS about actual household beneficiary
numbers and household size.
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C: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING
Output Title
HSNP is integrated into the broader National Safety Net Programme framework
Output number per LF
1
Output Score
B
Risk:
High
Impact weighting (%):
25%
Risk revised since last AR?
Yv
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
1.1 % of DFID's HSNP financing on
the GoK budget as appropriation in aid
Milestones
100% on budget
1.2 Number of households registered
with HSNP and carded with bank
accounts for potential emergency cash
transfer payments (in Turkana,
Marsabit, Mandera and Wajir counties)
300,000
1.3 Procedures for scaling-up HSNP in
response to drought are developed
with DFID support (within GoK/ NDMA
and HSNP)
Analytical work
undertaken which looks at
methods, operations and
functions of the GoK/
NDMA and HSNP
Progress
Outputs met expectation A: Achieved:
printed estimates show both DFID (as
Appropriations in Aid) and GoK financingvi
Outputs substantially did not meet
expectation C: Group 1: Out of 100,000
core beneficiary households, only 76,363 are
currently eligible (i.e. have IDs) Of those
eligible: 50,613 have the potential to be
reachedvii,viii
Group 2: 0 out of the further 274,806
households registered have been carded to
allow an emergency scale up.
Outputs met expectation A: Methodology
document and draft manual in place. Active
and positive discussions undertaken on
implementation.
Key Points
 There is increased GoK ownership of HSNP which promotes programme sustainability.
Getting DFID financing for HSNP on budget is a minor aspect of this broader sense of operational
and delivery ownership. Partly due to procurement delays, NDMA has been far more involved in dayto-day operations, coordination and management of the HSNP. For example, GoK has chaired
HSNP Steering Committee meetings which have been regularly held, well attended and minuted.
There is a risk with PILU now on board, GoK may reduce its engagement, and there is need for a
clear plan for how the GoK/ NDMA will manage the HSNP after 2017.
 The GoK has now started co-financing the HSNP. HSNP is now included in key GoK documents
(e.g. the performance contract for the Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Devolution and Planning.
GoK commitment for the 2013/14 financial year (FY) was KSH 312 million (m), but delays in the
programme meant that actual expenditure of GoK funding was only KSH 249.6 m. The 2014/15 FY
EDE MTP request was for KSH 624 million, but the allocation so far is only KSH 249.6 million. NDMA
are confident that a mid-year supplementary budget will allow for an increase.
 Delays in the targeting of beneficiaries resulted in knock on delays in opening bank accounts.
The bank account opening process has also been slower than anticipated for Group 1 and to
date no plan has been produced or agreed for Group 2. Work is still underway opening bank
accounts for core HSNP 2 beneficiary households (100,000), with no progress yet for the wider
emergency response. Efforts have been hampered by: (i) the fact that 24% of core beneficiary and
37% of emergency response households lack national IDs or had incorrect ID information collected
during registration; (ii) The coordination, management and monitoring of the payments component
has been weak and it critically affects all areas of programme operational delivery; (iii) delays to the
completion of the targeting exercise in Marsabit and (iv) insecurity in Mandera.
 There has been good progress in developing a methodology for scaling up the HSNP in
response to drought. A methodology document and a draft operations manual have been
completed and key discussions and agreements on elements of the design reached.
 However, HSNP is not currently ready to be used to operationalize an emergency response.
For those with IDs, there is currently no detailed and agreed plan from Equity Bank around which all
stakeholders can plan for the account opening for an emergency response. This is a significant issue
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which is impacting on programme delivery and perceptions, particularly given the current
deterioration in food and nutrition security in the ASALsix.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews
Although this is the first annual review for HSNP Phase 2, HSNP Phase 1 was assessed during the
annual review of DFID’s broader Social Protection Programme (SPP I). This recommended that the
programme increasingly engage GoK in design and operational decisions to promote ownership and
sustainability. As highlighted there is good progress in this regard; however, there is now a need for a
clear plan for how the GoK/ NDMA will manage the HSNP after the end of this phase and this requires
further independent analysis and leadership from GoK/ NDMA.
Recommendations
 GoK/ NDMA vision: There is an urgent need for GoK/ NDMA and other relevant Government
departments to define their vision of how the programme will be managed post 2017. This will
provide the PILU with a framework for their capacity development efforts at national, county and subcounty level (see key action 2).
 Information: In order to build GoK/ NDMA management and oversight abilities in the short term, all
implementing partners need to ensure that they are providing the GoK/ NDMA with the key
information they need to make informed decisions. These include annual work-plans, budgets,
progress reports and financial information. This is particularly critical for all field operations which
rely on coordination with the payments component (see key action 3).
 Logframe: DFID should amend the logframe to include further, more qualitative indicators, which
measure increased GoK capacity and commitment to manage the HSNP post 2017.There is a need
to adjust logframe targets to reflect the actual number of households registered in the four northern
counties (374,806), which in turn represents the maximum number of households for whom bank
accounts should be opened. The revised targets should also reflect the fact that it may not be
possible to open bank accounts for all households because not all registered households may be
willing or able to get a national ID before the end of the project life and be subsequently enrolled by
Equity Bank without lengthy and costly ‘mopping up’ exercises (see key action 5).
 ID resolution: There is an urgent need to address the issues causing underperformance against
indicator 1.2. Actions required include: (i) resolving any household ID issues that require only
information correction or change of recipient; (ii) releasing an update to Equity Bank regarding those
households which now have complete ID information and for whom bank account opening can start;
(iii) exploring options on how to complete card distribution in conflict affected Mandera and Wajir; and
(iv) rolling out proposed accelerated ID registration joint programme with NRB and HAI (see key
action 4).
 Scalability: There is a need to further firm up aspects of the design to scale up the safety net in
response to shocks. In particular there is a need to further elaborate the triggers to (i) clearly link
scales of response to key thresholds; (ii) allow geographic variations in response (so that responses
can be greater in more affected areas); and (iii) finalise costing work . In the light of current
humanitarian conditions, HSNP needs to provide clear information on current coverage against its
plans, in order to allow other actors to fill in any gaps in the short-term. HSNP’s focus needs to
remain on trying to get the core programme fully operational. However, the current crisis does
provide an opportunity to model triggers and thresholds and compare a projected response with onthe-ground conditions (see key action 9).
9
C: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING
Output Title
HSNP beneficiaries receive timely, predictable electronic cash transfers
Output number per LF
2
Output Score
C
Risk:
Medium
Impact weighting (%):
50%
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
2.1: Number of HSNP
beneficiaries who receive cash
transfers supported by DFID.
Total
Milestones
Targets in logframe
Revised targetsx
Progress
640,800
605,000
Female
Male
2.2: % of payments disbursed
from Payment Service Provider on
time
314,634
326,166
N/A
299,000
306,000
Outputs substantially did
not meet expectation C:
289,990xi
143,626
146,364
No assessment. On time
payments have not been
measurable during this start-up
year
Key Points
 As discussed above, delays in targeting, combined with a lack of IDs by some households
have led to knock on delays in account opening. These in turn have caused the payment
milestone to be significantly missed with only 50,613 households (289,990 beneficiaries) out of the
planned 100,000 households having the potential to receive payments by mid-July 2014. Payments
were expected to start in August 2013, but did not begin until March 2014. By mid-July 2014, 46,777
households had received some paymentsxii. Payments to date have not followed a strict schedule,
but instead have reflected the start-up nature of this enrolment period.
 The most recent payroll, comprised of both DFID and GoK financing, suffered delays to the
DFID financed component due to a recent fiduciary risk assessment commissioned by FSD
recommending revisions to the procedures. As a consequence, the DFID financed portion of this
payroll was held at FSD for nearly eight weeks before being released.
 A number of outstanding payments remain from phase 1 of HSNP. The total value of these
outstanding payments stands at KSH 194,653,536, with 21,139 beneficiary households awaiting
some back-payments. The old smartcard payment mechanism has been mothballed with the result
that beneficiaries are awaiting the opening of bank accounts before these payments can be made.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews
The SPP I annual review highlighted the need to ensure that minimum standards in the contract and SLA
for the Payment Service Provider (PSP) are sufficiently stringent and that penalties are enforceable.
However, errors were made in the assumptions in the Terms of Reference against which the PSP was
recruited (such as assumptions regarding the number of sub-locations where the programme would be
active and the role of INGOs) and the contract negotiated with the PSP without DFID input. Furthermore,
the fact that the programme was unable to hand over complete beneficiary information at once because
of targeting challenges and the lack of IDs, has created challenges in enforcing the SLA and have made
it less clear when standards are not being met. DFID has developed a Key Performance Indicator (KPI)
tracker for the account opening process which is reported against weekly. However, there is no active
MIS for the payments component meaning there is no formal and full monitoring of the payments
component, including against these SLA standards.
Recommendations
 ID resolution: The major remedy for the delays in achieving output 2 milestones lies with ensuring
that beneficiary households are able to open and activate bank accounts and be issued with cards.
10




The recommendation concerning the urgent need to improve performance against indicator 1.2 is
therefore relevant for the achievement of this output (see key action 4).
Logframe: There is a need to revise the target for indicator 2.1 in light of actual data regarding
household size and composition (see key action 5).
Timeliness of payments: Payments in the new financial year should follow the transfer cycle laid
out in the draft programme Operations Manual, with payments made every two months on the 5th day
of each second month. The programme should consider delinking first payments (payments to
beneficiaries for whom accounts have just been opened - and which include back-payments), from
regular subsequent payments. This will allow for better tracking of timeliness of payments as required
by the NSNP, while ensuring that beneficiaries with newly opened bank accounts receive payments
as soon as possible (see key action 10).
Payments component: FSD should strengthen its monitoring, management and delivery of the
payments component, in particular the field coordination of Equity Bank operations for regular and
emergency account opening, in coordination with PILU, GoK/ NDMA and HAI. This also requires
reporting against the KPI tracker and the SLA with the PSP. FSD needs to ensure Equity Bank’s
adherence to these standards. As part of this, there is an urgent need to: (i) ensure delivery against
agreed actions at the weekly PILU operational meeting; (ii) finalize the MIS in consultation with the
new PILU to ensure a dovetailing of information needs and fully operationalizing the payment MIS
within FSD; and (iii) ensuring Equity Bank and FSD are represented in HSNP meetings required by
the PILU (see key action 6).
Targeting: There is a need to impose a cut-off after which potential beneficiary households
(households who have been targeted for the programme but who do not yet have a payment card)
are removed from the targeted list if it has not been possible to issue them with a bank account.
There are a number of beneficiariesxiii from Phase 1 who have never received a payment; and there
is a risk of repeating the same challenges in Phase 2. Households do need to be given adequate
opportunity to access a national ID and to complete bank account opening procedures, but if they do
not avail themselves of these opportunities they should be replaced by other households who meet
the programme criteria (see key action 11).
11
C: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING
Output Title
Improved operation of HSNP 2 for the poorest in the four targeted counties
Output number per LF
3
Output Score
B
Risk:
Medium
Impact weighting (%):
25%
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
3.1 Targeting: % of HSNP
beneficiaries enrolled who are
in the bottom 10% nationally
Milestones
87%
3.2 Monitoring and Evaluation:
Monitoring and evaluation of
HSNP in the ASALs
M&E Plan developed. Clear
presentation of baseline
information drawn from HSNP
registration, with a quality
assessment.
3.3 Rights, complaints and
grievance system: (i)
Functional and NSNP
compliant rights, complaints
and grievance (R, C&G)
mechanism in place; and (ii)
Awareness of rights
(i) Communications strategy to
promote awareness of R, C&G
developed and implemented
(ii) 40% aware of rights
Progress
No assessment. But analysis from results
of Proxy Means Test (PMT) indicate that this
milestone should be met or is close to being
met.
Outputs moderately did not meet
expectation B: HSNP inputs have been
provided to Ending Drought Emergencies
monitoring plan. Overall monitoring plan still
being finalized.
No clear presentation of HSNP registration
information presented.
Outputs moderately did not meet
expectation B: (i) No communication
strategy in place, but awareness activities
related to rights, complaints and grievance
systems have been implemented.
(ii) No assessment; but communities visited
were aware of key programme aspects and
evidence shows complaints processes are
functional.
Key Points
 The implementation of the revised targeting approach proved more challenging than
anticipated. Equipment and software failures delayed registration, and meant that application of the
combined Proxy Means Test/ Community Based Targeting (PMT/CBT) approach could only be
applied after the official start of this programme phase rather than being completed prior to the
completion of the previous programme phase.
 Initial results of the combined approach resulted in 77% of programme resources being
allocated to Turkana, which was deemed to be politically unacceptable. A revised approach,
which set a quota of beneficiary households by county on the basis of a modified County Resource
Allocation (CRA) formulaxiv and then ranked beneficiary households within each county, was agreed
(see Table 1). The results of this approach were contested in Wajir and Marsabit leading to further
delays, with targeting in Marsabit still awaiting final approvalxv.
Table 1: Final HSNP 2 county beneficiary household quota’s
County
% HH from 100K using
ACTUAL % HH from 100K
PMT alone
(CBT+ PMT + modified CRA)
Turkana
77.5
40
Mandera
10.1
22
Marsabit
9.4
19
Wajir
3.0
19

Changing the targeting methodology will impact on the poverty focus. The change in targeting
approach from a pure poverty approach (using a combination of PMT and CBT) to one which
includes a measure of geographic equalisation will likely reduce the percentage of beneficiaries
12


falling into the bottom decile nationally. However, the milestone will still likely be met, or be close to
being met due to the high rates of absolute poverty in the 4 counties we are working in.
Although the HSNP has contributed to the overall EDE’s Monitoring Planxvi, the overall plan is
still being finalized. The database of HSNP registration information exists and has huge potential
as a key resource both as baseline information but also to inform and facilitate the provision of
complementary interventions. The information in this database has not yet been presented to other
stakeholders, to allow the development of protocols for sharing information in line with GoK data
protection laws. These protocols have now been developed.
Phase 2 “scaled-out” to a larger number of sub-locations and required the establishment of
newly formed rights committees in newly targeted locations. This has largely been achieved
with the existence of more than 536 Rights Committees in existence. Only a few sub-locations do not
currently have a Rights Committee in place in areas where conflict has prevented their
establishment. Those complaints which can be resolved at sub-location and county level are largely
addressed, but there need to improve on responses to complaints forwarded for resolution nationally.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews
The previous Kenya SPP I annual review stated that there was a need to ensure that the ways in which
data are combined in the final combined targeting methodology is effective both in targeting the poorest
households and in underpinning the rights component of the programme. This recommendation was not
followed up during the targeting process and field visits highlights that people do not fully understand
why some households have been selected and others have not.
Recommendations
 Logframe: Targeting indicator 3.1: Recommend this is removed from logframe and dealt with in the
evaluation. During the revision of the logframe, indicator 3.2 should be reconsidered and possibly
replaced by an additional indicator under output 1 focused on measuring GoK ownership and
capacity (see key action 5).
 Marsabit Targeting: A proposed way forward for resolving the current disagreement regarding
targeting in two sub-counties of Marsabit has been agreed between DFID, PILU, the GoK/ NDMA
and relevant MPs. This agreement should be documented and agreed at the HSNP Steering
Committee level. The agreement requires the implementation of an adjusted targeted approach in
the two sub-counties affected, which will likely take two to three months to complete. The approach
needs to be operationalized as soon as possible and payments to beneficiaries in Marsabit should be
actioned immediately. Additional spot checks should be included. (see key action 12) .
 Sharing the lessons learned study: An independent lessons learned study which DFID
commissioned on the new targeting approach used by HSNP 2 has completed. This recommends
fully assessing the effectiveness of the current targeting methodology and the need for government
leadership in any future targeting exercises. These recommendations should be considered prior to
any future targeting exercises (see key action 13).
 Sharing the HSNP database: The registration process and the resulting registry of beneficiaries
reflects a significant investment and has huge potential as a resource for other stakeholders. The
sharing of this registry (housed in the MIS at national and sub-national levels) using NSNP protocols
would benefit from an official launchxvii, which would both reinforce GoK/ NDMA ownership of it and
would explain to any potential users its composition and the ranking that was carried out see key
action 14).
 Recertification: The current business case suggests retargeting or recertification in 2014/15. Given
the delays in the programme, this is likely to be too early. Furthermore, future targeting/retargeting
should follow a more phased approach with a certain number of locations being retargeted each year
and be in line with any wider NSNP plans on recertification. This will spread-out the workload
associated with this exercise and should minimize any disruptions to on-going payments and
programme operations as a result. A presentation of an NSNP wide approach to MPs and their
endorsement would be helpful. Any future retargeting or recertification (including any adjustments to
targeting in Marsabit) should allow for community validation and correction of results see key action
15).
 Responding to complaints: There is a need to improve responsiveness to complaints. This should
be achieved by (i) devolving a number of change management functions to county or sub-county
level including the ability to verify and correct key identifying information (beneficiary names and ID
13
numbers) and (ii) improving the downward flow of information on not only whether complaints have
been resolved satisfactorily but how such complaints have been resolved and any further actions
required (see key action 7).
D: VALUE FOR MONEY & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Key cost drivers and performance
Actual project spending to date is approximately 48% of that planned due to delays in starting transfers
and procurement delays in the recruitment of the PILU. Key costs, cost drivers, measures to control
them and performance against Economy measures are summarised in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Summary of VfM and financial performance measures under HSNP 2
Key costs
(% budget)
Cash transfers (77%)
Cost drivers
Administrative costs
(18%) (targeting,
payments mechanism,
complaints &
grievances mechanism,
management,
evaluation)
Remoteness of
beneficiaries
Coverage of financial
services
Degree of
competition between
payment providers
Inflation
Measures to control
cost drivers
Need to carefully track
inflation and increase
cash transfer amount to
maintain its real value.
Further work needs to be
done on this.
Support increased
financial inclusion
Encourage entry of new
providers, competitive
procurement.
Economy measures
Cost per transfer value per
household per month: KSH 2,300 to
be increased to KSH 2,450 from
August 2014.
Payment cost per transfer with
required service standards:
KSH 1,002. This is lower than
anticipated because of procurement
delays, and it is expected that costs
will therefore increase in 2014/15
before reducing again in 2015/16.
The programme is implementing many good practices to maximise VfM including:
 Economy: best practice procurement processes for key contracts (the recruitment of the payment
service provider and the PILU);
 Efficiency: building a platform for scalable safety nets that can consolidate humanitarian responses;
 Effectiveness: the ability of the programme to influence the government and other key actors through
its engagement in broader NSNP discussions and its status as a key programme in the ASALs. There
remains room for further improvements. There are currently challenges in the management of the
SLA with the PSP (as discussed above), and there is further need to develop buy-in to the HSNP
scalable safety net platform.
VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case
 Cost Efficiency: The Business Case estimated that administrative costs as a percentage of total
costs would initially rise to 33% in 2013/14 due to the investment in targeting, registration and carding,
then fall to 18% by 2016/17 due to economies of scale. Actual data for 2013/14 is 30%, reflecting both
delays in transfers and delays in key procurements. We therefore need to wait until the delays are
resolved in order to see to what extent the programme is following the predicted profile.
 Cost Effectiveness: The Business Case estimated that the shilling cost per reduction in the poverty
gap would fall from 2.0 in 2011/12 to 1.4 by 2016/17 due to: (i) declining administrative costs; (ii)
improved targeting with inclusion errors falling from 11% to close to zero; (iii) achievement of greater
impact because consumption expenditure impact by poorer beneficiaries tends to be greater than by
less-poor beneficiaries; and (iv) a larger transfer value in real terms. The above factors are likely to
hold true. However, the adjustment to the targeting with the introduction of the modified CRA formula
may reduce the extent of the effect of factors (ii) and (iii) above. Estimating this reduction and its
resulting effect on overall VfM should be undertaken once the baseline for the programme
evaluation – and therefore an assessment of the actual effectiveness of the targeting approach
– has been completed.
Assessment of whether the programme continues to represent value for money
The programme remains good VfM:
 Results: despite challenges in the first year, these are likely to be achieved.
 Theory of Change: remains valid.
14
 Risks: although heightened, remain manageable.
 VfM practices: indicators that timeliness of transfers will improve from Aug 2014.
 VfM measures: cost-efficiency of the programme is projected to remain stable; cost effectiveness
likely to be improved from Phase 1 but needs close monitoring.
Quality of financial management
Narrative and financial reporting requirements have been met. However, the nature of the programme
with each component managed separately (including some activities financed through the GoK) makes it
difficult to monitor overall expenditure.
Recommendations
 GoK financial management: In future years there is a need for the GoK to maintain an up-todate overview of programme financing and expenditure and to play a more active role in overall
financial management (see key action 16).
 Cash flow forecasting: There is a need for better cash-flow forecasting to ensure that large
unspent balances are not held by implementing partners such as has been the case by FSD (see
key action 16).
Date of last narrative financial report
Date of last audited annual statement
N/A each partner provides own reporting
August 2014
15
E: RISK
Overall risk rating: High
A number of key risk factors have been upgraded, with the result that the overall risk rating remains high.
Overview of programme risks
 Governance, political and conflict related risks: Recent political blockages to the programme
are largely resolved, but heightened political interest and scrutiny of the programme – while
positive – will need on-going management. There has been a deterioration in the security
situation in Mandera and Wajir which is resulting in delays in the bank account opening process.
 Fiduciary/financial risks: The potential for the misuse of funds remains low with the use of bank
accounts and bio-metric authentication for the payment of transfers reducing the risk of diversion
of funds from the target group. FSD has recently completed its own fiduciary risk assessment of
the programme, which has made a number of key recommendations to reduce risks including the
implementation of a planned Payment MIS system and improved financial management capacity
in FSD. The risks concerning GoK commitments to the programme (both the HSNP budget and
the establishment of the NDCF in a timely manner) remain high.
 Operational risks: The fall-out from programme retargeting was larger than anticipated resulting
in significant delays in programme implementation. Although now largely resolved, there remains
the risk of a lack of buy-in to the results of targeting and its implications for programme scalability.
The looming humanitarian situation also presents a significant risk to the programme. There is a
risk that programme energies are diverted by this crisis; but there is also a reputational risk to the
programme due to the fact that systems for scale-up are not yet functional.
 Risk of doing harm, impact of programmes: These risks remain low.
 Outstanding actions from risk assessment: There is a need for active management of the
political risks and risks concerning GoK commitments to the programme. The recent
recommendations from the Fiduciary Risk Assessment also require close follow-up.
Recommendations
 Risk: (i) Levels of GoK funding to HSNP should be captured in the overall office risk register; (ii)
Programme level risk matrix should be updated and regularly reviewed; (iii) FSD to following up
on FRA recommendations (see key action 17).
F: COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Delivery against planned timeframe
Key Actions
Procurement of
key contracts
Bank account
opening
Payments
Rights
component
Status
The procurement of two key contracts (the PILU and evaluation) have been
significantly delayed. This has led to management gaps. The PILU has been
launched as of June 16th 2014 and the evaluation contracting process is now
underway, also after significant delays.
Delays in finalizing targeting along with operational challenges have led to significant
delays in account opening. Discussions are underway on how to accelerate this
process.
Delays to payments have been largely caused by delays in account opening. The
programme is now committed to adhering to the already agreed transfer schedule in
the 2014/15 financial year.
The rights component was contracted prior to the launch of this phase and has
made good progress in establishing systems and recording and reporting
complaints.
Performance of partnership(s)
There have been a number of weaknesses in how partnership arrangements have been set up and are
operating. These are being addressed through changes in the governance structures for HSNP and the
demands for more operational accountability of all partners to PILU. There is critical need to ensure that
16
the performance of the payments component improves, especially in relation to coordination with other
delivery components and stakeholders, to ensure this is not a bottleneck to overall delivery. Delays in
procurement of the PILU resulted in significant gaps in management capacity. This gap has exacerbated
a situation where the GoK is the overall manager of the programme (but with gaps in existing capacity to
operationalize this on a day-to-day basis), but the reporting and accountability arrangements for
implementing partners were to DFID. DFID staff have provided support during this period but have been
stretched because of their other on-going responsibilities and because of staff turnover in key positions.
The launch of the PILU provides an opportunity to resolve these issues but will require a substantially
different way of working for all partners. DFID should have less day-to-day engagement in the
programme (but still maintain a role through participation in the technical working group and steering
committee); the GoK’s ownership and management of the programme needs to be strengthened (and
not weakened) by PILU’s presence; and day-to-day reporting, accountability and coordination of other
implementing partners (particularly HAI, FSD and Equity Bank) needs to be channelled through the PILU
as the delegated unit of the GoK/ NDMA.
Asset monitoring and control
The majority of programme assets were under the management of the HSNP Secretariat and have now
been handed over to the PILU. The HSNP maintained an Asset Register which identified key assets
purchased and their condition. The PILU has recently completed a stocktake against this asset register.
This stocktake has identified a number of assets that were not seen, many of whose status is known.
However, a small number of items (mostly furniture) have been misplaced. These are items which were
not adequately labelled and were placed in storage. It is now not possible to identify these items. These
asset management weaknesses relate to the period prior to this review (items went into storage more
than 12 months previously) and are not significant. The updated assets register (based on a stocktake
and tagging) indicates enhanced asset monitoring and control systems. We plan to enhance this by
undertaking additional spot-checks throughout the year.
G: CONDITIONALITY
Update on partnership principles (if relevant)
The HSNP 2 does not use government financial systems for delivering DFID’s results. DFID Kenya has
judged that the partnership principles do not apply in the detailed management and monitoring of this
programme.
H: MONITORING & EVALUATION
Evidence and evaluation
The development of the business case relied heavily on the evidence produced through the monitoring
and evaluation of the Phase 1 of the programme and the wider national and international evidence base.
No evaluation has been conducted during this programme period. It is therefore too early to talk about
implications for programme design from evaluations of this programme phase. As discussed above, an
independent Targeting Lessons Learned Study was undertaken in May/June 2014. This study made a
number of recommendations regarding overall awareness of the programme and programme
coordination as well as specific recommendations regarding how targeting can be enhanced in future.
The procurement of the Evaluation for Phase 2 is underway. This will focus on delivering evidence of
HSNP 2 impact across a range of key areas: (i) Understanding Programme impacts at the household
and community level; (ii) Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of operational elements of the
programme; (iii) Informing future targeting and the size of a sustainable caseload for the GoK which
maintains an effective safety net function; and (iv) Helping to create a platform for wider Evaluation of
work in the ASALs.
Monitoring progress throughout the review period
At present, each implementing agency maintains its own system of monitoring, much of which is focused
on reporting responsibilities to DFID as principal funder. In addition, the HSNP Secretariat had prepared
bi-monthly reports against a limited number of indicators to the Social Protection Secretariat as part of its
reporting obligations for the NSNP and quarterly reports for submission to the GoK/ NDMA.
17
Recommendation:
 M&E: Now the PILU is in place, there is a need to review the overall monitoring framework of the
programme and to ensure that key activities and indicators are being monitored in a coherent
way across the implementing partners (see key action 18).
Beneficiary feedback
Overall, beneficiaries expressed their appreciation of the programme and reported that cash transfers
had allowed investments in livelihood activities, supported consumption (for their own families and also
the wider community), and had been invested in education. Concerns were expressed at perceived high
levels of exclusion error, particularly in sub-locations which had been supported through HSNP 1, and
the fact that communities were unclear regarding the reasons some households had been selected but
others excluded. Their feeling was that the new bank account based payment mechanism was a
significant improvement on previous systems as bank cards produced less ‘bad-finger’ errors than
biometric smart cards; money was not taken back to Nairobi if the beneficiary missed a two-week
payment window; and the move away from using ‘recipients’ to channel money to beneficiaries had
dramatically reduced complaints. Finally, beneficiaries were aware of where to register any complaints
they may have, although none of the beneficiaries consulted has felt a need to do so.
Annual Review
The annual review was conducted by an external consultant reporting to and working with the relevant
DFID staff, led by the Senior Poverty Hunger and Vulnerability Adviser and Snr Programme Manager.
Field visits were conducted in three sub-counties of Turkana. The results of this Annual Review have
been circulated to the GoK/ NDMA and implementing partners and will provide an input to the next
NSNP Joint Review and Implementation Support Mission.
18
Annex 1: Value for Money: Performance Against 3 Es
3 Es
Economy
Efficiency
VfM Good Practice
Use of best practice
procurement processes for
big ticket items.
Outsourcing functions which
can be done more cheaply
externally
Consolidation of similar
interventions to benefit from
economies of scale
Increasing efficiency using
ICT
Ensuring quality of Outputs
through quality assurance
and monitoring
Effectiveness
Ensuring that goods and
services are targeted
(geographically and/or to
particular groups and
institutions) where they can
have most impact.
Building capacity of
government and community
or incentivising the private
sector to deliver services in a
sustainable way
Choosing Outputs to tackle a
problem in a holistic way
Consulting with and
influencing government and
other key actors in order to
maximise outcomes.
HSNP Experience
Competitive tender of three key contracts: Payment Services
Provider; PILU and Evaluation. However, challenges in
management of Service Level Agreement
Outsourcing cash transfer payments to the private sector with
resulting benefits on cost and the security of delivery systems.
HSNP is building a platform for scalable safety nets which can be
used by other interventions. Although further work is needed to
develop buy in, HSNP is already listed as a key mechanisms for
any pay-outs from the African Risk Capacity insurance
mechanism.
ICT is being used to support number of programme functions
including an MIS which supports targeting, case management, and
complaints and grievances; and electronic payments. Need to
further maximise efficiency and effectiveness of MIS by devolving
key responsibilities and improving its use for case management.
A complaint and grievance mechanism and the use of a service
level agreement for the payment service provider allow some level
of quality assurance (although with challenges already mentioned
above).
Proxy Means Testing (PMT) has been introduced to complement
community-based targeting in identifying the poorest beneficiaries.
However, became necessary to introduce some level of
geographical equalization to ensure political acceptability and to
ensure four county coverage. As a result PMT cut-offs vary by
county.
PILU is expected to play a key role in building government
capacity. However, need for dedicated government counterparts
and a vision for government management for capacity building to
succeed.
HSNP has incentivised the building of Equity’s payment
infrastructure throughout Northern Kenya.
Establishment of rights committees in each sub-location provide a
sustainable mechanism for reporting complaints and resolving
those that can be resolved at the lowest level.
This phase of the programme has selected to use a payment
mechanisms which has the potential to result in broader impacts
such as enhanced financial inclusion and the building of financial
infrastructure in Northern Kenya.
The HSNP seeks to influence the government and other key
actors both through its participation in the NSNP and through the
work on developing a mechanism for operationalizing scalability.
Endnotes
i
By 15th August 2014 this had improved with 72% of those currently eligible (i.e. some 55,072 out of the 76,363 with IDs) having
received payments, against a planned 100,000 beneficiary households.
ii These issues were resolved in late July after the work on the AR was conducted. Out of the total 18,650 who were registered
in Marsabit, 15, 739 are currently eligible (i.e. have IDs). Of those currently eligible, some 8,358 have accounts opened, active
and have a card. Payments of KShs. 259,034,900 (including back payments) were made to a total of 9,521 beneficiaries, on
20th August. They payments went to a larger number as it includes those who are still awaiting cards issuing but have an active
account.
iii By 15th August 2014 this had improved with 72% of those currently eligible (i.e. some 55,072 out of the 76,363 with IDs)
having received payments, against a planned 100,000 beneficiary households.
iv See Quest: 4616476
v See Section E for further information
vi See printed estimates for 2013/14
vii According to the KPI tracker produced by FSD on 19th July 2014. All data presented in this annual review either corresponds
to this cut-off date, or the GoK financial year 2013/2014
viii We are seeing improvements in these figures weekly, particularly now Marsabit has been unblocked. According to the KPI
tracker produced by FSD on 14th August 2014, 55,072 beneficiaries of the 76,363 eligible (72%) have received cash; 64,009
beneficiary accounts have been opened and 62,136 opened accounts have been activated and funds can be transferred to the
cards. This reporting was prior to payments having gone out in Marsabit, which will further improve the figures.
ix As of mid-July 2014, an estimated 1.2m people were acutely food insecure, and levels of malnutrition were twice emergency
levels in many ASAL counties. The August Long Rains Assessment report has confirmed this number is now 1.5m.
x Targets were revised to take into account MIS information about actual household sizes and data on actual numbers reached.
xi These are the total household members of the 46,777 households who have received transfers. These include households
who were subsequently excluded from the programme having been identified by community members as ‘inclusion errors’.
These numbers have increased according to the HSNP MIS snapshot on 20 th August: total beneficiaries who have received
payment is now: 344,921, with 170,234 women and 174,687 men.
xii By 15th August, this number had increased with 55,072 households (72% of those currently eligible) having received
payments.
xiii The Phase 1 evaluation notes that a small number of people never got payments under Phase 1. Data in mid-August from
FSD on Phase 1 reconciliation notes that there are 21,295 Phase 1 beneficiaries owed money of various amounts by the
program max 80,600, Min <2000) totalling KShs194,653,536. Action is now being taken to address this.
xiv NDMA modified the CRA formula by removing land area and fiscal responsibility, increasing poverty to 30% resulting in the
following weighting: 25% basic equal share, 30% poverty and 45% population. The poverty line calculating the poverty
headcount rate component of the CRA formula was taken as the HSNP cut-off, i.e. a HH per adult monthly equivalent of
KShs.442.6.
xv To note that issues in Marsabit were unblocked at the end of July 2014 and payments are now going ahead.
xvi The key policy framework for intervention in the ASALs.
xvii In light of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, on 11 th August the HSNP data base was officially launched and opened up
to the public with clear data sharing protocols in line with the NSNP requirements– this is a major achievement.